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ROOTS OF DOGMATISM

Editor : **Mourad Wahba**

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
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OPENING SPEECHES

MOURAD WAHBA
Conference Chairman

Dear Colleagues,

The motive that propelled me to formulate the theme of this International Philosophy Conference was my conviction that it is high time to focus our reflections not merely upon the modern ready-made dogmas, but upon the roots of dogma qua dogma. As far as I know, no one has approached dogmatism from its foundation-stone irrespective of the complexities and differenciations of the dogmas.

Let it be noted in advance that the paradox of the dogma which we are going to face is that the dogma is absolute and, at the same time, the material of which it is composed is in a state of constant flux and evolution. In other words, there is nothing absolute in the absolute.

Following from this, a crucial question has risen out :

How did this paradox come about ?

The answer to this question is not up to one discipline of knowledge so far as dogma is not limited to one sphere or another. And that is why the invitations for the participation in such Conference extended to economists, sociologists, men of letters plus philosophers.

We hope that this Conference could remove layer after layer digging down to the core of the dogma.

Thank you.

THOMAS KOSZINOWSKI

Representative of Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Cairo

As the representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation I have the pleasure to welcome you to the IV International Philosophy Conference here in Cairo. I hope that this meeting will be fruitful for all participants and that the dialogue between scholars of the developed countries on the hand and those of the developing countries will deepen the understanding of the problems of each side.

I would like to take the opportunity of the opening session of this conference and the attendance of some journalists of the Egyptian press to make some remarks of a special issue namely the cooperation between financing organizations of Western countries and institutions in countries of the Third World.

International conferences like this one are based on the concept of cooperation between scholars of the industrialized countries and scholars of developing countries. Very often such activities are financed by organizations or foundations of Western countries. Sometimes an activity of a foundation is limited to the financing of a conference or another project. In other cases an organisation sends experts from industrialized countries in order ta train or teach people in Third World Countries. The cooperation can be in the agricultural, technical or scientific fields.

There is no doubt that the countries of the Third World have a special interest in such a cooperation because it provides them with financial aid for projects which they themselves could not finance or with experts they need for specific projects.

If financing organisations or foundations of Western countries engage in the Third World they have, of course, an interest in such a cooperation. If the industrialized countries are nowadays more interested in the problems and developments of the Third World than in the past this is because they are aware that these problems could in the long run

spread to themselves. At present there is no part of the world which can live isolated from others.

The Palestinian problem for example does not only concern the Arabs and Israel but the Europeans as well, for many reasons which I do not need to explain here. And since the West European countries receive most of their energy supply from Arab countries it is natural that they care about the stability of these countries and of good relations to them and that they take efforts to foster the mutual understanding.

But there are also different interpretations of the activities of these financing organizations and foundations. In Egypt — and this is the direct reason for my dealing with this subject — a leading journal (Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi) published a series of articles in the past weeks which criticise the cooperation which organizations and foundations of Western countries, especially the United States, in the scientific field, particularly in social sciences and condemn this cooperation as being highly dangerous for Egypt. They principally accuse these countries of pursuing with such a cooperation different objectives. According to their view the Western countries try to penetrate the host country, its society and to achieve control of the state. They collect data, facts and secrets which one day could be used against Egypt. Many other negative aspects, like shortage of scientists and high salaries, are connected with these activities of foreign organizations and foundations which I will not describe in detail in this connection.

Most of the authors of those articles ask for strong measures to be taken in order to prevent such activities and to avert the great danger they cause for Egypt.

Are these accusations and imputations reasonable ? Basically a criticism of the activities of Western organizations and foundations and the purpose they pursue is legitimate. There is no doubt that the presence of thousands of foreign researchers and consultants in high and sensitive positions in research institutions and ministries could endanger the

security. A country like Egypt must have full control of all activities of foreign organizations.

But if one reads these articles one gets the impression that many aspects of this cooperation are overcriticized and misinterpreted. If the collecting of facts or of data in itself is characterized as being the same what in the past was called espionage and scientific research of foreigners in Egypt is thus understood as a new kind of espionage, then — it seems to me — the criticism goes so far. If a country like Egypt cooperates with an organization of a Western country in the scientific field this country automatically gains access to information on this country. But one can get a lot of information about a country only by collecting data from newspapers and magazines and officially published data. If in one article it is maintained that in the United States there is more information available about Egypt than in Egypt itself, then this may be due to the more efficient and more advanced documentation systems and not to the assumption that the United States collected secret data in Egypt.

One author asks — and this question I heard very often in the past — why Europeans and Americans make so many conferences about the Arabs, the Islam and their problems and why here aren't such conferences about problems of Europe or the United States in the Arab countries? Just the same question I have asked myself many times. Who hinders the Arabs to organize such conferences ? The Europeans ? I don't think so. If the Arabs would be interested to organize such conferences it is up to them to do it and to invite European and American scholars. Many European scholars would like to discuss their problems with the Arabs.

However such a question reveals that the questioner has no idea what is going on in this field in Europe where there are hundreds of conferences which deal with the history, the society, the policy and many other things of Europe and which try to understand the problems of the European society in order to solve them.

If the Europeans or the Germans are interested in cooperating with the Egyptians in the scientific field or support them financially like this conference one mustn't suspect them to do it only in order to penetrate Egypt. There actually are people in Europe who wish nothing else than to help other peoples or countries, out of absolute selflessness, to overcome their problems. May be that this attitude is not understandable for some people.

Therefore, although a certain criticism in the activities of foreign financing organizations of Western countries may be legitimate, Egypt should not forget the positive side of this fact. If Egypt wants to modernise — and any understanding of the policy of President Husni Mubarak is that this is his intention — then it must cooperate with the industrialized countries and it has to open the country and to accept that foreigners get information about Egypt. It should not see in each activity of foreigners a danger for its security. This is an attitude which is not appropriate for a country which always speaks with pride of its cultural heritage and of its new self confidence gained after the October War. If the ideas articulated in these articles reflect the new trend in the Egyptian policy concerning the cooperation with Western organizations it would have farreaching effects for Egypt. I think Egypt is mature and strong enough not to commit the mistake of isolating itself.

CONFERENCE PAPERS

UNITY OF TRUTH AND PLURALISM IN SOCIETY

G. Verbeke (Belgium)

Some years ago I had the opportunity of visiting the old city of Jerusalem : a guide showed me the various geographic areas and provided some information about the people living there. Walking around I saw the American area with the beautiful old church, the jewish district with the synagogue that was rebuilt, the islamic part with the splendid mosques dominating the surrounding countryside, the Greek orthodox quarter with the famous Golgotha church and finally the Catholic section with some important religious houses. After this survey the guide drew the conclusion that religion is very divisive. Located at the top of a hill, this ancient city has become an image of the present world. Living the frontiers of a small area, various groups of people are deeply divided in their religious convictions. A contemporary French philosopher, Gabriel Marcel, wrote a theatre play entitled "The broken World" (Le monde cassé) : there is indeed a profound disagreement among men about some basic aspects of life, not only about religion, but also about philosophical problems, political questions, economic matters, social issues, about topics like wealth and poverty, peace and war. This disagreement not only opposes various countries against each other, it is present within the community of the same country, even within the same family : members of the same family may belong to different political parties, adhere to different religious groups or profess a kind of agnosticism or atheism. This variety of opinions and convictions is not new : looking at the world population as a whole, one notices not only a great number of languages, but also quite a lot of different views, ways of life and civilisations. What is new, is that people at the present day have got an increasing awareness of these differences. When various groups of people were more separated from each other, locked up within the boundaries of their ethnical com munity, they scarcely were conscious of the differences existing among men. Due to a growing mobility and a more intense traffic between

countries and continents, there is now a keen awareness of the many clashing opinions which divide mankind.

This multiplicity of views, even regarding the most essential aspects of life, raises an important philosophical problem : why don't people agree with each other, at least on important issues ? It is easy to reply that everybody is influenced by the education he received, the tradition to which he belongs, the civilisation area in which he lives. This answer however does not solve the question, it only removes it: why this variety of philosophical and religious opinions ? Is there more than one truth ? Looking at the history of thought as a whole, various interpretations of this diversity have been suggested. One may at least distinguish five different explanations : relativism of knowledge and truth, universal scepticism, the theory of double truth, the doctrine concerning the historical nature of truth and dogmatism. Wanting to explain the divergence of opinions among humans, we have to face immediately the same divergence with respect to the interpretations themselves of this lack of agreement : as a matter of fact this absence of consensus has been explained in different ways. Let us have a critical look at the various attempts which have been made in order to solve the crucial problem of our divided world.

The multiplicity of truth has been maintained by some philosophers in the past. In classical antiquity the relativity of all knowledge has been proclaimed by some sophists : according to Protagoras, man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not(1). What is true for one individual would not necessarily be true for another. Pirandello, a contemporary Italian writer, composed a theatre play treating this topic : eveybody has his own truth (Chacun sa vérité). Obviously the background of this theory is that truth refers to knowledge and knowledge to individual subjects. The concrete situation of knowing subjects is so different, that it must issue into opposing views, equally justified if one takes into account the particular circumstances from which they arise. After all the sophists refuse to recognize more truth value to one view than to

another, since various opinions have to be judged in the context of each knowing subject. Each individual is the maker of his truth, which is valid although it is not participated by other people. It has often been claimed that consensus is a criterion of truth : the Stoics v.g. insisted very strongly on this aspect. If some doctrines are generally agreed on, they must be true : since the divine Reason is immanent in the world, the majority of mankind could not consent to error(2). As to the sophists, they rather emphasized the individual character of truth, which is not necessarily shared by everybody, it bears the individual mark of the knowing subject.

We have to look more closely at this theory. Truth we are talking about, is indeed human truth, it is connected with individual subjects wanting and endeavouring to disclose the true nature of reality. Each individual has his own approach and deals with all kinds of questions from his personal viewpoint. In moral matters too, everybody has his own conscience and tries to find out what is good in the changing situations of life. The question however is whether truth is merely individual or also supra-individual : if it is connected with human existence, doesn't it reflect the ambiguous character of the knowing subject ? Man is not locked up within himself, within the narrow frontiers of his own being, he is openness to the world and to other subjects. To exist "in the world" does not merely mean that each human being is located in a particular place of the universe, it implies that man is orientated towards reality outside himself, and particularly to other subjects. The capacity of speech involves the possibility of communicating with other individuals; feelings of love and sympathy also show that man is by nature directed to co-existence with other subjects : according to G. Marcel to exist means to co-exist. This possibility of communication, dialogue and discussion implies that there is a common goal to be attained, a common truth for which all human subjects are in search. In the famous myth of Plato's **Phaedrus** human souls take part in the great expedition to the plain of truth : it is not easy for humans to follow the gods and to reach the top where they will contemplate authentic reality. Many of them lose their wings and fall back on the earth, because they were unable to

dominate their irrational powers withdrawing them from their aim. Those however who overcome the many obstacles of the journey, meet together with the gods at the same spot, they contemplate true reality, they sit down at the table of the divine beings and drink immortality. Plato firmly opposed the relativism of the sophists : in his view there is only one truth, it is a common goal for all thinking minds(3).

From a philosophical viewpoint one could hardly maintain truth to be merely individual, it is both individual and universal, one and multiple. It is universal because the formal object of thought is being : all propositions, either negative or affirmative, are related to being, whether this term is explicitly mentioned or implicitly present. Whetever we affirm or deny, concerns being : in a sense every act of thinking deals with the same topic, viz. being. Man is a metaphysical animal because during his whole life he never stops considering being. According to Avicenna the notion of being is the first one that flows from the active intellect into human soul : it must be the first because it is the basis and the source of all human thinking(4). One of the most characteristic features of this notion is that it is transcendental (in the language of Heidegger, it is "umgreifend", encompassing) : it involves everything, nothing is outside being, whatever exists is included in being. If man is always concerned with being that means that in his thinking he takes a viewpoint that is beyond each particular viewpoint : in a sense man is always dealing with the totality of reality, because using constantly the notion of being, he does not exclude anything from it. Even when he considers directly a particular object only, he is actually concerned also with a horizon that involves everything : All human minds meet each other within the same transcendental horizon: so the truth of one individual could not be quite different from that of his neighbour, because they are both dealing with the same encompassing object. There is however a sense in which truth is multiple, insofar as it is connected with the unique uninterchangeable condition of innumerous individuals: these subjects are constantly invited to confront their views with those of other people in an open and free encounter (ein liebender Kampf, in the language of K. Jaspers) to correct and improve their opinions and,

if possible. to come closer to each other on the way to a consensus. Thus human truth shows the ambiguity of existence, which is both individual, temporal spatial, as well as openness to other subjects and to whatever exists.

Another solution proposed with respect to the discrepancy of human views is that of scepticism. The most radical kind of scepticism consists in denying formally the possibility of ever attaining truth. This view-point however involves some kind of selfcontradiction, since it is based on a categorical statement, asserting that truth could never be reached. Most of the sceptics therefore take a more cautious stance, they simply refuse to consider any opinion as being certain; there is such a variety of clashing views, that none of them could be regarded to be trusty and certain. They may offer some degree of probability, but nothing more : instead of firmly sticking to some views and repudiating others, man should learn to live in a climate of uncertainty. According to the sceptics it is useless to want certainty; everybody has to accept his human condition and has to free himself from this restless search for absolute truth: only when he does so, he will live in peace (ataraxia), since he will not overestimate his own capacities nor those of other people. Also in the field of human behaviour and activity man has to be satisfied with probable arguments : there may be more reasons in favour of a particular course of action, but whatever arguments are put forward, they will never supply full certainty. This attitude has been adopted in antiquity by Pyrrhonism and has been developed in the writings of Sextus Empiricus : the famous doctrine of epochè or suspension of judgment is the immediate consequence of this view : man should withdraw from any firm consent to a particular judgment(5). At some stage of his intellectual development saint Augustine has been deeply influenced by this philosophical trend : in his **Contra Academicos** the author faces the problem of scepticism and expounds the reasons why he rejects this attitude. In the 16th century too scepticism was represented by several authors of whom the best known is Montaigne : he is a typical case since he converted from Stoic dogmatism to Pyrrhonian scepticism(6). One could mention also Francis Pico de la Mirandola, Cornelius Agrippa and Sanchez the

Sceptic(7). Some important works of Sextus Empiricus had been translated by Gentian Hervet and Robert Estienne and published in Paris in 1569(8). As to René Descartes he also starts his philosophical inquiry with a universal doubt : of course this doubt is a methodical one, it is intended to be overcome. In Descartes's view it is actually avoided by the certainty everybody has concerning his own thinking activity.

Could scepticism offer a valid solution to our problem : the disagreement among men about even the most essential topics ? Some facet at least of scepticism could hardly be rejected : if there are so many opposing theories and views, man has to be very cautious and careful before giving his consent to a particular statement. It is necessary to take into account all aspects of a topic before being able to draw a conclusion and in many cases of practical life the adopted stance will be grounded on probable reasons only. Quite obviously human life frequently develops in a climate of uncertainty : we have to take decisions and we mostly couldn't predict all the consequences of our acts. Even the most important initiatives of human life are taken with a sharp awareness of uncertainty. And yet when people are divided about political, social or economic matters, one could not conclude from this fact that there is a variety of opposing truths. Man mostly has to rely on some probable reasons put forward from a limited viewpoint. The question however remains whether doubt ought to be universalized and extended to all areas of knowledge and situations of life. One of the arguments developed in favour of scepticism is indeed the divergence of views : Sextus already points to this fact and concludes that all those opinions are equivalent. Hence man has to withdraw his consent and suspend his judgment : the reason for this suspension is that all those views are equally valid or invalid. There is no decisive reason to adhere firmly to one of them rather than to another(9). This way of arguing could not be accepted : even if there is a multiplicity of views, it doesn't follow that they all are equally valid. One may be more justified than another: actually there is in the course of history a constant progress of knowledge. Many opinions of the past have been shown to be erroneous and were definitively repudiated. All sciences, and also philosophy, have

made important discoveries : in the field of medicine v.g. the progress that has been realised, is very considerable.

About 900 years ago Avicenna wrote his **Canon of Medecine** : in the 12th century it was translated into Latin and has been for centuries extremely influential in the study of medicine at European universities. But during the last century the progress of medical research has been so important that students in this field now hardly know the name of Avicenna. Also in many other areas discoveries were made and they represent a definitive enrichment of our knowledge. With respect to philosophy too, nobody could reasonably believe that the theories of the first Ionian philosophers are equally valid as our contemporary philosophy of science. Of course, scientific hypotheses and theories are constantly improved and corrected, but this does not entail everything in the field of science to be questionable.

Besides it is not true that man when he agrees to live in uncertainty, will find peace of mind. Truth and certainty correspond to the deepest aspiration and tendency of a human being, particularly when the meaning of life is at issue. Man wants to know what he is and what is the meaning of his existence : he wants to know how to behave in life, how to act towards other humans and towards the material world. Regarding all those questions man wants certainty, not doubt. Of course man should be conscious of his limited capacities : instead of clinging to his views as if they were definitive truth, he should be willing to come back to them and to put them into question. That is the way in which progress is realized in science and philosophy : the most harmful people in this respect are those who live without problems, who never question the views they have, who don't learn anything from their contacts with others. Consciousness of our limits however does not coincide with scepticism : the possibility of reaching truth is not denied, what is rejected is a simplistic dogmatism that springs from an unawareness of the many obstacles preventing man from attaining truth. In this sense man should accept to live in a climate of uncertainty.

In the course of history it has been maintained that something might be true within the framework of a particular discipline, and not true when considered from the viewpoint of another branch of learning. Consequently something might be true in one discipline whereas an opposing view would be true in another. The viewpoints that are at stake are mainly those of science, philosophy and religion. A typical example in this respect is the debated question of the eternity of the world. In Aristotle's view the world exists from eternity, since neither motion nor time could ever have started : being a passage from potency to act, every motion refers to a previous one. If supposedly everything were unmoved, movement could never start : in order to begin, the so called first movement would require a prior one, some change in the existing world that makes that motion possible. In this way one has to go back indefinitely in the series of antecedent causes. The same obtains with respect to time : each beginning of time implies a before, some previous time; an instant is always located between a past and a future, a before and after(10). Some medieval philosophers have maintained this arguing of Aristotle to be irrefutably valid from a philosophical viewpoint : according to them it is philosophically true, although we know by divine revelation that the world was created by God and had a beginning(11). It may be added that according to contemporary science the beginning of the world, understood as the explosion of the primitive atom, dates back to a particular time in the past. Those who accept the possibility of clashing truths, are compelled to adapt this notion: in their view truth is the coherent and logical conclusion of a particular way of arguing. Starting from the presuppositions of Aristotle, one will inevitably reach the same conclusion about the eternity of the world. That does not mean this conclusion to be true from a more universal viewpoint. Other questions of this kind are the freedom of human will and the immortality of the soul. P. Pomponazzi stated that the freedom of will is incompatible with divine omnipotence, at least from a rational viewpoint, but it has to be accepted on the basis of divine revelation(12).

The problem raised has to do with the relation between reason and faith : is it possible rational thought and divine revelation to result into

a different truth ? This question has been put forward already by Philo of Alexandria, who belonged to a Jewish community in Egypt and was penetrated by hellenistic civilisation. Under the influence of Stoicism Philo explained biblical texts using an allegorical method of interpretation. In his view there is only one truth : there must be an agreement between biblical revelation and philosophy. Hence the constant effort of this author to demonstrate the consensus between the Bible and Greek thought(13). The same question arises again at the beginning of the christian era : when intellectuals converted to christian religion, they wanted to know whether a non-christian philosophy could contribute to understand and explain the content of faith. The issue was whether a synthesis between divine revelation and Greek philosophy was possible. Some christian writers, like Tertullian, Tatian and Hippolytus, opposed that kind of amalgamation : according to them no harmony is possible between pagan thought and the message of faith. The most influential christian authors however favoured this synthesis : St. Justin who was born near Samaria and later moved to Ephesus already incorporated Greek thought in the heritage of the christians. According to him the ancient hellenic sages were indebted to the Old Testament. The author firmly stresses the unity of truth : each element of truth is a seed of the divine Logos, who is Christ; all people who have thought and acted rationally and rightly, have participated in the divine Logos(14). Clement of Alexandria in the 2nd century also adopted a very positive stance towards pre-christian thought : in his view christianity is the fulfilment of the values already included in Greek literature and philosophy; in a way Greek philosophers may be called christians before Christ, they were justified by their philosophical inquiry.

What philosophy did in the past, it may achieve it also in the christian era : in Clement's view rational thought is a preparation leading to christian belief, it may help unbelievers to discover the truth of the Gospel. Besides philosophy is useful in view of the defence of faith, provided however that it remains within the frontiers of its specific role: it should never be identified with wisdom, it is the servant of wisdom. Is there anything beyond faith ? The answer of Clement is positive :

there is still a more profound penetration of truth, which he calls "gnosis", the highest degree of wisdom that a human being is able to attain. Anyhow Clement firmly maintained the unity of truth, a disagreement between divine revelation and philosophical truth should be excluded. A similar stance has been taken by Origen of Alexandria : he frequently uses Greek philosophy, in order to explain his christian belief. The author has to deal with the attacks of Celsus : this writer pointed to the ideas and doctrines borrowed by christians from Greek philosophy, In this context Origen often criticizes the behaviour and teaching of representatives of ancient thought(16). The same attitude concerning the relation between reason and faith is also maintained in the works of the Cappodocians.

As to medieval philosophers, they mostly endeavoured to realize a harmony beween their belief and philosophy. According to Alkindi the mission of philosophy is similar to that of revealed truth, although there are basic discrepancies between the two:(17) in this respect the viewpoint of Alkindi is different from that of Alfarabi, Avicenna, Ibn Tufayl, Avempace and Averroes. According to this last author, who was very influential also in the West, truth could never contradict truth, revelation could never disagree with rational truth(18). As to Al-Ghazali he did not deny the unity of truth, but he opposed philosophy because it shows too much confidence in reason(19). Medieval philosophers and theologians in the east also tried to realize a harmony between their belief and rational inquiry.

The most delicate question however remains : to what extent the content of religious faith is liable to be rationalized ? Will at some future stage the message of faith become totally rational ? It is difficult to answer this question : presumably a full rationalization of divine will never be achieved, because a human mind is finite, whereas divine perfection is infinite. By means of his natural capacity man will never be able to grasp and explain the fulness of the divine perfections. Hence there will never be a total parallelism between the results of rational investigation and divine revelation.

The question may be asked whether the diversity of views does not originate from changing historical situations and circumstances. If truth is temporal, if it is linked to the concrete conditions of a particular historical context, it must inevitably change from one period to another. According to Merleau-Ponty truth is always historical, it could never be absolute(20). Let us consider a concrete example. It has been largely accepted in antiquity and even later that human beings are not equal by nature, that some of them belong to a higher level of perfection, whereas others hardly participate in the characteristic power of man, viz. reason.

This widespread opinion was embodied in the organization of society: a political community was composed of free citizens, and a great number of slaves, incorporated in a family in which the head was invested with despotic power. An outstanding philosopher like Aristotle agreed with this social structure : he taught that there are indeed various levels of humanity, according to the degree in which individuals participate in rational activity(21). In his view some human beings are unable to conduct their life according to reason, their degree of rationality is too low, they rather move on the level of the irrational powers of the soul. In other words they are able to perceive instructions from other people and to execute them, but they are incapable to direct themselves in the changing circumstances of life. Our author is not astonished about this hierarchical structure of mankind : this kind of subordination is present everywhere in nature, already within the human soul itself. Direction belongs to the rational faculty, whereas irrational movements have to be subdued to the guidance of reason. The same criterion of rationality is also applied to other groups of society : barbarians hardly participate in rational activity, they represent a very low level of humanity, which is illustrated by their practice of anthropophagy and homosexuality. Women also are put on a low rank in the hierarchical structure of mankind, because they are mostly driven by their emotions, not by reason : in Aristotle's view emotions should not be totally suppressed, but they have to be moderated and guided by the rational faculty. Finally there is the group of children and youngsters : in our author's view reason develops slowly and gradually its activity is always based on experience. Intellectual knowledge originates from experience and is constantly nourished

and supported by sensible perception. Dealing with the study of ethics Aristotle declares that young people are not fit to attend lectures on moral subjects, because they lack experience. So young people also are on a rather low level of humanity. These ideas were widely accepted in antiquity, until a radical renewal was launched by the Stoics at the beginning of the 3rd century B.C. : according to them all human beings are equal by nature, Greeks and barbarians, men and women, free citizens and slaves. This teaching is directly connected with the Stoic doctrine of the divine Logos, who permeates the whole cosmic organism : every human soul is a particle of this animating spirit. Hence all individuals are equal since they all participate in the same divine principle(22). This theory was at the origin of a complete renewal of society, but because it was so different from previous conceptions it penetrated only slowly into the reality of life. The first step was a more human and benevolent attitude towards slaves; it lasted however a long time before slavery as a social institution was abrogated.

Could one conclude from this survey that what was true before Stoicism, became false afterwards ? Did truth radically change from one period to another ? In the history of philosophy there are many instances of this kind. Dealing with the problem in his book **Histoire et Vérité** P. Ricoeur states that it is totally misleading to consider the history of thought as a series of quite different views concerning the same eternal questions(23). According to him there is no adequate typology of philosophical doctrines expounded in the course of history, because the teaching of a philosopher is always connected with his own unique questioning. Not only philosophical theories evolve and change, but the questioning itself bears the mark of each individual thinker. So it is not correct to claim that there are in the course of time a limited number of solutions to a fixed number of problems. Each philosophy is a coherent and organic whole developing from a central intuition. In this sense truth is both temporal and supratemporal: being connected with knowledge, it is the goal that is pursued in the endless efforts during the course of time in order to disclose reality. All those efforts belong to the concrete situation of human beings, who question reality in their own way and from

their own viewpoint. Each philosopher has his unique questioning; what he wants to discover is not exactly the same as what his predecessors were searching for : so each solution has to be judged in light of the problem that was put forward. As to the problems themselves they mostly issue from a historical context ; with respect to our previous example it is obvious that the question asked by Aristotle about the degrees of humanity was not exactly the same as the Stoic problem concerning the unity of mankind.

But although the situation of each individual is closely linked to the wants to discover truth that is valid for all thinking minds of all periods of history. If a subject states that something is or is not, that means that it will always be true that it is or is not. Even if the fact under consideration is contingent and passing away, it will always be true that it was or was not. Of course the same event may be interpreted in different ways at different stages of history, but even then it remains true that the facts occurred. If different interpretations of historical events are presented in a coherent way, they all may disclose some aspect of truth : by confronting those various interpretations one may reach a more global encompassing intuition of reality. So it would not be correct to accept that each period of time has its own truth, which may be totally different from another period: truth is not merely historical, it is also suprahistorical.

Taking into account the ambiguous nature of truth, which is both individual and supra-individual, historical and supra-historical, one has to conclude that nobody is entitled to enforce by compulsion his own truth on other individuals. Truth does not belong to an abstract world, to a transcendent area, it is closely connected with the activity and inquiry of each thinking subject. The most characteristic feature of a human being is thought : in this respect man differs from other animals. Thinking represents the proper dignity of a human being : for this capacity more than for any other man has to be valued and respected by other individuals. Each person has the responsibility of his own thought: it was a commonly accepted axiom already in Roman law that "nemo

cogitationis poenam patitur" (nobody may be inflicted penalty for his opinions). Some acts may be punished because they are incompatible with peaceful life in society : but it belongs to the most personal responsibility of an individual to search for truth in a free, open and undisturbed atmosphere. It is a heavy duty and severe responsibility of a thinking subject to pursue the search for truth in an honest way and without prejudice.

But what then about the different views represented among men ? Should all members of a political society be compelled to profess the same ideology in order to promote the organic unity of the group ? That would be incompatible with the dignity of a person, who is responsible of his views and convictions; it would also be irreconcilable with the spirit of a free democratic society, which should be tolerant regarding different social, political and religious opinions. This viewpoint is not new : it has been strongly vindicated already in 17th century by John Locke and Benedict Spinoza. Among the orations of Themistius we find an inauthentic one (it was published by Andreas Duditius) addressed to the emperor Valentius and dealing with the variety of religious convictions. The author praises the emperor for having decided that everybody may profess the religion which he considers to be acceptable and which may contribute to the tranquillity of his mind. Compulsion in this respect would be against divine and natural law. Moreover variety of views stimulates fruitful discussion among people and may be source of further development and progress. These ideas could indeed be attributed to Themistius : as a prefect of Constantinople under the reign of Valens in the second half of the 4th century, he adopted a tolerant attitude towards the christians.

Let us try to clarify this notion of tolerance which is indeed so important in our contemporary society. Tolerance does not coincide with scepticism : it does not imply that all opinions are considered to be equivalent, nor that it is impossible to attain truth. The basis of tolerance is not a kind of indifference towards human views and convictions, it is on the contrary the expression of a deep respect of each individual and

of his personal responsibility in this most important activity, the search for truth. Each man is to a large extent responsible of his opinions: there are of course many influences which in the course of life are exercised on a human existence, such as hereditary factors, family education, social and cultural environment, personal contacts with other people, readings and study, all those influences are gradually assimilated and integrated in the personal reflections and initiatives of a subject. In a sense man is responsible not only of what he is doing, but also of what he is thinking, of the views he accepts.(24) In his ethics Aristotle strongly emphasized this aspect with respect to moral judgments : only a moral man is able to discover what is good in a particular situation. Other people are generally misled by their passions and emotions. The most basic responsibility of a human person is related to the research for truth. This yearning is naturally present in each individual, but it has to be developed and exercised. If everybody is responsible of his opinions and views, this responsibility has to be respected by other people. Compulsion in this field would be equivalent to the negation of human dignity and personal responsibility. Everybody has the duty of helping other people in their search for truth, but in a spirit of openness and free discussion.

Tolerance does not mean that the unity of truth is dropped. One may be very tolerant towards other people and their opinions, without abandoning the unity of truth. If human existence is really co-existence, truth will be the result of a common effort and constant research : looking at the history of thought, one easily notices that progress in knowledge is made thanks to a constant co-operation. Even if many discoveries may be attributed to some outstanding scholars, they are not merely the work of an individual, since each individual is largely indebted to the education he received and to the society in which he lives. Tolerance means that a subject does not consider himself to be the only depository of truth, but that he recognizes the dignity and efforts of other men. Moreover if a particular doctrine is enforced in a compulsory way, it will not be incorporated nor assimilated in the life of those individuals who were constrained to accept it. Increase of knowledge in an individual may be compared to the assimilation of food : like food has to be integrated in

the unity of a living organism, so new knowledge should be incorporated in the patrimony that a subject has already acquired. That means a process of gradual assimilation and integration, which is only possible when an individual freely consents and endeavours to make a new element of knowledge to a personal conviction.

Is tolerance only a pragmatic solution for a society that is actually pluralistic ? Since people who belong to the same society have different opinions about all kinds of important matters, it would be impossible for them to live together in the same community without being tolerant towards the views of their fellows. This is certainly true, but the basis of tolerance is deeper : it is linked to the ambiguous character of truth, which itself springs from the ambiguous nature of human existence. Truth is individual and supra-individual, because man is by nature self-consciousness, but also openness towards other subjects: this openness not only includes the possibility of dialogue and discussion, of mutual understanding, but also feelings of sympathy, friendship and love. Because truth could not exist without being related to individual subjects, to their intellectual activity and all the efforts they undertake in order to make progress, it ought to be the result of free development.(25)

And yet the variety of opinions should be overcome inasmuch as it is possible in a free and open society. There is something unsatisfactory and harmful in the profound divisions existing among men : they frequently prevent individuals from co-operating with each other in the framework of the same community. Moreover if truth is not only individual but also universal, it must be a meeting place of all humans : the goal that has to be pursued is a common agreement of all men on the same truth.(25) It is a kind of common duty and responsibility, put on the shoulders of all thinking subjects, to contribute to this universal agreement. Each human life has to be a piece of truth, an effulgence of authentic knowledge, that favours the gathering of all human beings in a universal agreement in the plain of truth.

In his **Protagoras** Plato presents a mythical narrative about the most

primitive stage of mankind.(27) At that time men did not live together, they were spread all over the earth and were often attacked and killed by wild beasts. And because they lived separately, they were unable to protect themselves against the attacks. Finally they decided to gather and to ground cities. But these political communities did not last : they soon collapsed as a result of all kinds of discord and disagreement, internal oppositions and clashes. So all efforts to ground lasting political communities were unsuccessful. At the end the gods deliberated about this disastrous situation : mankind was threatened by total destruction, if humans persisted living separately. The gods came to the conclusion that something was lacking in the equipment of men, so that they were unable to live peacefully together. As a result Hermes was sent to the earth to enrich each individual with two supplementary divine gifts : the sense of justice and self-respect and respect of others. This complement added to the human equipment was very effective : from that time towards all kinds of societies were founded and men were able to live peacefully together.

Using the language of Plato's myth one could maintain that justice includes tolerance, which is ultimately based on self-respect and respect of the dignity of others. This respect is constantly present in the dialogue of Plato : the contral actor of these philosophical dramas is mostly Socrates, who leads the discussion in which many kinds of people take part. The topics are very important and usually related to moral issues. Socrates never enforces his own conviction on his fellows who accept to talk with him, even if they vindicate the most erroneous theories as v.g. Thrasymachus and Callicles. Each dialogue is penetrated by a profound veneration of personal human dignity, it is a splendid instance of tolerance.

FOOTNOTES

1. Diels-Kranz, **Vors.,** 80 Protagoras, B 1 (Plato, **Theaetetus,** 152 A); cf. **Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers.** A complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels, **Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,** by K. Freeman. Oxford, 1948, p. 125.

2. Within the framework of Stoicism consensus is a decisive criterion of truth : the soul of each individual is a particle of the immanent divine Reason. Hence it is impossible that all men ever could agree on what is false. The number of sages is very limited : under the influence of their emotions and passions, people may go astray in particular cases and make all kinds of mistakes. But a universal agreement on what is erroneous, would be totally incompatible with the optimistic Stoic view on the development of the world.

3. In Plato's view truth must be unique, since it is connected with the existence of transcendent Ideas, which are uncompounded and immutable : v.g. there is only one idea of justice and it remains always the same. Truth is attained insofar as an individual is able to contemplate authentic reality. In this respect some individuals may be more capable than others, but this difference does not affect the uniqueness nor immutability of truth.

4. Cf. **Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina,** I-IV. Edition critique de la traduction latine médiévale par S. Van Riet. Introduction doctrinale par G. Verbeke, Louvain-Leiden, 1977, pp. 32+ - 36+.

5. Sextus mostly argued against the Stoics, whom he criticized for being dogmatists. What kind of dogmatism did Sextus intend ? It was the Stoic theory of knowledge according to which man is able to reach certainty, he should not always refrain from formulating a judgment. According to the Stoics kataleptic knowledge, starting from sensible experience, actually grasps true reality. Thanks to language i.e.

thanks to verbal expression, man is also able to ascend to a higher level of knowing, viz. to the level of understanding.

6. Cf. F. Strowski, **Montaigne.** Paris, 1931, p. 146 (cf. **Essais,** II, 16-17-18); p. 155 : "Ainsi la pénétration, la finesse, la souplesse et l'intelligence de Montaigne lui interdisent le dogmatisme". According to Strowski, the scepticism of Montaigne is a kind of "libre-pensée", which is not at all incompatible with religion (p. 180).

7. Cf. F. Strowski, **Montaigne,** p. 175: the author points to the fact that Montaigne borrows a large number of texts from Cornelius Agrippa **(De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum. Declamatio invectiva).** These quotations actually originate from Francis Pico della Mirandola **(Examen veritatis doctrinae gentium et veritatis christianae disciplinae).**

8. This publication included the following works : Sextus's **Adversus mahematicos** and **Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes;** the **Life of Pyrrho,** composed by Diogenes Laërtius and Galen's **Contra Academicos et Pyrrhonios.**

9. Sextus endeavours to distinguish his view not only from the Stoic doctrine, but also from the teaching of the Academic : these latter state man to be incapable to attain truth. Such a statement is dogmatic and has to be repudiated. A sceptic does not maintain that he does not know anything, he simply wonders what he knows. So the sceptic position is devoid of any dogmatic belief.

10. Aristotle expounds this doctrine at the beginning of book VIII of the **Physics,** where he makes an attempt at explaining as fully as possible the becoming process that occurs in the world : although this process never started, it could not exist without being caused. In Aristotle's view one must accept a first mover, who as a final cause produces the whole evolution of the cosmos.

11. Among the doctrines censured by the bishop of Paris in 1277, we find the following sentence: Quod naturalis philosophus debet negare simpliciter mundi novitatem, quia innititur causis naturalibus et rationibus naturalibus. Fidelis autem potest negare mundi aeternitatem, quia innititur causis supernaturalibus (nr. 90). Within the framework of the philosophy of nature one has to accept the eternity of the world; from the viewpoint of faith he may however reject it, because he then appeals to supernatural causes.

12. **Petri Pomponatii Mantuani libri quinque de fato, de libero arbitrio et de praedestinatione,** ed. R. Lemay. Lucani, 1957, p. 202: Rationabilior igitur videtur Stoicorum opinio opinione Christianorum; p. 221: Quare Stoici videntur magis convenienter respondere. Sic itaque mihi videtur esse diecendum in sequendo Stoicorum opinionem, quamquam ut in sequenti libro dicam, haec opinio sit falsa, quonian religioni christianae quae verissima est adversatur.

13. **Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy,** ed. A.H. Armstrong. Cambridge, 1967, Part II: **Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought,** by H. Chadwick, p. 138: Philo's work is an elaborate synthesis, or at least a correlation, of biblical revealed religion and Greek philosophy, mainly cast in the form of an allegorical commentary on **Genesis.**

14. H. Chadwick, **Philo and the Beginnings of Christain Thought,** p. 162. Philo also maintained the Greek philosophers to be indebted to the Pentateuch for their wisdom (p. 139).

15. H. Chadwick, **Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought,** p. 170: God who gave the Old Testament as a tutor to bring the Jews to Christ gave the Greeks philosophy for the same purpose.

16. H. Chadwick, **Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought,** p. 184: Philosophy is a valuable preparatory discipline for revealed theology.

17. M. Cruz Hernandez, **La Filosofia Arabe,** Madrid, 1963, p. 38.

18. Cruz Hernandez, **La Filosofia Arabe,** p. 279 : Pero para aquellos que tienen dotes intellectuales suficientes "it razonamiento filosofico no nos conducira a conclusion alguna a lo que esta consignado en la Revelacion divina, **porque la verdad no puede contradecir a la verdad,** sino armonizarse con ella e servirla de testimonio confirmativo".

19. Cruz Hernandez, **La Filosofia Arabe,** p. 118.

20. M. Merleau-Ponty clearly rejects the absolute character of expressed truth (les énoncés, l'acquis, la parole parlée) : contingency is the birthplace of all meaning, which could never be separated from the ways in which it is expressed. Cf. **Phénoménologie de la perception.** Paris, 1945, p. 456 : "La contingence ontologique, celle du monde lui-même, étant radicale, est au contraire ce qui fonde une fois pour toutes notre idée de la vérité". Language produces the illusion of eternal truth, but makes it at once impossible (Cf. R. C. Kwant, **De fenomenologie van Merleau-Ponty.** Utrecht-Antwerpen, 1962, p. 125).

21. I recently wrote a contribution on these various levels of humanity in Aristotle's view : it will be published very soon in Athens in a **Festschrift** in honour of Professor J. Vourveris **(Les degrés d'humanité el le sens du progrès chez Aristote).**

22. Cf. G. Verbeke, **Le Stoïcisme, une philosophie sans frontières, in : Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt,** I, **Von den Anfängen Roms bis zum Ausgang der Republik,** Vierter Band. Berlin — New York, 1973, pp. 3-42.

23. P. Ricoeur, **Histoire et Vérité.** Paris, 1955, p. 57 : "L'histoire de la philosophie n'est pas une collection de solutions variées (solutions typiques) à des problèmes identiques".

24. The question may be asked whether an individual may ever be allowed to cling to all kinds of errors and false opinions. If there is only one truth, why not by all means bring everybody to accept this truth ? This problem is indeed a delicate one : as we already emphasized, truth is one and multiple, temporal and supratemporal. The question is not whether an individual is morally allowed to adhere to error : it is quite clear that he is not. But the question is whether he should be constrained to drop his opinions and to consent to others. To this question our answer is negative because that kind of compulsion is incompatible with the dignity of a person and the freedom of a democratic society.

25. In this respect one could hardly agree with M. Merleau-Ponty, who believes that violence might be a necessary step on the way to a more humanitarian society (**Humanisme et terreur.** Essai sur le communisme. Paris, 1947).

26. . Ricoeur, **Histoire et Vérité,** p. 71 : the author deals with the notion of being, which is of fundamental importance with respect to truth. In his view being means openness : "l'être est cet acte qui, précédant et fondant toute possibilité de questionner, fonde la mutualité des intentions philosophiques les plus singulières". The author also tries to disclose the meaning of the expression: "j'espère être dans la vérité" (I hope to be in the truth) and he explains it as follows : "Je pense que la fonction de cette espérance est de maintenir le dialogue toujours ouvert et d'introduire une intention fraternelle dans les plus âpres débats". (p. 72).

27. Plato, **Protagoras,** 320 C — 323 a.

DOGMATISTS AND THEIR CRITICS

a philosophical inquiry into the roots of rigidity

Lolle Nauta (Zambia)

Introduction

Ask a random sample of professional philosophers whether any of them is in favour of dogmatism and most probably you will be disappointed, no candidates for the title being available. If you are looking for dogmatists, you apparently are in the wrong place. Philosophers like to think of themselves as being undogmatic. In inquiring into "the roots of dogmatism", they are expected to inquire into the roots of a phenomenon, they themselves are not part of. In their own professional eyes they are critical, rational, in favour of discussion and always ready to consider new points of view. Professional doubters they are; professional believers are to be found elsewhere.

It is always the others, who are supposed to be dogmatic. Even firm believers, who adhere to a number of clearcut dogmas, will hardly feel happy about being called dogmatic. Yet there are many contemporary philosophers, who think of their fellow philosophers as indeed being dogmatic. As long as there is no consensus in philosophy about fundamental assumptions, every philosophical school or trend will create its own mechanisms of defense. In a way pluralism calls for dogmatism. Members of the other school or group are supposed not to be willing or even not to be able to doubt their own assumptions and to see that they are out of touch with reality. Was this not the way the early logical positivists discussed metaphysics? And what about much of the criticism of logical positivism itself by, let us say, phenomenologists or marxists ? Were the members of the Vienna Circle in their eyes not very dogmatic especially concerning sense experience, science etc. ?

So, what can we do apart from hoping and trying ourselves not to be too dogmatic ? No longer calling other people dogmatic but just being modest about ourselves ? I do not think so. Modesty may be a virtue on a personal level; in philosophy as a discipline it is not. Here arguments count; being more or less virtuous does not matter at all. Therefore I would like in this paper to spell out the arguments against dogmatism, investigating whether or not they are correct. And after having done so, I will try to inquire into antidogmatism, scrutinizing some assumptions of a well known anti-dogmatic philosophical school : the philosophy of Popper and his students, called critical rationalism.

Dogmatism is bound to certain social conditions and the same is true of its critical counterpart. One cannot hold that dogmatism as a phenomenon is liable to certain social and historical determinants and at the same time that, let us say, critical rationalism is free from such "material" influences. In order for a critical mind to develop and to become less susceptible to dogmatic influences, certain social conditions have to be fulfilled. A certain level of education, for example, is at least a necessary condition here. Man's mind hardly can be set free without the acquisition of a certain educational capital.

Now, if in both cases epistemological and social factors are involved and if it is true as well, that we would like to discriminate between a "dogmatic" and a "critical" attitude, then, being philosophers, we are under the obligation to inquire into the relation between epistemological and social aspects. It is lazy thinking, if we deal with things like this on a social and historical level only, apart from the fact that it has hardly anything to do with philosophy. The social and historical sciences are supposed to do the job on this level. And it is also an easy escape just to remain on the level of epistemology, as a number of philosophers like to do as well. Neither dogmatism nor criticism are a matter of epistemology only, as Kant was well aware.

Without even trying to be complete, I will therefore in the second part of my paper raise the problem of the so-called transformations

between the socio-historical and the epistemological level. In order to avoid being too abstract, I will use fascism as an example for analysis. Fascism in its different forms of course is connected with a dogmatic attitude, and, apart from that, hardly any philosopher seems to be much in favour of it. Fascism and philosophy are almost mutually exclusive. Of cours there are philosophers with fascist tendencies and sympathies, but, as far as I know, serious philosophical thinking never got developed under any fascist regime. Fascism therefore may be an acceptable example of a transformation of socio-historical factors into epistemological or ideological ones, which all of us can be expected to reject.

II. — The Case against Dogmatism

The following sequence of arguments against dogmatism can be found among philosophers of a Popperian persuasion.

Dogmatists, they contend, are in the **first** place not able (or willing) to change their assumptions in the light of new evidence. Thus Popper's falsification principle is the cornerstone of a philosophy, which is critical of dogmatic attitudes in every respect, since the refusal to change an opinion in the light of contrary evidence is the core of dogmatism. When faced with falsifying evidence, dogmatists actually will try to change the evidence instead of their own assumptions. Several examples can be quoted here. A popular one concerns the Marxists of the Second International and their prediction of the speedy collapse of the capitalist mode of production. This prediction was, in some cases, made with great precision, extending even to year and date. When it did not come true, the belief of most of them was not shaken at all. The happy catastrophe could still be expected to enter world-history a bit later. Godot is coming tomorrow and "tomorrow" always happens to be later than today.

The **second** argument which is put forward against dogmatism, has more to do with social philosophy than with methodology. Not being able to cope with new information, dogmatists, it is contended, are blocking

social progress. In a time of rapid social change new situations require creative ideas and fresh solutions. Dogmatism is to be found in that part of society, which is conservative and reactionary. With their closed minds, members of this group adhere to their old-fashioned ideas when new problems crop up. They are like medical doctors, who stick to their old prescriptions, even when the diseases have changed. Recovery or improvement can not be expected from them.

The **third** argument is connected with the second and goes like this: in being an enemy of social progress our dogmatist will try to block new initiatives, be inclined to eliminate people with a critical mind, and in this way run the risk of becoming an enemy of true humanity.

Several things are at stake here, but it may be clear sofar, that the third and last part of our sequence of arguments concerns political morals. Here Popperians are specifically referring to those dogmatists who enjoy some form of political power. Only if this condition is fulfilled, do the dogmatists have the opportunity to put their critics into prison and to establish or at least support an actual system of repression. The third argument turns out to be of a political nature.

These political implications of course become very clear in Popper's later work, which was published after his discoveries in the field of philosohy of science. In these books a fourth argument can in fact be discerned, namely Popper's opinion that all forms of radical change, which try to revolutionize society as a whole, in the last resort turn out to be dogmatic. Changing a society as a whole is as impossible as rebuilding completely an existing city; only piece-meal engineering will do. Marxist revolutionaries, preaching radical social change and discovering that their blueprint cannot be implemented, in the end show their true dogmatic colours. Adhering to their ideology and not willing to give up their political power, they become their own worst enemies, trying to wipe out all forms of criticism and creativity. Everyone who is not in agreement with them, is blocking history and is therefore an enemy, to be eliminated.

I do not want to deny that there are a lot of revolutionaries, who behave like dogmatists in disguise. Stalinism is fact and not fancy. In some respects Popper's criticism of historicist Marxism is to the point. But I do not think his general argument, that all ideologies aiming at radical change are for that reason dogmatic, is correct. Moreover, it does not logically follow from the other three. Political radicals can very well cope with new information, promote social progress and take into account criticism of their assumptions of course. Marx himself is an example, changing his opinions in ten years more often than most philosophers do in their whole life.

We therefore can leave it at our three arguments, without adding a fourth. The epistemological argument comes first. It provides the foundation for the second one, widening the discussion into the field of social philosophy. Both arguments in turn call for the third one, which brings in a moral and political point of view. Being knitted together in this way, a two-way traffic among the three can start. In Popper's eyes the **methodological** rule, to put forward propositions, which are falsifiable, apparently at the same time is a kind of **moral requirement.** Provided certain conditions are fulfilled, there is a kind of moral obligation to be as critical about one's own assumptions as possible. Why ? In not doing so, we will hamper social progress and run the risk of taking sides with hangmen and oppressors.

Is the case against dogmatism well established in this way ? Are we justified in saying that there is a kind of moral requirement to be as critical about one's own assumptions as possible ? And can dogmatists indeed be said not to be able to cope properly with new information ?

Philosophers like very much to generalize about ideas, which in fact are context-dependent. The falsification-principle is an example, because here everything depends on the context one is referring to. Refusing to take into account new information **in general** hardly can be called morally wrong. Who will blame old people for not able to cope with new information and feeling happy with rapid social change ? Is

it justified to criticize religious people for not being ready to put their views to test ?

Popperians could object here by pointing to the fact that the falsification principle got developed as a methodological principle only. It is with the context of science that it is concerned : the "Logic of Scientific Discovery" was written in the thirties as a criticism of the methodological principles of Logical Positivism and that is all.

There are two serious counter-arguments however. The first point is, that even with regard to science the principle turned out to be too general. In the aftermath of Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" it was made clear by Lakatos that scientists cannot be expected to put to test every proposition to which they adhere. There is always a hard core of fundamental assumptions where falsification, at least in the short run, is to be ruled out. As a general principle Popper's theory does not even apply to scientific practice as a whole.

And the second point, is, as was already made clear, that Popper's claim in fact is even more general. Thus we are faced with a number of consequences of the falsification principle in the field of social and political philosophy and the philosophy of critical rationalism is more than just a set of methodological principles only.

Shall we then just dismiss the principle for being too general ? I do not think we can. Theories and expectations which evidently do conflict with reality are required at least to get reinterpreted or adjusted. There is no doubt about that. Only people who are mentally ill, are able to uphold unaltered a system of propositions which fly in the face of the facts in every respect.

If however we are not willing just to dismiss the falsification principle, we at least have, as one could call it, a "level-problem" because of the principle's very generality. It is not clear in which context or at which level it is to be applied, as a trivial example may show. A com-

mitted and fanatical disciple of Khomeiny as a matter of fact will on a certain level be able to cope with new information. He will look for a raincoat after discovering that his expectation of sunshine is not coming true. But at the level of ideology he is unable to act rationally; there his mind is closed. His general assumptions about the world cannot be changed as easily as his opinions about the weather. Only in times of crisis are ideological foundations apt to be shaken.

The problem of dogmatism, to say the least, therefore is not a problem of falsification only. Quite intricate problems concerning the relation of theory and practice (level-problems) come up for discussion here. Such problems however hardly appear on the agenda of the critical rationalists. They do draw moral and political consequences from their point of view, but their discussions of principles mainly concerns methodological or epistemological matters. Let us therefore take a look at them and see whether there is a case against anti-dogmatism as well.

III. — A Case against the Critics of Dogmatism

The point I want to make in this section is that, from an epistemological point of view only, the problem of dogmatism cannot be adequately analysed at all.

One reason for this state of affairs has in fact already been given. Taking the falsification principle as our only point of view, the problem of dogmatism in fact did not appear at all before our epistemological spyglass. Apart from mental illness, a **general** inability to cope with new information could not be detected. Only at certain levels or in certain contexts people are unable to put their opinions to test and this even appears to be true for many cases of mental illness. Human behaviour is not a single thing; is divided up into certain provinces, many times provided with clear borders. Well known are the stories about guards of concentration camps, brutes and oppressors, who happen to be so human, nice and tolerant in their private life. So, what is dogmatism actually about ?

There is another reason which makes it difficult, from a theoretical point of view, to deal adequately with the phenomenon under discussion. Originally, in Greek, theory ("theoria") meant looking at the stage, being in the theatre. Now, a theorist and a visitor of the theatre do not have very much in common apart from one thing : in both cases action has been suspended. For a while the normal course of the day has, so to say, been interrupted. Not always do human beings have to care for the production and reproduction of their daily life. Now and then take time off to consider the sense and nonsense of the affairs they are involved.

There is a lot of things we can laugh about at the theatre, without being able to do so outside its walls. At the field of action our behaviour is dictated by other rules than at a theatre-evening or in a philosophical discussion. We just cannot afford to spend every moment looking into the mirror and laughing about our neighbours and who knows maybe even ourselves. Action implies movement and in order to move we must be able to discriminate between a good and a false direction. The faster we move, the clearer the idea of our route must actually be. At the moment when we hesitate — is this really the right way to go ? — and take out our map, our car has already come to a standstill. It is dangerous to move and to study the map at the same time.

Opinions which we like to call dogmatic, are somehow closely related to the mode of action of the subjects concerned. Dear beliefs, which hardly can be changed, are intimately inertwined with a pattern of life. They are not of a theoretical, but of a practical nature. They neither have been brought up in the theatre nor have they been thought up in a philosophical discussion. From an epistemological point of view characteristics like their rigidity or lack of flexibility, for example, cannot be understood at all. With epistemological instruments only epistemological phenomena can be observed.

That worldviews are intertwined with patterns of life, as I like to call them provisionally, is a triviality. Everyone who happens to look

around in the world knows this. But knowing **that** does not imply knowing **how.** Marxists, who refer in this respect only to a set of modes of production, are as ignorant as their critical-rationalist counterparts who rely on a few methodological principles only. In particular, the way our own worldview is related to the world of action is most of the time less clear to us than in the case of worldviews and assumptions we simply do not share. Studying and analyzing the mediations between worldviews and patterns of life is not necessarily putting forward trivialities.

That "dogmatism" and "action" indeed are related can become clear from the the history of Marxism. Of course, historians of philosophy are most of the time aware of the differences between Marx and Marxism. Even Marx himself sometimes spoke quite ironically about the Marxists of his time. In the discussions however on the relations of Marx and the different kinds of 20th century Marxism, it is not always sufficiently clear that Marx mainly worked at a **theoretical level.** He and Engels, of course, did publish the "Communist Manifesto", but this pamphlet was an exception. The other major works are not pieces of political action at all. Even when Marx dealt with the relation of theory and practice, or with practice alone, he always did so at the level of theory. Considered as a whole, his work is a highly sophisticated endeavour to repudiate capitalism and to justify socialism in **the intellectual milieu of his time.** Marx wrote **for the sake of** the proletariat; he did not write for the proletariat. Philosophers, writers, political economists, politicians and such people are supposed to be his readers. If you are not sufficiently educated to read Hegel or Ricardo, Marx is going to be abacadabra for you.

Having been developed at a theoretical level, how then did Marxism become dogmatic ? The answer is simple. Marx and Engels themselves were not dogmatic, or at least no more so than any other social scientist. Marxism became dogmatic in the time of the Second International, when the thoughts of Marx and Engels had to be explained to the masses. It was then that they became **action-related** in fact, because the socialist parties and trade-unions had to be provided with an ideological basis.

For this reason Marxists like Plechanov, Kautsky and Lenin as well (who naturally was a man of action) had to put the sophisticated theories of their teachers in a simple and easy form, which is to say: now all kinds of provisos, precautions and boundary conditions, are typical at the theoretical level, had to be done away with. You cannot act under all kinds of restrictions. Action is something irrevocable.

It is important to note that the Marxism Popper got acquainted with was nothing less than the Marxism of the Second International. He himself informs us that his experiences with Marxism — he himself was a Marxist for some months — were crucial to him when he was a student in Vienna. He soon got fed up with the dogmatic way his fellow Marxists interpreted political reality, not being able to have their theories refuted in any way. When we look at Popper's *work*, the principle of falsification comes first and after that his social philosophy gets under way. *Biographically*, however, it is the other way around. He himself tells us that for the development of his epistemology his social experiences were crucial.

This political context of the development of the falsification principle does not affect its validity of course. One cannot assess discoveries according to the context in which they occurred. But two other consequences in my opinion do follow.

The first is that Popper's well-known criticism of Marxism is too general. What he is saying does apply to the historicist ideology of the Second International and to a large part of Marxism-Leninism. It does not apply to Marx and Engels, nor to, let me say, Gramsci, Habermas, Thompson, Cohen, Colletti and a lot of other Marxists in our century.

The second consequence relates to the subject under discussion here. Given the fact, that Popper's methodological principles got developed in the context of the Second International, we are justified in saying that he reacted to a **political** situation in an **epistemological** way. Popper's epistemology is the result of a process of transformation of crucial

political experiences. Behind his philosophy of science a political crisis is to be seen. Not only in science, but in the philosophy of science as well times of crisis turn out to be fruitful.

Knowing however what is methodologically wrong with dogmatism, does not mean that we are already informed about its nature. Methodological rules do not lead us to the roots of a phenomenon; they merely provide us with a licence to pass it by.

So, in fact we are faced with the problem of the relation of theory and practice. Firstly this came to the fore, when the "level-problem" was discussed, the remarkable capacity of human beings to cope with new information at the level of daily practice, apparently without doing so at the level of ideology. Human behaviour seems to be provided with certain "tracks of action", so to say, each of which having a programme or set of rules of its own. Different behaviour domains thus seem to be allowed considerable autonomy from each other. In order to live up to the requirements of one's cultural context, a certain amount of personal **disintegration** seems to be necessary.

Secondly, the problem of the relation of theory and practice came up, when we looked into the assumptions of critical rationalism. Epistemological instruments, we concluded, can only show us epistemological phenomena. They are necessary in dealing with dogmatism, but they are not sufficient. We see from afar the phenomenon of "frozen knowledge", but we do not know why it actually arose there. Even to say, as I have done, that such phenomena are "action-related" does not give us much information. Saying this only amounts to saying that such frozen phenomena do not belong to the level of theory, which is a negative qualification only. Let us therefore turn to a concrete example, to see if something more may be discovered about it.

IV. — Fascism as an example

Is it not exaggerating a bit to use fascism as an example in a discussion on dogmatism ? Are there not many forms of dogmatism, having

nothing to do with fascism and which can hardly be compared with it? And is there not quite a lot of honest people to be found everywhere, who may be called dogmatic in one way or another, without ever being ready to support racism, torture and other forms of repression ?

Without any doubt there is, as there is also a lot of decent and dogmatic people, who do support torture and repression, sometimes without even being aware that they are doing so. The point however is that I do not see on what grounds dogmatism in general should be criticised apart from moral and political ones. A general epistemological requirement that world-views must always be called into question simply does not make sense. And precisely for this reason fascism may be a good example of a species of dogmatism, which is especially difficult to accept and thus raises particularly clearly the question of why this difficulty is there.

Some other reasons as well may justify our choice. The first is that fascism is theoretically weak. Contrary to other political movements it never had excellent theoreticians. Of course, there have been plenty of fascist ideologues, swimming with the high tide of the mass movement and being ready to process legitimations into the ever hungry propaganda machine. Their level of argument however neither can be compared with liberal nor with marxist thinking. A fascist research tradition in fact never developed. In fascism we are faced with a phenomenon which hardly has to be refuted at a theoretical level and which has to be studied at the level of behaviour. They say it themselves. "Action" is one of their catchwords and intellectual endeavours they are not in favour of.

The second reason is, that fascism is a modern phenomenon, closely

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1. I will not elaborate on Stalinism here, which also is a phenomenon of our century. I do not adhere to the "totalitarianism-thesis" which treats fascism and Stalinism as phenomena of the same kind. However, it cannot be denied that there are important structural analogies between the two.

related to the capitalist mode of production in its imperialist stage(1). It does not make sense to call social movements before the 20th century fascist and the phenomenon itself is international and not limited to Italy or Germany. Everyone knows about McCarthyism and the Klu Klux Klan in the U.S.A., not to mention political regimes in El Salvador and Chile. However difficult it may be to determine the **nature** of its relation with 20th century capitalism, there can hardly be any doubt that fascism is part of its offspring.

In order to see in what respect fascism can indeed be called dogmatic, it may be useful to develop a **fascist's profile,** mainly based on work done by the Frankfurt School of Social Research.

I will list four important features only, the first concerning the level of ideology. A fascist is holding a Manichean worldview, good and evil being neatly separated and himself of course living on the right side. His reference-group, which is the family, the nation or the race, is symbolizing the positive values he adheres to and his ideology gives him a legitimation for this. On the level of psychology he is in favour of virtues, which sometimes are called masculine. Glorifying militarist force and violence, a fascist has a strong dislike for things like tenderness and also for emotions in general, which he prefers to call weak. Women in his company hardly can be seen. They have to stay at home and to the cooking and the bearning of children. A fascist's social relations are in accordance with features like this. Being motivated by a strong resentment against deviating behaviour and against strangers in general, other groups easily become a projection of his own repressed needs and wishes. A fascist hates homosexuals, artists, intellectuals and all other people who are disturbing the normal way of life. And his political behaviour has to be in harmony with all this of course. A fascist is obedient to the state and any other form of higher authority. His example and favoured model of behaviour is "the leader".

A little comment on this tentative profile. Features like this should

not be dealt with in isolation; for a profile of a fascist they belong together. A person can be quite anti-feministic without being a fascist and one can be in favour of a strong army without displaying the other features as well. In order for a person or group to be called fascist, they must manifest all four of these features at least.

Some may wonder why I am defining fascism on an individual level and not on the level of society. In order to know however what precisely must be explained at the level of society (or the structural level), the phenomenon concerned first has to be described, which can be done at a more individual level. Many times a structural analysis takes it so easy in this respect, not making it clear enough what it is that has to be explained in a structural way.

In the case of fascism dogmatism acquires on the existential level a specific meaning. A person, being a fascist, exhibits an exceptional kind of inflexibility and rigidity. As studies of the authoritarian personality have shown, he is liable to all kinds of bias and in the extreme tending towards conformist behaviour.

This rigidity not only finds expression at the level of the mind and not only concerns the ideas of the fascist, but it is also to be found at a more material level. The bodily movements of a fascist are rigid. He is fond of moving in a military way. Being together in groups which have nothing to do with the army, yet he likes doing as if he was. Look at the way the Nazis greeted their Leader, a stiffened arm and hand holding up, the body paralysed for the time being. Just like in the army, where most of the time individual differences are only disturbing, the uniformity shows the identity of the individual and the group. In his fascist role, an individual is not moving smoothly like a human being is expected to do, but like a marionet, his motions being stiff and his gestures being wooden.

This is not just a metaphor, because the marionet-like behaviour can be observed at an empirical level, where it acquires a symbolic

meaning of its own. I venture the hypothesis that in this behaviour the force and violence find expression which fascists themselves have undergone. Human nature, having been oppressed, is eager to oppress again. Human beings, having been victimized, are in need of victimizing other people. It was Sartre who once wrote, that for hangmen and torturers there never is an end. Repetition is what they are under. Thinking about fascism, the terrible crimes, committed by the Germans against the Jews, come to our mind. Today we witness the extermination of the Palestinians by the state of Israel, where history is repeating itself.

If indeed the fascist's rigid behaviour is a manifestation of the violence which he did undergo himself and which he is eager to inflict on other human beings, then on the field of social philosophy two points can be made.

The first concerns the problem of human freedom. We are here — provided the hypothesis can indeed be confirmed — faced with human beings, whose lack of freedom can be observed. It can be shown empirically that the patterns of behaviour, they are prisoners of, indeed were forced upon them. I do not want to say that they can not be held responsible for what they have done. The problem of moral responsibility is not to be dealt with here at all. I want to say that any criticism of their behaviour is not in need of an abstract point of view, since observable phenomena are at stake here.

The second point concerns the problem of social determination and is connected with the first. Philosophical discussions concerning social determination (or causation) are sometimes too abstract as well. In the case of fascism there are certain mechanisms which prevent human beings from developing freely and autonomously. The mechanisms concerned determine their behaviour until within their fingertips. They do not allow them to develop freely. They are forced to develop as rowdies, yessayers, patriots, soldiers, guards of concentration-camps and maybe in the end as torturers. It is this kind of social determination Marxists should be interested in. They are not supposed to develop a

general theory of social causation. Too long the metaphysical shadow of Spinoza and Hegel have haunted their mind. It is **specific, historically determined situations and the way these are transformed at the level of indiviual behaviour,** they are supposed to be analyzed and to be interested in. The question whether man's behaviour **in general** is determined, yes or no, is almost meaningless. **De facto** the determinations of human behaviour are not distributed in an equal way. If we want to fight oppression, we have to fight the historical and social conditions behind it. In order to eliminate fascist interpretations of the world, we are bound to change it.

V. — Mechanisms of Transformation (a marxist approach)

Being provided with a profile of the fascist at an individual level, are we now in a position to link it up with the historical and material circumstances of the subjects concerned ? Can the patterns of behaviour which were observed at the micro-level of individual behaviour, be located at the macro-level of history and society ?

Such questions can easier be asked than be answered. Most of the time dialectical materialists go exactly the other way. First a macro-picture is drawn up and then the micro-aspects, if any, are filled in. In this way the methodological principles of historical materialism are dismissed and replaced by a kind of metaphysical theory where all individuals, without any exception, are becoming marionets, dancing at the whims of the laws of history. In marxism of the 20th century economism is metaphysics in disguise.

A lot of research has been done of the macro-aspects of fascism and it has become clear that fascism got a strong foothold in the petty-bourgeoisie, the small-scale producers, small-scale owners and non-productive employees. With respect to Germany, for example, two relevant points can be made. The first is that their proportion in the general population is well below their proportion in the membership of the national-socialist party, the first being 12% in the years between

'30 and '34 and the second varying from 20.6 to 25.6%. Secondly, figures show that in the first quarter of the century "this section of the population suffered most economically" (20, p. 260). In this period "artisans and traders lost almost half of their income" (id.). Inflation hit worst at their social level and they got into additional problems because of the growth of monopolies in the field of banking and industry. The things they produced and sold were providing them with less and less income.

So far so good, but these circumstances, supposed they are correctly described, do not automatically yield a thing like fascism or national-socialism. We have a profile and we have a socio-economic picture (which is to be completed very much of course), but how are they related ? How do economic circumstances like this lead to the kind of rigidity and marionet-like behaviour which seem to be symptomatic for fascism ?

Looking for the machanism of transformation, which may be the missing link here, let me make a try without assuming that circumstances in reality are always like that.

Being a craftsman I have always worked very hard, as my father and grandfather did. By leading a decent life, my family already for long was able to earn a small income which provided us with our daily bread, sufficient means for the education of the children and something for the church as well. We never spent more than we could help and we were even able to make some savings for times of hardship.

But what is the matter now ? Although I am working harder than my father did and even my wife and oldest son assist me all day, I am earning less. A new machine even had to be bought, but I do not see how I can pay off the loan for it, which I got from the bank. These Jewish usurers are asking more and more. My costs are growing, while I am getting less of my products. Or better : I am getting as much money or even more than before, but I can hardly buy anything for it. Food and clothes are growing more and more expensive.

So, what is hard work for anyway ? Look at the people who are doing nothing sitting idly on their luxuries and just loitering about. Where do they get all their money from ? Why is the social-democrat government doing nothing ? And by the way, most of the time, these loiterers and usurers are not even Germans ! Why did they infiltrate into our society with their different way of life ? Just to take the money from people, who never strayed from the right path ? Let them go home please. Like homosexuals and artists they are; getting well to do without any effort.

This man is neither a guard of a concentration camp nor a turturer. It is a mistake to think that most members of fascist organizations are torturers. It is only that their ideas and feelings about life and society can easily be integrated into a fascist or national-socialist frame-work. Like the Catholic Church which is first creating and then expropriating the feelings of guilt of the members it is supposed to take care of, in the same way fascist parties, according to Barrington Moore, are manipulating their members. And the mechanism, which is put into effect here, is that of resentment and revenge. Fascist parties are organisations, skilled in the exploitation of hate. The most starting thing about fascism are the scale and brutality of its repression. This is what we do not understand or at least most of the time psychologically can not afford to understand.

Our imaginary craftsman does not want to kill or to destroy the people he does not like. In his opinion they either should lead a proper life or go back to the place they came from. Feelings of resentment however are clearly biting him and even they are not conditioned by economic circumstances in a mono-causal way. They are his way of reacting to them, such a pattern of behaviour being a product of certain historical and cultural circumstances. Although he is a Catholic, living in München, he is notwithstanding that part and parcel of a puritan culture of hard work. Having only primary school, he is not acquainted with economic theories. His knowledge in this respect can be written on a finger's nail, dealing with the relation between hard work and a

modest income only. Things which are not in accordance with this well-tested paradigm, are explained in another way, the method of "personalizing". Not being in accordance with the normal course of things, such phenomena are to be ascribed to evil spirits: communists, freemasons, intellectuals and other media of witchcraft.

So, several mechanisms of transformation may be effective here : legitimations from an earlier stage of the capitalist mode of production which are, so to speak, refuted by the new circumstances; feudal aspects may be important as well; the capitalist mode of production only dominated certain aspects of European life, even in the 20th century; a bourgeois culture with a more rational view of social matters never came to flourish in the southern and rural parts of Germany. But in my eyes the dominant tranformation is working through resentment, as may have become clear already from the last part of the portrait of the craftsman by himself. It is by resentment that material circumstances **here** are transformed into certain patterns of behaviour.

I am coming back now to the hypothesis which has already been ventured concerning the fascist's marionet-like behaviour. Fascists are not able to get rid of certain painful experiences in the past. These experiences are litterally — in a Sartrian sense — sticking to them. Fascists are not able to get through to them or even to look at them. They carry them on their backs, neither being able to start another period of their life nor to invent other patterns of behaviour. **Rigidity** and **repetition** belong together. Certain frustrating experience can press so heavily on the mind of the subjects concerned, that they can no longer discriminate between 'cases' which are similar to the previous ones, and cases which are not. **Every** Jew is like the one who exploited me. **Every** Palestinian is like the Nazis who wanted to destroy my people. Being asked, how Israel could destroy Sidon, Mr. Begin simply retorted to a reporter: when Dresden was destroyed, no protest was heard. Fascist action is the vain and therefore endless repeated effort to get rid of painful experiences in the past. Therefore it is always surprisingly easy for a fascist to plead not guilty. Was not he the first to be harassed ?

Every fascist is a retaliator. Trying to pay back what has been done to him, he is however, with iron necessity, always mistaking his aim. His objects are innocent.

Here indeed we are faced with a transformation of material circumstances into patterns of behaviour which actually constitute a burden of history. This is the true "Mythe de Sisyphe". No cunning of reason can be observed. Repetition is on. We may call the mechanism concerned **the mechanism of fixation.**

It should not be overlooked that these considerations on fascism which are leaning heavily on work done by others, are required for methodological reasons. Especially two are relevant here.

The first has in fact already been given. Dogmatism is not a problem of epistemology only, as could indeed become quite clear in our context. In the case of fascism from an epistemological angle only, really amounts to philosophical idealism; one in fact is depriving onself of the possibility to reach into the material ramifications of socio-historical practice.

There is a second reason as well, which hardly has been touched until now. Considering the exclusively epistemological approach as an idealist one, no progress is made by just turning it upside down, replacing mental entities by material ones. To do so, will lead to another version of philosophical idealism, in materialist disguise this time. Due to the dialectical method Marxists are most of the time neglecting the problem of **transformations,** as I would like to call it. Because dialectics is supposed to take into account ontological and epistemological matters **at the same time,** no room is left for the methodological and empirical study of transformations. Dialectical laws, so to speak, know already how socio-historical practice and human behaviour can be turned into each other; no reason at all to look into that. Due to Hegelian assumptions the turnover or transformation of one into the other has become a kind of automatism.

This second methodological point can be formulated, in other words, by saying that overestimating dialectics in theory will result in underestimating emancipation in practice. There are more transformations than the mechanism of fixation only and emancipation is one of them. Most of the time — and this is also due to Marx and Engels themselves, who were children of the 19th century — human emancipation is looked at as a transformation (transition) into a higher stage. Higher however can mean morally better, more in accordance with certain rules of social justice. But higher can also refer to situations where man has been liberated from material bonds. Statements about emancipation can become really confusing, when both 'layers of meaning' have been put togther, as actually is quite common. Then it looks as if a situation, which is more in accordance with social justice, at the same time is going to be a situation, where the laws of social gravity no longer hold : suddenly we have been transfered to heaven and lost our bodily weight. Normal rules concerning, let me say, the division of labour, no longer apply; selling and buying of commodities has become something of the past; conflicts, as they always will arise in a regime of scarcity, are no longer to be expected.

Emancipation is not a transformation of socio-historical practice into something else, as dialectical laws may suggest which are inextricably linked with the 19th century belief in progress. Emancipation is not a kind of elevation. Originally, emancipation means the release of child and wife from the power of the pater familias. In referring to certain restraints of socio-historical practice itself, emancipation consequently joins the original intuition of historical materialism which aims at the transformation of practice. It makes sense to use the concept of transformation here, because knowledge is required in order to get transformed into socio-historical practice itself. So, instead of going up, emancipation means going down. Symbolic elements, being provided with social gravity, are liberated from their almost inborn tendency to become free floating; theory is connected with practice, as Marx used to say who indeed succeeded in reinterpreting Hegelian concepts in the field of political economy.

Of course more requirements have to be fulfilled in order for emancipation to become real. Real conflicts in socio-historical practice itself are to be present and should have reached the level of social consciousness. No emancipation without class struggle. But I am not studying the mechanisms of emancipation now. My point is only that Marxists can no longer afford to leave the dynamics of transformation to dialectics. In a dialectical structure epistemological and ontological elements are impossible to disentangle. Socio-historical practice however can be studied only, if on a methodological level ontology and epistemology are clearly separated. Only by separating them first, our eyes can be opened for new amalgamations between the two, as the inquiry into the roots of rigidity may have shown.

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DOGMATISM IN RELIGION

J. P. Atreya (India)

What is Religion.

Religion has been defined in different ways by different scholars. Many such definitions expressed some aspect of religion rather than the whole of what religion has been. Religion in the ordinary sense of the term, is man's cognitive, affective and contative attitude to his environment and to the universe as a whole, chiefly determined by his instinctive and intuitive faith, which gets stabilized in tradition. It comes into operation the very moment the one becomes conscious of oneself as an individual surrounded by others, with whom he has to establish some such relationship as may enable him to feel at home with his environment, to continue his existence safely, and to satisfy all his natural cravings. This attitude lasts as long as this consciousness continues. It reigns supreme in life until the intellect comes of age and attains freedom from faith and tradition. It overtakes man when the intellect begins to deteriorate or when it fails to satisfy him. By intellect is meant the capacity to think rationally and critically, to question the beliefs based on naive faith, and try to reform them on the basis of fact and logic. There is a time in the life of the individuals and races when such a capacity remains dormant. The religion rules their life. Then man's natural desire to know his environment is satisfied by myths constructed by unfettered anthropomorphic imagination or received from tradition, his emotional response is determined by the threatened frustration or promised fulfilment of his strong instinctive cravings; and his active reactions take the form of prayer to, propitiation of, and bargaining with the power or powers imagined to be controlling his life and the universe. Naturally, the outward expressions of religion differs in different times and geographical situations. Critical intelligence functions little in religious construction. It is too much to expect any coherence, consistency

or system in religious ideologies and practices, which are more actuated by the 'pleasure principle' than by the 'reality principle'. Religious structures are truly skin to our dream structures. Traditional Religions seem to be established from day dreams of different groups of humanity. To some extent we are always religious and shall continue to be so, simply because our entire being can never be organised under the hegemony of intellect and because instinctive faith and wish-fulfiling imagination never ceases to function in the subconscious and unconscious strata of our mind, which are outside the jurisdiction and control of intellect and reason. We shall always fall back upon religion even in conscious life whenever the intellect fails to satisfy us and reason lands us in the world of antinomies and uncertainties. We shall also retort to religion whenever we become conscious of such cravings within us as are mocked at by science and philosophy but are too deep and insistent to be snubbed easily. We shall take shelter in religion when science and philosophy are not able to console us in moments of our deepest grief, sorrow and disappointment.

What Religion has to do in this Age:

Many of the functions that religion used to perform in life formerly, have already, and perhaps for ever, been taken up by philosophy and science. Can religion survive the present day vigorous movement of "Down with religion"? Yes, it can be provided only if and when religion ceases to be too ambitious and concedes to science and philosophy their proper place in life without interfering with their affairs, and comes to understand its right function. Science has given us far greater and much more accurate knowledge about the phenomenal world in a century than could religion give in its entire life time of several centuries. Let religion, therefore cast aside its fantastic astronomy, geography, history, physiology, psychology and other sciences. Let religion also not philosophise any longer.

Inspite of all our advancement in scientific knowledge and power, understanding and comfort, brought about by science and philosophy,

humanity still remains miserable and unhappy. Man is torn by conflicts. He lacks in integration within himself and in adjustment to and harmony with his natural and social environment. He does not feel at home in the universe and with his fellow beings. He is at war within and without, and is using his intellect and power, sharpened by philosophy and secured by science, in intensifying this war. Man needs a new vision, a new feeling, and a new motive, which may save him and make him happy, contented and at home with the world and with his fellow creatures, loving them all and being loved in return. This is expected to come from religion.

The Essence of Religion

The essence of religion consists in that discipline which enlarges and widens the experience of the inner world. It is an effort to clearly grasp the highest values and to realise them in actual life. It is an art of living.

Religion has its source in the eternal yearning of man to intimate in all dimensions of his being, which has not yet been satisfied by science and philosophy. Religion sympathises with man and urges him to keep faith in his yearning.

The study of various religions reveal that amidst all the divergent and different forms going by the name of religions there is but one and the same religion. The following principles may be considered as the essence of all religions.

(i) There is a faculty of power in man deeper than his senses and intellect. A high quotient of this faculty makes one a religious prophet.

(ii) Underlying and pervading all the multiple forms of being, there is a unitary being, which is richer than all its manifestations, emanations or creations, which is the source, the support and the goal of all beings.

(iii) We are more than sensations and intellect one can think of.

(iv) Every man is responsible for his own good or bad actions, the consequences of which he has to bear.

(v) The moment one consciously tries to surrender and sacrifice his self interest for the service and good of his fellow beings in devotion to God, his heart begins to the inflow of Divine wisdom and to the Power which guides and controls the universe.

(vi) Everyone should follow golden rule of reciprocity. We ought to deal with our fellow beings in the same way as we would like to be dealt with by them in similar situations.

(vii) Spiritual attainments and advance made through righteous life here are permanently conserved in the spirit.

(viii) Man himself is responsible for his fall or progress. It is entirely in the hands of the individual to be where he wishes to be on the scale of being.

(ix) The root cause of war lies in our wrong outlook on life; peace is the natural outcome of the right view of ourselves, of our relations to others, and to the value of life.

Dr. Hiroshi Hotoyama, an internationally known scolar of Japan is studying religion in a scientific manner. Religion has been regarded as man's invention. An eminent Psyshoanalyst Dr. Sigmund Freud said that during infancy man maintains a father image which is fearful yet strongly protective. As an adult this image survives in the unconscious, but whenever he encounters terrible situations such as storms, natural violence, and living difficulties, that unconscious image is projected as a fearful but strong protector, God. Thus, the proto-image of God is created. As such, God is a mental product to pacify man's natural restlessness.

David Hume states God as a by product of man's fear. Ludwig Feuerbach, the materialist thinker, claimed that religion is nothing but a by-product of human instinct longing for happiness. Bertrand Russell says God is nothing but a childish fancy or a by-product of emotional desire to satisfy the longing for security.

For the founders of religion and those whose prayers are granted, the existence of God, Buddha or the Ultimate One is not merely a matter of imagination, but in fact a reality.

The Way to realise the Ultimate

Prayer and other religious practices are two means to realize or experience God, the Ultimate. Prayer is a way of communion between the believer and the object of his belief. Most of life's problems are considered in prayer, such as passing examinations, success in marriage, clearing debts, recovering from disease, and freedom from harm by storms or accidents. Man spontaneously prays for protection from God whenever vital problems occur. And at the heights of prayer, one may loose himself in the prayer and experience the existence of God. Other religious practices are quite different in its purpose from prayer, by which people simply want to resolve their problem in order to maintain their present state of being. In these religious practices, people focus their attention to reach God, the Ultimate Being, aiming at the realization of union or identification with God as their final goal. In the case of Catholicism, a man is first initiated into the religion by receiving baptism, and then is ordained into a monastic order by renouncing the common ways of life in order to dedicate himself to austere religious training, including contemplation, meditation and fasting. Generally he may approach God or Christ consciousness, open his ears to hear the voices of God, open his eyes to see the form of God, and finally attains a complete union with God or Christ as is stated in the words of saints like St. Teresa.

In Buddhism, too, a man renounces the worldly way of life to join

a monastic order in a temple in order to undertake religious practices like Zazen and meditation through which he intends to realize his own nature of being Satori which is identical to the entity of the universe, the Ultimate Reality and ultimately, realise Buddhahood as is stated in the Buddist Texts.

Consequently, religion should be defined as man's life in relation to the Ultimate Being.

Man's relationship with the Ultimate can be classified as follows, according to the type of relationship :

(a) The relationship for the mundane interest.
(b) The relation for the realization of a religious ideal.
(c) The relation of complete unification with the Ultimate.

The true essence of religion consists in that man believes in the Existence of the Ultimate Being and makes a constant effort to realise unification with It by following the process of self-transformation to experience God in reality. The ideal of religion is that man actually becomes one with the Ultimate. All the religions have an ethical basis. It seems that ethics is an essential element of Religion besides many other elements.

Dogmatism — Its meaning :

Dogmatism according to Encyclopaedia Britanica, "is the uncritical acceptance and application of any belief, especially of those Ultimates or fundamental beliefs known as principles". The term was applied by Kant to most preceding systems of philosophy because of their alleged neglect to examine 'critically' the nature and bounds of human knowledge as a perliminary step to their construction.

The Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences say on 'Dogma' : "In ancient philosophy dogma meant axiom or maxim, that which claims ultimate,

not merely relative truth. In theology the term designates doctrines authoritatively defined and enforced by a church or a sect. The distinguishing characteristic of a dogma is its support by explicit or implicit social authority. In religion it is the implicit authority which works.

According to Durkheim, the origin of Dogma lies in those primitive, psychical attitudes in which representational, emotional and motor elements are blended and which are common to the members of a group, transmitted from generation to generation and impressed upon individuals, awakening in them sentiments of awe and adoration. Participation in group life is one, but not the only or primary. Collective representations are embedded in ritual, with the growth of social differentiation and criticism myth arises as the explanation and defense of ritual and of the collective representation embedded in it. In dogma the essential content of myth is abstracted, defined and promulgated by social authority. Hence myth and ritual are antecedent to dogma. Explicit dogma arises as a counterpart of heresy, against which it is directed in order to exclude disintegrating forces, to preserve tradition and its acknowledged value and to establish social unity.

While dogma actually reflects the particular historical conditions, it claims immutability, universality and eternal validity. The claim rests partly on the immediacy and sufficiency of those religious experiences which, it is believed, dogma defines, but its source will also be found in the desire for religious certainty in the historical relationship of dogma to political absolutism and in the need of every philosophy for some axiomatic basis.

Dogma has an important educational function, since it serves to define and transmit the content of religion.

All higher religions began probably as deviants. But sooner or later, with some solitary exceptions, they developed into orthodoxies with dogmatism in the spheres of beliefs, rituals including the form of prayer and mythology. Besides these three, 'ethics' constitutes the fourth element in

these religions. There is a view that the ethics preached by all the higher religions is the same. According to Vinoba, a great Indian thinker of present day, the ethical principles are some in all religions (**Selections** p. 28). This is corroborated both by Arnold and Toynbee, according to whom all the four higher religions that were alive in this age in which he was living were few variations on the single theme, and that, if all the four components of this heavenly music of the spheres could be audible on the earth simultaneously, and with equal clarity, to one pair of human ears, the happy hearer would find himself listening, not to a discord but to a harmony (S. Radhakrishnan : **East and West : Some Reflections,** pp. 127-28.

However, intoleration is borne of the fact that while these moral principles are deemed to be applicable to one's correligionists, others are considered to be beyond it. And this happens while these religions declare all to be children of God. This is the old spirit of tribalism which survived in these religions.

Dogmatism as a general attitude expresses itself through rigidity in adhering to a tenet and through the inability to accomodate anything at variance with the tenet.

Religious dogmatism might express itself in different levels of adherence to a particular religion. They are A. Belief level (including faith and convictions of a metaphysical nature) and B. Ritual level (Practice) including forms of worship. On its positive side religious dogmatism involves a kind of 'overdoing' and an unwarranted zeal.

Dogmatism is a closed way of thinking that is characterised by an intolerance towards those beliefs that differ from one's own and a partiality toward those with similar beliefs.

The research on dogmatism suggests that there is a dogmatic personality style. It is a generalised cognitive state that influences how a

person perceives others. Dogmatism sensitizes a person to learn content according to the manner in which it is presented. Dogmatic people tend to be rigid, and have trouble coping with new conceptual systems.

Rokeach (1969) developed the concept of dogmatism as general authoritarianism, or close mindedness, as encompassing not only prefascists by other political adherents who accepted only narrowly defined political positions and broadly rejected and condemned other people who differ, and who are insusceptible to influence to change their views.

The overthrow of dogmatism (Petrovskii, 1967, p. 343) in full bloom just prior to Stalin's death in 1953, was an important feature Stalinist dogmatism (referred to in the USSR euphemistically as the "cult of personality") had inhibited the development of scientific psychology in the Soviet Union, hindered a full realization of its creative potential, and led to fruitless discussions contered about the interpretation of quotations from the classics of Marx and Lenin.

Dogmatism means to assert positively, dictatorially and authoritatively. It is a positive view but one sided view. All religions are definitely dogmatic, e.g., Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism etc. It positively asserts certain views. The followers do not question the assumptions.

Dogmatism has its root in the word 'dogma', meaning a belief, doctrine or principle, or a set of these, taught by some authority, which must be accepted as true and good. It also means an opinion or set of opinions in which people strongly believe and upon which they insist. Dogmatism is the theory that dogmas are the only reliable source of knowledge. Dogmatism is the doctrine based only on one's own speculations. findings or enquiries, but on opinions of persons in authority without seeking any proof to establish their truth. It holds this revealed truth as positive and warranting as if there were no possible doubt.

Dogmatism is a system of principles or beliefs based upon an au-

thoritative source, such as a holy book. It may also refer to a Priori knowledge. It is the belief that truth can be gained through revelation only and not through philosophical speculation or enquiry.

Dogmatism has its source in mystical experiences of Yogins, prophets, the insight of the seers, the intuition of the sages.

Almost every religion of the world has three things as its sole asset : (i) Its origin from a prophet (ii) Its source book and (iii) Its ideosyncrasies.

Hindu religion is the only religion which has not emanated from the revelation of one great soul or prophet, but it believes in a number of seers (Rishis), men of contemplation (Munis) from whom the Vedas first revealed. These seers and contemplators were the very form of God. The Bhagwadgita asserts it. Islam and Christianity believe that their religion has originated from their prophets. The words of these prophets recorded as the holy revelation of truths happen to be the final words of their religions.

Why the Development of Dogmatism

Self Preservation is the law of life and it needs both stability and change. Hence conservatism as much a part of human nature as flexibility. Though society is always in a state of flux, the pace in old days has been slow. Hence conservatism became more ingrained.

The association of religions with power also contributed to dogmatism in the sense of particular interpretation of the principles in favour of the political or social power.

Religion embodies both essentials and uncertainties, permanent and temporary elements. The inessentials and the temporary need not be emphasised much. But the fear of endangering the whole, even if they are emphasised, is increasing the dogmatic tendency.

'Revelation' is a form of intuition and intuition is not altogether devoid of reason, though the logic may not be apparent. This revelation has played a great role in the propagation of religions reducing the importance of conscious reason. This too has led to dogmatism.

Dogmatism in Islamic Religion :

In the Islamic religion dogmatism is most frequently associated with what is called Mullaism. Mullah is associated with an overemphasis on Haria. And Sufi is associated with Tariqat and Maarifat.

From the standpoint of psychological research Mullah stands in the the category of closed-mindedness, and close-mindedness goes with authoritarianism, while Sufi stands with open mindedness i.e. liberalism. All shades and aspects of dogmatism have the closed-minded authoritarian character which is visible in every religion. Religious dogmatism has its genesis in the developmental history of personality. Adherence to a faith may or may not be characterised with dogmatism. It depends on how faith recoils upon conduct and attitude of a particular person, how one's personality is affected. The relationship between faith and dogmatism is purely psychological and not logical. Every religious minded person is not dogmatic in a strict sense. Hence depth, authenticity and sincerity to convictions does not mean dogmatism. In Islam, e.g. every religious minded person is not Mullah even if he wears the same dress — and every Mullah is not necessarily religious in the true sense. In its deeper analysis Islamic philosophy disowns dogmatism. Religious dogmatism is a kind of perversion. It has a pathological dimension expressed in a kind of obsessive-compulsive behaviour, especially in matters of rituals.

The faith and practice of Islam

The teachings of Muhammad became the basis of faith (Iman) and

practice of duty (din) of Islam. Quran is the only source book of Islam. Muslim authorities subsumed most of Islam under three heads : iman, or articles of faith, ihsan, or right conduct, and ibadat, or religious duty.

The first most important article of Muslim Theology is: la ilaha illa Allah meaning thereby There is no god but God. This statement about God seemed to Muhamed more fundamental than the declaration that God is one. God stands alone and supreme. He existed before any other being or thing, is self-subsistent, omniscient, omnipotent ("all seeing, all-hearing, all-willing). He is the creator, and in the awful day of judgment he is the sole arbiter who shall save the believer out of the dissolution of the world and place him in paradise.

Allah reveals his will and guides men in three distinct ways : through Muhammad, his messenger; through the Quran, his revelation; and through the angels. The second half of the Muslim creedal declares : Muhammad rasul Allah, Muhamed is the messenger (or prophet) of Allah. It seems self evident to Muslims that God must reveal himself through prophets. The second way by which Allah guides men is through the Qur'an. The Qur'an, revealed to Muhamed, is the undistorted and final word of Allah to mankind. The third means by which Allah make known his will is through the angels. The Qur'an has provided comprehensive guidance for everyday life. Qur'an has prescribed for its followers religious duties and practices. It is summed up as "Five Pillars" (al-Arkan) :

1. Repetition of the creed. La ilaha illa Allah : Muhammad rasul Allah : "There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the prophet of Allah".

2. Prayer (Salat) — The good Muslim prays five times in day the first comes at dawn, the second at mid-day, then at mid — afternoon, sunset and after the fall of darkness or at bedtime.

3. Almsgiving. This is known as Zakat. It means a free-will offering, consisting of gifts to the poor, the needy, debtors, slaves, wayfares, beggars, and charities of various kinds.
4. The fast during the sacred month of Ramadan, and lastly 4. Pilgrimage (hajj — Once in a life time every Muslim, man or woman, is expected to make a pilgrimage (a hajj) to Mecca.

Dogmatism in Hinduism

Hindu religion is the only religion which has not emanated from the revelation of one great soul or prophet, yet it believes in a number of seers (rishis) men of contemplation or (munis) from whom the Vedas were first revealed. These seers and contemplators were the very form of God. The Bhagwadgits asserts it. Islam and Christianity believe that their religion has originated from their prophets. The words of these prophets recorded as the holy revelation of truths happen to be the final words of their religion.

Hinduism is one of the oldest living religions of the world. It cannot be traced back to one source book. The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics mentions about Hinduism, "Hinduism is a very comprehensive term and has many shades and degrees of varying hues in it, ranging from Brahmanism, the highest and purest and most philosophical form of Theism, and the fetish worship of the aboriginal castes; it has in its course of evolution from nature worship to its present form passed through various phases, has come in contact with all the other religions of the world and has imbibed something from all. It is, in fact, "all tolerant, all compliant, all comprehensive, all observing" (Vol. IX p. 256).

Mr. M.K. Sen in his famous Penguin book, **Hinduism** — The World's oldest faith" compares Hinduism with a tree and says, "Hinduism is more like a tree that has been erected by some great architect at some definite point in time." Hinduism is a rich religion and much more catholic and liberal than many of the religions of the world. It

will not be an exaggeration if Hinduism is regarded as a culture, a social code, a way of living and thinking. It is theory as well as practice. Mr. R.C. Zahner in his book' Hinduism mentions, 'Hinduism is in fact, both Hellenism and Judaism: It is both a way of life and a highly organised social and religious system, but unlike Judaism, the essence of which is submission to one God who is personal, transcendent, and holy, who reveals himself in history. Hinduism is quite free from any dogmatic affirmation concerning the nature of God, and the core of religion is never felt to depend on the existence or non-existence of God, or on whether there is one God or many : for it is perfectly possible to be a good Hindu whether one's personal views incline towards monism, monotheism, or even atheism. This is not what ultimately matters (p. 12) Hinduism is a very catholic system of religion and it abhors rigidity and dogmatism. This view has been subscribed by Mr. J.N. Farquahar in his famous book "A Primer of Hinduism" published by the Oxford University Press, London, "Although Hinduism has many Gods, many sacred books, a man may remain orthodox Hindu without believing in any God or any theology, and without knowing and acknowledging a single sacred book (p. 181). Hinduism in its broader perspective sense may be taken as a philosophy and religion, theoretical as well as practical which aims for the betterment of the individual and the society. Dr. S.C. Chatterjee has very aptly remarked in his well known book **Hinduism.** "Hinduism as a religion includes both a theory of the world and a code of life, that is to say, it is a code of life with a philosophical background."

The sources of Hinduism are based on the religious and spiritual experiences of many Indian sages and philosophers. Dr. S.C. Chatterjee says in his book on **Hinduism,** "It is based on the varied religious and spiritual experiences and teachings of many Indian sages and saints, seers and philosophers, as these have been recorded in the Vedas and the Upanisads, the Smritis and Puranas, the Itihasas or Epics including the Bhagwadgita and the Darshhanas or philosophical systems" (p. 215). Hinduism is also known as Vaidic Religion, i.e. based on the four Vedas. The Vedas are divided into four parts: Mantras, Brahmanas, Aranyakas

and Upanisads. Mantras are basic verses. They were in forms of prayers to different deities for seeking favours. Brahamanas are explanations of the verses and they are said to be mainly concerned with rituals and ceremonies. Aranyak means forest literature and this is meant for those who have retired and leading a life of Vanprasthi. And lastly comes the Upanisads, the last part of the Vedas and also called by the name of Vedanta i.e. the end of the Vedas. Besides Four Vedas and Upanisads, many more epics, like Bamayana, Nahabharat, Puranas also form part of the foundation of Hinduism. These are regarded as the sacred books of Hidus.

Mr. M. Banerjee in his famous book' **Invitation to Hinduism,** says "It is a fact of great importance that Hinduism, the leading religion of the leading religious country of the world, does not have a founder. It grew gradually over a period of five thousand years absorbing and assimilating all the religious and cultural movements." (p. 10).

Puranas are very much popular in the history of Hinduism on account of the reason that they have all important elements of Hinduism, such as ritualism, ceremonialism, concept of virtue and sin, practices of atonements and pilgrimages and other similar things.

Swami Vivekananda subscribes to the view of Jains known as Anekantavada in the realm of religion. Swami Vivegananda preached Universal brotherhood, respect for all religions. Universal acceptance and tolerance are the fundamental concept of his religious philosophy. He says very clearly and categorically that one should follow one's own path according to one's ability and temperament. And he mentions four Yogas in this context : Jnana Yoga, Karma Yoga, Bhakti Yoga and Raja Yoga.

Rabindra Nath Tagore in his famous books **'The Religion of Man', 'Sadhana'** and **'Gitanjali'** tries to combine his humanism with spiritualism, and theism with supertheism writing about Hinduism. Mahatma Gandhi's contribution has also been very effective in this century. Being

a Hindu he seems to be profoundly influenced by different religions of the world, such as Islam, Christianity, Buddhism etc., His approach is universal and synthetic. He pleads for the respect of all religions and lays stress more on Truth and Ahimsa. Truth is God for him. Hinduism has not remained static throughout its development. It has changed according to the needs of the times and due to the influence of its adherents and spiritual leaders and exponents.

Man is the nucleus of Hinduism as in other religions. Great emphasis is laid down on Man and his transformation in various religions of the world. The most important and essential feature of Hinduism and of Indian Culture is its thorough going understanding of the nature of Man and its relations with other beings in the universe as a whole.

The place of Discipline is of great importance. Discipline is the key to all greatness spiritual and moral. The general name for discipline in Hinduism is Yoga. In religion Yoga means a way of life. In philosophy it means the process of practical realization of the Ultimate truths of philosophy. Yoga is a practical method of actualising the potentialities of man, of hastening the spiritual development of man, or realising oneself to be one with the Divinity which is immanent in all creatures, of uniting the individual soul with God, and becoming in tune with Him, of realizing the highest ideal of man, of becoming conscious of one's unconscious powers and potentialities, and making use of them, and finally, of attaining perfect health, happiness and mastery over everything in the world.

Inspite of much disagreement among the various schools of Indian Philosophy, there are some very important points of agreement which may be mentioned here. They may be regarded as dogmatic assertions of Indian Philosophy and Hinduism. They are :

1. **The Theory of Karma and Rebirth :** All orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy agree in holding that every individual has to

bear the good or bad consequences of his actions, either in this life or in the lives to come after death.

2. **Respect for Authority:** Almost all systems of Hinduism and Indian Philosophy have great respect for the statements of the "seers" or of the Vedas which are regarded by orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy as revealed. The Buddhists and Jains regard the statement of their religions with equal respect.

3. **The Doctrine of Mukti:** All the systems of Indian Philosophy except Charvaka (Materialists) hold that a state of existence is possible for the immortal soul in which it is free from all misery and suffering of the world.

4. **The Doctrine of Sadhana or Practical Realization:** To attain the state of perfection or freedom from the samsara (repeated experience of birth and death in this physical world), one has to undergo a course of practical training.

5. **The Doctrine of the Soul :** Except Charvaka and Buddhists all the systems of Indian philosophy believe in the existence of a permanent spiritual entity which exists in the physical body but is independent of the body. It is immortal and is not affected by the birth, growth and death of the physical body.

6. **Belief in the Beginninglessness of the Worldly career of the Soul:** We cannot logically determine how and when the individual happened to be entraped in the world. The present life is the outcome of the previous, and that, of the still previous, and so on, ad infinitum.

7. **The Existence of Subtle and Supersensible Aspects** of the world as well as of the individuals, is also accepted by all Indian thinkers.

8. **The Objectivity and Pseudo-materiality of Mind.** There is hardly any Indian philosopher who identifies the Self (atman) with the mind (manas).

9. **Almost all schools of Indian Thought are realistic.** They all believe in the existence of the objective world as independent of the mind through which it is revealed.

CONCLUSION

Every religion has its dogmas which the followers accept to be true. Without dogmas there may not be religion. It is on the basis of these dogmas followers of one religion differ with the people of other faiths. We must respect the Jain point of view and admit that the dogmatic assertions of particular religion be basically true but we should regard the viewpoint of others as well to be true to some extent. We should not discard the dogmatic assertions of other religions to be false. The Jaina Theory of Anekantavada tries to explain that there are various points of view to look at reality and each point of view may be true to some extent. We should value the dogmatic assertions of other religions even if they are not of our liking and different from our religious faiths.

For proper understanding of other religions we should consider the religions in full perspective weighing the pros and cons and testing the truth of dogmas on rational basis. Unless reason rules the basic aspects of religion we shall not be able to achieve the real purpose behind our thinking. The dogmas of other religions should be studied and tested in its entirety, on the basis of reason and critical acumen involved in it.

Unity of religion is the basic need of humanity today which can be achieved by through understanding of basic principles and dogmatic assertions of different religions by testing their efficacy and truth. We should not treat our religion the only one which claims the truth. We should be broad minded and study the dogmatic assertions in the real life situations. We should have a tolerant view of the realities. Truth

comes out of free and rational discussion. A great Indian Literary work, Yogavasistha says: A reasonable statement, even of a child, should be accepted, while the unreasonable to be discarded like a piece of straw. even though it might have come from the Creator himself.

Twentieth century reformers have deviced means for the welfare of humanity. Mahatma Gandhi has rightly said we should respect all religions. Basically all religions preach good things for the prosperity of society. Vinoba Bhave also stresses the need of the feeling of equality for all religions and in this context refers to four ingredients: (i) faith in one's own religion; (ii) respect for all religions; (iii) reformation of one's religion, and (iv) opposition to irreligiousness. All religions are partial embodiments of truth. The various religions should be understood as different forms of worship. God has innumerable attributes. Hence His worship too can take innumerable forms.

Vinoba Bhave has very aptly remarked that there is need to follow One's Religion better, and says: I would say that every Hindu should try to be a better Hindu, a muslim a better Muslim and a Christian a better Christian. Let each follow his particular way of worshipping the God. God has infinite names and attributes. There are several approaches to a city. Why should not then there be countless ways of approaching the God.

The Nyaya Sutras of Gotama mentions about dogma: An established tenet is a dogma resting on the authority of a certain school, hypothesis, or implication. The tenet is of four kinds owing to the distinction between a dogma of all the schools, a dogma peculiar to some school, a hypothetical dogma and an implied dogma. (i) A dogma of all the schools is a tenet which is not opposed by any school and is claimed by at least one school. (ii) A dogma peculiar to some school is a tenet which is accepted by similar schools, but rejected by opposite schools. (iii) An hypothetical dogma is a tenet which, if accepted, leads to the acceptance of another tenet. (iv) An implied dogma is a tenet which is not explicitly declared as such, but which follows

from the examination of particulars concerning it. (Book I Chapter I pp. 11-13).

All the religions of the world are definitely dogmatic. Every religion asserts certain views. The followers of particular religion and faith do not question the assumptions. If one starts questionming the assumptions, there will be no religion. Then it becomes the philosophy of religion. So there must be dogmatism in religion. But philosophy of religion is critical. While concluding we can say, if one is critical in religion, there would be no religion. So we can be critical to a certain limit. Beyond that we have to accept the assumptions. So the task should be to set a limit to criticism and dogmatism in religion.

THE FALL OF DEVELOPMENT MODELS - FETISHISM

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In economics, as in other social sciences, a number of theories and explanations of certain phenomena is based on assumptions that are arguable, and which are not easy to prove or refute. Even in cases where it may be possible to observe certain correlation between different variables, causation is more difficult to ascertain especially when the issues under discussion are rather complex. Moreover, economics deals with phenomena directly related to the contradictory interests of social groups and classes. As long as there is no consensus about fundamental assumptions various economic schools dealing with complex problems tend to defend their own stand refute other schools which are often accused of being unrealistic or dogmatic.

Economists differ about lots of issues. But it is within the realm of developmental economics that different schools find themselves completely apart. Developmental economics deals with the long term change in total economic systems including their structures, processes and relationships. For classical economists at the early stage of development of capitalism, their main concern was the necessary conditions for the flourishing and fast development of the new system. Since Marx the future of capitalism itself and the possibility of its downfall became the local point of discussion between economists dealing with development. It is here that most of the accusations of dogmatism, vulgarism, and apologitism take place. The arguments and the accusations are well known and need not be repeated.

After the political independence of large number of previous colonies and semi-colonies from the Yoke of direct colonialism and imperialism, and the struggle of the third world countries to achieve acce-

lerated development the problems of backwardness and development came to the fore of economic discussions. A large number of explanations, theories, suggestions of Policies and guidelines for action were presented in the writings of a vast number of economists, sociologists from the advanced countries and from the third world. Different schools of thought differed in their description and definition of the phenomena as well as in their explanation of causation, and suggestions of policies.

It is rather impossible as well as irrelevent for the purpose of this paper to try to present the various stands concerning those issues. It is not hard however to show that the literature is full of dogmatic positions which are directly related to the ideological biases of different writers or researchers. The most flagrant dogmatic stands are those of social scientists who tend to generalize from certain successful development experiences and consider them to have a kind of universality. Such attitudes spread among western scholars and researchers as well as among social scientists of the third world and the socialist countries.

Development was considered as equivalent of economic growth by a large number of western economists as well as by international organizations. Backwardness by the same notion is historic delay in economic growth. Economic growth took place in the advanced countries due to the existence of certain necessary conditions at the same time. These include, the apearance of social groups or individuals who are able to benefit from scientific discoveries and put them in the services of production and lowering of costs, the availability of enterpreneurs ready to bear risks of innovating especially in the field of industry, the availability of necessary capital to finance these ventures and readiness of owners of capital to take the risk of supporting innovating enterpreneurs, the availability of a working force that is ready to aquire new techniques and to be retrained through an economic system that force them all the time to increase their productivity through more specialization and coordination. These conditions which prevailed in western Europe in the late seventeen and early eighteen centuries enabled the western advanced

European and american countries of achieving a rate of investment which was continuously higher than the rate of increase of population, which made possible the continuous accumulation of new capital and the higher per capital income. Development in the underdeveloped countries will not take place unless the same necessary conditions can be repeated. This in the new conditions of today necessitates the opening of the underdeveloped countries to investment from abroad. National savings would not meet the investment rate necessary to guarantee a rate of growth noticeably higher than that of demographic growth, hence the need for foreign capital to fill the investment gap.

Developing countries with limited markets, should compete to grasp a share of the growing markets of advanced countries, to achieve that they have to adapt methods of management, marketing and production technologies similar to those prevailing in the more advanced countries. Multi-national companies are said to be the best vehicle to introduce such techniques in the more or less stagnant economies.

Moreover developing countries, to increase their own savings should allow more inequality between social groups, and be aware of the dangers of popular search and demands for more social justice, since only the rich can save and invest.

To sum up, the developing countries are asked by "experts" to adopt the capitalism mode of production, and change their own culture heritage, and follow the same path of the more advanced countries in order to ensure economic growth. Development, according to this view, could be accelerated only by removing obstacles in the way of capitalist development by reshaping structures and institutions in line with the requirements of capitalist growth, and by replacing the culture, customs and values in the developing countries — considered to be among the main impedient to their development — by those prevailing in the capitalist societies.

The development experience of the last three decades and the diffi-

culties which most third world countries encountered in their drive to overcome underdevelopment, even though they had assidiously followed the advice of development 'experts' and 'specialists' in the advanced capitalist countries and of international institutions dominated by these countries, cast doubts on the validity of the formulas they prescribed. In their critique of these neoclassical theories, third world economists stressed that the historical conditions in which capitalism had originated and flourished in western Europe, America and Japan would not recur. They noted that the capitalist systems on the periphery differed considerably from those prevailing, or which used to prevail, in the countries of the centre, and that peripheral capitalism had failed to provide suitable conditions for real economic and social growth conductive to economic liberation from imperialist domination and to satisfying the needs of the vast majority of the people. Although specific conditions could allow a number of countries on the periphery to achieve rapid economic growth, this growth would remain distorted and dependent. Authoritative studies confirm not only that poverty remains pervasive, but that it is in some cases becoming more acute. They point also to the growing problems of unemployment in many developing countries, even those which have recorded relatively high rates of economic growth.

All these factors, in addition to growing balance of payment deficits and the accelerated rate of external debt accumulation, gave rise to a new school of thought, which called for an "alternative" development, one directed at satisfying basic human needs, a raising of living standard, at releasing human potentials, developing man's personality and promote his creative abilities. This would come about through the citizen's democratic participation in the development process, in which he would both set the goals and become the instrument by which to achieve them.

The failure of formulas for development imposed from above, which ignored the cultural identity of developing countries and held western civilization up as the only model worth emulating, prompted second thoughts about the very meaning and concept of civilization and invalidated the contention that the west alone carried the torch of civilization

and that it was only in western civilization that the values and trends necessary for economic and social progress could be found. Modern trends in development literature stress the importance of preserving the cultural identity of different peoples in order to assure their active participation in the required processes of change and emancipation. They point out that there are positive elements in most cultures that can be preserved and developed in conformity with changing conditions, reconciling authenticity and renewal so that a society's distinctive personality is not destroyed but, on the contrary, asserted.

Just as capitalist theoreticians were wont to "deify" the capitalist model of growth as the only valid solution to problems of underdevelopment, so too did socialist, and particularly marxist, literature tend at one stage to hold up the view that the Soviet model of development, industrialization and the building of socialism is the only possible model to be followed if rapid growth and the building of a socialist society is to be realized. Two factors helped foster this tendency. One was admiration at the speed with which the first socialist state had managed to overcome the economic ravages of World War 1, the Revolution, the civil war and the war of intervention; at its successful assault on economic and social underdevelopment; at its ability to build an independent and advanced industry and to institute agrarian reform and development which enabled it to defeat the superior military might of nazi Germany; and, finally, at the Soviet Union's rapid recovery from the massive destruction of World War 11 without any outside help. The other factor can be ascribed to the dogmatism which characterized marxist thought during the Stalinist personality-cult period, and to an inability to differentiate between the particular and the general in the Soviet experience to build socialism and realize economic progress.

The duplication of the Soviet experience in the east European states, with their smaller size and different historical conditions, provoked a number of political and economic crises which raised the need to question just how 'sacrosanct' the Soviet model was and how far it could be generalized, whether in respect of development or the building of

socialism. At the same time, the rejection of capitalism by many national forces in the third world, some of whom opted for socialism and others for a path to development inspired by socialist experiences, raised many issues for which there were no ready answers in socialist developmental literature, which had been more concerned with studying the origins of underdevelopment than the ways and means of development. Among the main issues which came in for discussion was the fact that underdeveloped countries were not part of European civilization and that the productive forces in these countries were weak. What made a reappraisal of such issues possible was the return of vitality to marxist thought after the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Orthodox marxism has since come to adopt the thesis that there are many paths to economic and social development and for the building of socialism. Marxist methodology became acceptable to many thinkers who did not belong to communist parties or who did not accept the philosophical aspects of marxism. At the same time however, the ideological differences between the Soviet Union and China, and China's projection of itself as part of the third world of the South, which had suffered from imperialist domination and which continued to suffer from the collusion between world imperialism and the new 'social imperialism', coupled with China's success in building a different model of development in conditions of high population density and limited resources — especially agricultural — relative to the number of inhabitants, its raising of the slogan of 'self-reliance', its drive to realize technological development in traditional sectors of production while stressing the importance of retaining the cultural identity of the Chinese people, captured the imagination of many revolutionary elements in different parts of the world. These tended to 'deify' the Chinese experience and advocated following the same path to development, despite the fact that conditions in their countries were different from those in China, whose experience was the product of an historical evolution specific to it and which reflected historical and objective conditions intrinsic to Chinese society. In the the recent changes on the Chinese stage, the post-Mao opening into the capitalist west, the violent criticism of the Cultural Revolution and of some aspects of China's development experience, further confir-

med that neither of the two world models for development was as sacrosanct as their respective proponents or partisans had supposed.

The downfall of the present development model "fetish" is a positive phenomenon, in that it opened the field to creative thought and objective research into existing conditions to find the most appropriate means by which third world countries can achieve development without forgoing their cultural identity. This entails testing the viability of different ways and means to this end and allows for more in depth and detailed discussions of the component of development and for uninhibited and constant search for different approaches to these components.

If it has now been established that any society striving for development and cultural progress can follow any one of many possible paths, and that it is difficult to judge — a priori — the validity of a given path before testing the results it can produce in the long run, it has to be remembered, that a large number of "experts" of different schools, insisted, and some are still insisting, that there is only one successful path to development, and that the way out of backwardness is to follow a model already tested and proved successful in given historical circumstances. Dealing with a complex problem such as development, effected by their own ideological biases, "experts" tend to generalize from experiences that were the product of specific historical and objective conditions unlikely to recur. They ignore the fact that in addition to the political choice involved, each experience is linked to the stage of development attained by the society applying it, its relation with the outside world, the size of its material and human resources, the degree of diversity of these resources, and finally to the nature of the cultural values prevailing their historical origins and their specific characteristics. While some aspects of each experience may have their universal importance, few others are linked to what is specific in the given historical situation. This inability to differentiate between what is universal and what is specific is only one of the many roots of dogmatism in economics as well as in other social sciences.



THE TENDENCY TO EXTREMENESS OF RESPONSE : A FORMAL DIMENSION OF DOGMATISM

M. I. Soueif (Egypt)

Introduction

The problem of dogmatism has been capturing the interests of a sizable number of Western psychologists, social scientists, and thinkers during the forties and the fifties of this century. This came as one chapter in a whole series of cognitive reactions to World War II, its ideological as well as its action aspects. Perhaps the accentuation of the cold war between East and West that went on throughout the fifties contributed to the persistence and elaboration of interest in the problem. By mid sixties very few scholars had any new investment in this enquiry. With the rise of international tensions towards the late seventies, research interest in the nature of dogmatism seems to have been reactivated.

It is Socratic wisdom that words become astonishingly difficult to grasp when we try to define them conceptually. Yet we use words all the time, with an undeniable degree of effectiveness in handling ourselves, other persons, and interpersonal transactions. What we depend on in using words is a working rather than a conceptual definition. Numerous efforts have been made to define dogmatism. Noteworthy are the attempts made by M. Rokeach and A.S. Luchins. In order not to get entangled in the conflicts entailed by such different view points (Goodstein 1953) we would rather adhere to the following working definition : By dogmatism is meant a way of thinking which favours closed rather than open systems. This definition is nearer to, but not identical with, Rokeach's (Rokeach 1960; Brown 1965 p. 541). However, it is a working definition sufficient for our limited purpose in this presentation.

During the fifties and part of the sixties we carried out, in colla-

boration with a number of colleagues, a series of empirical studies on intolerance of ambiguity. In this paper we intend to give a brief account of what we did and of our main findings. We will, thereafter, discuss some of the implications of this work for research in dogmatism.

An account of empirical work.

Intolerance of ambiguity has been defined by E. Frenkel-Brunswik as, "A general personality disposition, according to which people consistently differ in their capacity to tolerate or cope with... unstructured objects and events. A person who is high in intolerance of ambiguity will tend to engage in black-and-white thinking..." (Kretch et al. 1963, p. 67). Elaborating on the same theme Frenkel-Brunswik went on to say, "We found evidence, in certain groups of our subjects, of intolerance of ambiguity in the perceptual as well as in the emotional and social areas". (In these groups of subjects) "feelings are expressed in terms of the ends of a continuum rather than of a continuum proper" (Frenkel-Brunswik 1951, pp. 394-5). In other words, such persons neither see shades nor express themselves in degrees. Guided by a few such notions in the literature (e.g. the writings of K. Lewin and J.S. Kounin) and a whole host of observations, we could develop the following hunch: **Socio-cultural marginality breeds tension which can be manifested in intolerance of ambiguity.** Within this broad framework a series of specific hypotheses were formulated and a number of investigations were conducted to test the validity of these predictions.

We first conceptualized a measurement of intolerance of ambiguity (Soueif 1958). The tendency to give extreme responses was considered to be such measurement. We, then, argued as follows : if individuals are consistent, within and across situations, and if this expectation could be established empirically, we could, then conclude that the tendency to give extreme responses is a reliable and measureable characteristic of human personality. A tool was constructed according to psychometric rules and a big number of field studies were conducted between 1958 and late sixties (Soueif 1965; 1968). Among the many results we came out with, that might be relevant to our present deliberation were the following :

1. The inclination to respond in extremes, irrespective of direction (viz. agreement or disagreement), and of content, proved to be a reliable characteristic of personality, i.e. self consistent within and across a wide variety of situations.

2. Exremeness of response was demonstrated to be part of a broader cluster of personality traits, identified as intolerance of ambiguity. In other words intolerance of ambiguity proved to have manifestations other than exremeness of response.

3. Social marginality is highly correlated with extremeness of response : the more marginal a group is the more its members tend to react in extremes. Thus females in a man's world are more extreme; Christians in a Moslems' world are more extreme; adolescents in a world controlled by the establishment created by adults go to extremes; members of the lower-middle class are more extreme than members of the middle-middle and upper-middle class.

4. There is a positive correlation between restrictiveness of socialization procedures and the tendency to respond in extremes; more restrictiveness is associated with more extremeness.

5. There is a correlation between psychological abnormality and extremeness of response : both neurotics and psychotics tend to give more extreme responses than normals. And psychotics tend to be more extreme than neurotics.

6. There is significant association between the magnitude and/or intensity of socio-cultural change and extremeness of response; more socio-cultural change (breadth and depth-wise) is associated with more extreme responses.

These were our major findings. What adds to their objective value is the fact that they were obtained by different researchers, working in

different places : J.C. Brengelmann in U.K. and Germany; J.T. Barendregt in the Netherland; M.I. Soueif, M. Hannourah and others in Egypt and J.P. Das in India.

The question now is how to interpret these results ? Why do some people tend to give extreme responses in most situations ? We submit that this takes place because such people suffer from a high level of generalized tension. The concept of tension has a reasonably established status in contemporary psychology (Eysenk 1953, pp. 299-303) particularly in the research area of drives and interpersonal and intergroup relationships. In their well known dictionary H.B. English and A.C. English define the term tension as follows : a hypothetical construct that ascribes states of unrest, uneasiness or restlessness and emotional states resulting when needs are unsatisfied, to state of disequilibrium in tissue activity (English and English 1958). P.L. Harriman (1963) defines the same term as "the behavioral effects of worry, excitement, strain or frustration". Kurt Lewin, however, used the term 'tension system' by which he meant "a motive that derives from an intention to carry out some act, and persists until that act is finally accomplished" Marx 1976, p. 604). Accordingly, there is nothing pathological about tension as such. Conceptually, tension is a necessary precondition for the flow of behaviour. Hence, when we talk about a high level of tension, hypothesises behind a tendency to give many extreme responses we mean something like 'residual tension' or 'above-optimal tension'. We think that it is this high level of tension which stands as common denominator behind marginality, restrictive way of socialization, psychological abnormality and acculturation stress accompanying voluminous socio-cultural change. It is interesting to note that, structurally speaking, results similar to ours concerning marginality and psychological abnormality were reported in U.S.A. on totally different measurements of extreme responses. Thus I.A. Berg and J.S. Collier reported that While females and Negro males gave significantly higher extreme responses than White males. They also stated that high anxious males, high anxious females and generally neurotic males demonstrated more extremeness than low anxious males, low anxious females and normal males respectively (Berg and Collier 1953).

Else Frenkel-Brunswik made a distinguished contribution to the study of intolerance of ambiguity. She suggested that, "I may well turn out upon further evidence that intolerance of... ambiguity is related to a broader psychological disturbance of which prejudice... is but another manifestation" (Frenkel-Brunswik 1949). We think that the 'broader psychological disturbance' mentioned by this author could be 'residual tension'. It should be noted in passing, that this concept is not to be identified with clinical anxiety. Yet clinical anxiety might be one manifestation of residual tension.

Our final question is: to what extent would the amount of residual tension as measured by extreme responses be influenced by transitory situational factors ? The empirical work so far published indicates that the tendency to extremeness shows reasonable stability across various situations, but at the same time leaves scope for some influences of transitory factors to enhance or to reduce the basic tendency. Emotionally charged objects and/or subjects tend to increase extreme responses.

These findings and comments can be meaningfully related to dogmatism as defined in the present paper. Though dogmatism is mainly denoting a certain way of thinking it is never a purely cognitive phenomenon. Correlated with dogmatism is relevant emotionality, viz. readiness to defend, with anger and fear, one's dogma. Defensive reaction is motivated by intolerance of ambiguity. Hence intolerance of ambiguity is to be considered part and parcel of the whole apparatus of dogmatism. Sir Frederic Bartlett (1958) defined closed systems of thinking as those systems including all the elements needed to solve relevant problems. Thus a thinker favouring closed systems saves himself the trouble of cognitive adventures. Anything like scepticism, agnosticism or a fresh view of a problem would be defended against. Two factors might, therefore be underlined to account for the way a dogmatic person may react in defence of his dogma : (a) an element in the personality structure; the position such person occupies on measurements of intolerance of ambiguity, and (b) a situational element; to what extent

the confronted situation is novel, unstructured or requiring adventurousness. The implications of this formula for education against dogmatism are quite obvious. Here is a field where psychology can prescribe psychological teachings as part of a treatment programme, and where philosophy may learn good deal from psychological wisdom.

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RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS AS PATTERNS OF POLITICAL INTERPRETATION AND BEHAVIOUR (WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION)

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We start looking at three political cartoons from Iran. The first one(1), from October 1981, comes from the weekly bulletin of the Islamic Republic Party. It shows three contemporary political leaders, King Husayn of Jordan, Saddam Husayn of Iraq and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia. The caption reads :

"Hasan (sic ! should be Husayn), Saddam, Khaled, the Abu Lahab, Abu Jahel, Abu Sufyan."

The bulletin is published in English, and distributed widely in Europe and the U.S.A. But the point in quoting the cartoon here is this : Although it is easy to recognize the persons depicted, and the caption is in English, the cartoon is incomprehensible for almost every European or American reader. The ordinary Western politician can guess that the cartoon selects to convey some criticism of these three, but he is, as a rule, unable to perceive in what respect.

The same cartoon is quite clear for everyone in the Muslim world, for every-one with some knowledge of Islamic history. The three names, Abu Lahab, Abu Djahl and Abu Sufyan, belonging to well known figures in the history of Muhammad and of early Islam, give specific associations to standpoints, acts and modes of behaviour. One understands the charge the cartoonist brings against the three leaders, irrespective of whether the comparison seems fair or absolutely false. The cartoon is comprehensible, and with its help one can surmise the IRP's intended policy as to these three. But the prerequisite for the prognosis is familiarity with the traditions of Islamic history. Mere understanding of a

foreign language is not enough, we must have knowledge of the cultural environment, the institutions, signs and symbols which convey patterns of interpretation and conduct.

In Iran, at present, the Islamic, and especially the Shii, historiography, the "cognitive universe" of Shii Islam, serves as a **language, a** language in the sense of a **system of signs**(2). By means of such signs and symbols, events, modes of behaviour, conflicts, are interpreted; one is able to objectify individual experiences, to obtain a **typology** for them, so that they become parts of a general pattern.(3)

The second cartoon(4) comes from another publication in English, **Echo of Islam,** issued by the Ministry of Islam Guidance, from a number in November 1981. We see Saddam Husayn (of Iraq) kneeling for the ritual prayer (the carriage of the body and the hands indicate the ritual of as-Salat). The outline of his face forms a frame for a question-mark. His prayer-rug is the flag of the U.S. On his shoulder is a swastika. Some twenty other persons are praying in the background. But the point is : They are facing another direction. The cartoonist expresses his (and the Tehran regime's) contempt for the enemy Saddam by a typification from an Islamic frame of reference. Saddam has the wrong **kibla,** direction of prayer. not towards the centre in an Islamic world-view (the Ka'ba in Mekka),(5) but to the diametrical — the U.S.A., indicated by the flag. We find here a good example of **legitimation,** in the sense of a "second order" objectivation of meaning, i.e. the process of explaining and justifying.(6) The picture only **appears** to depict a situation of ritual prayer. The meaning is wholly different : The cartoonist implies that Saddam's political and military actions are against Islam, Islam regarded as a political system. He means that the Iraqi leader has chosen a non-Islamic policy (=Western) and not the **nizam,** the "system" of God. Thus the war against Saddam is legitimate, it is a duty; he is typified as an enemy, and his error is "explained" and the contempt for him justified.

His error is explained by the question-mark. He is "ignorant" of true Islam, i.e. the comprehensive building of socially objectified "know-

ledge" (vocabulary, values, beliefs, historiography) which constitutes the cognitive universe of the regime in Tehran. This is the most common approach to concepts and stand-points which threaten one's own : Enemies and antagonists are regarded as ignorant as hypocrites. It is thereby possible to eliminate the danger which they represent for one's own patterns of interpretation.(7)

The cartoon contains an interesting detail : The swastika on Saddam's shoulder, a sign not from Islamic tradition but from Western history. We have here the phenomenon of juxtaposition of signs from different traditions(8), which involves their re-interpretation. They partly change their meaning when incorporated in a "symbolic universe" other than their original setting.

Now for the third cartoon (from **Echo of Islam,** Oct. 1981).(9)

Again the main problem is one of communication. The average Westerner, not acquainted with Islamic tradition, cannot grasp the entire significance of the picture, but in the Muslim world it is understood, and provokes reactions, from agreement with the idea of the cartoonist, to an angry repudiation of this use of religious concepts in a way easily regarded as blasphemous. The picture shows several men in the **ihram** dress worn for the rituals of the Pilgrimage of Mekka. They perform the rite known as "the Stoning of Satan", throwing pebbles on one of the stone pillars in the Mina valley, a ritual commemorating Abraham's rejection of Satan when the Devil tempted him to disobey God's command to sacrifice his son. The performance of the ritual is said to express willingness to resist the Devil and obey the precepts of God.(10)

But in this cartoon the stone column, symbolizing Satan, has the head of Uncle Sam, the Western cartoonist's sign for the U.S.A. By the juxtaposition of signs from two different "worlds" both kinds of signs change their significance. To the **denotation** "U.S.A." of the sign "Uncle Sam" are added the **connotations** which the word "Satan" conveys in the Muslim tradition, U.S.A. as the "greatest Satan". The stone pillar, the

symbol of Satan, and the ritual symbolizing willingness to reject Satan's temptations, become the expression of a specific **political** standpoint, the fight against the U.S.A. — or rather that for which the U.S. stands: the alternative cognitive universe. The political fight is typified as a religious duty.

It is reported from the Pilgrimage in Mekka in October 1980 that several of the pilgrims from Iran were seen making the V sign during this rite.(11) The rite was thus combined with another Western secular symbol, the sign which expresses assurance of victory in a military or political struggle. By means of the added Western symbol the "rejection of Satan" becomes a term signifying readiness for political and military encounter to gain victory over the enemies of the Islamic-fundamentalistic revolutionary movement. We may note that the philosopher of the Iranian revolution, Ali Shariati, in his book on the Pilgrimage describes this particular rite as a symbolic battle against enemies.(12) We may also remember that the date of the occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran is interesting in this respect. The embassy was seized on the November 4th, 1979. October 31st that year was the date of the 'Id al-Adha, connected with the Pilgrimage ceremonies. Thus the first days of November were the time when the pilgrims performed the "Stoning of Satan". It is sheer coincidence that the occupation of the Embassy of the "greatest Satan" happened exactly then?

By the use of the Islamic symbols, the events and modes of conduct of the revolution, and the subsequent conflicts acquire interpretations which span the spheres of reality; they are legitimized in such a way that they are regarded as connected with the divine order of the universe, with God and his commands.(13) It is of great importance to consider the psychological impact of this. Reactions, feelings, modes of conduct, can be foreseen, if we study cultural and religious traditions of a region, and take into account the continuous process of **reinterpretation** of the tradition as a pattern for understanding current events.

The problem in the Muslim world has been and still is the confrontation with a Western society having a different history, other interpretative patterns and patterns of conduct. The alternative "cognitive universe" and its challenge must be countered(14). The methods are manifold. The **traditionalistic** is one : to deny all value to the foreign, regarding it as un-Islamic in every respect, belonging to the category of Satan and polytheism **("taghuti")** — "nihilation" in Bergerian terminology. It is also possible to accept it as a secular "scientific" world view, this combined with a privatization of religion as a sub-universe with relevance only to a part of the total existence. A third way is the **"modernist"** approach which involves the incorporation of the deviant concepts, the translation of them into concepts derived from one's own universe.(15) This means that the challenge is changed into an affirmation, a process amply exemplified by the new use of ancient symbols and signs, and the juxtaposition of symbols from different "universes".

May I illustrate these different ways by a very trivial example ? The traditional way of cleaning the teeth has in the Muslim world been to use a **miswak,** a small stick with a chewed tip. The modern tooth-brush now challenges the **miswak,** the use of which is no longer taken for granted as the method of cleaning the teeth. "All" know that the Prophet Muhammad himself used the miswak. It is thus a part of Muslim history and tradition. But will it mean to follow his **sunna,** the pattern of his conduct, in this respect ? Is it to deny the Islamic character of the Western tooth-brush and establish the importance of using the miswak (and nothing else) for cleaning one's teeth ?(16) Or is it to use a modern tooth-brush in the same manner and for the same purpose as the Prophet used the **miswak ?** Or — a third alernative — does the **sunna** of the Prophet in this case indicate the importance of good hygiene in general ? The two later examples mean the incorporation of the Western tool and Western (modern) values, which signifies an affirmation of the "progressiveness' of Islam. The **miswak** can also assume a new role :

When some Muslim groups today, e.g. in the U.S.A. or in South

Africa, proclaim that the only correct **sunna** is to use a **miswak,** not the Western tooth-brush, the **miswak** has the function of a **sign** or even of a **symbol,** a sign of opposition to "modernism" and its incorporation of Western life in Islam, and a symbol of a special interpretative attitude and its world view. Characteristically these "ahl as-sunna" — groups always accuse their opponents of ignorance of Islam.

Words in political terminology derive their concrete meaning (their psychological "effect") from their connotations, their associations with what we know (or think we know) about events in the history of our group/nation/culture. If for instance we use the word "revolution", its connotations are in the European (and all Western) political language governed by the French and the Russian Revolution. They give us our attitudes, our feelings and reactions towards revolutions, and our anticipations of what will happen in a revolutionary situation.

Now we know that the Iranian revolution found its pattern not in the French or Russian Revolutions but in the rebellion of the third Shii Imam (Husayn ibn Ali) against the Caliphate of Yazid — a historical event of prime importance in Shii historiography. The traditions concerning his revolt (in 680 A.D.) and his 72 followers' death at Kerbela has conferred a special spirituality on Shiite religiosity, the high valuation of martyrdom.(17) The importance of this concept is illustrated by a glimpse at some of the dates in the progress of the Iranian revolution. We find that the first part of the month Muharram is of significance, particularly the days around the **'Ashura',** the commemoration of the tragedy of Kerbela on the 10th. The uprising in 1963 (end of May, beginning of June) coincided with this period. In the revolutionaries' own historiography this insurrection was the beginning of the end for the Shah.(18) In 1978 the Ashura coincided with the climax of the demonstrations against the Shah (December 10th and 11th). The ritual cry "Death to Yazid" became the political slogan "Death to the Shah". The religious processions in memory of Imam Husayin assumed the role and function of demonstrations.(19) In 1979 the days around the 10th of Muharram (turn of the month November/December) were marked

by huge demonstrations outside the occupied U.S. Embassy. Many of the demonstrators were dressed in shrouds, the symbol of willingness to accept martyrdom.(20) In 1980, as well as in 1981, the Ashura celebration provided an interpretation of the war with Iraq. To fight in the war against the "atheist" Saddam Husayn is considered "a Husaynic act."(21) The concept of martyrdom, and the interiorization of this concept by the liturgical repetition, the **ta'ziya**(22), undoubtedly played a considerable part in creating the morale of the Iranians in their fight against Iraq. Enthusiasm for martyrdom equals self-sacrifice and also frenetic hatred of those who are identified as "Yazidians".(23) We also find the Kerbela-motif in the reactions to the bombing of the IRP Headquarters on June 28th 1981.

News of the number of victims spread immediately : 72 people killed, and it was underlined that they were of the same number as the martyrs of Kerbela.(24) Even when it was known that the victims were more numerous, this figure was retained.(25)

The Kerbela-motif and the Ashura celebration is an **institution,** i.e. a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions. These typifications of actions are built up in the course of a shared history of Shii Islam. The institution lays down predefined patterns which control behaviour.(26) The study of the institutions (in this sense of the word) in the world today has a prognostic value. One is able to predict actions. One must know what "the other" regards as conventional reactions and modes of conduct.(27) A comparison with the policy of the Shah, and his system of legitimation, makes it possible to describe the revolution as a change of historiography (i.e. pattern of interpretation) from a secular-nationalistic to a Shii and fundamentalistic-Islamic.(28) Similarly, we can see in the conflict between Iran and Iraq how the war is legitimized by two different patterns, the Shiite-Islamic theoretic pattern and its historiography in function in Iran (and in a considerable part of the opposition in Iraq !), and the nationalistic Arabism in Iraq and its allies ("fight against the Farsi imperialism").

The religious pattern can be used in reverse too. A repudiation of the Iranian revolution is sometimes verbalized as "They are Shii, you know" — "nihilation" in the Bergerian terminology. One stresses one's **sunni** status.

We have now considered the Iranian revolution with tools from the Berger-Luckmann concept of Sociology of Knowledge. We can combine this with the model to be found in Victor Turner's **The Ritual Process** (Key words : liminality, communitas, structure).(28) The revolution was a liminal situation, where the previous structure of the society broke down, with its institutions, interpretative patterns and historiography. In the liminal stage the people experienced the **communitas,** the euphoristic feeling of togetherness. But this stage cannot last long. It must be followed by a restructuring of the society, and this restructuring occurs with Shii theology and historiography as the utopia(29), as patterns for the new society. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran provides excellent examples of this restructuring. Thus the **communitas** dissolves, and new tensions arise and must be resolved. The "knowledge", the interpretative patterns, has to be reaffirmed(30) through symbolic objects (.g. the shrouds) and symbolic actions (e.g. rituals such as the mourning rites, demonstrations — and the war with Iraq). The cartoons quoted above are part of this process.

We could continue and make an inventory of dates for important political events, and compare them with the Muslim calendar. We could point to the fact that Anwar Sadat as the date for his sensational visit to Jerusatem in 1977 chose the **'Id al-adha,** the commemoration of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son(31), and that Sadat's murderers chose the same day for their deed. We could observe that the "purging" of the news media in Iran(32), in 1979, happened during the last 10 days of Ramadan — and so on. But I think the examples given are sufficient.

I am convinced that in the long run economic and social factors are decisive for the political development, in the Middle East as everywhere

else, but for the actual political behaviour in the short run an important factor consists in the set of ideas and concepts (expressed by words, symbols, symbolic behaviour) which provoke certain reactions.

The Iranian revolution, like other examples of the function of religious traditions and concepts in the Middle Eastern politics, illustrates the **dialectical** character of the relation between the socio-economic setting and the interpretative and legitimizing sets of concepts(33). In Iraq for instance the driving forces of the opposition against the Ba'th Party and its policy can be described in socio-economic categories as a social protest, but this opposition gains much of legitimacy when interpreted as a Shii opposition against the Sunni secularism ("Atheism") of the Ba'th Party. The opponents themselves regard the inequities of the society as a lack of true Islam.

In order to predict the long term future development, and the basic political tensions, we have to consider the economic and geo-political field.(34) But in order to predict the immediate future (next month, year, decade) we must analyse the ideas serving as legitimation among the different groups. It is a question of "trial and error": What is regarded as "real", and why. A set of ideas is seen (by "all" or by groups) as right, or even taken for granted, and therefore applied intentionally or spontaneously in political actions. If these are followed by success (as for instance the Iranian revolution, and the Iranian victories against Iraq) the ideas are confirmed and the set, the cognitive universe, strengthened, so that the ideas become accepted by more people. Failures weaken the gripp of the ideology, and other ideas come to the fore. This process is illustrated by the current shift from Arab socialism to Islamic "fundamentalism" as patterns for policy and political legitimation, as we can see for instance in the recent developments on the West Bank.(35) A new shift may occur when failures refute the ideas. The interpreting "knowledge" not only differs between societies, but develops, and the analyses of the differences and changes are necessary for political prognoses.

NOTES

1. IRPWB 1:49, Oct. 2, 1981, 14.
2. For the concept of Language as a system of social objectivated signs, cf. Berger-Luckmann, 36 sq.
3. "Anonymization" in the terminology of Berger and Luckmann, of idem, 39 sq.
4. Echo of Islam 1:8, Nov. 1981, 63.
5. As for the concept of Centre and its role in contemporary Islam, cf. Hjärpe 1979, 30 sq.
6. Cf. Berger-Luckmann, 92 sqq., and Berger 1969, 29.
7. Cf. Berger-Luckmann, 65 sq.
8. Cf. Hjärpe 1981, 1 sq.
9. Echo of Islam 1:7, Oct. 1981, 16.
10. Cf. Hajj Studies I, 16 and 32.
11. Impact 1980 : 21, 4.
12. Shariati, 81 sq.
13. Signs as symbols, cf Berger-Luckmann, 40.
14. For the concept of **confrontation** in this respect, cf. idem 107 sq.
15. For the concept of **incorporation,** cf. idem 115, and as for the different interpretations of Islam today cf. Badawi, 12 sqq.
16. The miswak-theme is frequently taken up e.g. by the Majlis al-Ulama in Port Elisabeth in South Africa, in tracts and in their paper "Voice of the Majlis".
17. Cf. Hjärpe 1982, passim, see also Ende, 153 sqq.
18. Cf. the speech by Khomeini at the 1981 anniversay of the uprising, quoted in IRPWB 1.33, June 12, 1981, 23. See also Nyberg. 40.
19. Cf. Hjärpe 1980. 8.
20. Cf. Nyberg, 147.
21. See e.g. Mahjubah 1:1, April 1981, 17. This is a standing theme in the propaganda stressed in all the numbers of IRPWB during the war, as well as in the other papers.
22. Cf. Hjärpe 1982, passim.
23. Cf. fig. 4 The picture comas from IRPWB 2:2, 6 Nov. 1981, 19.

24. Cf. **IRPWB** 1:43, Aug. 21, 1981, 24; **IRPWB** 1:37. July 10, 1981. 6.
25. Cf. the editorial in the Kayhan International, Sharivar 11, 1360, Sept. 2, 1981, 2, and the special 'Ashura' issue of **IRPWB** 2:2, Nov. 6, 1981, the picture on p. 20.
26. For the concept of institutions and their function, cf. Berger-Luckmann, 54 sq.
27. Cf. idem, 57, 65 sq., 98.
28. Cf. Turner, 94 sqq.
29. **Utopia** in Mannheim's use of the word, cf. Rodinson 1979, 37.
30. Cf. Berger-Luckmann, 71.
31. Cf. Hjärpe 1980, 9.
32. For the dates, of Internationella Studier 1980: 1, 14.
33. Externalization and objectivation (Versachlichung) as a dialectical progress, cf. Berger-Luckmann, 61, and 87.
34. Cf. Rodinson 1977, 238.
35. Cf. Time, Febr. 1, 1982, 36.

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
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
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HASAN, SADDAM, KHALED THE ABU LAHAB, ABU JAHEL, ABU SUFIAN





PHILOSOPHY VERSUS RELIGIOUS DOGMA

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Is religious dogma open to philosophical criticism ? The answer we shall give in this paper is in the affirmative. We shall be mainly concerned here with refuting recent philosophical attempts on the part of some neo-Wittgensteinians to construe religious dogma as something immune from critical examination from without.(1) So let us first try to understand how these neo-Wittgensteinians attempted to establish their position.

The first thing we notice about such a neo-Wittgensteinian attempt is that its main thrust is directed against positivistic reductionism. According to these neo-Wittgensteinians, religious discourse can be characterized in the same way. G. E. Moore characterized moral discourse, namely as sui generis. This is to say that religion, like ethics, is incapable of any kind of reduction. We should not be misled into thinking that religious issues are empirical ones, because a question such as "Does God exist ?" has an empirical air about it. The fact that such a question seems to resemble empirical questions should not mislead us into thinking that the difference between a believer and a non-believer is in the final analysis a difference as to whether a certain state of affairs holds or does not hold.

D. Z. Phillips puts the matter in the following way :

> When the positivist claims that there is no God because God cannot be located, the believer does not object on the grounds that the investigation has not been thorough enough, but on the grounds that the investigation fails to understand the **grammar** (italics mine) of what is being investigated, namely, the reality of God.(2)

Phillips suggests, furthermore, that the question, 'What kind of reality is divine reality ?' must be contrasted not with the question, 'Is this physical object real or not ?' but with the question, 'What kind of reality is the reality of physical objects ?', 'For to ask a question about the reality of god', as Phillips puts it, 'is to ask a question about a **kind of reality,** not about the reality of **this or that,** in much the same way as asking a question about the reality of physical objects is not to ask about the reality of this or that physical object'.(3) This brings us to the famous contention of the holders of this thesis, namely, 'The criteria of what can sensibly be said of God are to be found **within** the religious tradition'. This conclusion has important bearing on the question of what account of religion, philosophy and theology can give. It follows from Phillips' argument that the criterion of meaningfulness cannot be found outside religion, since they are given in religious discourse itself. 'Theology', he writes, 'can claim justifiably to show what is meaningful in religion only when it has an internal relation to religious discourse'.(4) 'As soon as one has language', he continues, 'one has logic which determines what can and what cannot be said in that language without being prior to it'.(5) The gist of this is that neither theology nor philosophy can impose their criteria on religion from without. The role of philosophy in this context is not to justify or evaluate, but to **understand.**

In the light of the above we can now understand Phillips' previous remark that neither theology nor philosophy can impose criteria of meaningfulness on religion from **without.** The role of philosophy is not to justify or critically examine but to **understand.** And religious concepts can only be understood through having an insider's access to the mode of life in which these concepts inhere(6). If such an understanding is lacking, then, as Malcolm observed, these concepts will look like 'absurd constructions' of some kind(7) To do these concepts justice, then, one must understand the 'phenomena of human life' from which they have originated(8).

The above point is similar to what Spengler said about understanding cultures. Spengler emphasized that one cannot acquire a true under-

standing of a culture without being able to **indentify** oneself with it. This is definitely pertinent to the study of anthropology, and no one should deny that a proper understanding of a form of life requires, if not an identification, on the investigator's part, with the form of life in question, then at least a participant's understanding of it. But the holders of the irreducibility thesis want to go further. They want to stress that having a participant's understanding of religion is sufficient for accepting it as conceptually coherent. G.E. Hughes, for example, argues that it is not possible for one to devise a non-religious criterion for judging first-order religious propositions as conceptually incoherent or even false, if one has an insider's grasp of the concepts employed in them. In that case, it is not possible to devise some such criterion unless 'one is allowed to insist that they (religious propositions) must conform to the logic of some other category or categories of statements or expressions if they are to be said to make sense'.(9) But that is exactly what we are forbidden to do. And the ban on doing this is a logical one. To try to do the opposite can only be the result of confusion and misconception of the mode of discourse under analysis.

The philosopher's role in analyzing religious language can be taken to be somehow analogous to the philosopher's role in analyzing moral language. Philosophy is to religion as philosophy is to ethics. The philosopher's job is to interpret the **actual** use of religious terms and concepts in the light of the overall logic of the religious form of life. His job is to understand the workings of this logic, not to justify it or condemn it by using criteria which belong to another form of life.

Notice, for example, Martin's contention that when 'God' is used as a proper name or as a descriptive term, contradiction is the result. Martin was able to arrive at this conclusion, according to Hughes, only because he misunderstood the logic of 'God'. When God is thought of as a 'particular thing', then Martin's remarks about the contradiction involved in using 'God' as a proper name or a descriptive term become pertinent. But the logic of 'God', according to Hughes, is not that of proper

names or descriptive phrases. For God cannot be properly thought of as a particular thing within orthodox Jewish and Christian thought.(10)

The above remarks call for an interruption. God, Hughes is claiming, cannot be thought of as a particular thing. For, God, after all, cannot be identified or pointed at like a particular thing. So it seems reasonable to say that to think of 'God' as a proper name or a descriptive phrase is to misconstrue the logic of 'God'. But does this really clarify our puzzlement as well as Martin's about the logic of 'God'? Are we clear now about how God should be properly thought of? Consider the orthodox theistic contention that God is an **individual.** Now, if God is an individual, does this not suggest that God, after all, must be thought of as a particular thing? Or, doesn't this suggest, at least, that God must be thought of in a way which is somehow analogous to the way in which we think of particular things? For what is the logic of 'individual' if it is not the logic of 'particular thing'? So here we have, at least, a **prima facie** reason for being puzzled about the logic of 'God'. God, on the one hand, is not **this** or **that**; God is unidentifiable. On the other hand, God is an individual who answers prayers, performs miracles, judges, punishes, etc. But the two do not seem to go together. Take, for example, the word 'individual'. This word belongs to the overall discourse (English in this case) of which religious discourse is only a part. And the logic of this word is that embedded in this overall discourse. It is the logic of particular, identifiable things. How are we going to understand, then, the utterance 'God is an individual' if God is not to be thought of as a particular thing? Is it not the case that there is a seemingly obvious conflict between the logic of 'God' and the logic of 'Individual'? Aren't we, then, in some sense **justified** in our puzzlement about the logic of 'God' when combined with the logic of 'individual'?

— II —

Let us leave Hughes with all the above questions trying to figure out th logic of 'God' and turn to the major claim of the thesis under

consideration. This major claim, as I have tried to show earlier, consists in saying that religion is a form of life and as such is immune from the philosophers' as well as anybody else's onslaughts. This very claim figures prominently in Winch's **The Idea of a Social Science** and in his by now famous article 'Understanding a Primitive Society'. Winch, it must be noted, does not address, himself to the question of the intelligibility of God-talk. Many of the points he makes, however, have some bearing or another on this question. Take, for example, what Winch says about understanding radically different concepts than our own. We can begin here by taking the following situation : a man who was brought up in Western culture with all its emphasis on the scientific method was brought into an immediate encounter with a primitive culture, where, say, magic was one of the major practices. Now let us assume that this man tried to understand their conception of magic in the proper manner, namely, in terms of how it was taken by the people practicing it themselves and in terms of their own social structure, i.e., forms of life. However, if he were to argue that nonetheless these people were deluded and that there is in fact no magic or there are no witches, then he would be presupposing that our account of these matters, namely, the scientific account, corresponds with objective reality while their magical beliefs do not.

The above presupposition, Winch thinks, is the result of a misconception of what counts as objective reality. Winch does not want to deny that 'we should not lose sight of the fact that men's ideas and beliefs must be checkable by reference to something independent... some reality'.(11) What he wants to deny is the attempt to define what corresponds to objective reality exclusively in terms of what is scientific. He wants to maintain that it would be mistaken to think that if in a certain culture people have a different conception of reality than ours, that our conception, being scientific, corresponds in a more adequate way to reality than their conception(12).

Questions such as, 'What is real ?', 'What is reality ?', or questions about what corresponds to objective reality and what does not can only

be raised within some form of life. For the criteria of what is real or not, what corresponds to objective reality or not are **liguistic** criteria. As Winch puts it, it is not reality, as an independent thing, that 'gives language sense.' For what is to count as real and what is not can only be exhibited in the sense embedded in language, that is, there is no criterion for what agrees with reality or does not prior to language(13).

In his attack on Pareto's idea of a social science, Winch makes the same kind of remark. 'Ideas cannot be torn out of their context', says Winch, for 'the relation between idea and context is an internal one. The idea gets sense from the role it plays in the system'.(14) In the spirit of such a remark, Winch attacks Pareto's failure to distinguish between illogical and non-logical actions(15). Pareto, for example, treats both the practice of magic on a par with actions performed within an activity such as the business activity. The businessman's mistake is to be taken, according to Winch, as subsumable under the category of business activity. Magical operations, however, comprise in and of themselves a category of behavior. Magic, in cultures where it constitutes a genuine form of life, plays a role of its own and is performed according to rules of its own. The same is true of business activity as a whole. **Acts** performed within this activity can be understood only by reference to this activity as a general category of behavior.

A distinction such as the one just introduced between an activity as general category of behavior and an act subsumable under it is needed for a distinction between illogical and non-logical behavior. It is quite clear that an illogical act is one that involves a logical mistake, while an act which can be justifiably characterized as non-logical is one to which the rules of logic do not apply at all. Pareto failed to make this distinction, according to Winch, because 'he failed to see that criteria of logic arise out, and are only intelligible in the context of, ways of living or modes of social life. Hence one cannot apply criteria of logic to modes of social life as such'.(16)

The implications of Winch's ideas with regard to the issues under

considerations are quite obvious. Religion, for him, is a mode of social life, in the sense that religious beliefs together with religious practice constitute a general category of behavior. This makes criteria of logic or rationality not applicable to religion as such. Consequently, religion as a mode of social life is immune from critical examination from without.

— III —

One of the consequences of this position is that religion, as a form of life, is somehow **self-contained.** A form of life is to be understood after the analogy of a **system.** For example, we can talk about Aristotle's system and Galileo's system as two different systems. Therefore the concept of force, although it is used in both systems, does not have the same meaning in both. For them to be using 'force' in the same way, the two systems must be alike in all relevant respects.(17) Religion is not only a 'system' but a self-contained 'system', because on the view discussed religion seems to have no points of intersection with any other 'systems' (forms of life). Religion, as a self contained 'system', is to be taken as irreducible and thus as **conceptually independent** and **internally coherent.**

What gives an air of plausibility to the claim that the theistic form of life is irreducible is the fact that orthodox theistic discourse is centered around an infinite being. The reality of God, as we have seen Phillips contending, is a different kind of reality. God is not a **thing** or an **object,** and, therefore, He cannot be real in the same sense a thing or an object can be real. Furthermore, we cannot construe the expression 'reality of God's as analogous to 'reality of finite objects', for God is a **kind** of reality — divine reality — and not a being that belongs to a reality. Divine reality is **qualitatively** different from empirical reality. If so, then 'facts' pertaining to divine reality are bound to be irreducible 'facts' and thus statements expressing these facts are bound to have their own irreducible 'logic'. This does not seem to be problematic. It is quite obvious that if God represents a kind of reality distinct from,

say, physical reality, then the 'logic' of 'God' is bound to be other than the logic of particular things, and religious 'facts' are bound to be irreducible to empirical facts. One can generalize here by saying, if God, being infinite, is a **unique** reality (i.e., the divine realm is other than the empirical, the moral, etc.) then the logic of 'God's is unique in the same way. So far well and good. What is disturbing, however, is the realization that God is **so** unique that there is no possibility of applying our categories of understanding to Him. But then it is even in principle impossible to **understand** the 'logic' of 'God' or develop it in a coherent way. The point is that we have no way of telling **what** divine reality is, and consequently we have no way of understanding what it means to say that it is unique or irreducible.

Calling something 'unique' comes after the fact, in the sense that we first determine its nature, and then by some specified criterion we either predicate or withold predicating uniqueness of it, as the case may be. But this is exactly what cannot be done when it comes to God. For God's nature is inaccessible to our understanding. So, it is no help to be told that God is unique or that the logic of 'God' is a unique (irreducible) logic. All we can say is that if God is unique, then the logic of 'God' must be unique, too. But if we do not understand in what sense God is unique, then we do not understand the logic of 'God' either. More fundamentally still, if God is absolutely beyond our understanding, then there is, strictly speaking, no logic of 'God'. For in that case, every literal, first-order use of the term 'God' would be 'improper' in one way or another. It would not help much here to say that such descriptions are improper, not in the sense of being paradoxical and linguistically incoherent, but only in the sense that they are **inadequate** as descriptions of the infinite. For to say they are inadequate is to presuppose that we know what it is like for them to be adequate, and therefore, their inadequacy can be removed in theory. But that is exactly what cannot be done. For our problem is not that we know what 'infinite being' means but lack the linguistic means to express this meaning. If this were our problem, then the alleged inade-

quacy of our descriptions would be corrigible in theory. Our problem, rather, is that 'infinite being' has no determinate sense-whatever for us, and as a result we cannot fix the reference range of whatever description we have of God. This is why every first-order, literal use of 'God' is linguistically improper. In that case, of course, it does not make sense to talk about there being a logic of 'God'.

It might be objected here that divine reality is not inaccessible to us and, therefore, we can determine the logic of the divine. This is evidenced by the fact that, as religious believers, we know how to operate with religious concepts. But that shows that we know how to talk **properly** about divine reality. After all, as Winch might argue here, it is not reality that gives language sense. Whatever sense 'divine reality' has, is one embedded in the way religious concepts function in certain concrete contexts. To argue this way is not very helpful. For what we need to be told is what sense 'divine reality' has. What is this sense of 'divine reality' given to us in religious language ? As orthodox believers, we tend to look at this reality as infinite. Now, how is 'infinite' to be understood ? Not only is divine reality infinite, it is also an **individual.** But then in what sense can a reality be an individual ? And if an individual is an identifiable sort of thing, what does it mean to say that divine reality, which is by necessity immaterial, is an individual ? And if divine reality is infinite, what sense is there for the description 'infinite individual' ? The full force of these questions will not become clear until later in the discussion. For the time being we just want to emphasize that although we can grant Winch that reality is not what gives language sense, it by no means follows that since there is a discourse centered around divine reality that 'divine reality' is intelligible in some significant sense. For to discourse about something is not the same as discoursing **meaningfully** about it or, at least, whether we are discoursing meaningfully about it or not, is something that can be determined after the fact.

A Winchian might counter here by stressing that since we know how to operate with concepts pertaining to divine reality, (theistic

concepts) then there is no question about the meaning of intelligibility of these concepts. But do believers really know how to operate with these concepts ? Do they really know, for example, how to operate with the concept of the Trinity ? Aren't Christians playing the language game properly when they claim that the Incarnation is a mystery ? Would it be coherent within the Christian form of life to say that there is nothing mysterious about the Incarnation ? Of course, not. But then isn't the Christian in effect saying, I do not know how to operate with 'Trinity' or 'Incarnation' or that whatever I say here cannot be taken literally ? But then does he know how to operate with these concepts non-literally, i.e. symbolically, if there is nothing that can be known literally about the incarnation or the Trinity or God for that matter ? Or, take the question of Survival. Does a Christian know what it means to exist in a disembodied state ? Does he really know how to operate with 'disembodied love', 'disembodied pain', etc. ? But aren't these concepts an integral part of the theistic language, and aren't they problematic ?

It might be objected here that 'disembodied love', 'incarnation', etc. seem problematic, because we are not relating them **internally,** as we should, to the form of life in which they are embedded. To so relate them is to subsume them under the over-all direction or purpose of their form of life. The moment we look at them in this way, we can no longer raise doubts about the ability of the believer to operate with them and about their own intelligibility. This objection, of course, presupposes the conceptual independence and irreducibility of religious discourse, a presupposition that has been put into question earlier. However, the questionable nature of this assumption will not come to full light until later in the discussion. It also presupposes that understanding a concept in the light of the overall function it has in a form of life means **accepting** the concept as coherent and intelligible. Or, to put it differently, operating with religious concepts the way religious believers operate with them renders them unproblematic. But how do religious believers operate with 'incarnation' or 'disembodied love' or 'infinite individual' ? I have just pointed out that the religious believer himself is not all that sure as to how we ought to operate with these concepts. It is true that

the religious believer himself might be utterly confused about how these concepts are to be construed. But how do we determine that ? How can we determine, for example, in the light of the over-all purpose of the Christian form of life, that a Christian is confused in his claim that the Incarnation is an absolute mystery, meaning of course, that there is no way in which we can talk coherently about it ? It might be suggested here that this can be done by divorcing Christianity from all the metaphysical and theological elements that have crept into it and that are responsible for all the apparent incoherencies in religious language. But, then how do we determine what is **purely** metaphysical or theological and what is **purely** religious in the theistic form of discourse ? It seems to me that no criterion can be devised for this purpose, that is, for drawing a line of demarcation between the purely religious and the purely metaphysical or theological in theism. For, to begin with, we have **prima facie** indications that the theistic language is not metaphysically-neutral. When a believer claims that the universe has a cause external to it, and that there is life after death, he is far from being metaphysically-neutral. Claims of this type seem to be integral to the Judaeo-Christian tradition and, furthermore, there are **prima facie** reasons for considering them metaphysical or quasi-metaphysical. Therefore, it would be question-begging to even try to draw a line of demarcation between the purely metaphysical and purely religious in theism. Even if we ignore this difficulty what does drawing such a line of demarcation involve ? Suppose someone were to say that 'absolute simplicity' as predicated of God by some theologians is not an integral part of first-order theistic discourse but is simply a theologian's term. Now, here it is presupposed obviously that a line of demarcation can be drawn between the purely theological and the purely religious. But to be able to say that absolute simplicity cannot be properly attributed to God presupposes a certain **interpretation** of a religious discourse contrary to the one given by a theologian who finds 'absolute simpilicty' a proper religious expression. But then the one who does not find it proper is involved in **theologizing.** How do we determine here whose theology is the adequate one ? To do that we have to theologize ourselves; we have to arrive independently of either one's theology at an **interpretation** of religious discourse that is congruent

with one of the two or different from both. Is there a way to break this theological circle ?

It might be suggested here that one can break this circle by simply appealing to the way religious believers actually operate with their concepts, and thereby discovering the rules embedded in their discourse, and then by means of these rules determining what is the proper and what is not the proper thing to say about God. But surely a Winchian would want to distinguish here between how some religious believers operate with their concepts and how they **ought** to operate with them. Otherwise, he would have to say that they never **misuse** the theistic language, which is absurd in the light of the fact that Winch, as we have seen, has to allow for the possibility that a religious believer might be confused about what meaning to assign to some religious utterances. But if we have to distinguish between how some believers use theistic concepts and how they ought to use them, then to appeal to how believers use their concepts alone is not sufficient to determine how these concepts ought to be construed. To solve this problem here, we cannot appeal to the way the majority of religious believers use them, for this presupposes that we already possess some independent criterion for their correct use. Moreover, to be able to determine how a Christian, for example, operates with his concepts, we must be able prior to that to know that these concepts are purely religious. But that's exactly the question at issue. The problem, then, is this : To be able to separate the religious from, say, the metaphysical in religious language, we have to appeal to religious language as used by believers. But we have already acknowledged that metaphysical concepts have crept into this language. In that case, our appeal to this language for the purpose of separating the purely religious from the metaphysical breaks down completely.

Now even if we ignore this difficulty completely, can we really determine anything of significance by appealing to the way religious believers operate with their concepts ? Let us take one of Winch's examples, namely that on the way religious believers operate with certain concepts, it is illogical to say, 'One can pit one's strength against God's. Now,

following the Winchian reasoning here, since we can construe the latter as illogical or linguistically improper, it must be the case that we know how to operate with 'God'. There is no doubt that there is a sense in which we can talk about operating correctly or incorrectly with the concept of God, and Winch's example is a perfect indication of that. But what does it exactly mean to say that we can operate with the concept of God here ? One thing that could be meant is that there is a rule embedded in religious language by means of which one can go from 'X is God' to 'One cannot pit one's strength against X'. This rule can be thus stated, 'For anything, X, to satisfy the description 'God', it must be illogical to say that anyone can pit one's strength against X'. But surely, the fact that we can operate with 'God' in the sense of being able to subsume its use under some such rule does not mean that 'God' is a coherent expression. For we can employ some incoherent concepts in the same way, i.e., we know how to operate with them in some limited sense. For example, there is a linguistic rule to the effect that if something, X, is lazy, then **X** cannot be industrious. Thus if the absolute is lazy, then it is not industrious. But the fact that the use of 'the absolute is lazy' in the latter is subsumable under the former rule is not sufficient for us to ascribe intelligibility to that expression. This is the case because we might have — as we do in this case — other linguistic rules on which the linguistic expression 'the absolute is lazy' is to be taken as an incoherent one.

Let me restate my case here in the following way. A linguistic rule always takes some such form : 'If it is proper to say that something, **X**, has property P, then it is also proper to say that it has Q'. An instance of this for example, would tell us that it is proper to say that **a** which has P also has Q, but it can never tell us that it is proper to say '**a** has P' or '**a** has Q'. For this we have to turn to other linguistic rules. In other words, although one might find it proper to say that **a** is Q because **a** is P, one might have separate reasons for saying that it is not proper to say that **a** is P or **a** is Q. For example, as a rule, if **X** is a triangle, then **X** has three sides. But this is not to say that every substitution instance of the propositional function '**X** is a triangle' is

a legitimate expression. Analogously, if **X** is all powerful, then one cannot pit one's strength against X's. This is apparently alright. So, naturally it seems also alright to say, or, rather the proper thing to say that one cannot pit one's strength against God's, God being omnipotent. But, this is not to say that we know how to operate with 'God' or that it is legitimate to say that God is all powerful. Here, for example, one might say that it is not linguistically proper to predicate 'power' of an immaterial being. Now, if God is taken to be immaterial, as it is the case in Judaeo-Christian tradition, then it does not seem meaningful to predicate power of Him. So, although it seems proper to say that one cannot pit one's strength against God's, where 'God' suggests to us the image of an immensely powerful being, no inference can be drawn from this to the effect that 'God' is an intelligible expression. For, on further analysis, and in the light of other linguistic rules, it might turn out that there is no significant sense that we can attach to 'God is an immaterial being and has power'.

IV

One of the consequences of the thesis under consideration is that no belief about God can be said to intersect with non-religious beliefs. Given that God is infinite, then by necessity no beliefs we form about Him can be reduced in part or in whole to beliefs about finite beings. Therefore the criteria we employ in our search for the truth or meaning of the latter beliefs are not to be confused with those we employ for determining the truth or meaning of the former. The problem, however, is that, although, strictly speaking, no beliefs about an infinite being can intersect with beliefs about finite beings, theistic beliefs seem to have reference to and implications about things other than God. For instance, it is essential to theism to believe that God is the cause of the universe, or God gave man a free will. Now neither one of these two beliefs is about God **alone;** the first, for example, entails something about the world as a whole, the second has certain implications about the affairs of men. The first belief, one might argue, expresses a cosmological hypothesis of some kind. One implication of this belief is that the world

has a **cause external** to it, or the world is an **effect** of something. But words such as 'cause', effect', 'external', it might be argued, are taken over from ordinary speech and science. And these words occur in sentences that express true or false claims. Once this becomes clear, the possibility that religious claims might be in conflict with non-religious claims as well as with each other cannot be excluded. The point here is that the world cannot be made dependent or an effect by definition or fiat. The question of its dependency or of its being an effect is not a closed-question. If so, then we are faced with the possibility that the religious belief about God being the cause of the world might be in conflict with what holds true of the world. On the basis of this analysis, the following general statement can be made : Since some religious beliefs seem to entail certain statements about the world, and since the latter, or some of them at least, can be determined to be either true or false independently of any religious criterion, then there is at least a possibility that some religious beliefs might be in conflict with non-religious ones. In the face of this possibility, the strict compartmentalization envisaged by Winch with regard to modes of social life can no longer be seriously entertained.

To elaborate on this general point, consider the time-honored problem of evil. Hume along with many other philosophers seemed to have found some good reasons to consider the religious statements, 'God is good' and 'God is all-powerful' as either conflicting with one another or with certain facts about the world. The point I want to make, however, is different from Hume's. I simply want to argue that even if there is, as a matter of fact, no such conflict as the one envisaged by Hume, it is still the case that whether there is such a conflict or not is an **open question,** in the sense that although such a conflict might not exist in fact, it is still logically conceivable that such a conflict might have existed. My argument is very simple, I take it that 'God is all-good' and 'God is all-powerful' together entail the statement 'Every instance of suffering is a justified one.' For, on the one hand, God, being all-good, would not permit people to suffer except for a **necessary reason.** On the other hand, since God is omnipotent, He has it in His power to prevent

unnecessary suffering would exist. Now, even if we accept the claim that every instance of suffering is justified, it is still the case that the denial of such a claim is not contradictory. This, of course, raises the **possibility** that a set of religious beliefs might be either in conflict with one another or with certain facts about the world.

Consider another possibility of some such conflict. Take the religious belief that God gave man a free will. It is quite obvious that 'Man has a free will' is a necessary consequence of this belief. What is also obvious is that whether man is free or not is an open question. So, even if we assume the truth of 'Man has a free will,' this does not safeguard against the logical possibility of there being a conflict between 'God gave man a free will' and some facts about the world. If we were to discover on the basis of empirical observation that all our actions are determined by uncontrollable hidden urges and irrational desires, this would make the claim, 'Man has a free will' patently false and thus would conflict with the religious belief under consideration. Here again, then, there is a possibility that a religious claim might be in conflict with certain facts about the world.

What the above analysis shows, if anything, is that if religious claims entail, as they seem to do, certain things about the affairs of men and the world in general, then it is at least possible that religious claims are in conflict with certain known or knowable facts about the world or with one another. If so, we can no longer acquiesce in Winch's contention that religious beliefs are conceptually independent and self-sufficient.

A Winchian might counter the above argument in the following way. Religious discourse has its own rules of procedure, its own irreducable concepts in the sense that it has no implications whatever of a non-religious nature. Whatever is entailed by a religious belief or a set of religious beliefs has an **internal** relation to the conceptual system of religious discourse. Therefore it must be looked at from **within** this conceptual system to which it is internally related. This move, however, would be a question-begging move. For it would presuppose exactly what

is being questioned by the analysis offered so far. What has to be shown is that whatever we are claiming to be entailed by theistic beliefs is, as a matter of logical necessity, subject to no rules of procedure other than the ones embedded in theism. Otherwise, a Winchian would have to show that theistic belief cannot have consequences of the type considered.

Would it be congruent, however, with the theistic tradition to claim that religious beliefs have no points of intersection with other beliefs? I think not. It seems to me that Bernard Williams' essay, "Tertullian's Paradox"(18) offers, unwittingly, a strong case against the Winchian thesis. The gist of Williams' argument is that if all religious statements were statements about God and no more, then God would no longer be the God of theism, who, in Williams' language, is a 'toiler in the world'.(19) The fact that statements about God are not simply and solely about God is, as we hinted earlier and as we shall presently show, behind the paradoxical character of God-talk.

Religious utterances, Williams observes, are of different kinds. Some express assertions, some express moral directives, some are used to make prayers. Religious utterances which are used to make statements are varied in scope. Some are used to make statements about the nature of God such as 'God has necessary existence', 'God is eternal' and so on. Some are used to make statements about historical events such as 'God banished the Jews' and some are used to make statements about human nature such as 'God gave man a free will', God gave man a soul' etc. There are religious statements, then, which cannot be considered religious statements, then, which cannot be considered religious in the absolute sense. For these statements, although they are about God, make reference to things other than God.

The above point can be supported by the Judaeo-Christian tradition itself. 'If all talk about God were talk about God', Williams argues, 'and all talk about the world were talk only about the world, how could it be that God was the God of the Christian believer, who is a toiler in the world of men? Would not the views about the nature of God retire more

and more away from the world of men and his existence become like that of the gods of Epicurus, 'far remote and cut off from our affairs.(29)

The belief in a God who is a 'toiler in the world' reached its apex of dramatization in Christianity where God, the infinite being, was ready to be born and crucified. But this belief, which constitutes in fact the foundation of Christianity as a form of life, forms the point where religious discourse meets with non-religious discourse. For what has to be said here' is not that a certain person was crucified, but that that person was the son of God'.(21) But at this very point of intersection, a paradox arises. 'The paradox comes about', as Williams puts it, 'because, although we must have some statement which says something about both God and the world, when we have it we find that we have something that we cannot properly say'.(22) For when we talk about God from a purely religious point of view, we are required to consider Him an **infinite** being or **perfect** and **eternal.** This means, of course, that we cannot discourse about Him in the language which is suitable for talk about finite and imperfect beings. But we cannot talk about Him except by using this language. Therefore whatever we say about Him must by necessity be 'lacking'. Thus when we are confronted with an assertion about God and the world together, there is no escape from a paradox. For if we consider in this case the assertion in question satisfactory, it is imperative to look at the relation of God to the world from the point of view of the temporal world. This means that the assertion in question either described the world alone without any reference to God, or described God in temporal terms.(23)

It has been shown so far that religious discourse lacks conceptual independence or at least that the claim that it is conceptually independent comes to nothing in the light of the fact that we cannot even begin to say what it means for religious concepts to be separable from non-religious ones. And in the course of the analysis offered in this context, it has been shown why some people find good reasons for considering religious language incoherent and paradoxical. This claim requires some further analysis. Let me first state what incoherence consists of. In general, incoherence arises if one entertains a belief which implies two

incompatible propositions. There are many reasons why people become subjects to incoherence in this sense, but I need not enter into all of them here. However, incoherence arises, generally speaking, when the speaker of a certain language knowingly or unknowingly violates the rules of this language in such a way that he uses, say, two terms **a** and **b** to describe a certain state of affairs **S** where **a,** as it is ordinarily used, implies **x** and **b**, as it is ordinarily used, implies **y**, and where **x** and **y** are logically incompatible If, for example, a speaker of the English language were to say that some entity, **E,** is both an individual and immaterial, incoherence would result. For 'individual', as it is ordinarily used, implies 'identifiable' and 'immaterial', as it is ordinarily used, implies 'unidentifiable'. So the belief that something **E** is both an individual and immaterial would entail two incompatible propositions, namely, '**E** is identifiable' and '**E** is not identifiable'.

There are cases of incoherence in religious discourse which are analogous to the above example. The first case can be gotten simply by substituting 'God' or **E** in the above example. Apart from this, one can find other cases of incoherence in the first-order religious propositions. Consider, for instance, the religious belief that God is loving in conjunction with the belief that God is **immaterial.** The two propositions 'God is loving' and 'God is immaterial' do not appear to be contradictory until one starts examining the rules governing the linguistic use of both 'loving' and 'immaterial'. For when one does that, one immediately recognizes that 'loving' can be used only when certain **behavioral checks** are applied to the individual judged to be loving. But these behavioral checks cannot be applied unless the individual who is being judged is in possession of a body. The use of 'immaterial' however, excludes any reference to bodies and hence the application of any behavioral checks. Therefore, there seems to be some incoherence involved in entertaining the belief that God is loving and God is immaterial.

Incoherencies of this type can be found in many other cases. We are required, for example, to think of an immaterial being such as God as capable of acting in the different ways that we attribute to God. We are asked to think of Him as capable of creating, judging, talking, guiding

and so on. The picture becomes far more complicated when God is thought of as being **immutable** in the absolute sense of the term, which means that God is even in theory incapable of any change, or when we are to think of Him as being a **simple substance,** which means that there are no relations in God and consequently that God is without parts. Thinking of God as being absolutely unchangeable and simple, in conjuction with the belief that God is capable of acting in the various ways we attribute to Him, seems to yield a fundamental logical incoherence.(25) On the one hand, acting in the way we think of God as acting requires movement and consequently temporal succession. There is a temporal succession with regard to every action, because acting means moving from one state to another. On the other hand, when we look at God as being a simple substance, difficulties multiply. Being a simple substance means, at least, that it would be impossible to introduce any type of differentiation to His nature, that is, it would be impossible to distinguish one action of His from another. But for someone to be capable of performing **different** actions, we must be able to **differentiate** one action of his from another. God, as a simple substance, however, is incapable of reduction to parts. Therefore God lacks differentiation. If by definition He is not composite, then it is logically necessary that He has no parts and consequently that no part of His be distinguished from another. It would not help much here to say that 'absolute simplicity' is a philosopher's term and not an integral part of the corpus of 'religious language'. For it is still the case that 'God is immaterial' is a first-order religious statement, and thinking of God as immaterial admits of no possibility of change or temporal succession in God. It would be logically odd indeed to talk about an absolutely immaterial being as capable of division (analysis into parts) or change. But the latter is a necessary requirement — a logically necessary requirement, that is, — for acting in the various ways God is supposed to act. As Alston argues, the application of action-words presupposes the occurence of certain bodily movements(26). It is clear, for example, that one of the essential things we presuppose when we say **'A** punished **B'** is that **A** moved certain parts of his body in some way or another. This is simply to say that some bodily occurences are required not that a certain type of them is required. **A**'s punishment of

B cannot take place via purely intellectual process. **A** cannot punish **B** by simply entertaining the idea of punishing him. He has to **act** in some way or another to meet the punishment in question. But when it comes to God there is no possibility at all of distinguishing between God's thinking about punishing **B** and God's punishment of **B**.

The above poses a strong **prima facie** case for saying that religious discourse is, at least, partly paradoxical and incoherent. More fundamentally still, the above analysis presents a strong case for saying that religious discourse is not a 'private conceptual system', but, on the contrary, has intersections with other categories of utterance. To counter our analysis simply on the ground that religion is a form of life and as such is coherent and non-paradoxical is to beg the basic question at issue.

To reinforce this claim even more, let us consider the following hypothetical situation. Suppose, before the rise of any of the three Great Religions, a philosopher with a quasi-Hegelian mind started to develop, somewhere in the Middle East, a theory about the divinity of history. Suppose, furthermore, that he started to preach people to worship history for history is nothing else but the expression of the development of some divine power. Now, let us assume that this philosopher, or Teacher, or whatever you want to call him was able to command a big following and that later this following was to develop into some sort of a rigid group with its own creeds, rites, ceremonies, etc. Let us assume that some of this group's belief are the following : History is the manifestation of the development of some divine power, and therefore history itself is divine; this divine power is **transcendent** and **immanent;** it is a conscious power and hence history possesses consciousness, and so on. Now these beliefs along with the rites and ceremonies belonging to this rigid group would constitute a form of life **par excellence.**

The question now is whether this system of beliefs (form of life) is, or is not, subject to critical examination from without. Surely this question cannot be settled **a priori.** To see this point more clearly, let us forget for the moment about the new form of life that was developed and concentrate on the thought of the quasi-Hegelian himself. Now the

question of whether his thought is coherent or incoherent, meaningful in some sense of 'meaningful', or meaningless, corresponds with reality or does not, cannot be settled **a priori.** One cannot simply say that his beliefs are coherent solely because they are someone's beliefs. Nor can one say that his thought must be coherent simply because it must have a background in his society's traditions and beliefs which constitute a coherent form of life. For apart from the fact that the latter is question-begging, it implies the absurd claim that it is **impossible** for anybody's thought or beliefs to be incoherent or confused. For anybody's thought or beliefs must have some background in some form of life, that is, they could not have come from scratch. But surely this by itself cannot guarantee the coherence of the beliefs in question.

It follows, then, that the question of whether the quasi-Hegelian's beliefs are coherent or incoherent is an open-question. Now, if these very beliefs were adopted by the 'religious' group that was assumed to have developed later, then the fact that they are now shared by a group of people having their own private religious or quasi-religious practices does not by itself make them immune from critical examination. For they are still those very beliefs which were found to be open to critical examination.

A Winchian might object here on the ground that although these beliefs might originally be incoherent, it is still the case that when they are adopted by the group under consideration, they **must** develop, through time, into coherent and meaningful beliefs. But surely the 'must' here is not a logical 'must'. In other words, although it may well be the case that these beliefs will eventually develop into a coherent set of beliefs, it is still the case that there is a possibility that they will not. But then, if it is argued that if they do not develop into a coherent set of beliefs, then they cannot be said to belong to a form of life, it will follow that a belief belonging to a form of life is coherent by **definition.** But if a Winchian would insist on this latter point, then religion need not be necessarily a form of life for lack of coherence in some of its beliefs. This possibility must be allowed, if we are to allow the possibility that the above quasi-Hegelian group might never develop a coherent system of beliefs. If this is allowed, then the Winchian thesis will fall apart.

FOOTNOTES

1. We shall not examine here Wittgenstein's concept of a form of life which has figured very prominently in the position under examination. We refer the reader, however, to two critical treatments of this concept. Cf. Patrick Sherry "Is Religion a Form of Life ?" **American Philosophical Quarterly,** 1972, 9.2. pp. 158-67, and Kai Nielsen, "God and the Forms of Life," **Indian Review of Philosophy,** I.1., 1972, pp. 45-66.

2. D.Z. Phillips, "Philosophy, Theology, and the Reality of God," in **Philosophical Quarterly,** vol. 13, no. 53 (October, 1963), p. 345.

3. **Ibid.**

4. **Ibid.,** p. 346.

5. Ibid., p. 347.

6. Paul Ziff, "About God" in **Religious Experience and Truth,** edited by S. Hook, N.Y.U. Press (N.Y. 1961), p. 196.

7. N. Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Argument," **The Philosophical Review,** vol. LXIX, No. 1 (Jan. 1960).

8. **Ibid.**

9. Hughes, "Martin's Religious Belief", **Australian Journal of Philosophy,** vol. 40, (August, 1962), p. 214.

10. **Ibid.,** p. 215.

11. P. Winch, "Understanding Primitive Society," **American Philosophical Quarterly,** vol. 5 (October, 1964), p. 308.

12. **Ibid.**

13. **Ibid.,** p. 309.

14. P. Winch, **The Idea of a Social Science,** (London, 1963), p. 107.

15. See here, **Ibid.,** pp. 99-103.

16. **Ibid.,** p. 100.

17. **Ibid.,** p. 107.

18. Bernard Williams, "Tertullian's Paradox," **New Essays in Philosophical Theology,** edited by Flew and McIntyre (London, (CM Press, 1958), pp. 187-211.

19. **Ibid.,** p. 202.

20. **Ibid.**

21. **Ibid.,** p. 203.

22. **Ibid.**

23. **Ibid.**

24. **Ibid.,** p. 204.

25. See on this point, William-Alston, **Religious Belief and Philosophical Thought,** Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. (New York, 1963), pp. 223-224.

26. **Ibid.,** p. 223.

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

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1. Introduction

The analysis of the relationship between the nature of modern West European social democracies and types of social justice prevailing within them has to be connected with systematic references to long-term historical developments that brought about these (post-)industrial societies.

Looking back at the history of the development of modern western democracies one cannot avoid being impressed by the important role of specific historical events in the course of this development and by the contribution of ideas (values, cultural codes, ideologies) to the direction of this development.

We are witnessing a strong opposition in non-European countries, especially in the Third World, against the universalistic claims of western modernization models or theories. This opposition is often combined with a plea for the 'indigenization' of philosophy and the social sciences. The analysis of the development of Western social democracies may contribute to a better understanding of the issue of specificity in social science models and its relationship to the quest for universal validity.

Looking at modern parliamentary democracies in the west there are three characteristics that come to the fore :

a) a strongly developed societal and cultural pluralism;
b) the rationalization of social actions in almost all areas of social life;
c) the moral conception, strongly rooted in the population, that the state serves the population and does not have the right to tamper with civil liberties.

Connected with these characteristics is the tendency to increase the number of civil rights, to enhance their effectiveness and, until recently, to continue the development of the welfare state programme. The welfare state implies government-protected standards of income, nutrition, health, housing, and education, assured to every citizen as a political right, not as cahity.(1)

In the next parts of this paper I will try to trace the historical backgrounds of the characteristics that have been mentioned. In this analysis we have to include economic developments that created, in several respects, the conditions for important social developments, such as the construction of the welfare state, based in its turn on specific conceptions of social justice. Subsequently I will focus my attention on contemporary developments in social-democratic industrial societies, especially those that are related to changing attitudes to different conceptions of social justice and their implementation in society.

2. Societal and cultural pluralism in western democracies.

The genesis of the western democracies clearly shows that those societies cannot be understood as the product of some type of unilateral evolution propelled by forces that are exogenous to social life itself. Their development is not the result of 'universal laws'. On the contrary, we can point to culture-specific constellations in the past that strongly influenced the rise of present socio-cultural structure. Although we emphasize this specific side of the development of western democracies, we do not deny the importance of long-term changes toward standardization of the main social institutions. In this context we will discuss the importance of the process of rationalization and the role of science and technology. Nevertheless, ideas played a very central role in the genesis of societies and are likely to play an even more important role the more our awareness is growing that the societies in which we are living are the product of individual and collective actions. This statement does not lead us to an extreme form of voluntarism.

An important contribution of sociology to our understanding of societal change has been the identification of the tension between the organizational mechanisms of the social division of labour and the acceptance of the social order. Founding fathers of (western) social sciences have shown that this tension is bridged by a **symbolic universium** "that delineates the boundaries of collectivities, the identity of persons, and provides the basis of such meaningful construction of social reality and of trust among individuals".(2) Process of differentiation in society, such as the social division of labour tended, as Eisenstadt observes, "to intensify questioning of the legitimacy of the social and political order through the accumulation of technological and communicative resources and through the emergence of relatively autonomous institutional subsystems and components.(3)

Looking at the history of western European societies we note that a differentiation between the main powers has been a striking characteristic since early times. No ruling class has ever succeeded in acquiring a lasting and complete control over society. A separation — never a complete one — between spiritual and secular powers and a less outspoken one between political and economic powers is the rule.(4) Those powers are not only separated to a certain extent, but are further characterized by strong rivalries among each other. The modern democratic industrial societies fit clearly in this pattern. European history shows that in the development of the West specific outcomes of these rivalries have been very decisive for the direction of this development. Especially during the 11th and 12th century there has been a series of controversies between spiritual and secular leaders about the limits of their competences. On the one hand the moral superiority of spiritual power over secular power was accentuated, on the other hand it was argued that the secular powers had to be independent of the spiritual powers. Each power ought to have its own sphere of competence. This great controversy began with the accession to the papal throne of Gregory VII in 1073. Lay investiture — i.c. the part of secular rulers in the choice of higher clergy — was prohibited by Gregory in 1075. Emperor Henry VI tried in response to this prohibition to secure the deposition of Gregory, who

replied by excommunicating Henry and absolving his vassals from feodal oaths. "The first phase of the controversy closed with the Concordat of Worms in 1122, a compromise by which the emperor gave up the technical right of investiture with the ring and the staff, the symbols of spiritual authority, but retained the right to bestow the **regalia** and to have a voice in the choice of the bishops."(5)

These controversies between the main powers and the arrangements that resulted from them have been of great importance to the course of western development. Ginsberg says in his **On Justice in Society** in this context : "In western societies the granting of religious freedom has been associated with the secularization of the state and the separation, not always complete, of spiritual and temporal powers. It has been plausibly argued that the dynamic quality of the western peoples was enhanced by the conflicts and rivalries between the secular and religious powers, and there are many who would agree... that political liberty owns much to the frictions thus generated."(63

3. The process of rationalization in western culture.

This separation and the rivalry between spiritual and secular powers has undoubtedly contributed to the rise of a formal and rational juridical system, developed by trained lawyers. They introduced the authority of (secular) juridical norms binding on all the subjects. With the victory of the **formal** juridical rationalism the type of **legal** authority came in existence in western societies alongside of older types of authority (e.g. traditional and charismatic types). The most important variant of legal authority was and still is the bureaucratic types. We do not have the intention to give a real causal explanation of the origin and rise of western rationalism. Weber points out that this rationalism results from the specific nature of the western social order in which the rational structure of law and administration looms large. This rational structure was a necessary condition for the development of an economic order based on a rational management of private enterprises and on accurate calculations. Only the West disposed of such a complete formal juridical

system and administration that could be used in the management of economy.(7) This development has been of paramount importance to the specific relationships between science, technology and economy that arose in the West. Science and technology have strongly determined economic developments. It is besides the mark to say that the sciences — especially the exact and experimental sciences — have their origin in capitalistic market opportunities. The technical application of scientific knowledge, however, has been strongly influenced by economic stimuli. In this process formal law too played an important role, but also the rise of a practical-rational way of life and a new 'Wirtschaftsgesinnung'. It has been the great contribution of Weber to have made explicit the importance of the affinity between the economic ethos and the rational ethics of ascetic protestantism in the development of western capitalism.(8)

This specific social and cultural constellation in the West contributed to the continuation of the process of rationalization resulting in a rational order based on the conviction of the participants that the conditions of daily life can be understood rationally. Social life is essentially predictable once the rules are laid down. Rationalization of social life is the disenchantment' of the world by the rule of rational organizations in which orders are issued in the name of impersonal norms independent of personal authority or favours. Rationalisation has become the progress of the bureaucratic type of administration in the state and in the modern corporations. In this process both governments and the large modern corporations are becoming increasingly dependent on accurate, continuous, efficient and predictable (state) bureaucracies.

4. The rise of the modern state

The developments sketched roughly in the first paragraphs of this paper have been of great importance for the modern state and 'the civilization of modernity' in western societies. In the 16th and 17th centuries we witness the rise of form of government, in the Netherlands and in England, based on political philosophies that envisaged the state as an association rooted in the moral forces of the community. The ruler was

no longer considered as a 'proprietor', but as the protector of the liberties of the people. In the Revolt of the Netherlands, the State's General renounced in 1581 their allegiance to Philip II, in the Act of Abjuration with the ascertion :

"All mankind know that a prince is appointed by God to cherish his subjects, even as a shephard to guard his sheep. When, therefore, the prince does not fulfill his duty as a protector; when he oppresses his subjects, destroys their ancient liberties, and treat them as slaves, he is to be considered, not as a prince, but as a tyrant. As such, the estates of the land may lawfully and reasonably depose him, and elect another in his room." This was the birth of civil society, a society based on common assent or contract. In 1688, the civil society was founded in England, after the Glorious Revolution, and the Crown was in the keeping of parliament.(9)

"All mankind know that a prince is appointed by God to cherish longing to a certain estate in society — before the development of capitalism in the West, the Revolt of the Netherlands, the Glorious Revolution and the political philosophies of thinkers like Althusius, Grotius and Locke introduced a new form of government that has been of utmost significance for the development of the social-democratic societies of our time. We will not venture upon an analysis of the societal processes of development that brought about those societies, but restrict ourselves to the observation that these developments, and the revolutions that occurred afterwards, drove those societies on into the direction of modernization, both in organizational and symbolic respects. Eisenstadt, commenting on the consequences of revolutionary changes in a more general sense, says that "All postrevolutionary societies exeperienced growing structural differentiation and specialization, the establishment of universalistic organizational frameworks; the development of an industrial market economy, the articulation of relatively open, non-traditional systems of stratification and mobility in which criteria of achievement in general and of economic, occupational, and educational criteria in particular became dominant ; and the rise of centralized, strongly bureaucratic political systems. These

organizational changes were ultimately connected to the basic premises of modernity — initially these premises of European modernity and later those of modernity in general — which developed out of revolutionary symbols, ideologies, and movements. Indeed, these revolutionary symbols and tendencies are fundamental to the notion of modernity."(10)

It is important to note, that both in England and the Netherlands, those developments were accompanied by the coming into being of religious pluralism and cleavages in society based on religious differences. These cleavages had to be bridged in the new states and could be bridged. It is true that the new secular state clinged to a religious legitimation, but the governmental authorities themselves were not longer interested in carrying through and enforcing religious goals. Although the Protestant religion was dominant in these postrevolutionary modern societies, adherents of other religious denominations were given latitude to live according to their own convictions. Within certain limits cultural pluralism and freedom of conscience had been accepted by those who were in power. These freedoms, however, were not extended to the adherents of doctrines in which the preaching of religious intolerance was evident and to those persons who denied the existence of God.

We have sketched very briefly some of the important developments that influenced strongly the coming into existence of contemporary western social democracies. It is evident that the nature and direction of social and cultural developments cannot be seen as only the result of forces that are exogenous to social life. Cultural codes, values, and ideologies originating within the fabric of social relationships have been, and still are, important determinants of the direction of social cultural developments. They exercise their influence not independent of other social forces as e.g. those that are connected with the organization of production. We now turn to the development of industrial society, a development that until the 20th century was associated in the western world — and still is in large circles — with ideas about evolution and progress. This progress implied a progressive extension of

civil rights to all members of society and the institutionalization of social justice.

5. The development of industrial society.

We have seen that modernization of western societies was accompanied by religious pluralism and religious liberties for those who were not adherents of the dominant religions. We can refer to the rather protected position of Jewish communities in the Netherlands in the 17th century and to the absorption of many persons and groups that were persecuted for religious reasons. This tolerance was not restricted to persons with dissenting religious views only. It became evident that an enforced consensus was not a condition for the continued existence of the social order as long all groups abited to a set of general rules. In fact, the openness of the new societies proved to give a strong impetus to their further development. Moreover, the more the central values of society were formulated in a general and abstract way, the more the way was cleared for the preservation of the specific character or identity of each component : collectivities and increasingly also individuals. This is the birth of the civil society. Western modernization is specifically the rose of the civil society, based on an (increasing) number of civil rights or liberties. This type of modernization is pushed forward by the enlightenment, the French Revolution of 1789 and its 'Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen'(11) and the Foundation of the United States of America the constitution of which is strongly influenced both by the Dutch one and by the ideas of the French Revolution.

This acceleration did not mean that the majority of the inhabitants of those countries could already be regarded as citizens in the modern sense. The history of modern societies since their origin can be regarded as the history of the increase of the number of civil liberties and their extensions to the population's components that were originally not included : the working classes and several types of minorities. Their emancipation, strongly influenced by the ideas of socialism, leads to the firm establishment of their political rights in the 20th century.

The demolition of the feodal society, based on estate, was for the greater part the result of changes in the forces of production and in the organization of production. The rise of the civil society led to the institutionalization of civil liberties, but did not change the unequal distribution of scarce means into a more equitable one. This situation does not signify of course that this unequal distribution was considered to be fair. In 1755 Rousseau criticized this inequality in his **Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes** and explained the social inequality as the result of the existing ownership rights. When in the 19th century the unequal distribution of property and other scarce means grows into the dominant social problem of society, the solution of this problem of social justice is connected with the idea that society's development is unavoidable in the direction of increasing social equality. Already in the second half of the 18th century Saint-Simon postulated that industrialism, as the most important agent of societal change, would gradually lead to a decrease of class antagonism and finally to the disappearance of class society as such. Since Saint-Simon this thesis has been repeated over and over again by many sociologists and economists and is known as the **industrial convergence thesis.** This thesis is a product of enlightenment and positivism; (social) scientists clinged to the idea that they were on their way to discover the laws of societal development.

In this perspective industrial development was equal to progress. Old privileges, and social inequalities based on them, were thought to be undermined by the new relationship of production. There did not exist a consensus on the nature of the emerging society. On the one hand there were those who hold the opinion that the destruction of the old social structures and the establishment of economic relationships as contractual relationships would finally result in an egalitarian society. On the other hand, especially in the 19th century, the idea took form that the liberal conception of justice may be partly right in so far as social developments may open the road to equal opportunities. This equality of opportunity for individuals can go hand in hand with the persistence of unequal distribution of scarce means in society. Social justice defined as equal opportunities for all is considered to be a too

narrow concept. The outcome of exchange relationships between individuals in an open society may be in contradiction with the idea of fundamental equality of all human beings. In the latter conception not the contribution of individuals to the existing exchange relationships is important, but their (social) needs, including the need for self-actualization.(12) In this conception the contents of the idea of social justice is dependent on the development of society itself. This idea is expressed neatly by Marshall : "Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed."(13)

Both conceptions of social justice, i.e. justice based on reciprocity and justice based on fundamental equality of all citizens, continue to play an important role in political thinking in western social democracies. We shall return to the uneasy relationship between those two conceptions when we discuss the rise of the welfare state. Before doing so we have to go further into the idea, still powerful in western democracies, that the establishment of more equitable social relationships is dependent on industrial growth.

The big opportunities created by the application of science and the development of technology in the production of commodities have been, and still are, very influential factors in the pervasive optimisms, concerning progress. In which ways can industrial development, according to this idea, contribute to social justice as social equality ? The basic idea is that the development in science and technology and the changes that are precipitated by these factors in the relationships of production will result in an increasing social equality because of the growing com-

plexities of the tasks people are confronted with. This new and more complex organization of production will require more human talent than the older relationships of production. The position in occupational life will therefore increasingly be determined by a selection based on education and achievement. The income distribution will reflect this trend as the level of income will be a function of the demand for (scarce) occupational qualifications. In all industrial societies the effects of industrialism, propelled by technology and science will be roughly the same : increasing individual occupational — and social — mobility, based on a growing equality of educational opportunities, decrease of differences based on estate or class, the growth of the middle classes as a consequence of the increasing demand for highly skilled and specialized 'professionals' and a decrease of collective antagonisms (the end of class struggle).(14)

This perspective on society's development is clearly a deterministic one : the autonomous development of science and technology push society necessarily in a direction that is interpreted as progress. Moreover, this view is universalistic : **all** societies that adopt the industrial mode
view is universalistic : **all** societies that adopt the industrial mode of production will be transformed in modern societies according to the characteristics just mentioned, regardless of their regional cultural heritage. Values, ideas and beliefs seem to be only dependent variables, not forces that are meaningful in determining the nature and direction of societal development. Finally, this view narrows down all social problems to social inequality, especially inequality as determined by economic developments.(15)

Contemporary adherents to this industrial convergence thesis acknowledge that this societal development, and the idea of social justice that is connected with it, degenerate social problems too. It is supposed, however, that these problems can be resolved by government's interference. Government and the agencies of the state have to improve the educational opportunities of children from underprivileged social classes and have to protect those people who are not able to provide for themselves. These issues reflect the important influence of socialist revisio-

nism. After the 2nd World War this type of criticism of some consequence of industrial development results in the construction of the welfare state in the western social democracies. The development of the Welfare State is certainly facilitated by the unequalled economic growth that occurred in those societies and that continued to the end of the sixties.

We already referred to 2 conceptions of social justice, prevailing in western social democracies : a conception that is based on reciprocity of free partners and a conception that is founded on the idea of fundamental equality of all citizens, not only with regard to civil and political rights, but also to **social rights.** The provision by the State of means of subsistence to people who are not in a position to contribute to society is a right, not a favour. Moreover, the level of the provisions must be such that those persons don't have to live on a subsistence level but can organize their lives meaningfully according to the norms prevailing in society.

In the post-war period the provisions of the state, based on the Welfare State conception, have increased and so has the number of people who are entitled to these allowances. This development tended to contribute to the tension between the above-mentioned conceptions of social justice. This tension was reinforced by the stagnant economic growth leading to a decreasing solidarity between the gainfully employed and those who are entitled to allowances. Rising taxes and social contribution reduce the income's part to be spent by workers and employees themselves (e.g. less than 40% of the gross wages in the Netherlands). This effect is a logical consequence of the rising costs of the welfare state.

Although the rise of the welfare state was facilitated by economic growth, it is also evident that important developments that had their beginning in earlier centuries, did prepare this type of state. These earlier developments bear both upon changes in the socio-economic structures and changes upon the level of ideas, especially those concerning the relationship between groups and individuals on the one hand and the state on the other.(16)

6. Social democracy, the welfare state and social justice.

Contemporary western social democracies are in a certain respect the result of a long development in which a) differentiation in social division of labour; b) cultural pluralism and c) the genesis of 'rules of the game' (accommodation) between collectivities or classes play an important role. These societies are experiencing some internal contradictions that are becoming more manifest in recent times.

In the first place a contradiction can be observed between certain of the ideals of Enlightenment and the effects of rationalization of the relationships of production. We have seen that the ideals of Enlightenment emphasized the importance of civil liberties as the liberties of individuals vis-à-vis the state. In modern times the right of equal opportunities, without regard to social, religious or ethnic background, was coming to the fore. The social and cultural developments in industrial societies have enabled many persons to take advantage of these opportunities by having access to advanced educational systems and to professional or occupational circles that had been relatively closed so far. This policy of equal opportunities promoted occupation mobility and tended to increase ceteris paribus, competition in the labour market. This development can be interpreted as a growth of social justice in society according to the reciprocity model.

However, it is not easy to combine the realization of equal opportunities with the trend towards rationalization of the relationships of production, to put it mildly. The idea that economic growth is a condition for the creation of individual opportunities seems to be a myth. Those who make the central decisions about new investments and the organization of production are strongly influenced by technological and economic deterministic ideas. They tend to apply new technological and organizational opportunities in such a way that the control of management on labour is reinforced. This increasing control is justified by an appeal to the universalistic and unavoidable character of the process of modernization.(17) Socio-technical systems develop in which human beings are

reduced to the role of a function of the organization model that is ruled by efficiency criteria. The average educational level of the population is rising and people are, moreover, confronted, in and outside the educational system, with ideals about self-actualization, personal growth or self-improvement. The old values of the Protestant Ethics are waning. A consequence of these developments is a strongly increasing tension between the expectations and claims of workers concerning their goals and the reality of working life. The quality of jobs and the opportunities for advancement in organizations seem to be decreasing, relatively at least. This is certainly not a good base to foster the hope of individuals to improve their opportunities for advancement in occupational life by raising their 'investments' in advanced education.

Modern industrial development did not delete, so far, the opposition between those who make the decisions about the use of the means of production and those who contribute their knowledge, skill and labour. Industrial development has created and elaborated differentiation within the working classes. Cultural pluralism and the occupational proletariat did not promote the rise of a strongly organized proletariat.

The development of the welfare state is equally a factor that contributes to this discrepancy between the aspirations of many individuals to make autonomous decisions and the reality of increasing heteronomy. The welfare state is based on the idea that government protects minimum standards of income, nutrition, health, education and housing. These minima are assured to every citizen as rights. The welfare state, constructed in a period of full employment, was intended initially to correct some of the perverse effects of the free market. In reality the welfare state developed in a quite other direction. Once established, many citizens tried to roll off an increasing part of their costs (e.g. costs of nursing old people and of prolonged patients, educational costs) to the state. This trend was reinforced by the strong economic growth, the lack of a widely accepted ideology as an underpinning of the welfare society and the increasing atomization or individualization of society. In its turn, the growth of the welfare state reinforced the process of individua-

lization. This development resulted in a strong increase of national expenditures on allowances, as follows from the data for the Netherlands : ,

Expenditures on sociai insurance, 1948,1977
(in millions of Dutch florins)

year	allowances	year	allowances
1948	589	1963	5280
1949	677	1964	6251
1950	747	1965	7831
1951	859	1966	9159
1952	930	1967	10507
1953	1047	1968	12264
1954	1146	1969	14555
1955	1300	1970	16874
1956	1368	1971	20300
1957	2374	1972	24056
1958	2682	1973	28019
1959	2845	1974	33669
1960	3293	1975	40383
1961	3501	1976	46108
1962	4032	1977	51945(18)

Expenditures of the central government on welfare activities.

year	estimates in millions (Dutch florins)	increase with respect to the preceding year
1970	52,8	—
1971	72,2	19,4
1972	84,6	12,4
1973	101,8	17,2
1974	126,6	24,4
1975	172,3	46,1
1976	294,3	122 (19)

In this period many people experienced in their personal life an improvement with regard to social security allowances. The employed people were confronted with real increases of income in spite of increasing taxes and contributions to the social security funds. As long as the economic growth was considerable, this situation could continue.

But although economic security was growing for most people, the rise of the welfare state did not leave civil liberties unaffected. Those people who were receiving allowances could not themselves participate in the social security systems. Those systems are very opaque. A systematic structure for the social security system as a whole is lacking. In spite of many good intentions of the government and the social security administrations the individual citizen finds himself in a rather powerless position vis-à-vis the huge and complex agencies of the welfare state.

A third opposition looms large in contemporary social democracies: the growing antagonism between those who are actively engaged in economic life and those persons who are not gainfully employed but receive allowances for their subsistence. At this point two conceptions of social justice are confronted with each other : how is the entitlement to a share of society's scarce means, based on the worker's contribution to economic life, related to the entitlement on such a share, based on the concept of social needs ?

The tension between the two principles is becoming the more intense, the more the expulsion of labour increases as a consequence of technological innovation, of economic conjunctural and long term economic developments. The number of unemployed and of those persons who are considered not to be fit to work as a consequence of their mental or physical condition is growing. The latter category is being 'produced', partly at least, by the process of rationalization.

The important question may be raised whether we are entering a new phase of development in our society, a phase that will be dominated by quite a new conception about the relationships between labour, sharing

in society's scarce means and citizenship. At this moment we remain in doubt about the nature of such a new conception, although the awareness of the need for such a conception is increasing under present conditions.(20) We will return to this problem after a short discussion of welfare state problems as they are mentioned in recent literature.

7. The perverse effects of the welfare state.

The development of the welfare state has generated a number of unintended and partly undesired consequences. We shall refer to some of the consequences that are generally considered to be undesirable or 'perverse'.

It is important to note that in a social democracy the state's power is only slightly linked — on a formal level — to sectorial interests. The common interest of society, protected by the state, is dominant in the actions of the government and the state's agencies when social justice, as implied in the conception of the welfare state, is pursued. The state develops into a central mechanism for the redistribution of the national income according to criteria that are derived from the 'social needs model'. A consequence of this development is that an increasing number of groups and persons direct themselves to the state when they are experiencing or even inventing problems. The state seems to be responsible, according to some, even for the happiness of the citizens. "The day may come", Dahrendorf remarks, "on which historians note with surprise how in recent decades government came to be expected to deal with virtually every aspect of people's lives, and not unnaturally accepted the challenge, until the limits of this arrogance of power were at least revealed."(21)

This point of view is somewhat charged because we can point at other social developments that contribute to the increase of claims on the state's revenues. Nevertheless, the point made by Dahrendorf is very substantial.

In the social democracies important changes in the value-orientation of many persons, especially among youth, take place since the rise of the welfare state. This does not signify that a direct causal nexus exists between the two developments. A hedonistic, individualistic way of life shows up; the old Protestant ethics in which the role of (hard) work is pivotal, is fading. "Satisfaction depends on taking what you want instead of waiting for what is rightfully yours to receive. All this enters everyday speech in language that connects sex with aggression and sexual aggression with highly ambivalent feelings about mothers", Lasch notes.(22) At this place we shall not go further into these changes. They appear to generate new dependencies that are not only reinforced by the agencies of the welfare state but especially by the new professions. These professions turn their clients into an incompetent figure, at least with regard to the professional knowledge. The consequences of this are not negligible. "As retribute justice goes away to therapeutic justice, what began as a protest against moral oversimplification, ends by destroying the very sense of moral responsibility."(23)

The rise of the welfare state cannot be regarded as the cause of the above-mentioned phenomenon. Nevertheless the rules applied by the agencies of the welfare state when making decisions about awarding allowances reinforce the trend toward individualism. The welfare state itself, moreover, creates new dependencies. On the one hand the state reduces the types of dependence based on arbitrariness. But on the other hand the regulation of power relationship by the state creates new types of dependence by concentrating their power in the hands of those who execute the welfare state regulations. This dependence of clients is strongly marked in those cases where the participation of clients in the welfare state agencies is not formally regulated and where the legislation for the whole field of social welfare is characterized by opacity. In most cases the social welfare legislation is a far from consistent whole.

A certain degree of immobilism is a second important effect of the welfare state regulations. At least this effect is said to be operative. This immobilism is caused by the lack of stimuli in the arrangement to break

up the financial dependence in situations where the differences between allowances and wages are slight. The slight differences are considered as injust by many of those who are actively engaged in economic life.

The growth of the welfare agencies (bureaucracies) is considered by some observers as a totalitarian tendency in social democracy. The earlier mentioned fragmentation of the welfare state is likely to counteract this tendency. Nevertheless, several authors point out that the rise of the welfare state is accompanied by weak political regimes at the national level. Western democracies can be characterized by "The inability of the electoral system to generate a decisive majority for one political organisation or for an effective coalition."(24) Janowitz explains this fact in the following way: "the necessities of industrial development create the welfare state, and in turn the welfare state generates a set of economic equity claims that are complex, diffuse, and even initially contradictory.

Moreover, welfare expenditures do not necessarily generate partisan loyalties. To the contrary, these allocations are more and more considered a matter of law and citizen right.(25) Also Wilensky holds the opinion that the economic development plays an enormous role in the development of the welfare state. The nature of the political system explains very little, according to him.(26) Social heterogeneity and internal cleavages weaken the welfare state in those cases where government can be characterized by a decentralized, if not fragmentized, policy. The greater the central government's power vis-à-vis the lower authorities, the greater the amount of public expenditures on welfare provisions. The nature of the political system (e.g. socialist or liberal democratic) does not effect this relationship.

Both Janowitz and Wilensky consider economic developments as the decisive factor for the development of the welfare state, but they differ from each other with respect to their conclusions about the significance of the political system and the role of state agencies in this development.

Janowitz points out that a weak basis for effective coalitions between parties is a consequence of the welfare state's development, whereas Witensky considers a strong central government as a condition for this development. It may be that the perverse effect indicated by Janowitz — political instability — is a long-term consequence of the welfare state.

The French sociologist Touraine draws our attention to the state's main tasks in a capitalist or 'programmed' society. He puts forward the idea that in these societies the state is disintegrating because the main tasks are incompatible with each other. He distinguishes the following tasks:

a) the management of public utility services (considered by Touraine as part of the technocracy);
b) the administration of bureaucracies (that often represent sectional or corporate interests);
c) the maintenance of law and order and of the social hierarchies;
d) the development of international relationships.

In the capitalist societies no force is strong enough to keep these components togther: "... l'ensemble qu'on nomme Etat est de moins de moins unifié".(27) This contradiction becomes visible at the very moment that economic growth diminishes. The state has taken on too many tasks. The programme of demands is that much overburdened that no government is able to cope with it when the time has come that the revenues fall back. Important consequences of this development are, among others, a governmental crisis and the rise of the new right with the plea for a reduction of the state's tasks to a minimum. The idea of social justice that lies at the root of the welfare state is under attack.

All authors mentioned so far stress the importance of economic factors (e.g. level of economic development, diminishing economic growth) and do not seem to attach any weight to the influence of cultural factors, such as ideology, value systems or religion. Higgins, however, points out after a thorough analysis, that the industrial convergence thesis,

lurking behind the remarks of Janowitz and Wilensky, is also not tenable in **this** case. Political ideologies or philosophies of life **do** play a role in the welfare state's development. It is also evident that in those cases where the influence of the churches on public life is considerable, as in Ireland and the U.S.A., the state's influence on welfare spending is less than the countries where the role of the churches is relatively weak. International comparative research on the welfare state does not lead to the conclusion that these societies are converging with regard to their main institutions. "Within very broad parameters policy makers exercise choice, it will not be an entirely free choice but one at least which is sufficiently flexible to prevent all industrial societies tumbling headlong into the melting pot of convergence."(28)

7. Pluralism, rationalization and social justice.

In the history of the West pluralism, conceived of as diversification of spiritual, political and economic powers, has been an important precondition both for the development of civil liberties and the rationalization of social life.

Especially in modern times the strains between the development of civil liberties and the ongoing rationalization are becoming increasingly evident, as both the rationalization of economic life and the implementation of social rights seem to restrict the autonomy of many individuals.

Application of science and technology push forward the rationalization of modern societies. Habermas, among others, has pointed out that the progressive rationalization of society is linked to the institutionalization of scientific and technical development. He remarks: "To the extent that technology and science permeate social institutions and thus transform them, old legitimations are destroyed. The secularization and 'disenchantment' of action-oriented world-views of cultural tradition as a whole, is the obverse of growing 'rationality' of social action."(29)

It is quite evident, that also the development of microelectronics

and especially of information-technology, have important consequences for man's thinking about social relationships. In some cases, technological models have become themselves standards for evaluation of social life. In economic life many workers lost control over the contents of their jobs and the working-situation, being subjected to the rules of the new techno-social systems. Now we are entering a phase of development where man is becoming rapidly dependent on these systems in many other spheres of social life too.

The development of the welfare state reduces individual liberties in some ways. We have sketched very briefly the origin of civil liberties in the 17th century, followed by political rights and the extension of these rights to almost all members of society in the first decades of this century and the rather recent development of socio-economic rights, implemented in the welfare state's bureaucracies. Redistribution of scarce means, based on the idea of social justice as equality in life chances, created new dependencies by the rise of the welfare state bureaucracies. At the same time, the implementation of the socio-economic rights contributed to the undermining of existing service-networks in neighbourhoods, families and villages. Moreover, following the observations of Janowitz, Wilensky and Touraine, we may conclude that the quality of political decision-making is endangered by the developments just mentioned.

Under these conditions it is not surprising that pessimism over the opportunities to influence the outcome of individual and collective actions is widespread. It is true that the atomizing consequences of the two trends liberate individuals from the control of a more traditional way of life, but this new liberty is limited because most people are deprived of new and stable frames of reference for social and cultural integration. Many people are in quest for community in the social democratic societies in the West.

In which ways can the direction of these developments be changed ? We know from the analysis of western history that the process of mo-

dernization is very specific in several respects, although universalistic claims are derived from this western development.

There are many deterministic ways of thinking in the western world which, although refuted in science, still dominate decision-making of power elites. In this way the course of the processes described is maintained. Social science research can contribute to changes in these processes by exposing the consequences of deterministic ways of thinking and by elaborating on the potentiality to produce society.(30) The contribution to this task by international comparative research and cross-cultural research is important. Indeed, recent research within industrial, western countries has shown e.g. that the same type of technology is combined with widely different types of organization of social relations. International comparative research between the so-called socialist and the capitalist societies has already contributed much to our understanding of 'universalistic' and 'specific' trends in development and especially to our understanding of the role of values, ideologies, ways of thinking, and religions in social life. Without playing down the enormous theoretical and methodological problems that are inherent in this type of research, I venture to say that our insight in the relationships between cultural pluralism, conceptions of justice and societal developments could be enormously enhanced when a collaboration could be established between researchers in the non-European (e.g. the Arab) world and researchers in the industrial western world in the field of international comparative research.

NOTES

1. H. Wilensky, **The Welfare State and Equality. Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditure.** Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1975, p. 1.

2. S.N. Eisenstadt, **Revolution and Transformation of Societies. A Comparative Study of Civilizations.** New York/London : The Free Press/Macmillan, 1978, p. 22.

3. S.N. Eisenstadt, **o.c.,** p. 37.

4. R. Aron, **La lutte des classes,** p. 165 : "La proposition qui caractérise, à mon sens, les sociétés industrielles de type démocratique : les pouvoirs spirituels, politiques et économiques y sont séparés, les groupes qui exercent ces trois sortes de commendement étant rivalité permanente."

5. G.H. Sabine, **A History of Political Theory.** London : G. G. Harrap and Co., Ltd., 1952 (1937), p. 204 ff.

6. M. Ginsberg; **On Justice in Society,** Penguin Books, 1965, p. 156.

7. M. Weber, 'Einleitung in die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen', in : Max Weber, **Sociologie — Weltgeschichtliche Analysen — Politik. Stuttgart :** Kröner Verlag, 1968, p. 437.
   "Ein solches Recht un eine solche Verwaltung nun stellte der Wirtschaftsführung in **dieser** rechtstechnischer und formalistischen Vollendung **nur** der Okzident zur Verfügung" (p. 350).

8. M. Weber, **o.c.,** p. 352; and, of course his **Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus** (1965).

9. G.H. Sabine, **o.c.,** p. 328.

10. S.W. Eisenstadt, **o.c.,** p. 177.
T. Parsons, **The System of Modern Societies.** Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971.

11. In the 'Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen' these fundamental rights were proclaimed solemnly : the right of freedom, of equality before the law, of property, of safety and of protection against oppression.

12. J. Berting, **Reciprocieteit en gelijkheid** (Reciprocity and Equality). Meppel : Boompers, 1970, p. 32.

13. The extension of these rights is analysed by T.H. Marshall (**Class, Citizenship, and Social Development.** Essays by T.H. Marshall, with an introduction by S. M. Lipset. New York : Anchor Books, 1965).

14. c.f. Kerr, J.T. Dunlop, F. Harbison and C.A. Meyers, 'Industrialism and World Society' (1961). In : C. Kerr, ed., **Labor and Management in Industrial Society.** Anchor Pocket. New York : Doubleday, 1964, p. 345.
G. Lenski, **Power & Privilege. A Theory of Social Stratification.** New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966.
An early example, alongside to Saint-Simon, is T. Veblen, **The Theory of Business Enterprise.** New York : Mentor Books, 1958 (1904).
A well known study in this tradition is: R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset. **Social Mobility in Industrial Society.** Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1963.

15. c.f. J. Berting, 'New Technologies and Changes in the Social Division of Labour'. Contribution to the 4th World Congress of the Van Clé Foundation on 'Labour time — free time : challenge for mankind', 6 april 1982.

16. Cf. M. Janowitz, **Social Control of the Welfare State.** New York/ Oxford/Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1976, p. 18.

17. A. Touraine, **La voix et le regard.** Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1978, p. 69. "La manière la plus directe d'interdire une représentation sociale de la société est d'affirmer que celle-ci est soumise à un déterminisme technologique, que les forces de production déterminent un mode d'organisation sociale et aussi qu'elles emportent toujours les barrages que les anciennes forces de domination et d'organisation sociale opposent à leur poussée."

18. Source : CBS, **Tachtig jaren statistiek in tijdreeksen.**

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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACCORDING TO VATICAN II COUNCIL*

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On November 1963, the first draft on religious freedom was presented to the Council Fathers by the Secretariat for promoting Christian Unity, at the head of which was Cardinal Bea.

In the course of two years, five corrected versions of the text appeared in print, each being the work of many revisions within Secretariat. Three public debates were held in the Aula (in the Cathedral St. Peter) during which one hundred and twenty speeches were made. Six hundred written interventions were sent to the Secretariat, many of them signed by groups of bishops. Moreover, critiques of the successive draft texts were made by a considerable number of bishops and theologians who were consulted by the Secretariat.

Finally, after long discussion, one of the most important texts of the Council was approved the 7th of December 1965.

One knows that the general intention of the Council was pastoral in all its utterances. This however does not mean that the Declaration concerning Religious freedom contains simply practical advice. Its content is properly doctrinal and the practical applications are precisely a conclusion of the doctrine.

In particular, three doctrinal tenets are declared :

a) the ethical doctrine of religious freedom as a human right (personal and collective).
b) a political doctrine with regard to the functions and limits of government in religious matters.

c) the theological doctrine of the freedom of the Church as the fundamental principle in what concerns the relations between the Church and the socio-political order.

The declaration opened a new era in the relation between the believers as pertaining to the Church and as citizens of a secular state. A long-standing ambiguity has finally been cleared up. The Church does not deal with the secular order on terms of double standard-freedom for the Church when Catholics are a minority, privilege for the Church and intolerance for others when Catholics are a majority. The Declaration has opened the way toward new confidence in ecumenical relationships, and a new straigtforwardness in relationship between the Church and the world.

Finally the Declaration affirms a principle of great importance that the dignity of man consists in his responsible use of freedom. This freedom, a gift received from God, is to be asserted within the Church as within the world, always for the sake of the world and the Church.

The issues are many : the dignity of the human person, the foundations of religious freedom, its object or content, its limits and their criterion, the measure of its responsible use, its relation to the legitimate reaches of authority and to the saving counsels of prudence, the perils that lurk in it and the forms of corruption which is prone.

* * *

The general title of the Declaration is :

Declaration on Religious freedom. On the right of the person and of communities to social and civil freedom in religious matters.

The Declaration contains two chapters and a conclusion. The first concerns the general principle of Religious freedom and contains eight paragraphs; the second considers the religious freedom in the light of Revelation.

The first chapter is the most interesting for us because it is based only on rational arguments and then can be discussed and accepted in the light of reason. It is why I will insist on this part of the Declaration.

Let us read the beginning of the Declaration :

"The Vatican Synod declares that human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individual or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that in religious matters no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs. Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits." (p. 678).

It is to be noted that the unbeliever or atheist makes with equal right this claim to immunity from coercion in religious matters. But that does not mean that the Declaration affirms that a man has a right to believe what is false or to do what is wrong; this would be moral nonsense. Neither error nor evil can be the object of a right, only what is true and good. It is, however, true and good that a man should enjoy freedom from coercion in religious matters.

This brings up the question concerning the foundation of the right. The text says : "The Synod further declares that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person, as this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.(1) This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed. Thus it is to become a civil right." (p. 679)

We can follow the argumentation in this manner. First, the objective foundation of the right to religious freedom is presented in terms that should be intelligible and acceptable to all men, including non-believers.

Man, being intelligent and free is to be a responsible agent. Inherent in his very nature, therefore, is an exigency for freedom from coercion, especially in religious matters.

Therefore, in the following three paragraphs an argument is suggested that will appeal to those who believe in God, in objective order of truth and morality, and in the obligation to seek the truth, form one's conscience, and obey its dictates.

Two further arguments are advanced to show that a man may not be restrained from acting according to his conscience :

First, by reason of man's social nature, inner acts of religion require external expression; hence this external expression enjoys the same immunity from coercion as the inner act itself.

Second, there is the "further consideration" that no right resides in government to command or inhibit acts of religion, which by their nature lie beyond the reach of government.

Freedom for religious bodies.

Now, man lives in society; as he prays and worships individually, he feels also the need to join people in community. So the Synod affirms :

"The freedom or immunity from coercion in religious matters which is the endowment of persons as individuals is also to be recognized as their right when they act in community. Religious bodies are a requirement of the social nature both of man and of religion itself." (p. 681)

The Declaration gives some details concerning the extension of this social religious freedom. It says: "Provided the just requirements of public order are observed, religious bodies rightfully claim freedom in order that they may govern themselves according to their own norms, honour

the Supreme Being in public worship, assist their members in the practice of their religious life, strengthen them by instruction, and promote institutions in which they may join together for the purpose of ordering their own lives in accordance with their religious principles." (p. 682)

The text continues:

"Religious bodies also have the right not to be hindered, either by legal measures or by administration action on the part of government, in the selection, training, appointment, and transferral of their own ministers, in communicating with religious authorities and communities abroad, in erecting buildings for religious purposes, and in the acquisition and use of suitable funds or properties." (**ibid**).

Witness and proselytism.

A very touchy question is then tackled concerning the freedom for preaching and teaching one's religion. It is customary to distinguish in this matter between "religious witness" and "proselytism". Even if the Declaration does not use this last term, it stresses however on the differences between these two attitudes. It says:

"Religious bodies also have the right not to be hindered in their public teaching and witness to their faith, whether by the spoken or by the written word." (p. 682) This is for the witness.

Then the Declaration distinguishes carefully between this witness and its corruption which appeals to hidden forms of coercion or by a style of propaganda unworthy of the gospel. The text says:

"However, in spreading religious faith and in introducing religious practices, every one ought at all times to refrain from any manner of action which might seem to carry a hint of coercion or of a kind of persuasion that would be dishonourable or unworthy, especially when

dealing with poor or uneducated people. Such a manner of action would have to be considered an abuse of one's right and a violation of the right of others." (p. 682).

Does that mean that religion must be considered a purely private affair or that "the Church belongs to the sacristy". Not at all. The Declaration rejects this conception and recognizes that religion is relevant to the life and action of society. Therefore religious freedom includes the right to point out this social relevance of religious belief. The text says: "In addition, it comes within the meaning of religious freedom that religious bodies should not be prohibited from freely undertaking to show the special value of their doctrine in what concerns the organisation of society and the inspiration of the whole activity. Finally, the social nature of man and the very nature of religion afford the foundation of the right of men freely to hold meetings and to establish educational, cultural, charitable, and social organisations, under the impulse of their own religious sense." (p. 683).

Religious freedom for the family

One of the most important and vital social body is naturally the family which has the right to have its own religious life. But the internal structure of family relationships and the general style of family life vary widely throughout the world. Still greater variety is exhibited in the organisation of school systems, and in the religious and ideological content, or lack thereof, of their teaching. In consequence, the Declaration has to confine itself to a few principles of universal importance stressing on its doctrinal line: freedom coercion. I quote the text:

"Since the family is a society in its own original right, it has the right freely to live its own domestic religious life under the guidance of parents. Parents, moreover, have the right to determine, in accordance with their own religious beliefs, the kind of religious education that their children are to receive." (p. 683)

Moreover, the Declaration precises the relations between Government and the parents. It says:

"Government, in consequence, must acknowledge the right of parents to make a genuinely free choice of schools and of other means of education. The use of this freedom of choice is not to be made a reason for imposing unjust burdens on parents, whether directly or indirectly. Besides, the rights of parents are violated if their children are forced to attend lessons or instruction which are not in agreement with their religious beliefs. The same is true if a single system of education, from which all religious formation is excluded, is imposed upon all." (p. 683)

That means that, even in the countries where the schools are supposed to be "neutral", Government must provide religious teaching according to the different categories of believers in the schools.

Responsibility toward religious freedom.

The precedent development has clearly shown that religious freedom is a human right and that all churches and religious communities are entitled to equal freedom from coercion in what concern religious belief, worship, practice or observance, public testimony and the internal autonomy of the community itself.

Now, the Government has to respect this freedom and to preserve it by appropriate means. The pivotal notion in this domain is the concept of **the common welfare** which Leon XIII began to put forward in "Rerum Novarum", which Pius XII strongly developped, and which John XXIII defined with greater precision. The common welfare "chiefly consists in the protection of the rights, and in the performance of the duties, of the human person", who is to be the agent of the processes of society and their beneficiary.

The Declaration resumes these affirmations and says :

"The common welfare of society consists in the entirety of those

conditions of social life under which men enjoy the possibility of achieving their own perfection in a certain fullness of measure and also with some relative ease. Hence this welfare consists chiefly in the protection of the rights(2), and in the performance of the duties, of the human person.

"Therefore, the care of the right to religious freedom devolves upon the people as a whole, upon social groups, upon Government, and upon the Church and other religious communities, in virtue of the duty of all toward the common welfare, and in the manner proper to each." (p. 683)

The Declaration wanted to make sufficiently clear the function of government with regard to religion itself as a perfection of the human person and as a social value.

It is not easy to define with precision this latter function. I would like to quote here how one of the architects of the Declaration, Father John Murray, expounds the difficulty. He says :

"It is chiefly a matter of avoiding extremes. On the one hand, government is forbidden to assume the care of religious truth as such, or juridictionover religious worship or practice, or the task of judging the truth or value of religous propaganda. Otherwise, it would excede its competence, which is confined to affairs of the temporal and terrestrial order. On the other hand, government is likewise forbidden to adopt toward religion an attitude of indifference or skepticism, much less hostility. Otherwise it would betray its duty to the human person, for whom religion is the highest good, and also to the temporal and terrestrial welfare of society, whose content is not merely material but also moral and spiritual. Here then is the principle for finding the golden mean between the extremes." (p. 684, note 14)

The position of the Declaration is formulated in this manner :

"The protection and promotion of the inviolable rights of man ranks

among the essential duties of government.(3) Therefore, government is to assume the safeguard of the religious freedom of all its citizens, in an effective manner, by just laws and by other appropriate means.

"Government is also to help create conditions favorable to the fostering of religious life, in order that the people may be truly enabled to exercise their religious rights and to fulfill their religious duties, and also in order that society itself may profit by the moral qualities of justice and peace which have their origin in men's faithfulness to God and to His holy will."(4) (pp. 684-685)

Now, what about the instruction of "establishment", i.e. the notion of a "religion of the state"? Does the Declaration take a position toward it?

In order to understand the position of the Declaration, we must keep in mind that it is the work of men absolutely and unanimously convinced that Religion and state have to be distinguished and, in the line of the evangelical distinction between what pertains to God — the spiritual and religious life — and what pertains to Caesar, there is distinction without separation.

The paragraph concerning this position in the Declaration has been carefully phrased. The Council did not wish to condemn the institution of "religion of the state", because a respectable opinion maintains that the institution is incompatible with full religious freedom. On the other hand, the Council wished to insinuate that establishment, at least from the Catholic point of view, is a matter of historical circumstance, not a theological doctrine. For all these reasons, the text has been written in conditional terms. It runs as follows:

"If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among certain peoples, special legal recognition is given in the consitutional order of society to one religious body, it is at the same time imperative that the right of all citizens and religious bodies to religious freedom should be recognized and made effective in practice." (p. 685)

After that, the Declaration states the moral norm which must regulate the exercise of religious freedom : it is the principle of personal and social responsibility. Its restraints, of course, are self-imposed.

Concerning the juridical norm which should control the action of government in limiting or inhibiting the exercise of the right to religious freedom, the Declaration adopts the concept of **public order** and defines it with precision.

First, the requirements of public order are not subject to arbitrary definition, as tyrannical governments are tempted to do for their own ends. The public order of society is a part of the universal order; its requirements must be rooted in moral law.

Second, public order exhibits a threefold content : juridical, political and moral.

a) the order of society is essentially an order of justice in which the rights of all citizens are effectively safeguarded, and provision is made for peaceful settlement of conflict of rights.

b) the order of society is a political order, an order of peace which is not the result or repressive action by the police, but the work of justice; it comes about of itself when the demands of justice are met, and when orderly processes exist for airing and setting grievances.

c) the order of society is a moral order, at least in the sense that certain minimal standards of public morality are enforced at all.

The free exercise of religion may not be inhibited unless proof is given that it entails some violation of the rights of others, or of public peace, or of public morality. In these cases, in other words, a public action ceases to be a religious exercise and becomes a penal offense.

Stating the basic principle of the "free society", the Declaration ends this paragraph in saying:

"For the rest, the usages of society are to be the usages of freedom in their full range. These require that the freedom of man be respected as far as possible, and curtailed only when and in so far as necessary." (p. 687)

Commenting on this passage, Father Murray says: "Freedom is an end or purpose of society, which looks to the liberation of the human person. Freedom is the political method par excellence, whereby the other goals of society are reached. Freedom, finally, is the prevailing social usage, which sets the style of society. This progress is sanctionned and made secure by the Declaration of Religious freedom." (p. 687, note 21)

As I said previously, I shall not deal with the second chapter of the Declaration which is entitled: Religious freedom in the light of Revelation." Let us say only briefly that the aim of the Synod was to show that, given the requirement of the dignity of the person, and given that one of the major tenets of Catholic doctrine is that man's response to God in faith must be free, it is easy to see that religious freedom in society is entirely consonant with the teaching of the Church. What is more, this doctrine of freedom has roots in divine Revelation and for this reason Christians are bound to respect it all the more conscientiously. The example and teaching of Christ Himself show that coercion in religious matters is alien to the spirit of the gospel. The ways of God with men are not coercive. They are the ways of faithful love. The way of Christ became the way of the first Apostles, whose reliance was on the power of the word of God, never on earthly forces.

Desiring to be loyal to the truth of history, the historical consciousness of the Council required to make the humble avowal that christians have not always walked in the way of Christ and Apostles. At times they have followed ways that were at variance with the spirit of the Gospel and even contrary to it. The avowal is made briefly and without

details. But, as remarks Father Murray, the intention is to confess, in a penitent spirit, that the coercive instruments of power used in the supposed interests of the faith are not to be justified, much less are they ever or in any way to be reinstated. The Declaration is a final renouncement and repudiation by the Church of all means and measures of coercion in religious matters (p. 693, note).

Finally the Council greets with joy the fact that men of the present day want to be able freely to profess their religion in private and in public. Religious freedom has already been declared to be a civil right in most constitutions, and it is solemnly recognized in international documents.(5)

At the same time, the Council denounces with sorrow and deplores "that forms of government still exist which, even though freedom of religious worship receives constitutional recognition, the powers of government are engaged in the effort to deter citizens from the profession of religion and to make life difficult and dangerous for religious communities."(6) (p. 695)

And the Declaration concludes: "All nations are coming into ever closer unity. Men of different cultures and religions are being brought together in closer relationships. There is a growing consciousness of the personal responsibility that weighs upon every man. All this is evident.

"Consequently, in order that relationships of peace and harmony may be established and maintained within the whole of mankind, it is necessary that religious freedom be everywhere provided with an effective constitutional guarantee, and that respect be shown for the high duty and right of man freely to lead his religious life in society." (p. 696).

NOTES

(*) The english translation of the Declaration on Religious Freedom is due to Father John Courtney Murray, s.j. I have utilised the text published, with notes, in **The Documents of Vatican II** (Walter M. Abbot, General Editor), An Angelus Book; Guild Press-New York 1966. The quotations refer to this edition.

(1) Cf. **John XXIII, Encyclical "Pacem in Terris", April 11, 1963; Acta Apost. Sedis 55 (1963),** pp. 260-261; **Pius XII, radio message, Dec. 24, 1942; Acta Apost. Sed. 35 (1943),** p. 19; **Pius XI, Encyclical "Mit Brennender Sorge", Marc 14, 1937; Acta Apost. Sed. 29 (1937),** p. 160; **Leo XIII, encyclical "Libertas praetantissimum", June 20 1888 : Act of Leo XIII 8 (1888),** pp. 237-238.

(2) Cf. **John XXIII, Encyclical "Matter et Magistra", May 15, 1961: Acta Apost. Sedis 53 (1961),** p. 417; **idem, Encyclical "Pacem in Terris", Apr. 11, 1963 : Acta Apost. Sedis 55 (1963),** p. 273.

(3) Cf. **John XXIII, Encyclical "Pacem in Terris", Apr. 11, 1963: Acta Apost. Cedis 55 (1963),** pp. 273-274; **Pius XII, radio message, June 1, 1941 : Acta Apost. Sedis 33 (1941),** p. 200.

(4) Cf. **Leo XIII, Encyclical "Immortale Dei", Noc. 1, 1885 : Acta Apost. Sedis 18 (1885),** p. 161.

(5) Cf. **John XXIII, Encyclical "Pacem in Terris", Apr. 11, 1963 : Acta Apost. Sedis 55 (1963),** pp. 299-300.

(6) Cf. **Ibid.,** pp. 295-296.

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FREEDOM AND SOCIAL FREEDOM

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Freedom is an enchanting word. Innumerable fights have been fought in its name ; and blood, too much blood, has been shed for its sake. Blood is still shed. And in the name of freedom, the most unbelievable things are being done.

In the history of philosophy almost all philosophers have come to grips with freedom and the most diverging assertions were put forth to define it.

What can we learn from these practical and theoretical adventures of freedom ?

The first thing we can learn is the need to make distinctions. And what might help us to make these distinctions is to specify, everytime we deal with freedom, whose freedom it is.

Such an approach to freedom leads us to distinguish, at least, three main kinds of it, which, though interrelated, should by no means be confused. These are the "freedom of Man" — as a species, — which I call a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l and which is the kind of freedom mostly disputed among philosophers; the "freedom of the individual" in his interpersonal relations, which I call e t h i c a l , and s o c i a l freedom.

Anthropological freedom is a human potentiality — : an ontical possibility of Man to be actualized by individuals —, or, a characteristic of Man, distinguishing him from other living beings. It is a p l u s possibility of Man, actualized through various activities in inter-human relations : a possibility which makes Man — i.e. s o m e men — determina-

ble also by value knowledge and valuable principles in action. This possibility, which individuals actualize, constitutes one of the specificities of Man : it is a value of Man.

This possibility — or anthropological freedom — actualized by individuals in action, becomes a property of those individuals : the property of those who know and take into account the value of Man(1) and values in action. In other words freedom is, in the second instance, a value of the individual, or, ethical value. To put it very briefly : free is he who, in everyday life, acts basing himself on right evaluations — of actions, events etc., evaluations which he tries to make consciously, and with respect to human value. Or : ethical freedom is the characteristic of the individual who is able — when he possesses sufficient information for that — to make right evaluations, and who, basing himself on them, really does what ought to be done in a particular case in order to protect human rights or, in order to secure, in the ever thickening mud of our world, that these rights be less damaged in the existing conditions (like Dr. Rieux in Camus' **The Plague**).

What leads individuals to freedom is, mostly, other free individuals, whom they meet — if they are lucky enough — in life, or, in literary works, and who stimulate them to (ethical) freedom. But what helps individuals to remain free is the principles underlying the arrangement — : establishment and changing — of social relations in a given country. Such principles made valid in a country — to begin with in morals, in planning education, in enacting laws, in implementing justice up to those prevailing in political administration — may be principles intending to protect the value or dignity of Man in individuals; they may be the contrary of this, as usually is the case, or, they may be a conglomerate of both.

Because the kind of principles made valid — through laws, institutions etc. — in a country, and consequently, the existence or non-existence of social freedom and its measure, depend, to a real extent,

on the cognitive insight and ethical freedom of — the majority of — those in power, and those who govern public institutions in a country. This is why coincidences also play a considerable rôle in life. Something that we can learn from the long adventure of freedom, is this connection that cannot be severed, between social and ethical freedom: only free individuals can safeguard the permanent realization of social feedom.

Since social freedom, in general, is a n i d e a: the idea that social relations in a country, ought to be so arranged as to protect the human rights of individuals; so arranged as to give the opportunity to individuals to be determined by value knowledge in action, a s w e l l.

* * *

Let us now try to get a bit nearer to this idea of "social freedom".

The content of social freedom consists of various "freedoms', which we may divide into a few kinds, and, in fact, from two main viewpoints: from the view-point of t h e i n d i v i d u a l within his social relations and from the view-point of t h e S t a t e.

From the view-point of the individual, social freedom appears as m o r a l freedom(s) and l e g a l freedom(s). If from 'morals' we understand "the system of value judgements — the "good"s and the "bad"s — valid in a given group at a given time", 'moral freedom' would mean the absence of effective reaction against an individual — : absence of a reaction affecting his life —, when this individual acts, takes attitudes or evaluates things not in conformity with the relative value judgements valid in the group it belongs to, no matter whether these actions, attitudes, evaluations stem from his concern to protect value in the given conditions, or from other motives.

Social freedom appears as a bunch of various — basic and public — freedoms.

When we take a look at the contexts in which the term 'freedom' is used, what I call 'legal freedoms' of the individual seem to denote the absence of any hindrance for the individual, in doing what each freedom states. And this absence of hindrance is considered to be a right. Such a conception of freedom makes it a "dangerous" concept, a danger which those in power try to counter by bringing restrictions on "basic freedom".

Still, all the "legal freedoms" are counter-points of rights of the individual: they are the demands expressed by some rights of the individual, put under the guarantee of law. They express the actual legal protection — : safeguard and fulfilment — by State organs, public institutions etc., of the rights of the individual in a given country. Thus these freedoms express the idea of the actuality of the rights they correspond to. Let us now see how:

The rights of the individual consist of two main categories : his basic — or human — rights and his economic-social-public-civil. etc. rights.(2) The rights of the individual to which freedoms *correspond*, are his basic rights.

A part of these basic rights is connected directly with the exercise of human potentialities. They are demands, demanding that individuals be not hindered while exercising activities proper to Man only, and *not* in doing this or that. They demand the protection of rights which can not be *given* (by a State), but can only be *respected* (or violated) in individuals by individuals; or: they demand that "nobody" touch an individual for any reason, while this individual is engaged in realizing a human potentiality. Put in a legally valid document they *become* freedoms — the so-called "basic freedoms —, which guarantee the possibility to demand legally from "everyone" to respect them.

Thus, so far as this group of basic rights is concerned, *conceptually* a right and a freedom are exactly the same things, named from two different view-points: when we call a demand of this kind a

'right', we mean something that the individual possesses, even if it is not legally safeguarded. While we call it a 'freedom' we emphasize its being under the guarantee of law, which guarantee that this right be respected ; for this respect depends mainly on individuals. Where these basic rights of the individual are actually respected, there their correlative freedoms exist: people enjoy these freedoms; where they are not, there prevails insecurity — or anarchy and terror. And where they are violated by State organs, there reigns oppression.

To give an example, I would mention the so-called "freedom of thought", which, put in a legally valid document, expresses the guarantee that the right of every individual to put forth new knowledge and ideas will be respected, i.e. nobody — : his superiors, any State organ, the judge, the police — will "touch" him — : cause damage to his other rights — under no circumstances, because he put forth a new piece of knowledge or idea, no matter how divergent this knowledge or idea may be from the existing ones.



The second part of the basic rights of the individual, are demands related to the pre-conditions affording each individual the possibility to develop his human potentialities. The right to "a standard of living adequate for one's health", the right to education, the right to work, for example, are such rights. In opposition to the first group of basic rights, they can be protected only indirectly, through other rights given to the individuals by a State — by means of social, economic, political and civil rights — and through public institutions, founded mostly by political decisions. In other words : the protection of these rights presupposes the fulfilment of the complementary duties of the State.

Now, in order that these rights become freedoms, it is not enough that they be taken under the guarantee of law : a special condition of the rights, which protect them indirectly, is also required.

The given rights, which constitute the second category of the rights of the individual besides his basic rights, are limits drawn by the State to individuals in each country; they deliniate some areas within which individuals may act as they like and they demand that no citizen transgress limits. They are rights in which — not all human beings but — all (concerned) citizens in each country are equal. The determination of the lowest payment, of the minimum number of years of work required for retirement are such rights.

The fulfilment or non fulfilment of the indirectly protected basic rights of the individual in a country, depends on how the limits of the rights given to individuals are drawn. This inevitable connection of these two categories of the rights of the individual is the reason why the State — i.e. here, each government that comes to power — has to afford uninterruptedly the possibilities of protecting equally — : at the same degree, whatever this degree may be — these basic rights of all its citizens; rights which constitute the general pre-conditions of developing, as individuals, their human potentialities, and which can be protected only indirectly. This demand is also, more or less, my wording of social justice.(3)

Now, so that the indirectly protected rights of the individual can become freedom in a country, even the existence of the possibility of equal protection of these rights of all citizens — even the existence of social justice — would not be sufficient; not only the protection at the same degree of these rights of all citizens, but also a **certain** degree of protection is necessary: the existence of the possibilities of their full, i.e. dignified, protection.

To give a simple example to how these indirectly protected basic rights of the individual may become freedoms, I would mention the right to education : it becomes a freedom, I would mention the right to education : it becomes a freedom not only when the possibility to get primary education is afforded for all child-citizens, but when also the possibility to get secondary, vocational, high-school education is afforded to all

(concerned) citizens; when all citizens in a country are not hindered, by economic, moral etc. reasons, from developing systematically each his or her own capacities, a development which will afford him or her the equipment necessary, as a pre-condition, — for a dignified life. This is a simple example; things are much more complicated with other rights.

It is easy, I think, to notice that what I said on the relationship between freedom and rights, concerns only basic — : human-rights. So far as given — : economic and social-rights are concerned, the State of things is quite different; there is no question of their "becoming freedoms". 'Freedom' with regard to a given right, would mean the absence of any hindrance — or the absence of limits — in doing something, which would be in contradiction with the very nature of such rights: their being limits drawn to something; in connection with economic rights, for example, it would mean the **laissez faire, laissez passer** or **laissez acheter, laissez consommer.**

The same is true for political rights, which are also "given" rights. The so-called political freedom does not correspond to any political right, but it is an implication of the basic right of the individual to determine his own destiny, in our case his own destiny as a social being, i.e. to participate in the decisions of establishing and administrating what is "public". Political freedom is the counterpoint of this latter right. It is this right, put under the guarantee of law, becomes political freedom and is exercised by means of various given political rights.

Thus, social freedom is the general concept including all such freedoms: it expresses the fulfilment of the demand that the protection of the basic rights of the individual be taken under legal guarantee. It presupposes the abolishment of social injustice, but even the absence of the latter, in a country, would not be sufficient for the existence of social freedom. Social freedom would exist, only when implemented and enforced laws and established institutions afford, under the existing conditions, the possibility of equal and dignified protection of the basic rights of all the citizens in a country.

Up to this point we have looked at the question of social freedom mainly from the view-point of the individual. If we now look at this question from the view-point of the State, it appears as the question of the possibilities which a State affords to its citizens through the arrangement of domestic affairs, i.e. it appears as the question of public freedoms.

A State affords these possibilities through its organs and various establishments and institutions. The objective of establishing institutions and of established ones, of creating organs and created ones etc., as well as their functioning with regard to these objectives; and the existence (or absence) of some of them in the special conditions of a country, are also constituent of social freedom as a whole; they contribute to the concrete fulfilment of the indirectly protected rights. Thus, public freedoms are possibilities created by the State for the actual protection of the basic rights of the citizens — so that all their citizens may find the opportunity to develop their human potentialities and be unimpeded in being determined by value knowledge. Public freedoms are various ways of fulfiling, in a country, the indirectly protected rights of the citizens, according to the existing conditions at a given historical moment.

To give an example to such public freedoms, I would mention State mass-media, TV for example, though, according to the existing conditions, more specific institutions could be given as examples. One of the main objectives of this public institution is the contribution to the fulfilment of the right to — let us name it here — correct information, which may enable people to make right evaluations of events for themselves and take their attitudes accordingly — not advertising or propaganda in the narrow sense. Still we observe very often that, being State institution, TV's in many countries are oriented directly or indirectly by those in power — political and economic power —, and thus cease, to a great extent, to fulfil this objective.

This is why, in some countries, great efforts are made in order to

give an "autonomous" status to such institutions, which — people think — would prevent such interferences.

* * *

In conclusion I would say that in all its kinds — : as a potentiality (ontical specificity of Man), as a reality (property of some men), and as a necessity (an idea with regard to the establishment of social relations) — freedom appears to be a value : a human, an ethical and a social value.

In our age freedom finds itself in one of the turning points of its adventure, both theoretically and practically.

Various events and collective actions, which characterize our age — terrorism a n d the way States and we as humanity react to it, genocide etc. — make for us necessary to review, from the view-point of how much they protect human dignity, our international documents, constitutions, laws and ourselves. In the face of such events in our age, if we wish to bear with dignity the predicate of "human being", we have to review them, as soon as possible, from this view-point, in our name, and in the name of our countries and our age as well.

NOTES

1. For this term, see my "Philosophy and Human Rights", in **Philosophical Foundation of Human Rights,** Ankara 1982, p. 47.

2. See also "Philosophy and Human Rights", pp. 47-52.

3. See also my "Philosophy and Social Injustice", Proceedings of the **Second Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference,** Nairobi, October 1981

THE OBJECTIFICATION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

Clyde Pax (U.S.A.)

Human beings have developed many kinds of relationships both with individual persons and among groups of persons. In addition to living out these relationships, we have also tried to understand these relations and have done so differently in different times and places. Furthermore, we have not hesitated to make judgments about the worth of different structures and different understandings. We speak of relations that are just and others that are unjust, of friendships that are deep or superficial, of societies that are primitive or cultured. We speak of developed and underdeveloped nations, of the ethnic origin of a people, of a tension between interdependence and self-determination. We have constructed small communities, national states and a United Nations. We have searched for a basis for social relations in human nature, in a mutual contract, and in some basis beyond man.

The continued presence of wars and conflicts indicates clearly that we have not wholly succeeded in building a satisfactory social order. And our attendance at a conference on "The Roots of Dogmatism" would seem to indicate not that we have reached a satisfactory understanding of ourselves and others but that we are working towards such an understanding.

My paper is very much a working paper. It is a brief study of one way of structuring and understanding social relations, a way that I am calling the objectification of social relations. By the objectification of social relations I mean two things: I mean, first, the structuring of relations by objective constitutions and ordinances, institutions of various kinds, and by various uses of physical materials; secondly, I am using the term to designate the understanding of these relationships which is available when we step back from our involvement in these relations and

look at them from a "neutral," that is, objective point of view. The impetus for my paper is the conviction that the movement toward modernity has been marked by an increasing reliance upon objective structuring in social relationships, and by an increasing acceptance of an objective understanding as the form of knowledge which alone or at least best enables us to understand these relationships. My contention in reference to this hypothesis is that the objectification of social relationships is intrinsically ambiguous because the goods resulting from this objectification can easily obscure some concomitant evils. Thus I do not doubt that there is value in these objectifications, in both senses indicated above. At the same time, however, I think that modern society precisely because of the degree of its reliance upon objectification is perhaps peculiarly vulnerable to certain dogmatic ideologies and peculiarly limited in its options in the face of political and social violence.

I have divided my paper into three parts. The first part is a brief outline of a philosophical anthropology which provides a framework for the discussion. The second part attempts the risky task of identifying some of the ways in which contemporary society may have become dogmatic by a too great reliance upon objectification. The third section makes several brief and tentative suggestions of how we might move to overcome the dogmatic positions identified in the second part. In this brief working paper I cannot, of course, provide an exhaustive study of those topics, but I hope to present the material with sufficient fullness to encourage your response to my remarks.

I

If we look for a framework to understand social relations, we can recall that already the ancient thinkers taught that man was social by nature. In noting that man is social by nature, they were doing more than noticing that man like other kinds of beings exists individually as one member of a kind. By calling man social by his nature, they were saying that man lives the problem of being one and many in a unique

way; and history tells us that the way has been troublesome to man and that moments of success have remained fragile.

The question of how there can be individual beings which nonetheless form one community of being is always troublesome to the intellect. It is the question which Aristotle referred to as the ever-present and ever-puzzling question of philosophy, and which Heidegger claims we have more nearly forgotten than solved. The question does not become any easier if it is formulated in terms of truth rather than being, as might be more appropriate for a study of dogmatism. We might ask, for example, how there can be individual truths which while retaining their full integrity as individual truths some-how belong to an encompassing social unity of truth and are thus placed alongside other and perhaps conflicting individual truths. Or, if we phrase the question from the side of unity, we might ask whether and how we can seek a meaning of history itself. Is such a question still possible in our pluralistic and fast-changing world, or must we now be content to seek only various meanings **within** history ? And what are the consequences for human society if we dare to rule out of order the question of the meaning **of** history ?

To say that man is social by nature is to acknowledge that this problem of the one and the many exists for the intellect not only when it looks out upon the world from an assumed point of interior self-presence. It is to accept the bewildering condition that the problem belongs to the very structure of the understanding, and that it invades as well the affective dimension of man, and indeed his whole being as he exists and grows to maturity. If man is social by nature, he can be himself only by being in relation to others; and this relation to others, though different from his relation to himself, must be as intimate to a person's proper being and proper self-understanding as is his relation of identity with his own self.

If man is social by reason of being who he is, there would seem to be a kind of ambiguity at the very center of man's being. I will try

to investigate this ambiguity in some detail but wish first to relate it immediately to our question about the roots of dogmatism.

One of the frequently irritating and profoundly disturbing aspects of our encounters with dogmatism is that the dogmatic stance or attitude is as deceiving and cunning as it is self-assured. Only with difficulty can a dogmatist — myself or another — be made to see and reject his dogmatism. The dogmatist sees himself as a defender of the truth, not a defender of a dogma. We frequently have as much difficulty in distinguishing the dogmatist from the genuine lover of truth as Socrates had in distinguishing the sophist from the genuine philosopher. To make matters worse the dogmatist is the kind of person who gets things done and thus bears close resemblance to a person simply dedicated to a cause. Always the dogmatic attitude seems to rest upon a restriction of one's view in relation to the available and relevant evidence and not upon a total rejection of evidence. Dogmatism, at least as I am here using the term, arises precisely from this unwarranted restriction of vision; a firm commitment to a particular position after the relevant evidence has been considered can be called dogmatic only in a derived and non-pejorative sense of the word. If there were not this close and deceptive kinship between dogmatism and truth, and if man were not so persistently determined to abide faithfully within the truth, dogmatism would be a relatively small problem for man. In noting this deceptive aspect of dogmatism we do not want to overlook, especially in our century, the possibility and reality of a simply dogmatic brutality which knows full well what it is up to. However, sometimes even this brutality is instructive for our issue, as when it seeks to hide its cruelty and its dogmatism by clever or sometimes even clumsy propaganda.

The cunning character of dogmatism — cunning in the sense in which Hegel speaks of the cunning of historical reason or as Kant speaks of a self-deception in speculative reason — suggests a working definition of dogmatism as a premature or unwarranted closure of consciousness, but a closure that is made with at least an implicit approval of consciousness itself. The unwarranted closure might be purely intel-

lectual. More often, however, it is affective as well, and frequently manifests itself in ways which can include political and economic repression and physical cruelty and annihilation. The strength of dogmatism, its possible vehemence and its unwarranted character all arise not because we are directed toward what is true and valuable, but directed in such a way that we can fasten too quickly or too exclusively on some portion of what we desire. The essence of dogmatism would seem to be a form of reduction, and the birth of dogmatism appears to result from an act of seduction inasmuch as the intellect implicitly affirms the unwarranted reduction.

Who is man that he allows himself to be so easily seduced, so easily and frequently led to cling to only a portion of all that could be his ? How is he constituted that he can so easily abandon his own desire for fullness and thus become an accomplice against himself ?

Answers to questions such as these would surely be helpful in a study of the roots of dogmatism. In my opinion, some help in answering them is available from the philosophical movement called phenomenological existentialism. And it is appealing to turn to phenomenology because its own beginnings in Edmund Husserl lie in the rejection of all dogma and in a reliance upon descriptions of experience as the most reliable source of our understanding.

The most central insight in a phenomenological or existential description of man is that man discovers his own reality as an ecstasis, that is, as an **immediate** standing out of himself toward what is — in various ways — other than himself. To appreciate the meaning and force of this insight, it is crucial that we understand the ecstasis as something primary and fundamental to man's experience of who he is. As phenomenology sees and describes him, man is not first who he is, and then in relation to others. Rather his way of being who he is, is as an openness and availability toward what is other. To emphasize the uniqueness of the human person as revealed in a phenomenological description, we might say that although many things are, only man **ex-ists.**

This description reveals a positive kind of ambiguity at the heart of all man's actions and indeed at the very center of his being, because it presents man as the one who exists only in, and consequently neither prior to nor subsequent to, an openness to what is other than himself. Only within the living out of this openness in its multiple forms, does he achieve integrity, interiority and personhood.

Such a description, contrary to what is sometimes thought, does not deny or minimize the value of individuality. It does, however, call for a radical re-understanding of individuality as the term applies to persons rather than to things. A thing is individual by reason of the boundaries of its being which separate it from other individuals; a person is individual by being a unique pole of an encounter with what is other; and one is most truly and responsibly person when it is least possible to identify precise boundaries between the self and what is other than self.

I cannot here present the kind of full evidence that would justify this description of what it means to be an existing person. Perhaps for the present purposes it will suffice to reflect very briefly upon the concrete experience in which we are now engaged. If we stay close to the experience as it concretely manifests itself, and ruthlessly refuse to begin with some abstract meaning of ourselves, it would seem that I am able to speak these words with meaning only if you are listening, that is, only if the words are already yours as well as mine. The words belong to you as hearers and thus belong to you differently than to me; but in this conversation they are neither yours nor mine except insofar as they are also ours. In a similar way, we are able to look at one another only if our eyes are led and formed by the bodily shape and color of the other; and each of our seeings is unique at least inasmuch as none of us can see those eyes which we each call ours, but which are paradoxically visible only to the others. We are able to work together on a study of dogmatism only because we are already available to each other, both positively and negatively, in ways in which no animal or natural object exists or is present to us.

By a phenomenological description I mean a description of our actual presence to the world, to each other, to ourselves and to reality before we interpret the experience in terms of subject and object. Such a description reveals a difference between self and others which is not identical with but more primordial than the comfortable and common-sense distinction between subject and object. Let me hasten to add, however, that the refusal to give an experiential primacy to the otherness which appears in the distinction between subject and object is not at all to deny the reality or the usefulness of that distinction. Nor is this refusal in any way a move which denies otherness and seeks to understand all as a single and undifferentiated unity.

Experientially, otherness is fundamental to the presence and constitution of the self. However, the primary relationship between self and other is not a relation of two things brought together by some third mediator. It is an immediate relationship which must be seen as constituting what the self and other actually are. Because of this immediacy the relationship is difficult to see — in fact, it is unavailable to objective vision, which can begin only after a certain separation of the self from the other. Because this relation to what is other is both immediate, in the sense indicated, and multiple in its possibilities, all human experience is a creative interpretation of self and what is other than self. Nothing has meaning or value except insofar as it comes into the pale of human consciousness and freedom; but it is equally true that human consciousness can be an awareness and human freedom can be a responsible act, or even an enjoyable act, only insofar as they take heed of and follow what is other than themselves. This fundamental ambiguity (to use the phrase of Merleau-Ponty) or this creative fidelity (in Marcel's words) characterizes both the point of departure of the human journey and every step along the way to social maturity.

If this description does, in fact, set forth the major contours of human experience, it suggests a way to understand more precisely the nature of the unwarranted closure of consciousness which we have called dogmatism. Described concretely, experience appears as a kind of

unity-in-plurality in which the self and various others arise as integral moments of the unity which is the experience. In this view, any fastening upon that pole of the unity called self without due recognition and acceptance of otherness would be dogmatic; equally dogmatic would be any fastening upon the otherness or upon some one of the various others without due recognition of what is **not** other by reason of its being uniquely mine, or ours, or uniquely human. I suggest that the view which over-emphasizes the pole of self is illustrated by Cartesian philosophy, Sartrean anthropology and much of secular humanism. Examples of the opposite and also dogmatic view might be certain fundamentalist religious stances, some forms of behaviorist psychology, as well as those forms of evolutionism and naturalism which fail to see a difference in kind between man and the rest of nature. I mention these examples at this point simply to make clear the direction of my thinking. Further study and discussion is undoubtedly necessary to establish to what extent these examples are in fact instances or are caricatures of what they are meant to illustrate.

II

The examples just mentioned are suggested as examples of dogmatism in reference to the general relational structure of self and otherness. Our concern in this second part of the paper is with dogmatism as it arises from a false reliance upon objectivity. The description of dogmatism as a too hasty closure upon self or otherness is so abstract as to cause little difficulty or complexity. However, when we remember that the relation between self and other is a relation which constitutes the meaning and reality of both, the relation is no longer easy to understand. The difficulty and the complexity of the question take on an overwhelming force when we begin to reflect upon the fact that the ecstasis who is the human person is not one ecstasis but is all of the ways in which persons comport themselves and thus define themselves and their world. The difficulty increases still more when we consider that this constituting experience is a changing and never completed act of creative discovery of self and other. Moreover, if this constituting

ecstasis is truly fundamental it must be as profound as the depths of man's being and as encompassing as the question of why there is any sense or meaning at all, rather than nothing.

To move from this purely structural and thus abstract description of experiencing to a concrete understanding of man and his place in reality obviously entails problems of extraordinay difficulty. Here I wish to take two modest steps toward concreteness.

As a first step I will briefly discuss four ways in which the self relates to what is other. I am making no claim that the list is exhaustive, but am merely seeking to direct attention to four significant ways of experiencing. My aim is to further uncover the structure of experience so that it becomes possible to reflect not only on the relationship between self and otherness, but to study also the relationships among various meanings of self and various meanings of otherness. The second step will be a beginning of such a study as it relates to the question of dogmatism. Thus the second step will amount to an effort to throw some light on the hiding places which dogmatism so successfully creates by ignoring or slighting various meanings of self or of otherness. It is clear, of course, that, from an existential point of view, these four ways in which the self relates to what is other are also four ways in which the self is given its own proper reality because of the ways in which the other impinges upon the self. Each sense in which the other is seen or accepted as real and valuable by the self is also a way in which the self (or a people) is urged to understand its own reality. Equally importantly, the ways in which the other cannot be seen or appreciated are ways in which the self, likewise, cannot be seen or appreciated, whether the self is mine, yours, or the people's.

The four ways in which self and other appear to each other are the following:

1) To common sense, and to various powerful interests in the modern world, the other is predominantly that which is objectively other.

In this interpretation of otherness, to be real in the fullest sense of the term is to be objectively real, and to be objectively true is to be true without need for further discussion. In this view, the self understands itself as a subject, which is to say, it understands itself as a particular kind of object; like any other object, the subject exists in its own being, but differs from other objects in having its own special structure and functions.

2) In a second view, the other appears as the personal other, or better, as the personal others, in the plural. In this interpretation, the others are more real as they are more intimately related to the self by kinship, friendship, or moral bonds; the self is real as "belonging" in some personal way to the others. The belonging in this interpretation must be seen as significantly different from the way in which the subject belongs to the objective world by being one of the natural objects in the world.

3) A third sense of otherness is the temporal other. In this interpretation, the other appears, in part, as what the self has been or what the self is able to become. More importantly, the temporal other is that otherness which is revealed in the self's coming to the understanding that it cannot grasp its own birth nor forestall its own rapid movement toward its death. It is thus an otherness which reveals the self as having been birthed and as always already on the way to destiny, however that destiny can be understood. It is an otherness which reveals the self as on-going and ageing. It is an otherness which can instill a sense of urgency into the life of the self.

4) A fourth way in which otherness can appear is as a radical ontological transcendence over the self. Such an otherness, if it can be perceived, reveals the self as a wonder to itself because it reveals the self as real in the sense of being possible. If such an otherness appears or is admitted into consciousness, the self — even in its actual presence here and now — remains the self as enabled to be, as having happened. This ontological enabling reveals the self as "belonging" in

the primordial depths of its own being and thus belonging in a more primordial way than the way in which a self belongs to its own past or its own destiny, or even to its own presence as a being.

In summary, otherness appears not only as otherness, but interpretively so, i.e., otherness **as** objective, **as** personal, **as** temporal or **as** ontological. Each of these ways of otherness signals to the self which perceives them a way in which the self can come to know itself, i.e., as objective subject,as person, as fundamentally temporal, as a radical uniqueness vis-à-vis an encompassing ontological otherness.

These four interpretations of self and of otherness are not, of course, the only possible interpretations, but they should suffice to alert us that in experience we are faced not only with different evidences, but with different orders of evidence. It would, for example, be a serious misunderstanding of what is being said if these various interpretations were taken to be four ways in which an already existing self relates to what is other. To understand my remarks in such a way would be to miss the entire point because it would be to take the self understood as objective subject as if this self were simply equivalent to the real self.

My point is precisely that the objective interpretation reveals only one way in which the self and otherness appear and in this appearing constitute each other. We are so accustomed to taking the other to mean the objective other that we tend without thinking to relegate all evidence which is not evidence in the objective mode to a secondary status. My contention is that objective evidence, like all evidence, **arises within and as an original interpretation** and that this evidence, like all other evidences, then gives rise to further interpretations within the same order of evidence. Both the original interpretation according to a particular mode of evidence and the further interpretations in that mode can be called dogmatic if they inappropriately exclude other relevant and available evidence in other modes of evidence. I realize that terms like appropriate are troublesome in this context, but I can only hope to bring some clarification to these terms in the remarks that follow.

In this paper I am concerned with only a portion of this problem, namely, with trying to understand some of the ways in which objective interpretations can become dogmatic as they are used to structure and/or explain social relations. Coming to such understanding is difficult for a number of reasons. One reason is surely the vastness and complexity of the issue. Another reason, I suggest, is that the tendency to handle social relations in a purely objective way has today very powerful allies. Among these allies are the generally unquestioned acceptance of the economic good as the primary good and an equally uncritical acceptance of the primacy of technique as the way to knowledge and understanding. The unquestioned acceptance of the first has allowed an economic model to be applied not only within the traditional order of consumable goods, but also to politics as a whole, to psychology, to the study of language, to interpersonal relations and even to religion. The dominance of technique as a way of knowing has become such that even serious people can begin to wonder whether there is any basic difference between the human mind and the computer of the future. Such dominance makes criticism of that order of evidence unwelcome. Such criticism is especially unwelcome in a world which is increasingly divided between the rich and the poor and in a world in which technology is unquestionably more and more needed to bring relief from suffering. In such a world, any responsible critic of the extension of the economic model or of the adequacy of the technical has a counter critic within his own heart.

A third reason why it is difficult to come to an understanding of the appropriate role for objective interpretation is that we do not have an effective consensus regarding an encompassing context into which this or that interpretation might be said to fit well or poorly. In the absence of such consensus what can be called an appropriate interpretation is never totally independent of what can actually be achieved in a world polity. In this situation it is no more surprising that a powerful and successful order of evidence should seek to dominate over and conceal other orders of evidence, than that a powerful military group, for example, should seek to make its interests dominate over those of others,

Strictly within the military order, only effectiveness, i.e., victory, has meaning, and only if a different order of interests is allowed in its own right can there be a meaningful questioning of the value of military victory. So too in the case of uniquely different orders of evidence : only the acceptance of an order of evidence in its own right can serve as a justification of that order. This is as much the case for objective evidence as for any other order. The reflections which I now wish to present are nothing more than an introduction of evidences; since some of these evidences may have been dogmatically pushed into secondary status, a few remarks about their credentials may be necessary.

Let me begin, therefore, by acknowledging that I know of no ultimate set of criteria that we might apply to a particular position or view and thus decide whether the view could be called dogmatic. But this acknowledgement must be followed by the observation that the desire to be able to rely upon some external and already available set of criteria is a desire which springs from the objective mode of interpretation. Only this one mode, of the four we have listed, separates the conscious self from its other in a way that provides sufficient distances for the application of criteria external to the self. It is consistent with this separation that the self understands truth as a correspondence between the mind and its object; it can then fall in love with the clarity which results from a definite designation of boundaries between itself and the various objects it confronts.

The objective mode of interpretation is inherently seductive regarding knowledge of both self and the object. The clarity and rest which are the fruit of comprehension and conception can deceive the mind into believing its task of thinking has been completed. The control over the other as object which is given in definition and experiment can be misundesrtood as the proper relation to **all** forms of otherness. When the seductiveness results in a reduction of all truths and values to those which can meet the expectations of this self understood objectively, the self has become dogmatic. This remains the case even though the person in such a position would claim to have overcome subjectivism and

dogmatism precisely by the decision and courage to rely always and only upon what is present to him with objective evidence.

This decision, in its historical accomplishment, has indeed enabled us greatly to reduce one form of dogmatism and its attendant blindnesses and injustices. However, because this decision was made in large part with the prior restriction of evidence to one mode of evidence (namely, the objective) it has been gradually leading us to an understanding of the self corresponding to this order of evidence. The self in this order of evidence is the controller of what is other and present for its consumption. **This** self appropriately relies on technique; this self is, in truth, the technician who by method and persistence grasps whatever is graspable by his methods and who becomes an expert by the perfection of his methods of defining — and this definition can be physical, political or moral as well as intellectual. **This** self, also appropriately, defines itself as a consumer; the goods it consumes are evidences, experiences, as well as food and material resources, and even other selves as these are seen to be in a less strategic position by reason of age, sex, or lack of power in the pursuit of individual or national interests.

My primary concern, however, is not that the self understood according to technical and economic models covers over other understandings of the self. My primary concern is to raise the possibility that our way of looking **at the difference** between self and otherness has become dogmatic. If so, the problem would not be a matter of this or that evidence being ignored or slighted, but of whole orders of evidence being given scant recognition. Have we become so seduced into seeing the relation betweeen self and otherness as one of objective and essential difference or sameness (the two views are the same for the present consideration) that we can no longer even entertain the idea that this difference might have to be understood otherwise if we are to build humane societies ?

To suggest that some other understanding of the difference may be necessary in no way means that it is unnecessary or false to understand the relation objectively as well. Responsible social behavior in our present

world clearly includes the development of increasingly efficient techniques for producing and distributing economic goods. If our time is characterized by an unwarranted reduction to the technical and the economic, this reduction appears not in what is or can be accomplished and understood in the objective order, but in what is closed out and not understood.

If our aim is indeed characterized by an unwarranted reliance upon and trust in objectivity, perhaps especially as objectivity is manifested in terms of what can be viewed economically and handled by technique, one might argue that we would be unaware of it by reason of our blindness. In the hope and trust that our blindness is not complete, I would like to present an exhibit to us who are both the judged and the judges. The exhibit consists of a brief outline which contrasts the ways in which our four orders of interpretation present evidence for understanding the meaning of four central experiences. The experiences are the experience of language, of knowledge, of politics and of life itself.

1. Language. In a technical-economic intepretation, language is principally a means of communication between independent speakers. Its perfection is that of a tool and is marked by univocity, clarity, fixed meanings and independence from the particular users, times of use and purposes.

   The current dominance of this interpretation obscures, perhaps seductively obscures, important meanings of language which are available from the other interpretations :

   a) from the personal interpretation, an appreciation of the fact that language **as a possibility for man** distinguishes us from the rest of nature and thus reveals us as belonging together prior to our use of language, that is, prior to our first word of mutual acceptance.

   b) from the temporal interpretation, the fact that words, prejudices, judgments and we ourselves all have a time; that all of these are

historical in that they find a place only in reference to tradition and destiny; that historical awareness must, therefore, include an intrinsic reference to tradition and destiny and cannot be limited to the ability to adopt an objective point of view in reference to times other than our own; that time is not money.

c) from the ontological interpretation, the awareness of language as wonder, praise, gratitude and silence.

2. Knowledge. In the technical-economic interpretation the essence of knowledge is clear conception; its ideal form is the univocal unit open to computerizable calculation and its purpose is control. Ideally, its validity should be publicly confirmable. Its object is what is present.

a) from the personal interpretation, the realization that the contrary of what is called publicly verifiable and scientific knowledge need be private concern or private opinion, but may well be a communal, existential knowledge of others, of goals and values; that friendship, worship, morality, and fidelity are deprived of their richness when they are deprived of their social reality.

b) from the temporal interpretation, the knowledge which is not limited to that which is essentially present but which respects also the wonder of becoming, and thus refuses to forget that man remains truly present only if he remains in touch with his absent origin and his not-yet-present destiny.

c) from an ontological interpretation, the knowledge that even in my inmost being I do not belong to myself; the knowledge that "my life" is mine only in a metaphorical and abstract sense.

3. Politics. The dominance of the technical-economic interpretation is illustrated by the degree to which politics has been reduced to political economy, the exercise and goals of which are restricted chiefly to the ordering of competition among the most powerful and

voracious consumers. The two great ideological blocs fundamentally agree on the definition of man as a consumer, but disagree about the control of the means of production and the distribution of the goods.

The dominance of this view clearly obscures other meanings of political reality :

a) from the personal interpretation, the rights and abilities of peoples to live in societies which are not defined by the economic interests of the technically advanced; an appreciation of morality and of positive law as more than a game which one chooses to play or not to play; the political space to forgive, to forego interests and to remain wisely apathetic to various ideologies; the fact that more monstrous than the arms race is the political self-understanding that continues to make such a race possible.

b) from the temporal interpretation, a remembrance that political life does not arise naturally but in a way which sets man off from nature, and that our political thinking does not become radical unless it asks about the very possibility of the emergence of the political order.

c) from an ontological interpretation, a need to think out a basis— beyond belonging to a common species — which would enable us to extend freedom and respect to all persons. A basis in a common species cannot be called adequate so long as we can resort to war or can allow whole peoples to perish. A respect for otherness at this political level might demand that we inquire more carefully into Heidegger's thought that freedom belongs not to man as a property, but as the "place" where he is granted existence.

4. Life. In a technical-economic interpretation this term denotes the chief characteristic of the person understood variously as the ultimate

unit of value, a commodity of exchange or a unit of productive force. The worth of the person depends upon his function and power in the system of exchange of commodities; when he lacks all power and function he lacks all values and reality. Seductively covered over are other meanings of life, some of which we may recognize only with difficulty :

a) from the personal interpretation, the meaning of life as the ability and decision to donate myself totally and irrevocably to another, even the ability to choose to forego all further economic consumption and all further planned activities in a sacrifice of my life for others; the ability to marvel that another's love can choose me in an absolute sense and thus remove me entirely from the order of exchange.

b) from a temporal interpretation, an awareness that life is not only a present situation, but is also always given meaning by its absent origin and absent destiny ; the awareness, therefore that my life is never something that I possess.

c) from an ontological interpretation, an appreciation of the fact that my life can be seen as my place of meeting with reality, or better still as the self-manifestation of an Otherness which takes me now out of nothingness. In this reading of evidence, my life is so little mine that it is not even clear that I can end my life.

III

This exhibit is obviously incomplete. If even in its incompleteness it illustrates ways which might be thought of as dogmatic, we might raise the question of what we can do about the matter. To conclude my paper I would like to make suggestions.

1. First we need to convince ourselves that a critique is necessary and possible. The cunning of dogmatic consciousness makes it not surprising that dogmatism should find root and grow precisely in the place from which we thought it had been banished forever, namely within objectivity itself. The roots have become more firmly entrenched as they have become entwined with the flattering suggestions that it is man himself who is the ultimate unit of value, and his own ever more powerful technologies which are the liberators from the dogmatism of less enlightened times. Thus thrust of my paper is not to reject the powerful forces of technology and the economic model, but to appropriate them, that is to make them appropriate by learning how to judge both their value and their limits, so that they can be included in a more wholistic understanding of society. Given the present stage in human history, this means the creation and maintenance of an intellectual habit which looks resolutely beyond all questions of technique, even while it is at home with technology and while it is totally cognizant of the demands of economic justice.

2. The second suggestion is that the problem is not a technical problem nor even a problem about technology or economics. The problem is more centrally a problem of epistemology, that is, of being able to read evidence. The difficulty we everywhere experience of finding values which can be effectively held in peaceful co-existence arises not because we have deeply conflicting ideologies, but because all of our ideologies are alike in failing to reveal values which are appropriate to draw us into a radical and encompassing commitment. It would be false to say that the problem is modernity itself. The problem is rather that blind spot of modern consciousness which reduces the real to that which is present, and thus dulls us to both tradition and destiny.

3. My third suggestion is that we need to think more fully about that response to the problem which asks what can or should we do. The challenge which I am here suggesting is not to the

necessity of our doing something, but to the uncritical presumption of the adequacy of action and the uncritical rejection of any place for passivity. Within a technical understanding, passivity may well be the contradictory of activity. But for a self that is in fact an ecstasis, responsible and meaningful action can only be action that remembers its various contexts and which obeys or follows what is other, even while it performs. The creativity of a self who is an ecstasis is not antithetical to respect; for such a self, waiting upon the other is as fundamental as action. and it is necessary if the action is not to degenerate into manipulation.

4. A fourth suggestion is that we need to take seriously the task of re-kindling the depths of our languages. In making this suggestion, I am acutely aware of the limits of my own knowledge of languages other than my mother tongue. However, the rapidity with which technology and now computer technology has raced to all corners of the earth suggests the existence of a general attitude which is at home with a reduction of language to a closed system of structurally related signs. This reduction, especially as the meaningful differences between signs can be more finely programmed toward univocity, brings great clarity and great power of organizing and communicating units of information. On the other hand, such a srtuctural view of language by itself knows nothing of language's "bite on reality," to use Ricoeur's powerful metaphor. Such a reduced view of language is of decidedly subsidiary value when we need to ask again who we are who live together with one another, but who do so only with difficulty and with the repeated failure that is epitomized by our still recurrent resort to war. We need some fuller depth of language to be able to ask in what sense it is true to say that "the first thing is to live." We need a language deep enough and rich enough to continue to give meaning to the term "life" after we have come to realize that an economic technical definition of life can only end in meaninglessness.

THE SOCRATIC METHOD AS AN ANTIDOTE TO DOGMATISM

Amira Helmi Matar (Egypt)

Since the end of the 18th century, that was when Egypt found her way to modernism, the rational and critical method of thought was considered the only route to overcoming reactionary modes of thinking and living that prevailed throughout the medieval world.

European philosophers of the age of reason (17th, 18th century) heralded this rational method and it appeared in cristalized shape in Kant's Critique of reason.

Basing themselves on Kant's teaching, academic scholars who came after could see how it was that our knowledge is limited by our experience, hence all sorts of attacks were launched against dogmatic metaphysics.

It is instructive as well as interesting to look back across generations of philosophers to remind ourselves that it was Socrates who first used critical rational method to expose the defects of dogmatism.

1. Virtue is knowledge :

Some modern contemporary thinkers claim that going on combating evil has proved to be much more difficult than combating intellectual laziness, accordingly those thinkers are convinced that much of our troubles and social difficulties can be related to us being mistaken or misguided.

Our modern interpretation of this doctrine means that if we know what is right we will not obviously choose the wrong. Evidently it is an

optimistic way of moral thought, because it shows that the more we apply our rational faculties to our moral life the more we can control our conduct and discover our mistakes. Consequently this point of view will give us hope that progress in scientific and technological discoveries can ultimatly help mankind to overcome troubles and misunderstandings which threaten their happiness.

2. Dialectic :

Another characteristic of Socrates' rational method is his maintenance of the dialectical method as the best method of criticism and a safeguard against all confusion and ambiguities which nourish dogmatic attitudes.

This method of dialectics remounts to Zeno of Elea who first practised it to deduce contradictory results from erroneous premisses about Being as a whole. But with socrates this method was used in human or moral science. He tried by dialectical discussions to invite people to examine the reasons by which they maintained their beliefs. He went on asking experts about the meanings and the detinitions of their ideas but found that most of his contemporaries were maintaining either contradictory or senseless ideas. Plato illustrates this socratic dialectics in his earlier dialogues. In the EUTHYPHRO, Socrates challenges Euthyphro's stubborn dogmatism regarding matters of piety and religiosity. When he askes Euthyphro to reexamine his ideas it became clear that what Euthyphro thought about these matters was either contradictory or senseless.

The lesson we draw from this episode can be stated as follows: The Socratic method teaches us that in human and moral fields self-criticism and logical discussion can save us from being dogmatic and make us much more tolerant towards others.

It also shows us that beliefs and ideas cannot be imposed by force. Faith and convictions are valuable when they are freely admitted, sin-

cerely held and reasonably justified. Thus attempts to force others to conform in the long run is often useless.

Objective truth :

A third lesson we may learn from Socrates is concerned with general and universal concepts. This would be appreciated if we remember the prerequisities of modern scientific thought.

Modern scientific spirit emphasizes faith in the individual's right to think and search for truth by its own power. This has been gained after the withdrawal of all authorities — either religious or secular — from securing this field. With this withdrawal scientific truth replaced old dogmas.

But the removal of ancient or medieval authorities does not imply that scientific truth is easy to find or that it can be coloured by individual wishes or subjected to personal attitudes. Scientific truth is characterized to be objective and impersonal; and it is our task to find it by the appropriate methods and to know that it is not in our power to change it or to interpret it according to our likings.

Though the Socratic method was not of any use for empirical studies and though Socrates' attitude was not favouring secular education and scientific truth propounded by his contemporaries the Sophists, Socrates is known to have been one of the first methodologists who affirmed that science did not deal with particular instances but looked for mental concepts called by him and by Plato Essences or Ideas.

Here is a classical quotation derived from the above mentioned dialogue The Euthyphro. In this dialogue Socrates reminds Euthyphro that when viewing scientific knowledge he is not contented by stating particular examples, but he is trying to define the general rational concept by which all these examples are explained; thus he states :

> "Remember, that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety — but to explain the general form which makes all pious things to be pious".

What Socrates called 'Form' or 'Essence' can point to the mental concepts which scientists formulate to explain perceived and experienced data. Accroding to modern methodologists science is characterized by the passage from a perceptually suggested order to a rational order — from percepts directly inspired by sense experience to purely rational concepts through which is built a representation inaccessible to the eye of the body but available to the eye of the mind.

THE ABSOLUTE IN T.S. ELIOT'S THOUGHT

Mona Abousenna (Egypt)

The following is an attempt at a new reading of Eliot. It proceeds from a certain assumption that locates the centre of Eliot's thought in a pivotal idea which I call "the incarnation of the Absolute," and which derives from and aims at the absolutization of a certain kind of dogma that has its root in religion since it comes out of it, namely, the Christian dogma. Thus, if a religious society is established, which is the ultimate aim of Eliot's thought, it would be a dogmatic society. And the dogma by its very nature is an absolute so far as it embraces all the moments and degrees of reality whether it be ontological or cultural. This statement is fully justified in Eliot's work and in his Weltanschauung as will be illustrated in the following pages.

But before proceeding any further, three questions have to be raised:
What is meant by the Absolute ?
What is Eliot's Absolute ?
What is meant by the "incarnation of the Absolute" ?

The "Absolute" is that beyond which there is nothing, that which is timeless, ultimate and unconditioned. According to Eliot the Absolute is a whole way of life that envelopes individual and society and extends to the whole universe. The realization of this absolute in our life is possible through incarnation, the archetype of which is the Christian culture from which springs the Christian society, where the Christian Absolute will be incarnated in all aspects of social existence and in all fields of knowledge.

This pivotal idea will be examined here on three levels of Eliot's thought: his cultural writings, critical writings, drama and poetry.

In his book **Notes Towards the Definition of Culture** Eliot equates culture with religion, indicating that "no culture has appeared or developed except together with a religion," and that therefore culture is the "product of the religion, or the religion the product of the culture." This means absolutization of culture.

But what kind of culture is to be absolutized ? The reason why I raise such question is due to the distinction made by Eliot between the different levels of culture, namely, the individual, the group, the class, and the whole society. He writes :

> It is part of my thesis that the culture of the individual is dependent upon the culture of a group or class, and that the culture of the group or class is dependent upon the culture of the whole society to which that group or class belongs. Therefore it is the culture of the society that is fundamental, and it is the meaning of the term "culture" in relation to the whole society that should be examined first.(1)

In his book **The Idea of a Christian Society** Eliot differentiates between a pagan culture and a religious one or, strictly speaking, a Christian culture. He rejects the first and absolutizes the second, which in my own terms is the "incarnation of the Absolute" as three : the Christian State, the Christian Community, and the Community of Christians. The Christian State, according to Eliot, is the "Christian Society under the aspect of legislation, public administration, legal tradition, and form."(12) Within the Christian State a Christian education "would primarily train people to be able to think in Christian categories."(3) He then identifies the Christian Community with the parish which is capable of realizing the religious-social unitary community and which will be the centre of interest of all classes. By the Community of Christians Eliot means the Christian organization of society, a society in which

> ...the natural end of man — virtue and well-being in community — is acknowledged for all, and the supernatural end — beatitude — for those who have the eyes to see it... (where)

> the religious life of the people would be largely a matter of behaving and conformity; (where) social customs would take on religious sanctions... (where) the rulers accept Christianity not simply as their own faith to guide their actions, but as the system under which they are to govern... (and which) the people will accept as a matter of behaviour and habit.(4)

This Christian society, Eliot is careful to point out, is not strictly national, that is limited to national entities, but is a "supranational Christian society" which can only be realized through the "Universal Church".

In this sense Eliot was directly influenced by the Ecumenical movement that emerged in 1910 in the World Missionary Conference held in Edinburgh and directed by the two theologians John Mott and J.H. Oldham. Eliot was particularly influenced by Oldham. In the "Notes" on his book **The Idea of a Christian Society** Eliot admits that he was directly inspired by a letter written by Oldham and published in "The Times" of October 5, 1938 (one year before the publication of Eliot's book) stating that this letter "might serve either as prologue or epilogue to all that (he has) said, and which provides the immediate stimulus for the lectures which form (his) book."(5) In his letter Oldham writes:

> The basal truth is that the spiritual foundations of western civilization have been undermined... May our salvation lie in an attempt to recover our Christian heritage, (by) discovering in the central affirmation and insights of the Christian faith new spiritual energies to regenerate and vitalise our sick society.(6)

After diagnosing the disease Oldham prescribes the remedy, or what he calls "the path of wisdom", as the "attempt to work out a Christian doctrine of modern society and to order (the British) national life in accordance with it."(7) Oldham had outlined this Christian doctrine in the Preface to his book **The World and the Gospel,** published 1916 (twelve years earlier) :

> ...if the missionary movement is to accomplish its work in the new world into which we are being brought, it is necessary for us to go back to first principles and take a fresh hold of the fundamental truths on which the whole undertaking rests.(8)

These "first principles", or the roots of truth, are embedded in what Oldham calls "faith in the Gospel", and

> ...the one sure way in which we can learn anew what the Gospel means is boldly to assert its right to rule the whole life of the world... The Christian Church has all the time had in its keeping the truth which can vitalize and give health to the social order. The Christian social ideal is the very antithesis of those rivalries and self-seeking aims which are now bearing their harvest of death.(9)

By "rivalries" Oldham means all non-Christian societies. He then distinguishes the mark of the Christian society, as founded by Jesus Christ, from other societies, as that in which people do not "set their heart on earthly authority and power, but find greatness in service."(10) In such society, Oldham asserts, "lies the secret of social health and happiness, the real solution of all the problems of industry and politics."(11) He concludes his book by announcing that "It is only by attempting to apply the law of Christ to the whole of our social and national (i.e. British) life and in seeking to evangelize the whole world that we shall become rooted and grounded in the love of Christ... and be filled with the entire fulness of God."(12) In this sense Oldham proclaims the Christian soeiety, or the Absolute incarnized on earth, as being the only remedy for the modern world's disease, namely, decadence, which is one of the main issues treated in Eliot's literature as a ramification of the pivotal theme of the "incarnation of the Absolute".

From the above cited texts one cannot fail to discern the direct impact of Oldham's ideas on Eliot. From this angle one assumes that

Eliot could be regarded as the representative of the Ecumenical movement in the field of literature, and that his plays and poems should be interpreted accordingly. That is, they should be seen as attempts to incarnate, in literary categories, the Christian imperatives which are the direct expression of the Absolute by evangelizing the literary devices, i.e. the ritual form, Christian allegory and symbolism.

If Eliot's ideas about the "Absolute" have been crystallized through the influence of a theologian, Oldham, they derive their roots from the British philosopher, F.H. Bradley. Hence, Eliot's Absolute is based upon a philosophical concept that was theologically elaborated and crystallized, as a natural development, into the direction of the world missionary movement. In his essay on Bradley, Eliot praises his favourite philosopher for having "replaced a philosophy (Ultilitarianism) which was crude and raw and provincial by one which was, in comparison, catholic, civilized and universal."(13) Eliot then quotes a line from Bradley's **Ethical Studies** on the close connection between morality and religion: "Reflection on morality leads us beyond it. It leads us, in short, to see the necessity of a religious point of view,"(14) from which Eliot deduces that "A system of ethics, if thorough, is explicitly or implicitly a system of theology."(15) The reason behind Eliot's reductionist attitude is his religious assimilation of Bradley's philosophy by carrying it to its theological conclusion. It is this kind of assimilation which made Eliot surpass Bradley and, possibly made him unkeen to complete his Ph.D. dissertation on the philosophy of Bradley which he began at Harvard. Another example of Eliot's reductionlist attitude on the point of ethics in relation to politics is cited in **The Idea of a Christian Society**: "As political philosophy derives its sanction from ethics, and ethics from the truth of religion it is only by returning to the eternal source of truth that we can hope for any social organization which will not, to its ultimate destruction, ignore some essential aspect of reality."(16)

Eliot's religious reductionism is exemplified in what I have called the "incarnation of the Absolute", which is the pivotal theme and idea in Eliot's writings proceeding from Bradley's ideas as propagated in

Appearance and Reality (1893) where he describes the Absolute as "timeless, but possesses time as an isolated aspect, an aspect which, in ceasing to be isolated, loses its special character. It is there, but blended into a whole which we cannot realize..."(17) He goes on to say "the Absolute 'is' its appearance, it really is all and every one of them" and that there "is truth in every idea however false, there is reality in every existence however slight; and, where we can point to reality or truth, there is one individual life of the Absolute."(18) And that is why Eliot compares Bradley with Aristotle, who synthesized essence and form or matter and spirit, a synthesis which appealed to the medieval theologians as much as it did to Eliot, namely because "the tendency of his (Bradley's) labours is to bring British philosophy closer to the Greek tradition."(19) In other words, Eliot praises Bradley for attempting to absolutize the tradition of human thought. In Eliot's assessment the true value of Bradley's theory is the realization that "no one 'fact' of experience in isolation is real or is evidence of anything."(20) For that matter Eliot quotes a passage from Bradley's **Appearance and Reality** in the Notes on **The Waste Land** to clarify the following lines in the last movement entitled "What the Thunder said":

> I have heard the key
> Turn in the door once and turn once only
> We think of the key, each in his prison
> Thinking of the key, each confirms a prison(21)

In Bradleyian categories the lines read as follows:

> My external sensations are no less private to my self than are my thoughts or my feelings. In either case my experience falls within my own circle, a circle closed on the outside; and, with all its elements alike, every sphere is opaque to existence which appears in a soul, the whole world for each is peculiar and private to that soul.(22)

The "private soul", or the human entity, is, according to Bradley, only

a passing phase of the final "Reality" or the "Absolute". In this sense Eliot's interpretation of Bradley's idea in **The Waste Land** consists in regarding consciousness as contained in closed units complete in themselves and yet united in the Absolute.

The idea of the timelessness of the Absolute has its clear impact on Eliot's formulation of his concept of history, or as he calls it in his famous essay "Tradition and the Individual Talent", the "historical sense" which is "a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together", and which "makes a writer traditional."(23) The concept of time also constitutes the opening of Eliot's poem **Burnt Norton :**

> Time present and time past
> Are both perhaps present in time future,
> And time future contained in time past.(24)

In critical terms, time "involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence."(25(In this sense tradition becomes **the** Absolute which unites all elements of time into one : the past, or the roots where the first principles of Christianity are located. These fundamental principles will redeem the present decadence as described in **Burnt Norton :**

> If all time is eternally present
> All time is unredeemable.
> What might have been is an abstraction
> Remaining a perpetual possibility
> Only in a world of speculation.
> What might have been and what has been
> Point to one end, which is always present.(26)

Eliot's Christianization of Bradleyian categories is also discernible in his notion of depersonalization which is the incarnation, in the field of literary criticism, of the Absolute by turning it into the Christian category

of self-denial. According to Eliot "The more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates; the more perfect will the mind digest and transmute the passions which are its material."(27) This is because "Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality."(28) Although Eliot claims that in this way art will approach the condition of science, one should not be misled into thinking that Eliot is advocating scientification of art, for he overtly admits that "a purely 'scientific' philosophy ends by denying what we know to be true,"(29) he only means science in the strict sense of a scientific formula or a chemical process. Having rejected pure science, Eliot's meaning of science is limited to the disciplining of emotion through the unity of the poet's mind the all-comprehensive mind, the Logos or the Absolute.

Eliot's preoccupation with the incarnation of the Absolute in the ideal Christian society took on the form of an organized campaign against the modern western civilization on the grounds that it became secular and, therefore, pagan. In **The Idea of a Christian Society** he says: "I believe that the choice before us is between the formation of a new Christian culture, and the acceptance of a pagan one... Our choice now is not between one abstract form or another, but between a pagan... and a religious... culture."(30) He, thus, rejects all ideologies on the grounds that they are pagan or, in other words, a denial of the Absolute, a replacement of that Absolute as incarnated in the Christian dogma which is, according to Eliot, that which differenciates a Christian from a pagan society."((31) He rejects conservatism, liberalism and radicalism because "Conservatism is too often conservation of the wrong things; liberalism a relaxation of discipline; revolution a denial of the permanent things."(32) He also adds fascism to the list, indicating that "The fundamental objection to fascist doctrine is that it is pagan."(33) What Eliot means by Christian dogma is the incarnation of God's law on earth, that is, the establishment of the Universal Christian society through the Universal Church.

The issue ultimately crystallized in one theme: the religious versus the secular, or Christianity versus Secularism.(*) Eliot outlines tne issue of the struggle as that "between secularists — whatever political or moral philosophy they support — and anti-secularists."(34) He, thus, divides the world into a Christian, or non-secular, and a pagan, or a secular one, and locates the roots of the decadence of the modern world in secularism as a whole way of life that characterizes what he calls the "materialist" world, by which he means both the capitalist and the socialist systems, for Eliot firmly believes that "There are two and only two finally tenable hypotheses about life: the Catholic and the materialist."(35) In his essay on "Religion and Literature" he writes:

> There are a very large number of people in the world today who believe that all ills are fundamentally economic. Some believe that various specific economic changes alone would be enough to set the world right; others more or less drastic changes in the social as well, changes chiefly of two opposed types. These changes demanded and in some places carried out, are alike in one respect, that they hold the assumptions of what I call Secularism: they concern themselves only with changes of a temporal, material, and external nature; they concern themselves with morals only of a collective nature.(36)

Eliot, thus, condemns modern literature on the grounds of its secularism:

> What I do wish to affirm is that the whole of modern literature is corrupted by what I call Secularism, that it is simply unaware of, simply cannot understand the meaning of, the primary of the supernatural over natural life: of something which I assume to be our primary concern.(37)

(*) Elimination of religion, and this differs from secularization which reduces religion to private life.

Eliot's attempt to incarnate the Absolute in literature is expressed in the same essay : "In ages like our own, in which there is no such common agreement, it is the more necessary for Christian readers to scrutinize their reading, especially of works of imagination, with explicit ethical and theological standards."(38)

These Christian standards will have to be incarnated in "a literature which should be unconsciously, rather than deliberately and defiantly, Christian."(39) The function of this kind of literature is to attach what Eliot calls the "common code" of a certain society to "its theological background" and to alter the morals. And, accordingly, the function of criticism becomes "the application of religion to the criticism of any literature."(40) Eliot, thus, bluntly rejects what some critics have for so long insisted on attaching to him, i.e. the objectivity of the critic, whereas he insists that the critic's function is a purely subjective one. He even goes a step further by restricting this function to a religious one. He insists that "Literary criticism should be completed by criticism from a definite ethical and theological standpoint."(41) Hence, literary criticism becomes a religious mission for the indoctrination of Christian imperatives. In a likewise manner Eliot shatters the illusion of the autonomy of literature when he affirms the ethical, and for that matter, religious value of literature :

> The 'greatness' of literature cannot be determined solely by literary standards; ...The persons who enjoy these writings **solely** because of their literary merit are essentially parasites; and we know when parasites, when they become too numerous, are pests.(42)

Eliot, therefore, calls upon all Christians to consider it their duty to maintain consciously certain standards and criteria of criticism over and above those applied by the rest of the world ; and that by these criteria and standards everything that we read must be tested and "tirelessly criticized according to our own principles (i.e. Christian principles, and not merely according to the principles admitted by the writers."(43)

The question that should be raised now is :

How does Eliot carry out his self-imposed mission, namely the incarnation of the Absolute in all fields of life, in his own literature ?

In his famous essay on "The Metaphysical Poets" Eliot locates the root of secularism in what he calls the "dissociation of sensibility". This dissociation, which set in the seventeenth century, Eliot admits, has been the result of the separation of State and Church which, according to him, has a historical necessity due to political circumstances.

In **Murder in the Cathedral** Eliot sets out to unravel the historical roots of decadence, namely secularism. On the general level the conflict of the play is between State and Churcl , or the temporal and the spiritual authorities. On the particular level this conflict is conceived in the struggle between King Henry II, as the leader of the secularist trend, and the Archbishop Thomas Becket, as the representative of anti-secularism. Eliot presents Henry II, who never appears in the play, as the initiator of decadence by attempting to act as an independent statesman through the constitution in order to weaken the authority of the Catholic Church, to lay down the foundation of civil authority, and build a social system based on a human rational basis. In this sense, Henry II was just one particular case amid a general atmosphere that pervaded Europe in the twelfth century, culminating in the Lutheran Reformation of the sixteenth century. In Germany, Emperor Friedrich II (1152-1190), trying to wrench from the Holy Sea its power and influence in the affairs of the Empire, was attracted by the theory of the Moslem philosopher Averroes of the twofold truth, that is the distinction between the theological truth and the philosophical one. This philosophy later had its overwhelming impact upon the Renaissance in liberating man from the dogmatism of the church. In short, the twelfth century witnessed the beginning and growth of a new culture, that is, a secular culture as distinct from that of the church.

For Thomas Becket, the representative of the church, as much as

for Eliot, such trend is nothing but decadence which must be fought against. In the opening words of the Chorus of the Women of Canterbury this is announced :

> Destiny waits in the hand of God, not in the hands of statesmen(44)

and in Becket's words :

> Those who put their faith in worldly order
> Not controlled by the order of God,
> In confident ignorance, but arrest disorder,
> Make it fast, breed disease,
> Degrade what they exalt.(45)

Archbishop Becket willingly sacrifices his life for "the order of God". He, thus, trying to incarnate the Absolute, is united with Jesus Christ, the incarnized Absolute. The real sin committed by King Henry, according to Becket, is his attempt to disrupt the Absolute, or to relativize the Absolute, by breaking up the unitary community into religious and social compartments. The only redemption from that sin is "total submission to the will of God" through sacrifice.

The cathedral, which Becket protects with his life, is a specific example of the incarnation of the Absolute. It is the dramatic equivalent of the parish, Eliot's model of the Christian Community which is one of the fundamental element of the Christian Society. The parish is capable of realizing the religious-social unitary community by uniting the spiritual and temporal powers into one, namely, the Absolute.

Sacrifice and atonement as a need to save the world from decadence is discovered by Becket through the attainment of the highest level of consciousness by uniting his own individual consciousness with the Absolute through that of the group and society as represented by the Chorus. The act of sacrifice, as total submission to the will of God,

is the incarnation of the union of Becket's consciousness with the Absolute.

The "incarnation of the Absolute" is carried out on the technical level in the play through the Christian ritual tradition, and by the actual performance of the play in a cathedral, which is an explicit invitation for a specific kind of audience participation, namely a Christian participation. This participation proceeds from evoking in the audience a Christian consciousness with the purpose of making them identify with Becket's suffering and temptation, and ultimately unite with him by joining his consciousness in the final act of sacrifice.

The Chorus completes the tradition of Christian ritual by acting as a link between the audience, or the worshippers, and the drama, or the ritual. In this sense, as Raymond Williams points out, the Chorus becomes a choir.(46) In this sense also the Chorus, which is originally a Greek tradition, is absolutized by being dramatically presented within the frame of Christian ritual, that is, as an instance of the "incarnation of the Absolute".

The element of Christian ritual is reinforced by the use of verse rythms based on Christian hymns. For instance the hymn of the **Dics Irae :**

> The agents of hell disappear, the human, they shrink and dissolve
> Into dust on the wind, forgotten, unmemorable; only is here
> The white flat face of death, God's silent servant.(47)

The sermon, another Christian ritual, is dramatically used to function as, Williams indicates, a soliloquy.

In this sense what Eliot is doing in **Murder in the Cathedral** is desecularizing drama by Christianizing its secular content and form, thus, reducing it to its medieval roots. This absolutization of drama's essen-

tially dynamic and changeable form serves one purpose, namely, the "incarnation of the Absolute", as an essential imperative for the realization of the Christian culture. This imperative is expressed by Eliot in the terms "spiritual guidance". This "spiritual guidance" when incarnated in a Christian culture, as a whole style of life, will save human civilization from secularism. This idea is strikingly expressed in **The Rock:**

> Men have left GOD not for other gods, they say; but for no god; and this has never happened before
> That men both deny gods and worship gods, professing first Reason,
> And then Money, and Power, and What they call Life, or Race, or Dialectic.
> The Church disowned, the tower overthrown, the bells upreturned, what have we to do
> But stand with empty hands and palms turned upwards
> In an age which advances progressively backwards ?(48)

In his essay "Thoughts after Lambeth" Eliot predicts the inevitable decline of a non-Christian civilization, asserting the ultimate triumph of a Christian civilization :

> The World is trying the experiment of attempting to form a civilized but non-Christian mentality. The experiment will fail; but we must be very patient in awaiting its collapse; meanwhile redeeming the time : so that the Faith may be preserved alive through the dark ages before us; to renew and rebuild civilization, and save the World from suicide.(49)

Trying to interpret Eliot's ideas scientifically by using the language of Cybernetics, this non-Christian civilization is an "entropy" which is due to a weakness in the "feedback system". According to Cybernetics "if the feedback system is weak its own entropic tendencies are checked and kept within limits sufficiently stringent. In this sense entropy is controlled through feedback. But if the feedback system tends towards

deterioration entropy increases until the whole system collapses."(50) In Eliotic terms, the entropic tendencies are located in the non-Christian or pagan civilization, which he equates with the dark ages, while the feedback system is embodied in the Christian society which is only realizable through the "Universal Church". For this purpose Eliot calls for the necessity or "repatriating those descended from men who would never have left the Church of England had it been in the eighteenth century what it is now in the second quarter of the twentieth."(51) This means that Eliot was hopeful of the possibility of the ultimate control of the feedback system, i.e. Christianization of culture through the "Universal Church", assuming that "there are signs that the situation to-day is quite different from that in the eighteenth century", concerning the authority of the church.

The question now is:

Why should Eliot make this assumption, and what are the signs of change ?

The answer is provided by Eliot in his book **The Idea of a Christian Society** when he refers to the "wave of revivalism" of 1939, using such terms as "moral re-armament", "regeneration", and "born again".(51) All these terms refer to one growing trend both in the West and in the Orient, namely, fundamentalism. In the Arab world, for instance, the emergence of the Moslem Brotherhood movement represents this trend of fundamentalism which calls for the Islamization of culture and the establishment of the Islamic "Umma", which is the Islamic equivalent of Eliot's "Universal Christian Society" through the "Universal Church". Sayed Qottb, one of the main figures and founders of the Moslem Brotherhood movement writes in his book **Landmarks on the Road,**

> Islam knows only two kinds of societies: the Islamic society and the pagan society. The Islamic society is that in which Islam is incarnated as dogma, worship, Shari'a, discipline,

> morals and behaviour. The pagan society is that in which Islam is not incarnated nor does it govern society's faith; concepts, values, discipline, Shari'a, morals and behaviour. The pagan society may take many forms; it may take the form of a society that denies the existence of God and interprets history in a materialist dialectical way and adopts what it calls scientific socialism as a system. It may take the form of a society that does not deny God's existence, but reduces Him to the realm of heaven and isolates Him from the realm of earth. So it does not apply God's law on its life style nor does it judge according to His morals which He fixed as eternal values in people's lives. Such society allows people to worship in religious establishments, churches and mosques, but prohibits them from demanding the rule of Shari'a. It, thus, denies or suspends God's divinity on earth.(53)

One cannot fail to observe the striking similarity to Eliot's ideas about the Christian State which is the "Christian Society under the aspect of legislation, public administration, legal tradition", or in Islamic terms the "Shari'a", as being the main mark that distinguishes the religious from the pagan society. The trend of Islamization that has spread all over the world, culminating in the Iranian revolution and the establishment of the first Islamic republic, can be regarded as a result of the confrontation of culture, that is, the confrontation of national identities on the level of the religious absolute, each culture trying to incarnate its own idea of the absolute.

In the west, particularly in the USA, the same trend occurs but is known as the "New Right" or "neoconservatism", characterized by the adoption of fundamentalist Christian attitude. The role of the church in the 1980 Presidential elections is well known. The roots of this trend can be located in what is considered in America to be the manifesto of the "New Right", namely, the book by the American thinker Russell Kirk entitled **The Conservative Mind.** In this book, Kirk

says that the "essence of social conservatism is preservation of ancient moral traditions of humanity. Conservatives respect the wisdom of their ancestors; they are dubious of wholesale alteration."(54) He goes on to state six canons of conservative thought headed by the belief that a divine intent rules society and that the political problems, at bottom, are religious problems. In other words, conservatism equals absolutism since it arises when the society is based on religious dogma, or on the Absolute.

An interesting observation to make about Kirk would be his keen interest in the supernatural which shows in his ghost stories and in such essays as "The Reflections of a Gothic Mind", where he writes:

> Mine was not an Enlightened mind... it was a Gothic and medieval in its temper and structure. I did not love cold harmony and perfect regularity or organization; what I sought was variety, mystery, tradition, the venerable, the awful. I despised sophisters and calculators; I was groping for faith, honor and prescriptive loyalties.(56)

Kirk's purpose is to encourage among his readers a consciousness of the supernatural, in the sense of the invisible things, which surpass the orbit of human consciousness, through faith. It is exactly this concern with the supernatural, as distinct from the natural world, that Eliot considered the core of Christianity.

The present movement known as "born-again Christians" or the "New Christian Right' led by the fundamentalist leaders, the most influential of whom is Reverend Jerry Falwell who played a major role in 1980 elections, registers the speedy growth of the power of the church as an institution in the United States. One of the main reasons for such growing power is, according to E. Heisey of the United Methodist Office for the United Nations, that approximately 60 per cent of Americans, or 127 million people are registered church members.(57)

The American fundamentalist trend is more explicitly outlined by the Secretary of the Interior James Watt in an interview with **Dialogue.** Discussing the Reagan programme and the ideology behind it, Watt says :

> In this country, we're going through a reassessment of our values. It's back to fundamentals — fundamental economics, fundamental social structures, fundamental religion, fundamental basic concepts.(58)

This new alliance between church and State was Eliot's life-long dream when writing in 1939 that "the allignment of forces which has now revealed itself should bring more clearly to our consciousness the alternative of Christianity or paganism."(59)

The alternative of Christianity calls for the reunion of churches accompanied by the re-alliance of church and state in all Christian countries as a counter movement to what he calls "the allignment of forces". This attempt to revive the medieval theocracy is Eliot's solution of the crisis of the western world or, more strictly speaking, the capitalist system.

Eliot locates the roots of the crisis in the Reformation which was the rupture of the tradition of the church. The breaking up of the dogma of the church marks the true spirit of capitalism which preceded the capitalistic order and paved the way for it. But advanced capitalism was destined to run the same process of stagnation against which it revolted at the beginning, so that the paradox of modern capitalism now is that at its apex it has to resurrect the church; the very force on whose ruins capitalism rose. The church that was once the fetters of capitalism is now its saviour. By solving the old contradiction between church and state, the crisis of contemporary capitalism is apparently solved, but only temporarily. For this union has to face one challenge represented by one common enemy : socialism.

Concluding, one might add that had Eliot lived longer to witness this evolution, he would have been very proud of his American origin. The emergence of the "New Christian Right" in the USA in the last third of the twentieth century in this sense has finally reconciled Eliot to his American roots.

NOTES

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3. **Ibid.**
4. **Ibid.,** p. 34.
5. **Ibid.,** p. 85.
6. **Ibid.**
7. **Ibid.,** p. 86.
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9. **Ibid.**
10. **Ibid.,** p. 5.
11. **Ibid.,** p. 8.
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18. **Ibid.,** p. 122.

19. T.S. Eliot, **op. cit.,** p. 455.

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22. **Ibid.,** p. 306.

23. Eliot, **op. cit.,** p. 14.

24. Eliot, **op. cit.,** p. 189.

25. Eliot, **op. cit.,** p. 14.

26. Eliot, **op. cit.,** p. 189.

27. Eliot, **op. cit.,** p. 18.

28. **Ibid.,** p. 21.

29. **Ibid.,** p. 454.

30. Eliot, **op. cit.,** pp. 13-18.

31. **Ibid.,** p. 59.

32. **Ibid.,** p. 93.

33. **Ibid.,** p. 20.

34. Eliot, **The Criterion,** xvi, October 1936, p. 68.

35. Eliot, **op. cit.,** p. 514.

36. **Ibid.,** p. 400.

37. **Ibid.,** p. 398.

38. **Ibid.,** p. 388.
39. **Ibid.,** p. 392.
40. **Ibid.,** p. 389.
41. **Ibid.,** p. 390.
42. **Ibid.,** p. 401.
43. **Ibid.**
44. Eliot, **Murder in the Cathedral,** (London : Faber & Faber, 1975), p. 13.
45. **Ibid.,** p. 32.
46. Raymond Williams, **Drama from Ibsen to Brecht,** (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 200.
47. Eliot, **Murder,** p. 77.
48. Eliot, **Collected Poems,** p. 178.
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50. Nobert Wiener, **The Human Use of Human Beings,** (London : Sphere Books Ltd., 1968), p. 26.
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52. Ibid., **The Idea of a Christian Society,** p. 83.
53. Sayed Qottb, **Landmarks on the Road,** Cairo, 1962.
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56. R. Kirk, "The Reflections of a Gothic Mind,"
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DEFENSE DE LA FEMME ET RESTRUCTURATION NATIONALE ET CULTURELLE
(Avec application sur le cas de Qasim Amin)

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La thèse que nous présentons ici est la suivante : un réel mouvement de défense de la femme ne le sera que s'il comporte, expressément ou implicitement, un appel a une réorganisation des tâches et des rôles sur le plan national, et à une nouvelle formation intellectuelle qui s'étendrait à tous les aspects de la culture.

Si l'on essaye d'entrevoir les grands problèmes de l'humanité dans un futur plus ou moins proche, on réalisera qu'il ne s'agirait plus de la lutte de classes, mais bien de ceux autres sortes de lutte : la lutte entre femme et homme, et celle entre enfant et famille ou la lutte des générations. Toutes ces luttes, du présent et de l'avenir. tournent autour de l'exploitation et de la domination : exploitation de ceux qui ne possèdent pas par ceux qui possèdent, de la femme par l'homme, et de l'enfant par la famille, ou tout au moins sa domination sur lui. Le devoir de la pensée est d'examiner, dès maintenant, ces luttes futures, dont dépendra, non seulement le bonheur, mais plus simplement la santé mentale, de l'humanité.

Ceci dit, il faut ajouter que les mouvements de défence de la femme, de toutes sortes, auront long à faire, et ne sont en réalité qu'à leurs débuts. Ne suffit-il pas de rappeler que le salaire de la femme reste souvent inférieur a celui de l'homme dans les pays de la civilisation occidentale elle-même, y compris les Etats-Unis d'Amérique ?

Les façons, aussi bien que les motifs, des mouvements de défence de la femme sont variés. Des façons, il en a surtout deux : la première est celle des mouvements appelés "femmenistes", ou autres, et

tenus par les femmes elles-mêmes, et qui sont souvent, et forcément, "impartiaux", avec tout ce que cela comporte de bien et de mal, d'enthousiasme et d'exagération. L'autre façon est celle des mouvements où sont intégrés des femmes et des hommes, en tant que membres responsables de la société, et qui visent, à travers la déefence des droits de la femme, à dessiner le cadre d'un projet de changement ou de mutation de la société, de la mentalité humaine, et peut-être de la civilisation humaine elle-même. Il y en a aussi deux sortes de motifs : la première est celle basée sur la "générosité" ou simplement la "charité", de la part de l'homme vis-à-vis de son voisin, la femme; la deuxième est celle qu'on peut appelée scientifique ou objective, ou même politique, et qui est en tout cas infiniment plus "humaine" que l'autre façon, et qui vise à changer la structure de la société. Dans la perspective d'un tel changement, il ne s'agit pas de faire habiller les femmes à la façon des hommes, et de leur accorder le droit de fumer le cigar en société, mais bien de changer l'homme et la femme de l'intérieur, et, en fin d'analyse, de faire naître une nouvelle société, une nouvelle mentalité, et peut-être une nouvelle humanité.

L'essai présent prétend que c'est ce cadre de mutation nationale dans un esprit "scientifique" et objectif qui peut le mieux faire comprendre la vraie signification de l'oeuvre de l'important "réformateur" égyptien du début de ce siècle, Qasim Amin (1863-1908), auteur de **Libérer la femme** (1899) et **La femme nouvelle** (1900).

En fait, l'interprétation courante de cet oeuvre à grand besoin d'être profondément remaniée. L'image qu'on a fait de Qasim Amin souffre du même mal que celles des autres figures importantes de la renaissance égyptienne : une hative de leurs intentions réelles, qui se dégrade souvent en formules superficielles sans vie. Voyons les traits de l'image courante de Qasim Amin : il est le défenseur de la femme en Egypte, qui appelait à "réformer" son statut, en tant qu'elle constitue "la moitié de la société", ce qui se traduit en : lever la voile (tout en respectant la voile imposée par la loi religieuse), éducation de la femme, sa sortie au travail si besoin). On ne peut pas dire que cette image est "fausse',

puisqu'elle s'appuie sur la lutte des écrits de Qasim Amin. Mais est-ce qu'elle va au coeur même de son appel ? Est-ce que l'éducation de la femme, la levée de la voile, et la sortie au travail, constituent l'essentiel de ses visées ?

Notre interprétation de Qasim Amin se résume en deux thèses :

a) Le problème essentiel de Qasim Amin n'est pas celui de la femme; celui-ci n'est que le grand cas qu'il emploie comme un moyen de traiter ce qu'il considère comme essentiel.
b) Le problème réel chez lui est celui de la réorganisation de la société égyptienne et de la reformation de la mentalité des membres de cette société. Assigner à la femme une nouvelle place de nouveaux rôles, n'est qu'un moyen pour ce double but, qui doit par conséquent primer sur tout le reste.

A) **Restructuration Nationale :**

Les écrits de Qasim Amin reservent une place importante pour les notions de nation, patrie, et réforme (nationale); ils lient, de plus, et clairement, entre état de famille et état politique, et on peut dire qu'il considère que le problème de la femme est fondamentalement un problème politique.

Certes, il y a des expressions qui justifient la vue considerant qu'il vise à la réforme de la "moitié de la société", quand il dit par exemple : "une partie de la nation"(1); en fait il visait toute la nation (citons en entier le texte où se trouve cette dernière expression : "J'ai considéré un des aspects de la réforme dans notre nation, qui touche une partie des membres de la nation, et qui aura de grande conséquence pour sa totalité"). Voyons par exemple cette constatation : "Il y a une corrélation entre la bassesse du statut de la femme et la bassesse de la nation et son barbarisme, et entre le developpement de la femme et le progrès de la nation et sa qualité de civilisé".(2) Mais Qasim Amin dit

que son but final est une mutation nationale pour laquelle la réforforme du statut de la femme sert comme un moyen : "Le lecteur qui aura suivi la chaîne des règles générales... ne manquera de remarquer qu'elles se résument toutes dans une seule phrase : pour améliorer l'état de la nation il faut absolument améliorer celui de la femme".(3)

La nation que Qasim Amin vise est tantôt, plus particulièrement, la nation égyptienne. Dans tous les cas, le fond de problème est la vie et le bonheur de la nation, qu'elle soit islamique ou égyptienne. Il dit par exemple : "Si les Egyptiens veulent améliorer leur état, ils doivent commencer la réforme à partir de son premier pas : ils doivent être convaincu qu'il n'y a pas d'espoir pour eux d'être une nation vivante et considérée entre les nations developpées, et ayant une place dans le monde de la civilisation humaine, avant que leurs maisons et leurs familles ne soient un milieu capable de former des hommes aux qualités dont dépend le succès dans la vie".(4) Quant à l'Introduction de **Libérer la femme,** elle parle littéralement d'"une nouvelle naissance de la nation".

D'autre part, Qasim Amin avait nettement conscience que la réforme nationale ou sera-t-elle compréhensive et s'étendera à tous les aspects de la vie nationale, ou elle ne sera pas. Donc, il ne pouvait accepter que la question de la femme soit considérée en elle-même et en tant que problème "sui generis". Encore, une telle réforme du statut de la femme ne peut-être considérée comme un luxe, qui peut être réduit ici ou là, ou ajourné pour plus tard. En fait, Qasim Amin dépasse les motifs "humanitaires" qui poussent quelques-uns à défendre le sexe "faible", et fait de la cause de la femme "un impérative nationale", si l'on veut que "tous les organes de la société soient vivants, actifs, et en mesure d'accomplir leurs fonctions".(5)

Quant au "patriotisme", il peut-être considéré certainement comme un des motifs de son action. L'essentiel du patriotisme, à savoir l'amour de la patrie et l'enthousiasme pour défendre ses causes, se fait jour dans les écrits de Qasim Amin, et depuis son livre en français, **Les Egyptiens,** rédigé en 1894, en réponse à celui du Duc d'Harcourt sur l'Egypte et les

Egyptiens. Il en ressort qu'il considère la société Egyptienne comme une entité homogène, et parle oisément de l'Egypte et des Egyptiens: "L'amour de la patrie, quoique instinctif, se raisonne cependant. En analysant la patrie, on la trouve composée de tout ce que nous chérissons. En la défendant, c'est la meilleur patrie de nous-mêmes que nous défendons. Aussi, le jour où la patrie égyptienne, ou plutôt la patrie des Egyptiens, a été formée par les mains bienfaisantes de Mehemet-Aly, les Egyptiens n'ont point épargné leur sang pour jeter sur elle le plus d'éclat possible.(6) Il parle aussi de la "régénération de l'Egypte",(7) et déclare : "En un mot, l'Egypte s'est effectivement réveillée."(8) Il appuie notre interprétation "nationale" de ses objectifs quand il dit que le changement du statut de la femme "sera le plus grand événement dans l'histoire de l'Egypte."(9) Patrie et patriotisme ont donc leurs place dans les écrits de Qasim Amin; cependant la notion de "nation" occupe l'avant scène dans **Libérer la femme** et **la nouvelle femme.**

Nous avons déjà constaté combien sont liées "nation" et "réforme" dans l'esprit de Qasim Amin, et que la réforme serait totale et compréhensive ou ne sera pas. Ajoutons que Qasim Amin avait une conscience aiguë de la complexité du changement social. Il dit : "Tout changement intervenant dans une nation et dont le résultat apparaît dans ses conditions de vie, n'est pas une chose simple; il est au contraire constitué par de multiples sortes de changements qui naissent progressivement dans l'esprit de chaque individu, et s'étend des individus à l'ensemble de la nation, de telle sorte que le changement sur le plan de cet ensemble apparaît comme une nouvelle naissance (ou : régénération) de la nation."(10) Constatons sans commentaire l'esprit individualiste et "libérale" dans ces vues sur la société.

Venons maintenant au coeur de notre argumentation, à savoir que Qasim Amin ne voyait pas seulement le problème de la femme en tant que problème national, mais encore comme un problème essentiellement politique. Nous l'éloignerons ainsi des motifs "humanitaires" qui ont beau d'être généraux et charitables, mais qui se prouve, à la longue et à l'épreuve, être naïfs et à courte portée et de courte haleine.

Les Egyptiens a constaté déjà le rôle primordiale de l'autorité politique dans la vie de la société. La conscience de la spécificité du "politique" en pays d'Islam, est un phénomène assez récent, et son histoire, avant et après Qasim Amin, reste à faire. Mais Qasim Amin n'a pas réalisé dans ce livre-là le rapport entre système politique et statut de la femme et de la famille; cette découverte doit être considérée comme l'une des plus importantes contributions des deux livres suivants de notre auteur. Une forte expression de cette découverte se trouve dans **La nouvelle femme :** "Il nous importe de constater quelque chose qui à affaire à notre sujet, c'est la corrélation qu'il y a entre l'état politique et l'état familial dans chaque pays. Partout où l'homme a abaissé du rang de la femme et l'a traitée en esclave, il abaisse du même coup de lui-même et se fait perdre le sentiment de liberté, et au contraire... Les deux états son en fait complètement liés l'un à l'autre. Et si l'on s'interroge : lequel influe sur l'autre ? nous dirons qu'ils s'influent mutuellement, chacun à son influence sur l'autre. En d'autres termes : la forme du gouvernement influe sur l'éthique domestique et familiale, et celle-ci influe sur la forme de la société."(11) Et d'ajouter : "Regardes les pays orientaux, nous trouvons que la femme est dans l'esclavage de l'homme, et l'homme dans l'esclavage du gouvernant; il subit l'injustice ainsi en dehors de sa maison, pour autant qu'il la commet à son intérieur."(12)

Le lecteur de Qasim Amin constatera que sa documentation est aussi bien solide que valiée. Ainsi trace-t-il un tableau succincte de l'évolution simultané des systèmes politique et du statut de la femme;(13) mais il ne voyage dans l'histoire que pour revenir à l'Egypte, qu'il considère dans une grande partie de son histoire (l'Egypte ancienne l'attire en effet très peu). L'une des nouveautés de **La femme nouvelle** (1900) est l'accent mordant et parfois sarcastique de sa critique impitoyable, et sans précédent à notre connaissance en écrits arabophones, de la civilisation islamique en domaine social en général, et en domaine politique en particulier. Cependant, cette critique est déjà présenté dans **Libérer la femme** (1899). Dans les deux livres, il distingue soigneusement, en bon stratagème, entre règles religiuses et faits politiques qui prétendent se conformer aux premières. (Signalons en passant combien cette distinc-

tion est nécessaire et d'importance de nos jours.) Il déclare dans ce dernier : "Dans cette belle religion ont pris le dessus de mauvaises moeurs que nous avons héritées des nations où s'est propagé l'Islam, et qui l'ont embrassé entraînant avec elles leurs traditions en moeurs et illusions. Le niveau de connaissance de ces nations n'avait pas atteint le degré qui permetterait à la femme d'occuper la place à elle attribuée par la "shari'a". Le facteur le plus responsable de la persistance de ces moeurs-là était la succession des gouvernements despotiques dans nos pays. En effet, les sociétés islamique ont été depourvues, en tout temps et lieux, des institutions politiques qui assignent aux gouvernants et gouvernés leurs droits respectifs, et qui donnent aux seconds la possibilité d'exiger des premiers de s'arrêter devant les limites que leur assignent la "shar'a" et l'ordre. Au contraire, le gouvernement de ces sociétés a toujours pris la forme despotique : ainsi son pouvoir et celui de ses agents étaient absolus; ils gouvernaient à leur guise, sans condition, ni consultation, ni contrôle quelconque, et dirigeaient les affaires des populations (ra'yia) sans que ceux-ci puissent y intervenir. Oui, les gouvernants, petits et grands, étaient tenus de suivre la voie de la justice et d'éviter celle de l'injustice, mais l'expérience prouve que le pouvoir sans bornes invite à en abuser quand qu'il ne trouve pas une limite qui l'arrête, et une opinion qui discute, et une institution qui le contrôle. C'est pour ces raisons que des siècles ont passé et les nations islamiques se trouvaient toujours sans le gouvernant de despotisme absolue; durant ces temps, ses gouvernants ont absolutisé de leur pouvoir, suivi immodérement leurs passions et inclinations, et joué avec les affaires de leur populations; ils ont même joué avec la religion elle-même durant la plupart du temps, et s'il y en avait des exceptions, leur nombre est tellement infime par rapport avec l'écrasante majorité."(14)

Qasim Amin généralise encore plus, et va des gouvernements islamique à des gouvernements orientaux. Il réplique pertinement à ses critiques: "Les raisons sur lesquelles nos écrivains fondent leur opinion allant à priver les femmes de leur liberté, sont exactement les mêmes que les gouvernements orientaux utilisaient afin de priver leurs sujets de la liberté de

parole, de presse et d'action; elles sont aussi les mêmes que celles qui ont incité les musulmans des périodes tardines à closer la porte de l'"ijtihad", dont la mission est de concilier les besoins des nations en tous temps et lieux avec les règles de la religion, sans transgresser pour autant les principes généraux du Livre Saint et la tradition légtimée du Prophète; elles sont aussi, enfin, les mêmes que celles qui ont incité les pères chez nous à utiliser la cruauté et la dureté comme moyens d'éducation de leurs enfants."(15) Mais à chaque fois qu'il voyage dans le temps ou l'espace, Qasim Amin retourne toujours à l'Egypte,(16) et trouve dans les nouvelles conditions de gouvernement sous l'occupation britanique (sans dire le mot) la raison pour espérer dans l'avenir.(17) Ajoutons enfin que Qasim Amin déclare son adhésion à l'idéal individualiste et libéral de la civilisation occidentale, qui assurerait, selon lui, un gouvernement qui aura en contre partie un satut familial qui respectera la femme et ses droits.(18)

B) Restructuration Culturelle :

L'adjectif "culturel" renvoie ici à l'image qu'on fait de monde et de l'homme; ainsi s'agira-t-il d'une reformulation de la conception que la société se fait de la nature, de la société elle-même et de l'individu, y compris naturellement les relations qui s'établissent entre ces éléments. Nous pouvons dire que Qasim Amin entendait, à travers un nouvel statut de la femme, faire intervenir des changements essentiels dans quelques domaines de la culture dominante de la société égyptienne, en particulier ceux de l'individu, la famille, et les attitudes intellectuelles.

Une idée qui a dominé les crédits de Qasim Amin est celle de liberté. Il considerait, et à raison évidemment, que s'il y avait une idée qui manquait excessivement à la culture traditionnelle, ce serait certainement celle de liberté, et sur le plan social et politique, et sur le plan individuel. Et quand il parle de liberté, il entend notre liberté à nous tous, hommes et femmes. L'essence de cette liberté est l'indépendence de l'individu vis-à-vis des autres et du pouvoir social.(19) Il précise encore, en bon juriste : "Nous entendons par liberté ici l'autonomie de l'homme, dans sa pensée, sa volonté et son action."(20) Il signale d'autre

part que l'autonomie de la volonté est une voie principale vers le bonheur.(21) Mais il faudra que la liberté soit guidée et "ordonnée" par la "bonne éducation".(22) La liberté est donc un principe qui se veut pour soi, et qui se cherche aussi pour son utilité. En fait, elle est un droit naturel, la source du bien, le fondement de la floraison de la société, et le critère du progrès.(23) Ceci est vraie et pour les individus et pour les nations : le manque de liberté dans la société égyptienne, l'a abaissée au rang "végétal", et l'a plongée dans un état de retard généralisé : retard intellectuel, retard moral, et retard matérial.(24)

Quant à la liberté de la femme en particulier, Qasim Amin ne la connait pas en soi, mais bien comme une exigence d'un autre concept plus général, celui de la dignité de la personne humaine. Et nous nous trouvons ainsi devant un autre aspect des mutations culturelles visées par Qasim Amin, dont le vrai but est de générer un nouveau type humain. Le titre de son deuxième livre, **La femme nouvelle,** en dit assez. Le tout tourne de concept de "personne", avec tout ce que cela comporte de dignité. Ce dont nous avons besoin est "un nouveau respect pour la femme,"(25) avoir confiance en elle, et de lui accorder toutes les chances pour qu'elle accède au plus haut niveau de la "perfection" humaine, physiquement et intellectuellement.(26) Tout cela équivaut en fait à une nouvelle image de la dignité de l'être humain, et de sa place dans l'univers.(27)

Il était tout naturel que la nouvelle carte culturelle de Qasim Amin comporte une place particulière pour ce qu'il appelle "le rang de la femme dans la maison et dans le monde,"(28) pour sa fonction dans la société, et pour le système familial lui-même. Un des plus importants traits de la femme nouvelle est qu'elle serait le compagnon de l'homme, et non sa domestique, ou le femelle-objet sexuel; c'est aussi l'éducatrice des hommes futurs, et la porteuse des normes éthiques pour l'espèce tout entier. Qasim Amin accorde un grand prix au rôle moral de la femme-mère : "La fonction de la femme dans la société est de former la moral de la nation."(29) Quant à la famille, elle devra être le cadre de l'amour, de la compréhension mutuelle, et de la jouissance de la vie. Le vrai

mariage est au fond une amitié, à sa base se trouvent la cordialité et la miséricorde. Il doit être la plus grande source du bonheur.(30)

Ajoutons, enfin, en passant, que Qasim Amin a aperçu l'importance d'une force sociale, qui n'a cessé de faire parlé d'elle jusqu'à nos jour, à savoir celle de la jeunesse. C'est ainsi qu'il adresse son deuxième livre à la jeunesse, "dépôt de nos espoirs dans l'avenir."(31) Certes, il était obligé d'agir ainsi, dans sa recherche d'auditoire ; mais la logique de sa nouvelle vision incitait à percevoir la spécificité de cette nouvelle force sociale. Cependant, les allusions de Qasim Amin à la jeunesse sont très réduites.

Une autre nouveauté chez Qasim Amin, et qui va très loin, est sa conception de la finalité de la vie. Signalons brièvement qu'il revalorise le "temporal", le "terrestre" de ce monde-ci (dunyawi), considère que le réel but dans la vie est le bonheur, et coiffe le tout par condamner les esprits vers le passé, et appelle à regarder surtout vers l'avenir.(32)

Nous avons signalé la présence de nouvelles orientations intellectuelles chez Qasim Amin. Le cadre général de sa pensée peut être ces trois idées complémentaires : changement, progrès et perfection. Ses idées sont evidemment d'une nature idéologiques, mais elles comportent aussi des implications méthodiques d'une certaine importance, et qui se trouvent appliquées, et parfois clairement constatés, par Qasim Amin. Signalons par exemple l'idée de la nécessité du changement, celle d'un optimisme radical qui a dominé le XXème siècle européen, une attitude qu'on peut appeler scientifique ou objective ou réaliste ou autre, une autre qu'on peut appeler pratique... etc. Partant dans son oeuvre, les idées de vérité, de causalité, de nécessité,de science, de faits, d'utilité, sont présentes et appliquées tour à tour. On peut parler même d'un sentiment sous jacent de relativisme.

Ce que nous avons essayé de montrer dans les pages précédentes est qu'il a une différence de niveau entre la thèse principale de Qasim Amin et ses visées essentielles qui constituent le cadre réel de son oeuvre:

certes, le problème de la femme et son statut est le grand (et apparent) problème de ses écrits, mais il n'est pas, à notre avis, le problème central, qui, est, selon l'interprétation de cette étude, celui de la réorganisation de la vie sociale, politique et intellectuelle de toute la nation égyptienne. Ainsi sa thèse principale peut être : Liberez la femme et éduquez-là, mais sa visée essentielle est bien la réforme de l'Egypte. Autrement, changer le statut de la femme n'est qu'un moyen à un but plus essentiel et plus général. Cela resort, non seulement de la place importante, qu'occupent chez lui les notions de "nation", "patrie", et "réforme", mais aussi et surtout de la correlation stricte qu'il établit entre statut de la femme et système politique, faisant du second le principe déterminant la forme du premier, quoique l'influence peut être mutuelle par la suite. Il y a cependant un point curieux : Qasim Amin ne suit pas la logique de sa constation, et ne demande pas expressement de changer de fond en comble, le système politique égyptien; au contraire, il insiste sur le côté "réciprocité", pour espérer que le changement de la condition de la femme aide à réformer les conditions de la vie politique nationale.

NOTES

1. **Libérer la femme** (=LF), Préf.
2. **Ibid.,** Introd.
3. **Ibid.,** Ch. III.
4. **La femme nouvelle** (=FN), Conc.
5. LF, Ch. III.
6. **Les Egyptiens,** p. 52.
7. **Ibid.,** p. 26.
8. **Ibid.,** p. 287.
9. FN, Introd.
10. LF, Préf.
11. FN, Ch.Prem.
12. **Ibid.**
13. **Ibid.**
14. LF, Introd.
15. **Ibid.** Ch. IV.
16. Cf. une illustration piquante de la hierarchie du despotisme, **ibid.,** Intro.
17. FN, Ch. Prem. et II.
18. **Ibid.,** Ch. II.
19. **Ibid.,** Ch. Prem.
20. **Ibid.**
21. LF, Ch. II.
22. FN, Conc.
23. **Ibid.,** Ch. II, III.
24. **Ibid.,** Ch. II.
25. LF, Introd.
26. **Ibid.,** Ch. III.
27. FN, Ch. II.
28. **Loc. cit.**
29. **Op. cit. Ch. IV.**
30. LF, Ch. II.
31. **Ibid.,** Introd.
32. **Ibid.,** Conclusion.

LOOSELY STRUNG REFLEXIONS ON THE CHRISTIAN-ISLAMIC DIALOGUE

Bernd Weischer (West Germany)

The following personal reflexions on Christian-Islamic Dialogue are based more or less on the proceedings of the last big meeting held in Tunis end of May 1982 under the title : IIIème Rencontre islamo-chrétienne: 'Islam, Chrétienté et les droits de l'homme' (Islam, Christianity and human rights) in other words; 'Creed and justice'. One should mention, that there were organized in 1974 and 1978 two other great meetings under the title of 'Creed, sense and level of revelation' and 'Muslim and Christian conscience and modern development' i.e. 'Creed and tradition' -- 'Creed and Sciences'. If we look at the participants of these Tunis encounters we can state that normally the number of the Muslims prevailed slightly over the Christian participants, which is a normal thing. (In 1982: 18 Christians (2 Arabs), 25 Muslims (4 from Europe), Theologians cultural personalities, university professors of philosophy and law had all a certain experience in the intercultural and interreligious dialogue.

The participants discussed on the basis of mutual tolerance the human rights which were born as a concept outside the religious context and the specific problems arising with the development of human rights for the religious muslim and christian conscience as such as tolerance and fanaticism, religion and peace, religious belief and fundamentals of human brotherhood and so on. The opening speech of Prime Minister Mzali about 'Religion, philosophy and human rights' showed how much importance he gave to the conference. He put the question on the future of religion in modern society, hinting to difficulties of its future — denial of religion and metaphysics in favour of a certain positivism and an inherent metaphysics of natural sciences on one side and an ideological falsification of religion in the sense of the integrists on the other side, but gave a positive answer for the future of religion and religious experience. His balanced speech, at the beginning of the Christian-

Islamic Conference in its appeal to mutual religious tolerance and understanding, was a good beginning, I don't want to give you a whole survey on the contributions of the participants of this encounter, but would like to present to you some personal reflexions, questions and observations having arisen, on behalf of the conference. Inspite of the indubitable achievement and positive sides of such a dialogue I see critically also some dangers : Is an interreligious dialogue only an exchange of different dogmatics — a sort of comparative dogmatics — one agrees in the common dogmatic : belief in God as a causa prima, belief in the other world, belief in the possibility of revelation and one differs on other special dogmatic sentences? Is it to bind religious beliefs together and their common dogmatics against another sort of dogmatism of unproven theories of natural scientists ? Or is it only in the common way to the plane of truth inspite of dogmatic differences or as one participant (Prof. Abouridha from Kuweit) said : 'we are all in the same caravan moving towards the other world'. As religious authorities have still great influence on people is it the goal to mobilize a common front on the ground of religious belief against a materialistic, technological form of life which is spreading on through the whole world — normally from the west — and shaking the fundamentals of traditional religion everywhere. Is it to find the deeper causes for an ongoing secularisation due to modern technical development? Is it the lack of assimilation from the side of traditional religion of the modern form of life caused by dogmatism not being able to respond to modern challenges ? Is it the loss of power on the masses which frightens the dogmatic representatives of religion and must they try to go together in the inter-cultural context to defend their old positions or is it a real feeling for the need of intercultural research for being able to keep the balance between spiritual and materialistic forms of life, a common friendly struggle for the finding of an appropriate answer to modern life in its complex forms on the basis of a fundamentally common belief ?

As the whole world becomes nowadays more and more one (mass-media, shorter distances) there is an imperative of dialogue especially in the religious field.

THE CAVE AND THE DOGMA

Mourad Wahba (Egypt)

The pinnacle of Plato's philosophy in his doctrine of Forms is presented in the parable of the cave where the prisoners are symbols of human beings. They are captured by an optical illusion that convinces them that the shadow of truth is truth itself; and they are dogmatic in their conviction.

Now the question is :

Why did Plato choose the parable of the cave and not any other parable ?

Most probably, the parable is referring to the primitive man who used to live in the cave hiding from the terrific forces of an environment to which he was hardly equal and engaging himself in decorating the walls of his cave with drawings and paintings. But most probably the primitive man was little concerned with beautifying his abode. He had drawn the figures of fierce animals having their heads cut off imagining that, in this way, he had got rid of them. It was not only fierce animals that put terror into his heart, but also nature itself. There was lighting followed by thunder. There was ominous night with its searching sounds coming out of the bush. There was the sudden transition from life to death.

An old legend runs as follows :

"King Saurid, son of Salahoc, reigned in Egypt three hundred years before the Flood and dreamt one night that the earth was convulsed : all houses fell down upon men and the stars collided in the heavens such that their pieces covered the sun. The king awake in terror, rushed

into the sun-temple and consulted the priests and diviners. Akliman, the wisest of them said he too had had a similar dream... It was then that the king had the pyramids built in that angular way suitable for withstanding even the blows from stars, with enormous stone blocks held together with iron hooks and cut with a precision such that neither the fire of heaven nor the Flood could harm them. There, the king and the leaders would find refuge".(1)

Then, even the pyramids played the same role of that of the cave with a slight difference. That is, the cave emerged from the insecurity, during life span whereas the pyramids emerged from insecurity after death. But both concepts, the cave and the pyramid, pushed the primitive man to fill in the gaps emerging from the inability of understanding, in a rational and scientific way, the relation of man to nature. The gaps were filled with spirits. And once man entered into a relationship with the supernatural, the affinity was bound to the creation of gods, or strictly speaking with the absolutes. But the absolutes cannot live in peaceful coexistence, otherwise they lack being absolutes, for the absolute, by its very nature, cannot be but one. And that is why, using the Darwinian terminology, **the absolutes struggle for existence,** and the survival is for the fittest. But this struggle is performed by man, the relative, and not by the absolute. Thus, man, adopting an absolute, struggle for it to the extent that he kills the other absolutes, and this what I call **"theological murder".**

Put the Socratic case and you will grasp this act of murder. Socrates was charged with corrupting young men and not believing in the city's gods. His accusers demanded the death-penalty.

Other cases could be mentioned, but I like to limit myself to one more, which is more significant, that is, the religious war waged by the Emperor Charles V against the Lutheran princes who adopted a new

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(1) P. Kolosimo **Not of this world**, (London: shere Books, 1975), p. 236.

absolute and were subject, at the same time, to the authority held by a representative of the old absolute. The war lasted for twenty five years.

In both cases, the believers think that when they preserve their absolutes, these, in return could cure them from the **plague of insecurity.**

Still, in contemporary society, man is beset by the plague of insecurity which emerges not from the primitive cave, but from a new cave, that is, the **techno-cave.**

Clearly, this techno-cave contains a presumption towards totality, towards technicism. It encompasses all dimensions of human relations. In this context, technology is a threat to the very essence of man by transforming him into a **man-machine.** As a counter-attack, a **fundamentalist ethics** is built upon "heuristic fear" designed to awaken humanity to the threat posed by technology, which results in alienating man from his essential relation to nature, or strictly speaking, to cosmos. This techno-cave sounds, amazingly, like the primitive cave in which the magic of technology resembles that of the magic of words and drawings in the sense that modern man has fallen into an optical illusion covincing him that technology could solve human problems. In this sense, the techno-cave man absolutizes the technique imagining that this absolutization, or strictly speaking, this dogmatization could cure him from the feeling of insecurity.

Now the question is :

Is this tendency towards dogmatization in born, that is, genetically conditioned ?

As far as I know, it seems to me that Popper is the only twentieth century philosopher who tried to approach this question. In his book "Unended Quest," Popper says that "the inductive method of science had to be replaced by the method of (dogmatic) trial and (critical) error

elimination which was the mode of discovery of all organisms from the amoeba to Einstein". (p. 52). Concerning the relation between the dogmatic and the critical, Popper asumes that there can be no critical phase without a preceding dogmatic phase, a phase in which something — an expectation, a regularity of behaviour — is formed" (p. 51) This means, according to Popper, that the human propensity to look out for regularities leads to dogmatism. But, in my opinion, this is a psychological interpretation, and consequently, the real interpretation should be a cosmological one surpassing not only the psychological level but also the sociological one, for both levels limit themselves to the relation of man to man, whereas on the cosmological level the relation of man to nature comes first.

What could we breed on the cosmological level ?

If the main task of psychoanalysis is to free man from the psychological unconscious, and that of sociology to breed social consciousness, the task of cosmology is to breed **cosmic consciousness.** But this new breeding is in need of the technological and scientific revolution that will lead to the creation of a new species of man, that is, the **space man** or the **cosmic man** equipped with cosmic consciousness that will revolutionize the pattern of human thinking. Up till now, the human mind is facing obstacles against being creative to the extent that being genius is considered a rare case, whereas, through the cosmic consciousness, creativity without stop will be the essence of man. And creativity, by its very nature, is against any dogma, or strictly speaking, against any absolute.

The authors of the following papers submitted their texts to the organizers, but could not attend the conference due to personal reasons.

DOGMATISM : ABORTIVE ELEMENTS IN EVOLUTION

Florence Hetzler (U.S.A.)

At various times and places in the history of this cosmos, tragic dichotomies have unfortunately come into being; viz., the separation of man from the rest of nature of which he is a part and by which he is nourished, and the separation of man from his fellow men through whom he is especially nourished and whom he nourishes in an I/You relationship.(1)

What is the evil that has been so incisively incisive ? It is dogmatism in its various forms. What is dogmatism ? What are the roots of dogmatism that have been so powerful as to give rise to all these destructive dichotomies ? What are the consequences of this dogmatism ? Lust for self-affirmation, inordinate self-seeking, may be causes of dogmatism. Man needs to be important, to feel important and authoritative at any cost, even if it is the denial of the importance of the rest of nature, the flowers, mountains, stars and minerals. Man's push for self-aggrandizements has been the history of man. He has been aggressive for land, but not for respecting the nature and being of the land, but for POSSESSING it. In the book by St. Exupéry, **The Little Prince,** the King possessed the stars because he said that he was the first to own them.(2)

A loss of the sense of the cosmos has been very costly. It has thrown the cosmos into turmoil. Dogmatisms now not only fight for supremacy, but they also fight for the world's minds and money in the name of the truth. To steal a mind is, indeed, a serious thing. It is, indeed, strange that dogmatism is based upon so many "truths" of the truth. Some dogmas have ruined races and families, and have then gone to the winds like the fluff of old dandelion blossoms. Not too long ago, Catholics could not eat meat on Friday. A non-Catholic could not be buried in a Catholic cemetery, because the ground in that cemetery was holy

ground, since it had been blessed. A person who committed suicide could not have a Catholic church service, even though the anguish of the person who committed the suicide and that of the survivors demanded a rite of burial in a faith ascribed to for generations. These one-time "dogmas" are no longer "dogmas."

Dogmatism is unfreedom. Even the definition of dogmatism has deteriorated from to think or to have an opinion, Greek dokein into unfreedom.(3) In art we see a freedom that makes for human creativity on all levels in all worlds, including the misnamed "third world", which is part of the one world. I propose the freedom of art as a paradigmatic antidote for the unfreedom of dogmatism which does not allow for change, for openness, for becoming, growth and the evolution of the human psyche, imagination and emotions. Dogmatism, like freedom, is a universal problem. The former thwarts and aborts becoming, while the latter opens up the human spirit to co-creating with nature, to developing the self and the powers of nature, even the powers of extraterrestrial habitation.

Some say that the roots of dogmatism may be laziness, self-seeking, the lack of committment, contentment with the status quo, etc. If there is dogmatism in art, Egypt would be filled with pyramids, all similar if not identical to one another. Compare, if you will, the motion in the works of Eadweard Muybridge, the movement in the microtemps series of Nicolas Schöffer, the time-space element in the work of On Kawara, Tingueley, and Constantin Brancusi, in the tableaux of Kienholz, especially in his work "The Wait", and the spaceman painting of Isamu Noguchi. One might even compare the space/time concepts of the Aztecs, the Incas, and the North American Indian. Philip Guston, an artist, has written: "To arte es un tipo de aucinatòn, pero con trabajo. O bien, es poneros a sonar con los ojos abiertos... Mi concepto es que los artistas deberian cambiar todo el tiempo, porque los sentimientos se transforman en forma constante."(4)

There cannot be laws or dogmas of creative transformation in art,

although there are laws built in by the nature of the materials or the media of the art. In art almost all is equal: canvas, paint, easel, nose, stone and clay. The mind and genius are unequal. Art makes man integral with the whole world, fifth, third or tenth. It is a kind of cosmic intercourse. The esthetic is the highest human quality of man and the world. It unites them. It removes the dichotomy between man and the world and man and man. It enhances all. Creative transformation is an enemy of dogmatism. It is its opposite. Art is the co-creativity of the whole cosmos; it is the mutual revelation of man and the cosmos. It removes the dichotomies that prevent progress, yes, which put man in a stagnant pool of hatred and antiprogress that will do nothing but dry up until another rain which will carry on where the other puddle left off. Isamu Noguchi, an artist, seems to see the unity of stone and man. He has said:

> Stone is the fundament of the earth, of the universe... it is not old or new but a primordial element. Stone is the primary medium, and nature is where it is, and nature is where we have to go to experience life.
>
> Stone breathes within nature's time cycle. It doesn't resist entropy but is within it. It begins before you and continues through you and goes on. Working with stone is not resisting time but touching it...
>
> Direct carving is a process of listening. When I am with the stone, there is not one second when I'm not working. I'm so involved in doing the right thing. You do what you are permitted to do. The balance between yourself and the stone has to be equal. You can't presume to overwhelm the stone. That's why I dislike things that are forced upon the stone. You haven't even asked the stone.(5)

On the other hand, dogmatism may be the slow death of man, the slow but sure abortion of human evolution and becoming. We must reflect again and again upon our powers of imagination, emotion and reason. Robert Burch, writing about a new book of Edward Pols, **The Acts of Our Being: A Reflection on Agency and Responsibility,** says:

> Are we capable of responsible rational action, as we have traditionally supposed, or should the very notion of responsibility be regarded as an archaic survival from a prescientific age, a mere commonsense symptom of what we still do not know about human nature but will in due course find out ? Should the notion of responsibility and indeed the notion of action itself be replaced, in any rigorous intellectual context, by whatever account of human nature the science of the future shall provide ?
>
> Arguing that we are the responsible rational agents that the law and our self-awareness tell us we are, the author explains that the **prima facie** features of action are what they purport to be and not mere appearances of some deeper reality. Thus, though science can explain important features of the infrastructure of action, rational human acts — just as we know them — are profoundly important explanatory factors.(6)

What about the dogma of the early cosmologists ? What about he rational approach there ? If we had stopped with Thales, we would not be able to accept such advances as those of radio astronomy that are being studied in such places as Joddrell Bank in England, Bandung in Indonesia, and Greenbank in West Virginia, in the United States. There is a quadrimensional characteristic of space. This is a challenging notion that did not exist in the so-called dogmatism of 600 B.C. Philosophical cosmology cannot be left to that of Aristarchus, even though he tried unsuccessfully to change the understanding of the geocentric theory. This had become dogma. His suggestions of the heliocentric theory caused a lot of trouble. One of the reasons for opposition to it was a strange root of dogmatism. It disturbed the "repose of the gods."(7) Giordano Bruno was also given a rough time, so rough that he was burned at the stake for going against the established dogmatism. Galileo, for suggesting the same anti-dogmatic idea was encloistered in his own home, and became blind. He could not even look through the telescope that he had invented, and was reduced to the time and space of his own body. The measure

of his imagination was the size of his body. It takes courage for philosophers to present uncommon or unconventional theories. Often, as we have seen, one does so at the risk of his own life. But the greatest is not to risk, especially when it concerns human integrity. Accepting dogma blindly and without challenge is unphilosophical.

Would it have been better for these cosmologists to have rested in roots of dogmatism, namely, in fear, habit, and laziness or lust for self-seeking ? Exploration of and into the cosmos, along with the inventions and explorations into the matter and mind of that cosmos on the part of the artist and scientist would not be. Revelation would be aborted, and there would be an ignorance that could be shared with warm, cult collegiality. "The true artist helps the world by revealing mystic truths."(8) The poet, e.e. cummings, seems to say this well.

* * *

what if a much of a which of a wind
gives the truth to summer's lie;
bloodies with dizzying leaves the sun
and yanks immortal stars awry ?
Blow king to beggar and queen to seem
(blow friend to fiend : blow space to time)
— when skies are hanged and oceans drowned,
the single secret will still be man(9)

People do not need blind dogma, but they do need a stance. They need a belief, but not necessarily a blind, forced one. Their stance is their being in great measure, but this stance not be closed to interpersonal discussion. It cannot be a silencing on the part of authority, as a bishop or his vicar. This makes for everlasting hurt and chaos, even cosmic chaos worse than the situation before Hesiod's **Works and Days.** Milton Rokeach, speaking of primitive beliefs, has written :

> It is assumed that the more closed the system, the more will

> the content of such beliefs be to the effect that we live alone, isolated and helpless in a friendless world ; that we live in a world unworthy and inadequate to cope alone with this friendless world; and that the way to overcome such feelings is by a self-aggrandizing and self-righteous identification with a cause, a concern with power and status, and by a compulsive self-proselytization about the justness of such a cause.(10)

If we review the roots of dogmatism, that is, the roots of chaos, as the preservation of the self at the expense of the other, as the visibility of the self, as a haven for self affirmation and reaffirmation, as a lack of education, and as indoctrination, obviously man's relation to the dust and dirt that grows roses and cabbages is not obvious, nor it it praised. Self-identity in dogmatism does not mean relatedness which makes for identity. Reflection and self-reflection are almost unknown. Consider Alfred North Whitehead's bobbin man, a man who sold sticks for fires.

> The old bobbin man, as he journeyed with his horse and wagon slowly from the woods near Canterbury to the North Foreland at the tip of Kent, passed through scenes of English History unthinkingly and unknowingly. There still remain in England individuals of his mental grade. But as a type he has vanished from the land. The gap between classes has been largely closed. To him the immense story of Canterbury with its relics of martyrs, heroes, artists, and kings was nothing... He could appreciate neither the past from which he sprang nor the forces of the present which so soon were to sweep away folk like him.(11)

These people may be gone from England but they exist in large masses elsewhere, especially in what has come to be known as the third world. Daniel Bell, in his **The Reforming of General Education** has said :

> For in the process of making and achieving, one learns that it is not the business of art to use the chaos to express chaos.

nor is it the character of experience to be entirely unreflective. This is the traditional wisdom of maturity.

> The liberal arts, which this book affirms, have their own hard and difficult place, which is too often easily surrendered when a university seeks too freely to please those who rule, be it elite or mass... The liberal spirit is not an opposition to orthodoxy, but to its enforcement not against virtue, but against its imposition, whether Jacobin or Platonist. The liberal arts must have as an end, when confronting the young, both self-consciousness and self-transcendence. One lives, thus, in the tension between the universal and the particular, and often in that painful alienation which is the continuing knowledge of doubt, not of certainty. And yet this, too, is a state of grace, for as Dante said "Doubting pleases me no less than knowing."(12)

The "Cogito Ergo Sum" is much more powerful than the "Scio Ergo Sum' 'could ever have been.

During a question period at a meeting in Bogota, Columbia in August, 1982. Professor Mourad Wahba of Egypt said that he doubted if there were any ethical basis of the free market. He said that if there were ethical norms that were only for the free market, this would be an absolutization of relative norms, a kind of preserving of the status quo and a preventing of progress. What Wahba was talking about was, in short, dogma. He also said that if there were norms, either they would not fit for any other system and would be transformed into absolutes, or, if they fit another system, it would be nonsense to have these illusory norms as ethical ones. It is a result of the exclusion, he continued, of the relationship of man to nature. By eliminating this relation, he insists, we fall into the optical illusion of the relation of man to man. This leaves aside the essential relation of man to naure.

This question lets us see that the roots of dogmatism involve the non-progress of culture. Art, on the other hand, which is free, involves the

creation of and the expansion of culture. We cannot stop the revelation of art. No dogma fits it. Dogmatism would abort creativity, just as it aborts evolution. Dogmatism involves rusty brains; it does not sharpen intellectual and emotional antennae to help them evolve. We are told that we are using only about two percent of our intellectual capacity. Why ? Dogmatism has kept us at this low level on the totem pole of evolution. We have been stagnating in pods where there are no high waves to fight or where we cannot see the high waves because we are not accustomed to seeing them.

If there were dogmatism in art, we would have, as has been said, a proliferation of the same works to fit the same dogma, just as to believe in one philosopher would be to put man into anti-thought. In thought, one is either advancing or regressing. There is no neutral stage in thought. To believe that one man thought all thought would put man into anti-thought. To have thought as the goal of thought would also be purposeless. As John Macmurray has so aptly said, "All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action for the sake of friendship."(13) Man is both head and heart, as the quotation from Macmurray suggests. Art is a basic good of man. Growth and creativity are important goods of man. They are, in a sense, his very being. What is bad destroys the life of society. What is good enhances it. It is bmad to cut individuals out of a society for the undogmatic in art opens up and out; it does not insulate or isolate. Art is made from matter, the cosmos, and man. It is made from the cosmos which includes matter and man, head and heart, psyche and matter/spirit. Art is an enhanced, transformed and transfigured part of the cosmos, and man has done the enhancing. In both art and science, man helps the cosmos reveal itself.

Somehow science gets shortshift because art is more commonly obvious. Science is terribly important. The same results or the same kinds of results can happen in science as in art. In Egypt, a Mr. Habib Gourgi brought children in from the street, and let them create art as

they wished. They did great work, work that caused interest on the part of people like Carl Jung and Julian Huxley. They proved that dogmatism prevents openness to the revelations of the cosmos and of themselves. Habib Gourgi left a museum of his own in Cairo. The so-called illiterate boys who worked with him, six year-olds, lived with him and did sculpture completely on their own. They also made carpets with designs that were also theirs. This situation might be likened a bit to that in a school that I visited while on a lecture tour in India. There a Mr. Deshaprabu worked with students in art classes that were completely free. The children worked with broken bangles, casuarina burrs, tree bark, and leftovers or discards they could find. Their creativity was incredible.(14)

Habib Gourgi found out at the end of his experiment that his "boys" passed through three phases in a sculpture. These phases resembled those that humanity passed through, viz., the primitive, the medieval and the modern. He did not teach them anything that they had to follow, and went on the theory that man is born an artist. Prof. Wahba saw these boys at work at Gourgi's house and bears witness to this. All phases were incorportated into the modern phase. There was no disparaging of the early phases.

In New Guinea, as in other areas of the planet, some people are trying to eradicate old civilizations and old arts. Missionaries want to make extinct certain ways of dress that have been good for centuries. Brown breasts that have been bare to the sun and the sky must now be covered. A dogmatism has forced them to wear coverings, often old modern bras that they find that have been left by tourists. Need I say that the fit is often less than perfect ? The new dogmatism has brought with it new guilts and new taboos. Other work in science might have been more helpful for the tribe as a whole and for its individuals, too. Here there is a worstening of the dichotomy between man and nature as well as that between man and man. The pre-established harmony, first mentioned by Leibniz, might well be called upon here :

> It is true that, in my view, there are forces (efforts) in all substances; but these forces **(efforts)** are, rightly speaking, only in the substance itself, and what follows from them in other substances takes place only in virtue of a **harmony pre-established** (if I may use the word), and in no wise by a real influence or by the transmission of some **species** or quality.(15)

Is it possible that we will ever have cosmic consciousness, consciousness of the whole cosmos with its harmonies and disharmonies? Both art and science probe and energize the Heraclitean matter of the universe. Art reveals matter's energy in a way different from that of science. A stone may be transformed by the creativity of the artist. The matter of a star may be studied by the radio astronomer or by a satellite. Science, like art, is constantly revealing new facets of the universe. It creates new probable knowledge, knowledge taken as true for now and for the most part, as Aristotle tells us in th **Topics.** This knowledge is true for now, because it is not obvious that the conclusion can be reduced to the principles. Induction is never complete. Today's artists, like today's scientists, like process philosophers, show cosmic change in its primordiality, in its radicality, in its unseparatedness, and in its integrity when there were not the divisions between man and nature and man and man. How far they are from the inhuman, anti-human dogmatism that prevents becoming and evolution !

Webster's dictionary defines dogma as :

1. Positiveness in assertion in matters of opinion; statement of a view or a belief as if it were an established fact; derogatorily, such positiveness or statement when unwarranted or arrogant; also, the use of dogmatic statement as a method of exposition; as the **dogmatism** of Emerson's writings.
2. Philoso. Philosophy based upon first premises whose truth can be doubted; specif., philosophy which assumes what neither reason or experience can corroborate; — applied

by Kant to the philosophy of Leibniz and his followers.

3. A dogmatic system or doctrine. **Rare.**(16)

And Webster defines a dogmatist as "one who is presumptuously dogmatic."(17)

Dogmatism aborts the energy of human becoming. If we are seeking the truths of the cosmos, there is no room for dogmatism which may tell us to explore the mind only, the moral world only, agriculture only or the imagination only. We must think for ourselves. The cosmos is a multifaceted being crying for exploration. Only an openness to its mysteries that are there to be discovered can give knowledge that will nudge man slowly up that totem pole of evolution. Dogmatism will not even let him know the existence of the evolution of the human intellect and heart, and of its power and value for man. The challenge today to people in every discipline is to remove the causes of that crippling dogmatism, to remove the lethargy, acceptance, ignorance, and life of ease in the stagnant pond. We need to throw soap into that water and see what happens. There may be the gush of a geyser as in the case of the action of the water in Iceland. Man is his relationships, as Leibniz' monad is its relationships. All relatednesses must be explored openly. One must no longer accept silencing. To explore or be exploited dogmatically is of the past, of those horrid days of the Inquisition. To explore dogmatically is not to explore, because it is to start out blindfolded and with answers that are forever, and forever wrong, perhaps. Exciting advances can, on the other hand, be made with acute senses, awakened imagination, and with the fullest uses of reason by men of various disciplines dialoguing together with openness, doubt, and humility. The joy of discovery will then be shared.

This does not entail the removal of one's traditions. Rather it enriches and adds to them. The historical meaning of traditions is seen in new scientific and humanistic perspectives in the world that is forever changing. All of man's traditions, his whole history, is brought to bear in his striving to learn about himself and his relation to the cosmos of

which he is a part. Man must be open to "squeeze" the revelations out of the cosmos and to let it be free to reveal and become.

It is with pleasure that I close this paper by a very pertinent statement from Alfred North Whitehead. He is trying to analyse meaning.

> Philosophy in its advance must involve obscurity of expression, and novel phrases. The permanent, essential factors governing the nature of things lie in the dim background of our conscious experience -- whether it be perceptual or conceptual experience. The variable factors first catch our attention, and we survive by reason of our fortunate adjustment of them. Language has been evolved to express "clearly and distinctly" the accidental aspect of accidental factors. But no factor is wholly accidental. Everything which in any sense is something thereby expresses its dependence on those ultimate principles whereby there are a variety of existences and of types of existences in the connected universe.
>
> Thus the task of philosophy is to penetrate beyond the more obvious accidents to those principles of existence which are presupposed in dim consciousness, as involved in the total meaning of seeming clarity. Philosophy asks the simple question, What is it all about ?...
>
> The endeavour to make our utmost approximation to analysis of meaning is human philosophy...
>
> In our experience there is always the dim background from which we derive and to which we return. We are not enjoying a limited dolls' house of clear distinct things, secluded from all ambiguity. In the darkness beyond there ever looms the vague mass which is the universe begetting us.(18)

We must not allow dogmatism to deprive us, indeed, to wrench us, from the joy of becoming freely through our universe, our common universe.(19) Dogma too often makes finding alternative ways of living

extremely difficult. Measures should be taken wherever possible to make this tragedy unnecessary. Man has a right to be free, to belong to his land, and to keep his dreams.

Change is the common denominator in our finite world. Let us make openness to change the greatest change.



POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND DOGMATISM

D. A. Masolo (Kenya)

1) Dogmatism in Social Sciences.

Dogmatism is essentially a problem of the humanities, or of the Social Sciences. And we want to begin our paper by claiming that the origins of dogmatism must therefore be sought within the poverty of the social sciences themselves — that is, of those sciences that do not have any specific claim to any body of principles or criteria other than logic consistency, and moral appeal, to make their propositions demonstrable — such as religion, psychology, political science, history, philosophy and world-views such as we get in ideologies.

David W. McKinney Jr. writes that "Since there exists no body of demonstrable knowledge in the social sciences, it must be presumed that the various **approaches** to social science data are inadequate for the task for which they are employed".(1) This is due to the fact that the area or range of human activity is unlimitedly wide, and his behaviour patterns exceedingly difficult to fix and make constant under a limited number of laws. Correspondingly, therefore, the inadequacy of any given single approach is due to the failure of theory, methodology, specific research techniques and procedures to comply with the requirements induced by the initial and corollary assumptions which underlie the broad body of data for which the specific unit of study represents only a particular and limited instance.

This inadequacy must not therefore be seen as a question of the legitimacy or validity of any specific approach taken separately, but rather as lying in the inability of each approach to cover the broad area of the data. Each approach thus forms its own world, remotely open to other approaches' assessment, but at the same time holding on to some

form of absolutism, ultimacy (although open to development from within) and authoritarianism. Thus each social science is dogmatic in relation to others. But are all these dogmatic qualities for mere self preservation and identity ?

Of course these questions would be more relevant where one talks of personality and/or of areas of activity that are controlled by and depend on human characters. Ideology is such an area.

But what do we mean by Dogmatism? Just what is a dogmatic statement ? And how are these related to ideology ? These are the questions we wish to attempt to clarify rather than answer in this paper.

2) Dogmatism : Irrationality, idolatry or faith ?

With Dogmatism we commonly refer to an attitude (of mind) of he who makes affirmations in an absolute manner without giving intrinsic proofs thereof, and often with a claim to authority. Dogmatism thus inhibits rational discussion, with the implication that if the claim were to be dispassionately examined, it would turn out to be unwarranted. The strength of dogmatism thus lies in its invocation of authority as its basis rather than the demonstrability of the claims made therein. A historical survey of the use of the term, so closely connected with religion, reveals this authoritative character of dogma as "authentic, authorized and infallible declarations, judgements or decisions, on the part of the **magisterium** (authority). Within the history of the use of this term within the Catholic Church, the authority of dogma shifted from the **magisterium** (teacherhood) of the doctrines themselves, to be invested in the very personality of the leadership of that institution. Thus Vatican Council II ratified the infallibility of the Pope. He who is in power must be above the institution he so leads as Bishop Gasser of Brixon commented on complaints that the draft on the infability of the Pope (made doctrinal by Vatican Council I) was separating the Pope from the rest of the Church : "We are not separating the Pope, we are not in the least separating the Pope from the consent of the Church, provided

that such consent is not understood to be a condition, whether antecedent or consequent — This consent of the Church can never be lacking to papal definition".(2) Thus dogmatism plays a vital role in developing the authoritarian personality in he who holds power. And once achieved, power engenders the attitudes of dogmatism. The attitude of the authoritarian character toward life, his whole philosophy, is determined by his emotional strivings. The authoritarian character loves those conditions that limit human freedom, he loves being submitted to fate. And "fate may be rationalized philosophically as 'natural law' or as 'destiny of man'; religiously as the 'Will of the Lord', and ethically as 'duty' — for the authoritarian character, it is always a higher power outside of the individual, toward which the individual can do nothing but submit.(3) Such people have a logic of their own which integrates all life for them in such a way as to make their actions not only understandable, but from their own point of view, quite justifiable and correct.

Behaviour is essentially an expression of motivational intent. Thus because philosophy, as a discipline, seeks truth in general, it is characterized by a 'behaviour' of openness, critical attitude and ability to spread over a variety of issues and comparative approaches. But also because ideology — as defined by Professor Wiredu – is "a political weapon in the relentless pursuit of power or when attained, the determined retention of it at all costs"(14), it is dogmatic, closed and exclusive in character or "behaviour". Behaviour is an expression of interests. Thus dogmatism, as a **pattern** or set of behaviour, is particular type of prejudice based more largely upon factors in the subject and his total situation as far as his conception of a given reality is concerned. Hence to understand why this particular conception of reality occurs rather than some other possible conceptions, it is necessary to focus attention on the needs and wishes of the holder of this conception.

Ideologies, whether "specific" or "total" in the Mannheimian distinction, are a set of logmas, social formulae or even belief systems, normally held by specific groups or classes as justifications for some specific set of interests. In any given society, therefore, there is to be

found multiple ideologies — some dominant, others dominated; still some manifest while others suppressed — but all openly or silently colliding in a constant struggle for power. Each ideological framework contains not only interpretative schemes (**"weapon"** in Wiredu's definition), but also normative propositions regarding specific truths about the intelligible reality. Ideologies are always in function of interests, or its uses. We may, however, distinguish the use of ideas for descriptive and explanatory purposes from other uses of them; such uses as making requests and giving order, making value judgements, expressing moods and feelings, and so on.

An ideology is overtly descriptive and explanatory. It (ideology) is also prescriptive in that it often takes a moral position or makes a value judgement in relation to a certain interpretation of reality, be it a state of affairs or a set of actions. But the ideology that we have in mind here is the type analysed by John Plamenatz as one which would contain also an idea of man, an interpretation of his activities, compatible with but not presupposed by the findings of the psychologist and the sociologist... a product of reflection, a fruit of experience. It would be a belief or set of beliefs about man and not just a feeling or attitude or disposition expressed in words."(5) As Plamenatz himself suggests, this is the kind of ideology we often get in philosophical hypotheses and accounts for in dogmatic religion with elaborate theological doctrines.

3) Social and political ideology.

But there is still another type of ideology which, despite the fact that it lacks the clear and overt philosophical exposition like the one we have described above, still remains different from the kind of "false consciousness" with which Marx painted religion as class ideology. In other words, this kind of ideology is not mere fantasy. It is theory about society and about the social world Of course, to Marx this would only apply to the bourgeois class. The lower classes have religion as their **ideology** (fantasy) in the manner of false consciousness. However, at one time or another, even the lowest class in a class society also acquires

an ideology in the theoretical sense, and this may include even religion, why not? Ideology is a body of truth propositions.

In each society, every social group has its own perception of reality which it resorts to, and which guides its aspirations and expectations regardless of its truth. But who would have to judge its truth? The truth value of each ideological framework is judgeable by the other ideologists only in terms of whether or not the activities and ideas of its adherents are conformant with those of the opposing or judging point of view. The ruling class will hold the workers' ideology as true only in so far as it does not embody any ideas that threaten their own. Social truth becomes synoymous with social consciousness, and the later, to use the words of my colleague Prof. R.J. Njoroge, "can be viewed as a normative stance towards social phenomena." Njoroge calls this interest conflict between the rulers and the masses a sign of the second phase of social consciousness, marred by hostile diversity and dogmatism in regard to concepts and values which are, in themselves, not truths of fact, but of the moral and metaphysical kind.

The situation is even more complicated than this. There are situations where this conflict in ideologies does not exist or just exists in a wild way, but their maintenance in their respective places is one of mutual interaction and influence. Houseboys may help their employers in maintaining their status of houseboys by homogeneously acting and thinking towards the employers in a manner suggesting that they recognize and accept their role in that specific interaction, thus helping to maintain the employer (boss) — house body division. In such a situation, conflict would only arises when and where the houseboys begin to desire to become the employers. But in the latter case, we observe a change both in the interests and in the ideology of the houseboy group. And what brings in this change is probably more of a psychological factor than one of understanding or "false-consciousness." The former is often deemed "reactionary" ideology and the latter revolutionary.

However, in conflict or in conformity, each group endeavours to

achieve and then maintain its interests. Ideology and the field of social goals can therefore be characterized as primarily constituting an area of idealizations, concept formations or projections to be converted into action, and cuts deeply into the concept and problem of truth. We have used the term "interest(s)" here in a manner comparable to "point of view" (Wiredu) or "context" (Odera Oruka). Ideologies are not mere sets of beliefs, but rather theories that attempt to explain how some part of life fits into a larger context; and this fitting is patterned according to the general picture one (individual or class) has of the larger context — that is, from their own painting of the ideal social reality.

Hence, in claims or policies, we often use ideas and advance demands which fit into our general ideological positions and attitudes, whether we make them in the name of a class or category to which we may belong. We use such ideas both to make claims and advance demands and to resist claims and demands that conflict with them. Hence dogmatism in ideology is not to be seen as the attitude bent towards the retension of the status quo of any social group, but the uncompromising attitude bent towards the achievement of defined aims. Those aims and the conditions for their achievement may be denied of one group by another, and the former's struggles to grab them from the latter may be equally dogmatic as accepting and uncompromisingly struggling to retain the status quo. Thus scientific socialism is just as dogmatic as staunch capitalism.

4) Ideology in modern Africa :

What we have said above about ideology in general implies that every social group in a society is conscious or aware of its unity, role and interests in relation to other social groups, and that therefore, there is always also the implied social conflict in society. Sometimes, however, as Plamenatz again says, members of two or more social groups may be passive as groups in terms of their interaction while remaining highly active in their respective roles internal to their groups.(6)

Generally, this has been and largely is the situation in modern Africa. The ruling elite, deeply engaged in carrying out their duties of running the state machinery set and left behind by the former colonial elite, has done little if anything to establish a meaningful relationships with the large number of peasants dwelling and working in the remote countryside. Given the diverse interests of these two groups (due to the difference in the way of life) each lives "beside" the other without any meaningful contact or awareness of the other, though they are of common origin. The peasants form a passive social group. They are unaware of forming together a distinctive class in the society. Nor are they aware that those others who portray elements of difference from them — like possession of cars, big houses, better (different type of) clothing, difference in eating habits, etc. — have anything to do with them. The only time they hear of some of these "others" is when it is demanded of them to put a thumb for the name of one or the others. For what purpose, the majority of them don't even know. One could even daringly say they lack an ideology except for the traditional weltanschauung together with some scattered detail.

The elites, on the other hand, are an active class or social group, for they are aware of their common belonging, thrust further by the constant competitive conflicts between them, be it in terms of power or wealth possession. In every direction they are an active group. And passivity of the peasantry is even a further contribution towards the sustenance of their position. Their conception of reality and of social goals and values are more comprehensive and clearly defined. This comprehension and definition may not be clearly exposed in any theoretical form, but all their activities ranging from political slogans to choice of the administra tion structure are consciously made to fit into these nevertheless well conceived aims. Even educational systems are designed and structured to promote the sustenance and continuity of the existence of these ideological interests, of idolatry rather than rationalism. In terms of education we are thinking here not only of those systems where the humanities and social sciences are deliberately given lower grading because they lead to political awareness, but also those where religious education is

promoted so as to instill obedience and pious servility and subservience as a high godly-given virtue. Thus the educated class, though trained primarily to assist the ruling elite in the management of the substructure, pose essentially as the only possible threat to the masters. This suspicion on the part of the rulers triggers off measures to close most of those gaps that may lead to the top of the ladder. And as a counter effect, these measures themselves have prompted criticisms from the intellectuals who are therefore seen as the real threat to the positions and privileges of the ruling class and their administrative aids.

But to what extent are the intellectuals a real or mythical threat to the ruling class? More often than not, the intellectuals themselves have been responsible for their fate in this struggle. And this is mainly due to the language in which they express their idealization of the better society. They make it look a society ruled by the peasants, — and this term, in many parts of Africa, has come to mean the poor and illiterate masses dwelling and working in the countryside — people who by the standards of their experience and understanding are unable to handle the matters of modern state. And because they are educated and bound to know these simple facts, the intellectuals are deemed by the rulers not only as a threat to their ('rulers') positions and privileges, but also as liars who want to achieve their own goals by riding on the back of the peasants. And because the rulers themselves have control over the machinery of contact with the public, they have all the chance to hang the intellectuals on the necks of the peasants: all detensions without trial, closures of higher educational institutions and other acts of repression hence become "legitimate" for the "protection" of the majority. They (the intellectuals) become the "real" enemies of peace, justice and order in the definition of the nobles.

On the other hand, the intellectuals — we mean the intellectuals in modern Africa — are a committed class without distinctive aims or interests of their own. They are a class of liberals acting as mercenaries for the proletariats and peasants. Between them and the nobles, the problem is not so much "about the range of allowable personal aims and

about the opportunities and rights people must have to be able to pursue these aims effectively" as "about the conditions, social and economic, for providing these opportunities."(7)

In so condemning the intellectuals, the ruling elite intentionally wish to kill two birds with one stone. By portraying the intellectuals as liars and seditious they wish to diminish their (the intellectuals) potential enlightening being exposed by any intellectual of upright mind. They "disarm the oppressed classes of the more revolutionary theory" which is increasingly being exposed by any intellectual of upright mind. By condemning the intellectuals the ruling elite also wish to perpetuate the status quo by indicating to the masses that any change is only equatable with chaos and lawlessness. Any opponents are thus portrayed as disappointed group of individuals apparently misled by ignorance and inapplicable and unworkable "foreign ideologies."

Ironically, therefore, it is the intellectual who is termed the ignorant. Cries for equality, justice and a halt to corruption are termed effects of unworkable "foreign ideologies." It is obvious that in such a situation there can be no dialogue between different interpretations of reality. The ruling ideology thus becomes exclusive and dogmatic as the intellectual, the sole possible interlocutor, is termed a "false revolutionary" and left not only without a platform on which to present his contribution on matters of common good, but also without listeners.

However, "if the development of an ideal society had convinced one that one's own society contained radical faults, then one would surely wish to see it changed. If (one the other hand) one's own society seemed to measure up well against one's ideal, then one would surely want to maintain it against (11) ill-conceived changes. In either case (however), the question of the nature and justification of social change becomes important."(8)

Ideology and Science :

In all these ideological conflicts and unwavering faithfulness to

one's class or group position, there is one fundamental assumption or claim being made. This claim or assumption, which is fundamentally responsible for dogmatism in ideology, is that each position claims that its assertions reflect the **truth** or state of provable facts in a similar way we talk of scientific assertions.

The assumptions of ideology, like those of philosophy, are sometimes said to be "self-evident"; but, as they differ from one class or group to another, or from one school to the next, it is clear that this can only mean that there is no unquestionable outside evidence for them. "There cannot be : their truth or falsehood is intrinsic. They cannot be proved or disproved; they can only be taken or left."(9)

The assumptions of ideology cannot be fully substantiated by any empirical observation, for they are assertions not of material fact, but of reality and meaning. For example, a wealthy ruler's conception of the **true** needs of the poor peasants may range from tractors to efficient highways for the transportation of his (peasant's) produce for sale in the urban areas — unaware that such **truth** reflects or is so only in terms of the magnanimous way of looking at and expecting things from the point of view of a wealthy ruler. The peasant, on the other hand, knows his needs to be a cheap hoe to enable him cultivate for subsistence crops. Hence truth in this aspect is relative, not absolute. It is often not realized by people deeply involved in ideological framings and in activities based on specific ideological positions that their axioms are primariiy dogmatic assumptions based on unprovable claims. They are also integral and absolute, and their strength or weakness lies just in this.

It is a no less necessary condition of ideology that its objective reference should be taken as scientifically valid. The conditions of a peasant can be described in no better terms by a social scientist than by a politician. The facts in his life — the physical environment, the tools he uses, the quantity and quality of his produce, his health conditions, etc., are observable and indisputable facts. Ideology, like philosophy, goes further beyond this domain of facts (science) in trying to fit these

facts into a larger context of reality. The data of facts are thus trimmed or prolonged to fit into this magical box of ideology. They are interpreted, and thus enter the domain of dogma as 'an affirmation of a certain integral character resident both in events, things, persons and peoples, and in reality as a whole."(10) Thus while different ideological aims and prerequisities may widely vary or oppose each other from one group or class to another, they all claim that the unity and coherence reflected in the structure of their patterns are **manifested** (observable) in the different areas of life, i.e., politics, economics, religion, family, group relations, education, etc. The same facts may be cited to support end-theories or aims diametrically opposed to each other. It is sometimes contended in social science that in certain respects there are bodies of verified interrelated explanatory propositions (theories) that make comprehensible a body of verified empirical findings, and that to this extent such propositions consist of an end product — a body of demonstrable knowledge.(11) But unless we are talking of numerical calculations like we get in economics, in ideology, such logic is intrinsic to broader assumptions of valuational elements and can often contain "biased" and "false" assertions.

This scientific view of ideology is as old as Destutt de Tracy who "assigned to ideology the tasks of defining the sources of human knowledge, its limitations, and the degree of its certainty," and investigating the origin and law governing the formation of ideas in a scientific manner that could provide an adequate foundation for the political, moral, and educational sciences.(12) Since, to him, right thinking was the basis of right political action, ideology as the science of ideas, could not be short of certainty and truth in the manner of physics. In a manner reminiscent of Plato, de Tracy held that "only such indubitable knowledge would enable the legislator and ruler of the state to establish and maintain a just and rational order".(13) Destutt de Tracy's philosophy is a firm claim to realism. And all rulers, including our own rulers in Africa, however mediocre they may be, have a similar claim. Yet only a few of them perhaps understand that even the details of such realism are"meaningful" only because they are fittable within a more general

and broader picture of the context of their application which no longer has the image of an indubitable reality of mathematical precision, but one of valuational and metaphysical images specific only to the perceiver(s). "Interests" may not be immediately evident in such a broad metaphysical reality, but the point is that as a conception of reality from a given context, it always carries with it feelings of satisfaction to the perceiver in the corollary desire and wish that such a world be ever realizeable. This alone has both emotional and physical or material interests in that it implies a "model" of life or man's place in a so-conceived world.

Being the work of the intellect, however, this world is many times illusionary, and a dogmatic and exclusive attachment to it for action-orientation always hide, the danger of perpetuating falsehood and deception. Our point here is that it is the power of interest elements of ideology that often erode its significance both in the field of knowledge and in matters of social construction by hindering its openness and constant re-evaluation in order to achieve more adequate and truer assessments of facts than those that are available or in use rather than that a doctrine forfeits its claim to objectivity because it contains value judgements.

Many times too, the wheel of ideology roles endlessly on the very dogmatism that keeps it up, especially in our young countries where such concepts as responsibility (for) other people's lives and national interests either have no meaning or have not taken root at all. Upon realizing or in fear of their own self-deception, deception of others, and deception about the nature of the world (because it is falsified by events), the leaders undertake to further and aggravate their mistakes by forcefully remaining in indisputable power positions by declaring themselves life Presidents and amending Constitutions to safeguard such interests and aims. Falsehood is thus intentionally made to run people's affairs. In the platonic sense, the **doxa** is made the **episteme** and vice-versa. Man becomes chained forever in the cave of slavery and appearances. The irony is, however, that even the philosopher who has raised some doubt

regarding the permanence (objectivity) of this world is not allowed to enlighten those entrusted to him, so that the question about the difference between **doxa** and **episteme** should never arise if not only in the reminiscent world after death. In a manner reminiscent of this, Francis Bacon asserted that unless great care was taken, **idols** can be obstacles in the path to true knowledge.(14)

Karl Mannheim puts it even more to the point. He observes that the modern meaning of the term "ideology" originated with Napoleon from a contrast between thought (theory) and political action or practice, and was used by him to ridicule and discredit his critics. He says that "the new world gives sanction to the specific experience of the politician with reality, and it lends support to that practical irrationality which has so little appreciation for thought as an instrument for grasping reality."(15) In such circumstance, such rulers, especially in Africa, have come out-strongly against the intellectuals of differing camps or views by challenging them to demonstrate the "realism" of their "talks" by producing cars for the nation or producing bags of maize for the needy. In turn, however, the rulers are often themselves at pains to answer to the challenges their own assailance has put them in by demonstrating a pragmatism based on a realistic or "true" consciousness. Thus "the necessarily supplementary relationship between action and perception speaks immediately against the entirely arbitrary handling of tested and testable evidence in ideologies and in any kind of action-oriented belief system."(16) Perception is an essentially subjective phenomenon and activity, and the truths about its "total" structure are possible only within an intersubjective dialogue, by relating the various facts to one another, so that we are able to judge our own perceptions and the perceptions of others, since "the account we give of our experiences and more especially of our motivations may be faulty."(17)

Conclusion:

The validity of a theory essentially lies in its testability, body of proofs or accountability. Proof or experiment, however, does not only

aim at verification, or justification of the contents of a proposition. Justification is also reached, however negatively, from lack of evidence to the contrary. So Sir Karl Popper added to the positivist principle of verification that of falsification. A simplification of this is to say that, for example, we don't prove the durability of our plates in the house by storing them away and let the children use woven baskets. In order to have a ground for claiming their durability we must expose them to constant and proper use. The number of tests or length of time required will both depend on our natures and habits. In the domain of social political truths and tests, the situation is even more complex as both the subject and object is man himself.

Man interprets and transforms according to a general context into which specific beliefs and belief-derived actions fit. This is the area of his ideological fumbling. Whether clearly outlined or not, every human individual capable of using his reason normally is not only capable, but always has this often-called "philosophy" of life. But man is a complex being; he is cultural, social as well as ecological or natural creature. His life "philosophy" often reflects a complex of the specific impact of all these "modes" of his existence. Hence diversity in these philosophies varies from individuals, through groups and classes to categories. Each has its own ideology or life-philosophy. In primitive and recent traditional times, each ideology was exclusive of the other, co-existence was unthinkable. Elimination of the other (and this meant physical elimination of people belonging to a different and rivaling ideology) was the best guarantee for survival. This resulted in frequent jihads and other types of war aimed at subjugating or eliminating ideological adversaries. As ideological co-existence was out of question, dogmatism thrived in the absence of reason with its powers of investigation and assessment. Dogmatism thus became a powerful instrument for the achievement of obedience, and upholding unity. In this respect dogmatism has held religious systems and political parties together by closing doors to heresy, schisms and revolutions. The rewards for violation of such dogmatic attitudes in religious or racial ideologies are often executions or excommunications. From Hitler's Germany to Khomeini's Iran and Betra's

South Africa, the trend has been this absolutist approach to matters of socio-political values and ideals, based on an absolutist ideology of race or religion.

Dogmatism, however, thrives only in a situation of inversely proportional decline or suppression of reason, and vice-versa. Even in the most established churches or religious systems, dogmatism was at its peak only before the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods. With reason more fertile soil is quickly gathered where some was eroding below the feet of dogmatism. Theology has grown into a formidably strong and rich science or discipline today, for example, as a result of the decline of dogmatism in the Christian Churches, especially in the post Vatican II period.

The qualities of diversity and even opposition that often go along with reason, have not so much shown fragility of system and power grips as they have demonstrated constructiveness, better understanding and better management of the affairs of men by integrating diversity for a richer and more diversified human life.

And this can be reached only through toleration and participation; that intellectuals and other persons capable of formulating and articulating concepts and ideas be given the opportunity to contribute to the national policies and ideological frameworks. We must learn to accept that many times it will be the man who objects to and opposes the status quo that has the wellbeing of his country and people deepest at heart. The developing countries cannot afford the luxury of dogmatism of any form. Given their diverse and complex social, cultural, political and economic problems, diverse thoughts, ideas and opinions from within are urgently required for the planning and construction of a better and true society of men so glorified in their constitutions. Reason and participative dialogue must be promoted if we want to save ourselves from the idolaterous demon of personality cults disguised as single party systems.

FOOTNOTES

1. McKinney, D.W. **The Authoritarian Personality Studies : an inquiry into the failure of Social Science Research to produce demonstrable knowledge,** Mouton, The Hague — Paris, 1973, pp. 14-15.
2. Cfr. Groot, J.C., "Aspects horizontaux de la collegialité", in BARAUNA, G. and CONGAR; Y., Edd., **L'Eglise de Vatican II,** Paris, 1966, p. 816.
3. Fromm, E., **Escape from Freedom,** Rinehard Co. Inc., New York, 1941, pp. 170-171.
4. Wiredu, K., **Philosophy and an African Culture,** Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 86.
5. Plemenatz, J., **Ideology,** Pall Mall Press, London, 1970, p. 83.
6. **Ibid.,** pp. 99-100.
7. **Ibid.,** p. 105.
8. King, J.C. and McGilvaray, J.A., **Political and Social Philosophy: Traditional and Contemporary Readings,** McGraw — Hill Book Co., New York, 1973, p. 9.
9. Wilson, G. and M., **The Analysis of Social Change,** C.U.P., 1968, p. 65.
10. **Ibid.,** p. 68.
11. Cfr. McKinney, D.W., **op. cit.,** p. 16.
12. Cfr. Barth, H., **Truth and Ideology,** University of California Press, London, 1976, pp. 1-3.
13. **Ibid.,** p. 6.
14. Cfr. **Novum Organum** § 38
15. Mannheim, K., **Ideology and Utopia,** Routledge Paul, London, (1936) 1968, p. 64.
16. Seliger, M., **Ideology and Politics,** George Allen & Unwin, London, 1976, p. 160.
17. **Ibid.,** p. 160.

ARE ALL MEN EQUAL?

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> It is in fact man's inequality in every visible respect which makes peace between them possible only on the basis of their fundamental equality.(1)

Whether all men are equal or not is quite clearly not self-evident truth. The declaration that all men were born equal is itself problematic and in need of elucidation. If being born or created equal means that there is some characteristic that is equally distributed among all men at birth, it is not clear just what such a characteristic would be. If we succeeded in isolating such a characteristic of equality at birth we would still have to show that it was so dominant that it was never overridden by characteristics of inequality (if any) unequally distributed among men. I argue in this essay that even though the claim that all men are equal is false from an empirical point of view and rationally unprovable from a metaphysical point of view, no social arrangement can function satisfactorily without it. I attempt to show that belief in equality of all men is necessary for harmonious social existence and argue that this is sufficient justification for the claim.

I

For any measurable characteristic one chooses one can always find two individuals who possess it in different degrees. Men differ in bodily strength, mental abilities, wealth, artistic and moral qualities etc. Inequality in life is clearly commonplace. It takes little effort to show the falsehood of the claim that all men are equal from an empirical point of view. The claim that all men are equal would have to be based on grounds other than empirical to be true.

Frequently the claim of the equality of all men is based on what is believed to be the nature of man qua man. We shall call such claims metaphysical in this essay. The doctrine like that of Martin Luther King, that all men are children of God in his (Luther's) appeal to the American white racists to accord the Blacks equal treatment is an example. The belief that all men are equally children or creatures of God is the basis of the claim that they are all equal. The trouble is that the belief that all men are equally children of God is a matter of faith and as much in need of rational support as the claim of the equality of all men. Besides, from purely human experience common ancestry does not at all imply equality.

Other attempts to justify the claim on the same vein are such as Kant's. Immanuel Kant believed that all men are equally free rational moral agents. Now, for Kant, the characteristic of being free and rational moral agent is not empirical but transcendental and thus neither confirmable nor disconfirmable. Moreover, if Kant's stand were acceptable, we would hold all men equally responsible as moral agents something we don't do in our social relations. Views like Kant's such as that all men equally have infinite value and that they are sacred are by their very nature not confirmable. Metaphysical beliefs cannot therefore justify the claim that all men are equal.

II

The claim that all men are equal has nevertheless, played a highly important role in social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau.

According to Hobbes all men are equal by nature. Hobbes tells us.

> Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body and mind: as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another;

yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of the body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.(2)

Hobbes seems to be holding the position that even from an empirical point of view differences among individuals are negligible details when we consider equality of all men for on the balance no one individual has superiority over others in all respects. Given any two individuals each will be better than the other in some natural endowment be it phsical or mental. Each can therefore threaten the other in some way. This view is persuasive enough to serve Hobbes' purpose in his attempt to justify individuals' allegiance to society or state. Hobbes' view does not however amount to a proof that all men are equal.

Rousseau on the other hand believed that all men were born free and equal.(3) In "A Dissertation on the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality of Mankind" Rousseau gives an answer to those like Plato who were for inequality. According to Rousseau,

> There are two kinds of inequality among human species; one, which I call natural or physical, because it is established by nature, and consists in a difference of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of the mind or of the soul : and another, which may be called moral or political inequality, because it depends on a kind of convention, and is established, or at least authorized, by the consent of men. This latter consists of the different privileges which some men enjoy to the prejudice of others; such as that of being more rich, more honoured, more powerful, or even in a position to exact obedience.

For Rousseau a question fits perhaps to be discussed by slaves in the hearing of their masters, but highly unbecoming to reasonable and free men in search of the truth is whether those who command are necessarily better than those who obey, and if strength of body or of mind, wisdom, or virtue are always found in particular individuals, in proportion to their power or wealth.(4) Here Rousseau seems to be for a position similar to that of Hobbes — i.e. that on the whole, some balance of equality is maintained among all men. Rousseau found the idea of equality necessary in his attempt to explain the nature of the good society which needed a social bond that made it possible for each participant to remain as free as in the state of nature where he obeyed himself alone.

In his **Second Treatise On Civil Government,** John Locke(5) describes an original state of nature as a "state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident than that ceatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection". Locke felt that one's desire to be loved by one's equals in nature as much as possible may have imposed upon him a natural duty of reflecting towards them the like affection. For Locke, "the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult, it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions."

Equality of all men which was a prominent characteristic of the state of nature for Locke was to be maintained in his civil society with the added feature of an impartial judge to administer the law fairly. It is evident that for Rousseau and Locke assumption of human equality was necessary for any social life. Locke was severely critical of Hobbes because Hobbes' civil society required an absolute ruler, an outrageous denial of human equality. For this reason Hobbes' civil society continued to be a state of war this time between the ruler and the ruled.

Rousseau and Locke required that there be social equality among members of the civil society. Each individual was to be free to exercise some power of decision formally equal to that of any other member. This in effect is a requirement of democratic practices where equality consists in the vote itself (each person counting for one) and genuine participation in the free discussion preceeding the vote. To participate satisfactorily in the decision making the individuals must have a genuine sense of equal status, equal power, and equal responsibility. "The logic of democracy", Sidney Hook(6) has pointed out, "requires complete political equality — an equality unaffected by differences in station, race, religion and sex". A strong point in both Rousseau's and Locke's social contract theories is deep awareness that belief in equality of all members is fundamental to any social community to which persons freely belong.

III

The notion that all men have equal human worth is best exemplified in Kant — in his doctrine that all human individuals are ends in themselves and not mere means to other people's ends. Man's being as an end in himself is the source of human dignity equally due to all. It calls for equal regard for all persons regardless of race, religion, tribe, sex, etc. Sometimes reference is made to sacredness of the human person to quality his status as an end. We shall use the expression "equality of respect" in this essay to refer to equal regard which should be accorded to all men because being human each person has a value in-and-for-himself. Equality of human beings is regardless of empirical differences which individuals happen to have. These individual differences have only **ad hoc** bearings on the good lives of their possessors and cannot count against the claim to basic human equality like that of respect.

Bernard Williams(7) in his "Idea of Equality" discuss this complex notion of 'respect' admirably. Williams distinguishes between Technical or professional point of view of man and human point of view of man :

> From the technological point of view, a man who has spent his life in trying to make a certain machine which would not possibly work is merely a failed inventor, and in compiling a catalogue of those whose efforts have contributed to the sum of technical achievement, one must 'write him off': the fact that the devoted himself to this useless task with constant effort and so on is merely irrelevant. But from a human point of view, it is clearly not irrelevant: we are concerned with him, not merely as 'a failed inventor' but as a man who wanted to be a successful inventor.

Williams cites professional relations also where individuals operate and are regarded solely as bearers of labels such as 'miner', 'manual labour', 'cleaner', 'messenger', 'General Manager', Executive Managing Director's etc., as though these titles fully define their bearers. Kant's injunction that each man be treated as an end in himself, and never as a mere means contains the demand that men should be regarded from a human point of view. Each man should be singly identified not merely as a surface on which a label is placed but as a self-conscious being who operates intentionally to achieve certain goals in the process of self-realization. Each man is owed an understanding and thus being abstracted from certain conspicuous structures of inequality in which we find him. Equality of respect has to do with recognizing other persons as being equally important as ourselves.

A racist or a tribalist or even a religious gigot is guilty of denial of equal regard on some segments of society on the basis of skin colour, tribe or religious belief. A tribalist for instance, assumes some kind of superiority over members of other tribes usually for purposes of exploitation thus manifesting an attitude other than that of equal regard. Among the Agikuyu of Kenya, the attitude of equal regard is manifested by the expression **mundu no mundu**(8) (a person is after all a person) uttered when a person is treated in a way not befitting a human being. It is used especially when an unfair deal (like selling a barren cow for breeding purposes) has been dealt as an unsuspecting person. Clearly, with

equal regard for the other person such a deal would not occur. Equality of respect is based on a view of man as having a basic value simply because he is a human being. All persons, therefore, have such value — a value not based on contingencies. This value is the basis of the equality of all men. Clearly, equality of all men is based on a certain view of man — a view that all men have a certain worth as human beings. This view seems to me not capable of proof. It is rather a postulate. The belief in the equality of all men in this sense is nevertheless not taken as dogmatic. It is capable of being justified on the basis of its fertility as I hope to show later in this essay.

It is quite consistent with respecting people equally to be equally concerned for the goodness of their lives in the sense of making them happy and satisfactory. For this reason all people should have equal opportunities to develop their lives and become the best beings possible. They should equally have access to the available means to self-development. The conditions set for the means should also be such that all men stand a chance of satisfying them. It may be true that High School education is available to all children who at age thirteen pass Certificate of Primary Education Examination. The chances of passing the examination are however not equal. For obvious reasons, rural children at age thirteen stand little chance compared to urban children.

There is an apparent conflict between equality of respect and equality of opportunity. Equality of respect, I repeat, is first and foremost concerned about human dignity and worth not conditioned on any contingencies like wealth, professional status, political power etc. Equality of respect refers to man qua human being. It has to do with the 'spiritual' dimension of man. Equality of opportunity on the other hand is concerned about equal access to certain goods like wealth, education, political power etc. It has essentially to do with the 'materialistic'(9) dimension of man. Being on the opposite poles of a spectrum any emphasis on one appears to exclude the other. Equality of respect, for instance, ideally should ignore all material considerations which are contingent. On the

other hand, much emphasis on professional getting ahead becomes an end in itself and denies respect to the individual who becomes only a centre of achievement — a mere means.

The conflict needs not exist, however, when one appreciates that the two kinds of equality are mutually complimentary. Human dignity definitely is adversely affected by extreme poverty. Equality of respect cannot therefore be unaffected by maldistribution of wealth in any society. Equality of opportunity has a bearing on the equality of respect. On the other hand given equality of respect one has every reason to worry about equality of opportunity. Equality of respect is incarnated in the equality of opportunity. It would be an inconsistency to be a believer in equality of respect and yet be unconcerned of equality of opportunity. How well equality of respect and equality of opportunity are balanced is a measure of a well ordered society.

IV

There is a close relationship between equality and justice. Let us understand justice as the problem of distributing benefits and burdens in a given society fairly among its people. The link between equality and justice as Gregory Vlastos(10) points out is manifest in both history and language. The great historic struggles for social justice have centred about some demand for equal rights : the struggle against slavery, political absolutism, economic exploitation, the disfranchisement of the lower and middle classes and the disfranchisement of women, colonialism and racial oppression. Justice presupposes equality. Considerations of justice would have no point if it was not believed that some sort of equality among all men existed. In this essay it is equality of respect. Justice also aims at some ideal equality. When socialists talk about achieving classless society it is presumably due to equality having been approximated to a much higher degree than in existing societies. Such equality can only be achieved through practising justice in existing societies.

Equality and justice are, however, distinct. William Frankena tells us that the "basic standard of distributive justice is **equality** of treatment... the principle of justice lays upon use the prima facie obligation of treating people equally." It is not clear just what the relationship is between the two concepts in Frankena. His handling of it is confusing. Distribution of benefits (and burdens) can be equal and unjust e.g. every family (regadless of size) being allocated Shs. 1,000 per annum for medical care. Distribution of burdens (and benefits) can be just but unequal e.g. graduated Income Tax. Justice is therefore **not** simply equality of treatment.

V

It is not rationally provable that all men qua men have equal worth. Yet as Nyerere points out, it is only on the basis of this belief that life in society can be organized without injustice.(12) Elsewhere Nyerere observes that man can only live in harmony with man, and develop to his full potential as a unique individual only in a society based on the principle of human equality.(13)

When the principle of equal worth is accepted persons will be accorded equal regard even when 'visibly' unequal. Being treated as equals enhances communal consciousness which includes a feeling of belonging, a share in communal stake and consequently loyalty. Equal regard encourages cooperation, trust, fellow-feeling and in the end mutual endearment. Equal regard avoids divisiveness, exploitation resentment, hatred and risk of hostility in a social organization. It seems to me that the principle of equal worth like that of induction must be accepted not on the basis of rational proof but because it is so fruitful in human life.

NOTES

1. Julius Neyerere, **Freedom and Unity: Uhuru na Umoja** (Dar-es-Salaam : Oxford University Press 1966) p. 269.

2. Thomas Hobbes, **Leviathan : Or The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil,** Ed. Michael Oakeshott with an Introduction by Richard S. Peters (London : Collier Books, Collier McMillan Ltd., 1970), p. 98.

3. J.J. Rousseau, **The Social Contract and Discourses,** Trans. by G.D. H. Cole, (London : Everymans Library, 1968), p. 4.

4. Ibid., p. 160.

5. Saxe Commins and Robert W. Linscott, Ed. **Man And The State : The Political Philosophers** (New York : Washington Square Press, Inc., 1966), pp. 59-60.

6. Sidney Hook, **Political Power and Personal Freedom: Critical Studies in Democracy, Communism, and Civil Rights,** (New York : Collier Books, 1962), p. 53.

7. Bernard Williams "The Idea of Equality" printed in **Moral Concepts** Ed. by Joel Feinberg, (London : Oxford University Press 1969), pp. 158-9.

8. Equivalent expressions will be found in other Bantu languages as well. This if a tautology, it is a significant one — it is fruitful as a reminder of basic human equality.

9. I use the terms 'spiritual' and 'materialistic' for want of better terms to bring forth the desired contrast.

10. Gregory Vlastos, "Equality and Justice" in **Social Justice** Ed. Richard B. Brandt, (Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 31.

11. William Frankena, **Ethics 2nd Ed.** (Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1973), p. 51.

12. Julius Nyerere, **Freedom and Socialism: Uhuru na Ujamaa,** (Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Pres, 1968), p. 13.

13. Ibid., p. 22.

PHILOSOPHICAL METHODS OF CULTURAL EVALUATION AND EXPLANATION

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The purpose of this paper is to argue that two methods of evaluating and explaining culture are inappropriate — entelechy and forms of over-extending evaluative import of explanations — particularly in understanding the culture of African peoples. This negative approach is predicated on the assumption that actions based on unjustified evaluations and explanations of culture are misguided. Consequently, if we have an understanding of what methods do not work theoretically, we will be one step closer to knowing what does form an appropriate evaluation and explanation of culture consonant with a viable praxis for liberation.

The question, 'What is the philosophy underlying the beliefs of African peoples? has been answered with 'It is peculiarly humanistic, spiritual, and emotive and forms an important part of our inherently pluralistic world.' Such an answer does not tell us how these traits function as social variables nor why we should warrant their continuation. The question, 'What is the historical origin of liberalism among blacks and is it warranted?' when answered by 'Its historical basis is in the influence of white society on blacks and the need for blacks to defend their race through adopting beliefs that seem amenable to giving an acceptable view of black life and because of these influences, liberalism is bogus,' does not tell us what's wrong with liberalism. The above answers are the kind we find couched in theories using one of the following inadequate methods of reasoning: (a) Entelechy: a believed nature of the universe is used to frame an explanation and evaluation of social life and/or (b) explanations of how social conditions come about are used to evaluate the resultant circumstances (by virtue of the grevious methods employed in creating the circumstances), e.g., the explanation is

presumed sufficient to warrant some set of correlated evaluations without a justification for the correlation. The first problematic (a) is a misconception found in the works of Alain L. Locke and other pluralists such as Nelson Goodman. If the universe is inherently pluralistic, I will argue, that does not mean that social life should be or that the cultural traits Locke finds grounding the cultural philosophies of African peoples is worth maintaining. The second misconception (b) is found in William T. Fontaine's explanatory social theory as well as Marxs'. Liberalism, understood as a belief in the value of social reciprocity and the **sui generis** character of cultural traits, when justified the way Locke does is thus inadequated. And the criticism of liberalism, when forged in Fontaine's fashion, is without sufficient justification.

I shall not enter the debate over whether we can have an explanatory that is not value ladden nor the debate over whether value theories are dependent for their persuasiveness on an explanatory correlation. For the purposes of this paper, explanations purport to answer 'why' questions and typically tender causal connections, correlations, or relationships between events. Explanations provide coherent pictures of a series of events. Explanations predict, or at least contribute to our ability to do so. Value judgments, however, weigh and adjudge the worth of things. How things are adjudged can take a variety of forms. Marx's social theory, for example, has been interpreted to include a juridical theory of justice.(1) On this interpretation justice, for Marx, is what the laws of the state happen to condone and what juridical practices are most compatible with the interest of the prevailing political economy. Marx's historical materialism, as an explanatory juridical theory on this account, is not hinged on a moral view of justice. Given that an explanatory theory can be amoral, there are other forms of value judgments entailed in Marx's theory which are intuitively attractive. (A system that stifles self-realization and rewarding work, for example, is intuitively unattractive, particularly if a viable alternative exists.) Taking this interpretation of Marx's theory of justice as an example, we can have an

explanatory theory which holds certain kinds of value judgments, amorally construed, as intuitively attractive.

The problem of concern is not whether both moral and amoral value judgments are always couched in explanatory theories, but the limit of support value judgments of either sort can gain from an explanation. A loose distinction between explanations and judgments is sufficient to consider their theoretical roles.

Pluralism is a term that has been used with varied and sometimes contrary meanings. The metaphysical views of the pluralist persuasion I shall consider hold that reality is itself composed of diverse elements, or at least, that reality is susceptible to more than one true understanding. According to the metaphysical pluralist Goodman, "...many world-versions are of independent interest and importance without any requirement or presumption of reducibility to a single base."(2) Interpretations or explanations of an event on this account can have equal merit for equally valid reasons.

Locke contended that "All philosophies... are in ultimate derivation philosophies of life and not of abstract, disembodied 'objective' reality; products of time, place and situation, and thus systems of timed history rather than timeless eternity."(3) For Locke, monist and rationalist claims about how to know certain knowledge or what counts as certain knowledge are in actuality bound by 'feeling modes' and life's circumstances. In the **New Negro** Locke provided the theoretical basis for later theories of negritude and African personality.(4)

The New Negro both explained why urban Afro-American began to assert their new found race consciousness and evaluated the character of that consciousness. Race consciousness, Locke argued, had been formed by America's history of racism. African people from different languages, religious, and cultural backgrounds were treated as one 'race'. Racist constructed stereotypes and legitimized bigotry based on those stereotypes. Under the stereotypes, all Afro-Americans were the same and

all genuine cultural traits — such as affinity to nature, sensitivity, humanitarian inclinations, and symbolic art — were deemed inferior traits. The social dynamics, Locke believed structured the new race consciousness, as a consciousness of being a race, were dislocation of settled agrarian roots, migration, residence in industrial urban centers, heightened expectations occasioned by limited participation in mainstream American industrial life, and the grim realities of lynching, race stereotyping, and poverty. Urbanization, fueled by industrial capitalism, forced large numbers of Afro-Americans into concentrated areas and by so doing unwittingly fostered greater black unity, self-regard, and race consciousness. Rather than denegrate the cultural traits white society held inferior, black artist applauded them. The applause for Locke was warranted not simply as a functional response to oppression or because the traits contributed to a human society by their moral qualities, but because diversity is the way of the world. Locke argued that if the class struggle was resolved, for example, and we found ourselves in a classless society, we would still have the shackles of our "psychological tribes". Cultural diversity for Locke is endemic to human society and their manifestations are not to be judged according to some hierarchical arrangement of inferior, superior, inane or heathen.

Locke's metaphysics colors his explanations and evaluations in a way that make them untenable. Why can't different human ways of thinking be but one unified component of a pluralistic universe ? Just because the universe is, on the metaphysical pluralist account, inherently many, does not tell us that human cultural diversity will be so divided, e.g., be multitudinous rather than unidimensional one in a universe containing a variety of other things. Nor does the existence of different psychological tribes mean that those tribes will form distinguishable cultural groups or that psychological tribes and cultural groups should exist. Locke's metaphysics is taken to tell us what must, or should be, the case if we are to be compatible with the nature of things. Cogent explanations of real social events rarely fit the structures of metaphysical

positions, and, as I will argue, the method of Locke's reasoning leaves certain spheres of questions unanswered.

The general traits Locke believed best characterized the cultural modes of African peoples and that he adjudged to be contributions to a humane society reflect problematics with his entelechy method of reasoning. Why believe, for example, that Afro-American cultural traits (spirituality, emotivism, symbolism) are conductive to the future survival and development of Afro-American ? In what ways are such traits simply stereotypes ? How might such traits, whether they exist in fact or as traits we want to stand as general descriptors, function to perpetuate oppression ? These questions are to some degree answerable by an explanatory theory of strong predictive power. But a value judgment that sees endemic Afro-American cultural traits as valuable, and an explanation hinged on such a judgment, are judgments and explanations restricted in cogency (presuming they are warranted) to a particular, and not a universal or eternal, condition.

The particularity of the human condition is, of course, a central feature of Locke's views. For Locke, our knowledge is always conditioned by life's circumstance and as such never attains certainty or objectivity. Taking the pluralist tenet that the world is inherently many and the tenet that we can not have certain knowledge, what we get is a philosophy that cannot on its own terms tell us that the future will, in fact, be pluralistic.

Locke's metaphysical pluralism is taken as telling us how the world actually works — not simply what the world is, but how it operates. But if the world is pluralistic in nature, and full of inconsistencies, there is no reason to suppose that how things work in the world need parallel some supposed underlying nature of the world.

The argument here is not intended to be against metaphysical or epistemological pluralism as such. Rather, the focus is on the theoretical

difficulties they involve by over-extending their import of explanations and evaluations. Over-extention of import also occurs in the context of the relation between explanations and evaluations.

William T. Fontaine, in his first published articles, "An Interpretation of Contemporary Negro Thought from the Standpoint of the Sociology of Knowledge", 1940, and "Social Determination" in the Writings of Negro Scholars", 1944, held that knowledge, in the form of social theories, was determined by a variety of social forces of which theorists were not always cognizant.(5) Fontaine argued that "a relation of functional dependence between the social situation confronting the Negro group and much of the knowledge cultivated by its scholars" explained the content of the then popular liberal theories.(6) Fontaine's general approach was in concert with Karl Mannheim's **Ideology and Utopia.**(7) According to Fontaine, embracing liberalism because it provided a ready method of defending the race represented a social response conditioned by racial oppression. Afro-American scholars were engulfed by America's liberal **weltanschauung** because it ostensibly offered compassion toward minority problems. The liberal — black courtship for Fontaine suggested that Afro-American scholars were not acting as independent rational agents standing beyond the reach of white philanthropy or above idiosyncracies of a defense psychosis.

Fontaine's views concerning what cultural traits were generally encouched in black culture and the importance of applauding those traits were not contrary to Locke's perspective. But there is a significant difference between the adjudgment of liberalism. Locke, as a functional relativist and pluralist, considered liberalism a practical solution to competing and conflicting cultural preferences regardless of their historical origin because of the perpetual existence of different psychological tribes and cultural diversities, what counts as reasonable will always vary; consequently, liberal attitudes of tolerance and reciprocity were for Locke functional.(8)

Fontaine condemned liberalism among Afro-Americans because of its social origins and mode of becoming adopted. Fontaine criticized Afro-American assimilation of liberalism because he considered its assimilation as motivated by a defense psychology, imitation, or as a means of securing advantages of good will from whites. Such acceptance was reprehensible for Fontaine because it was an acceptance without critical evaluation from the standpoint of a disinterested, objective, rational position. To the extent that a position is socially determined for Fontaine, that position is suspect. If a rationalist position were adopted conflicting ethical and value commitments could be resolved through a system of weighing the intrinsic and extrinsic importance of the value commitments to the parties and pursuing a compromise course. Leaving aside the problem of why a rationalist would necessarily be a nominalist and value relativist, Fontaine supposes that the reasoning patterns attributed to rationalism are patterns which exist outside the pale of social determination, assumable by us all, and that their reasoning procedure would produce common results ?

It is not clear why a defense psychology is taken as a social causal factor or why, as a causal factor, it is taken to explain so broad an area as black intellectual products. Which causal factors — economical, political, or psychological — explain what and how influential each factor is, are problems historically plaguing the appeal of the sociology of knowledge tradition. Nonetheless, if Fontaine's explanations were warranted, they do not thereby lend as much support as he supposes to his value judgments.

Fontaine doesn't tell us what's wrong with liberalism per se, only what's wrong with how it became accepted and the various psychological and instrumental purposes for which it is used that are unassociated with the cogency of liberal tenets. Nor does he tell us why rationalist resolution of conflicts in the form of compromises is so appealing. Why suppose that rationalism is something one arrives at as an independent and free agent or that once a person is a rationalist he is no longer subject

to the same influences that purportly explain social and individual behavior otherwise ? Good consequences can certainly be the result of reprehensible causes. Telling us how something came about does not, **ipso facto,** tell us that the result is a bad thing.

The important evaluation (that liberalism is bad) is without an adequate justification in Fontaine's works because the explanation (how liberalism came into being) explicates the reprehensible modes of its origin which are, **mutatis mutandis,** supposed sufficient to condemn liberalism per se. Fontaine over-extends the import of his explanation.

Integral to Fontaine's over-extension is his approach of judging the character of individuals in the process of explaining behavior as if the terms of use in one could be summarily used for the other. The terms of the explanation, such as 'defense' or 'feeling excluded', are relevant descriptors for individual persons, but not explanatum for groups. Groups don't feel anything, individuals who form groups do. The behavior of groups need not conform to the behavior of any particular individual member or to what the individuals conceive of themselves as doing. It makes sense to look at causal relations when explaining social behavior, but 'rational persons' stand outside the spectrum of explanation. They act, in effect, as individuals unaffected by intrinsic or extrinsic motivations of the sort an explanation can capture. Consequently, being defensive is not something Fontaine's conception of a rational person could be. This means that rational persons are thereby no longer persons in the normal sense, e.g., having feelings; and thus not subject to an explanation of relevance to groups or individuals.

Extrapolations from metaphysical theories don't explain social reality, particularly pluralist metaphysics, and explanations are not alone sufficient to warrant evaluations of the things explained. If Marx's juridical theory of justice, for example, does not answer certain questions associated with value judgments such as why self-realization or rewarding labor should be intuitively attractive, that is a limitation of the theory.

It is a limitation in the sense that a Marxist construction of a justification for the value of self-realization or rewarding labor restricting itself to the framework and terms Marx used to explain social development would be an over-extension of Marx's explanatory apparatus. Locke's explanation and evaluation of the cultural characteristics of African people remain unconvincing because certain cultural traits are warranted through the reference frame of pluralist metaphysics, e.g., the world is reduced to the confines of metaphysics. And Fontaine's condemnation of liberalism and the black elite, as founded solely on his explanation, is without force. In each of the above cases what an evaluation of cultural conditions depends on for its justification is employment of entelechy or over-extension of an explanation's import. Neither offers an adequate way to understand culture.

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4. See Alain L. Locke, ed., **The New Negro.** New York : Atheneum, 1969, (Original 1925).

5. See William T. Fontaine, "Social Determination" in the Writing of Negro Scholars", **American Journal of Sociology,** XLIX, January 1944; "An Interpretation of Contemporary Negro Thought from the Standpoint of the Sociology of Knowledge", **The Journal of Negro History,** XXV, January 1940.

6. The feature of liberalism Fontaine addresses in part, and of concern throughout this paper, is the belief in social reciprocity and the equal value of different cultural traits.

7. Karl Mannheim, **Ideology and Utopia.** Trans. L. Wirth, E. Shils, New York : Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936.

8. Op. cit., Locke, A. L., "Values and Imperatives", p. 34.

9. For W.T. Fontaine's comprehensive development of his rationalist views and its mode of resolving conflict, see "The Means-Ends Relations and Its Significance for Cross-Cultural Ethical Agreement", **Philosophy of Science,** 25, 1958.

SYNTHESIS*

André Mercier (Berne)

The task-Ladies and Gentlemen — to present a synthesis is not an easy one. Ought it to be a sort of chemical synthesis reproducing a substance which has been analyzed into its elements, or an Hegelian synthesis merging from the opposition between a thesis and an antithesis, or what... ? The case of chemistry must be discarded, I believe, for we had not at the beginning such a substance called **dogmatism** contained in a glass into which we dropped various ingredients for the analysis. We did not even have an egg-painted person like Humpty Dumpty sitting on a wall, though perhaps we had all the King's men and all the King's horses ready to attempt at putting poor Humpty Dumpty — after his great fall — together again.**

What we had perhaps was an egg which however was not yet painted into the person of Humpty Dumpty, and we had maybe also a wall to

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* This text as requested by the Organizers of this International Conference has been prepared at the end of the Conference and read at its Closing Session. Apart from few stylistic improvements, it has been left in the form in which it was read in order especially to respect the numerous references to either the papers presented or the interventions made during the discussion by the various scholars attending the Conference and to keep thus its intentionally personal character as well as its originally scholarly intention.

** This is an allusion to an old English Nursery Rhyme which reads as follows:

"Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall
"Humpty Dumpty had a great fall!
"All the King's horses and all the King's men
"cannot put Humpty Dumpty together again."

Of course, Humpty Dumpty is an egg with a human face painted on it.

put it on, and the game which You, Ladies and Gentlemen, — the King's men and horses — have played has been to paint it. What a picture ! One eye straight, the other bumped, a crooked nose, and so on and so on, this or that missing, hair torn away — for indeed You painted a rather uggly picture of Humpty "Dogmy" as he might be called now... Is the task given me then to make him fall from the wall ? I hope not for, then, neither You the men and horses, nor I who am not even the King, will be able to do anything about it, not even to cook an omelet out of the broken egg.

Several years ago, my University — where each Winter a series of public lectures is being organized on various subjects — announced such a series on **Aggression;** however, it had been thought advisable not to let 'aggression' stand alone in its 'negativity', but to connect it with something positive which would compensate the evil which is meant to root in aggressivity, and the antidote chosen had been : tolerance; moreover, it had been thought clever to go as far as to ask an expert philosopher to even speak on Peace, for if aggression eventually manifests itself among peoples as war, peace is, at least on the parchment, what makes the object of agreements after a war is ended. .

In our debates, the word aggression —or the more generic term of aggressivity — was not the object of any discussion, whereas tolerance was spoken of several times. Yet war was mentioned, in instances perhaps, but not without some intention to suggest that dogmatism may eventually lead to that violent kind of action which war is. Violence and non-violence were thrown into the discussion. ·

Such concepts are meant to describe actions of men or groups of men and their relationships, even — in the case of aggressivity as an instinct — actions among animals, and it is well known that a lot has been learnt about aggression from the whole of animal psychology, which has shown by the way that men are not the wolves of former pre-

judices, for wolves simply follow their instincts when they are hungry or in danger, whereas men start fighting even though they might have quite enough to eat or not be threatened. So they have to invent reasons for their fights if they are to justify the actions.

Now, one main feature which distinguishes man from a mere animal is that man has **ideas** whereas animals have none. Sir JOHN ECCLES was even able to locate the part of the human brain where ideas settle down, whereas none of the animals, not even higher apes, possess such a part in their brain. This does not mean that the material part of the human brain is identical with either the mind, or the spirit, or the soul or what have you, but it shows that men have reached on the physiological level a stage which allows for the claim that they **think** and are, say, philosophers. Maybe some animals have some sort of faculty of thought. Insects exchange information. Birds sing intentionally etc. The most extraordinay in that respect is perhaps the fact that elephants bury their dead and have nearly invented the cemetary. How near or distant this last phenomenon is from some sort of religion, I do not know, but it is remarkable.

Yet no animal seems to philosophize. For philosophy, e.g. according to GABRIEL MARCEL (who has been quoted by at least two of our speakers), is 'Second reflection', i.e. reflection upon reflection, or thought about thought if you please. I would not exclude that my dog had some sort of thoughts about me, but I'd exclude that it had thoughts about thoughts about me. For that is what makes man a philosopher.

Similarly, no animal has genuine religion, for religion is not just an intuition (or even instinct) about after-death, but revelation and adoration, and I would also exclude that elephants have that.

No animal has ever been accused of being dogmatic. Hence dogmatism must be located either as a possibility of philosophy, or a possibility of religion, or both.

Well, every man is a philosopher, at least in principle, and forms ideas which settle down in that special part of his brain which I mentioned. Whether he remembers the ideas from a stage outside his worldly life, as was the opinion of Professor VERBEKE's friend, old PLATO, or whether they came by inspiration into the minds of Professor ATREYA's ancestors the **Rishis,** or are given us by birth for the over-emphasizing of the pole of Self as Professor PAX's French opponents from DESCARTES to SARTRE believed, can be left to a Socratic dialogue not to decide, according to Mrs. MATTAR's description of such dialogues. But if, on the other hand, men are at least as confident as, or even more so than, elephants in rites, concerning after-life **and** all what is beyond worldly life, it seems to me undoubtable that besides such 'philosouhers' **by nature,** they are also 'religious beings' **by nature,** for all men do adore some sort of a Capital Being.

Is it then perhaps that 'doubleness' of nature which is at the origin of the problematics of dogmatism ? The debates of the past week seem to me to suggest it. But there are various possible interpretaions.

This 'doubleness' of nature may be the cause of an ambiguity. But it is neither a schizophrenia, nor a neurotic state. **Qua** ambiguity, it would situate man in a position of hesitation, not knowing whether to behave as a philosopher or as a religious being, either compelling him to a choice or, if he is so to speak lazy, to leave it again to SOCRATES 'not' to decide. We heard a lot about ambiguity, be it from the point of view of experimental psychology, or be it in the perspective of contemporary hermeneutics.

Yet that 'doubleness' needs not be just ambiguity. It could also be human spiritual richness : The spiritual wealth by all means. I mean that if on the one hand man were only philosophic, but not religious, he would only be a still higher ape and could establish himself as the king of animals and dethrone the lion. If on the other hand he were only religious, but not philosophic, he would be a super-elephant and could

invent super-cemetaries. But in either case, he would still be a sort of super-animal. Whereas if he is both, then he is the seat of a stress capable of yielding an explanation of his non-animality, which may look like a dialectic situation, though it is not that of thesis and anti-thesis **à la Hegel** but the contradistinction of two complementary 'ways of salvation from his merely animal nature', if I may express myself with the help of that phrase which is to understand as a metaphor, as a symbolic way to explain — like Professor HJARPE's cartoons — man's ability to not only remember his animal origin as a **kind** of tradition, but also walk away from it towards his unknown destiny of which he does not even have a clear notion.

To say, as some have done or still do, that there is nothing of the nature of a Capital Being, — **one** and **infinite** as Father ANAWATI would have it, — the experience of which would help man find his way in that pilgrimage, is arbitrary for, as Professor DAHER would admit, not even mathematics can help in the pilgrimage because the infinite which it constructs is built from finite elements and does not trespass the transfinite, whereas the case of the mystics as confirmed by Dr. WEISCHER proves most concretely the experiential nature of the relationship between man and that Capital Being.

Be it as ambiguity or as wealth, this doubleness of the philosophic and religious nature of man seems to me to be — not the roots of — but the earth in which the subject of our Conference, viz. dogmatism, can grow. Yet, since it is a **humus** and not a tree, the seeds of several trees may fall into it and grow into various trees. Therefore the concept of dogmatism is not univocal. It is historically, geographically, culturally and otherwise conditioned and that is one reason why it is not certain that we all spoke about the same during the Conference, and is also perhaps the specific reason why Dr. HETZLER's paper as read in the absence of its author was attacked so vehemently, for it alone conceived of a dogmatism of a cosmic dimension which, because of its intended di-

mension, was both very difficult for her to describe and uneasy for us to grasp, especially since examples— and she had put such forward — are always of a local and contingent nature, which is precisely not of a cosmic dimension. Professor PAX too meant, I think, to grasp the all-encompassing concept of dogmatism, but his hermeneutical methods derived from the quasi-hermenentical tradition borrowed somewhere between MARCEL, HEIDEGGER, BUBER and WHITEHEAD did not give him really the opportunity to explicitly mention dogmatism as a phenomenon, much rather he had to criticize all kinds of objectificative approaches that would come up as hindrances to the genuine promotion of otherness.

For indeed, dogmatism has to do with the immense difficulty there is to establish a comprehension of the Other. This difficulty begins even already at the level of the self 'itself', for if the self of man is that doubleness of being both philosophic and religious, how is the philosopher in one and the same self to understand the religious and the religious man in it to understand the philosophic ? Of course one can conceive of a man who would fulfil his self in such a manner that, being both a philosopher and a religious man, the mutual relationship within this doubleness be totally harmonious and at the same time realized at a very high degree. This would endow him, it seems to me, with the potentiality to be totally non-dogmatic... if he would succeed in transposing it from this 'homeo-otherness' or otherness within the self to real, i.e. 'hetero-otherness' from one to another self.

But the second condition of the fulfilment of the relationship, viz. that it be realized 'at a very high degree', makes it difficult for the first condition to apply simultaneously, because man is limited in practically all respects — Father ANAWATI called him finite —, so that the superposition of the harmony and the highness of degree makes a total which may trespass his possibilities. I know of very few really great men in history who have achieved the double fulfilment with all its ramifications, for when analyzed in detail, it is found to imply that these men had to

have a full understanding of truth, of beauty, of the good, of the mystical and of the revelation of the divine.

For instance, I am not sure, Mrs. MATTAR, that SOCRATES achieved it. We do not know much about his understanding of the beautiful, but let us grant it to a sufficient degree; surely he understood better than most others, the truth and the good; and there is a passage in the **Apology** which suggests that he had some sort of mystical experience at least as a youth, but one can doubt whether he genuinely and actually was a religiously animated person. This may be the reason why he had to drink the hemlock.

PLATO on the other hand seems to me to have achieved harmony at a very high degree. Even though JOWETT — the great Editor of PLATO's works in English — strongly doubts the mysticality of PLATOs' mindedness, I for myself am tempted to affirm it; and beside the evident fact that he understood truth, beauty and the good, he was — in contradistinction to SOCRATES — genuinely religious for he understood the myths, did not distort them into superstition and received divine inspiration with due reverence. And even though ARISTOTLE's views differed much from those of his master, one can — I believe — speak about him of a comparable harmony, however the degree he achieved seems less than the one reached by PLATO. Professor VERBEKE, who seems to have known these people quasi-personally, could confirm or infirm what I say.

A personal friend of WITTGENSTEIN, by the way, Professor DAHER, confirmed me in my conviction that WITTGENSTEIN was a great mystic — comparable with SIMONE WEIL. I should say, so both of these might be candidates to the list.

But if I am approximately right, there may be in the Socratic irony which professor NAUTA finds reproduced in KIERKEGAARD's pseudonomity a slight touch of what I'd like to call 'dogmatic anti-

dogmatism', for, as some contemporary German phenomenologists like to put it, SOCRATES' insistence in asking again and again "but what do you mean by saying this or that, what are your reasons to say so", **à la longue** becomes a burden seemingly introduced in order to allow him — SOCRATES — to have the last word, as e.g. in the Banquet.

No, having quoted the Banquet, it gives me opportunity — after having disparaged him — to enhance SOCRATES — and PLATO too of course — in connection with love, reminding however my listeners (resp. my readers) that love is not comparable with truth, beauty, the good etc. and is therefore not a value; much rather it more or less is the motor of their promotion, a state of affairs which ARISTOTLE seems to have ignored; and that is of importance, because it is perhaps the quintessence of that which allows the integral understanding of the Other, be it the other Other or the otherness of self between the philosophical and the religious, so that he or she who is incapable of love risks to show a tendency to be dictatorial and, at the extreme, intransigent, i.e. dogmatic.

Is it indeed not so, that where dogmatism is encountered, there is no love ?

In modern times, DESCARTES lacked that equilibrium, I am afraid, for his language, however clear it may be, has not the beauty which radiates e.g. from that of PASCAL (or of PLATO of course) and he does not seem to have had more mystical experience than in the story of the dream while sleeping behind the oven, whereas PASCAL is probably the best example of a fulfilment of the Self as I am postulating, so that if DESCARTES was the greater philosopher, PASCAL was the greater man.

KANT — to examine a further candidate — would not see any sense in trying to 'prove God'. In our days, one does not speak anymore of the proof of God's existence, but more strictly of the proof of

God, because existence has a temporal touch which implies that God's existence makes sense in time only, i.e. if He incarnates Himself, and within the group of religions for which God is a Person with Whom man can 'speak', Christianity is the only one teaching this incarnation in Jesus Christ. These circumstances, I believe, will justify me in putting Professor DAHER at the side of KANT and in reminding him that if for clear reasons ANSELM spoke of God's existence (and ended his proof by addressing himself personally to God : "Therefore, O Lord, Thou art"), in our days, the idea of a proof of God has a totally new aspect since we are able to distinguish between : (i) mathematical proofs — which are the only certain proofs but which do not prove anything real —, (ii) the so-called physical proofs which are not proofs but adequations — in the sense used by THOMAS AQUINAS — of our theories about the behaviour of matter and our observations made on this same matter, and (iii) the metaphysical proofs, in old days called **argumenta,** which are of a quite different nature for they concern (mainly) the soul and the divine, i.e. objects implying an incommensurability which neither logic nor mathematics can overcome, so they necessitate the use of dialectics which, though distinct from mathematics and logic, is a perfectly method of reasoning.

The oldest appearance of something like dialectics is to be found in the Vedas. But from the very beginning, these forerunners of the doctrinies of Hinduism and of its heterodoxy called Buddhism have conceived of the divine not as a Person, but as an indifferentiated principle, Brahman. This is the reason why the case around Hinduism and Buddhism differs radically from the case around Judaism, Christianity and Islam. For, if one conceives of a personal God, it becomes practically impossible to identify religion with philosophy, whereas with the indifferentiated principle, this identification is not only possible but a sort of evidence, though — I must confess — it necessitates for practical purposes the establishment of a complicated mythology based on a secondary polytheism, from which eventually incarnations (called avatars) may be derived.

Western thought has since ARISTOTLE and more explicitly since the spread of Christianity adopted the dichotomy of philosophy versus religion. But PLATO was not so evidently in favour of the dichotomy, influenced as he was perhaps by Pythagoreism. India and Eastern thought in general have not accepted the dichotomy and, apprently to the Westerners, live or think in confusion. This has to do with complementarity : That concept, invented about 1928 by NIELS BOHR and which is not to be found in any dictionary prior to the nineteen thirties, means that two complementary attitudes, even though they apply to the same object, do no admit of the togetherness of application; for instance you can look at an electron from the point of view of a particle or from the point of view of a wave, but not at the same time, or : you can punish a criminal in the name of justice or pardon him in the name of charity, but not at the same time. These are complementary situations. Well, the two facets of the doubleness of Self are the origin of a complementarity like that, for they exhibit two complementary natures : the critical mindedness of the philosopher in Self, and the confidence of the religiously animated Self, -- as if **mind** and **soul** (French **âme,** Latin **anima**) were distinct, though not contradictory, just like I can see, or touch the same object, while these applications of two physical senses yield distinct, though non-contradictory, information about the same object.

The complementarity just disclosed, Professor WAHBA, has a far reaching consequence, namely that there can be no 'philosophy of religion, and no 'religion of philosophy', just as there can be no punishment of love nor love of punishment without an intolerable situation ending in destruction : destruction of religion, or of philosophy. I know that very respectable scholars have engaged themselves in activities like the so-called philosophy of religion, but I disapprove of it, whereas there be nothing to say against philosophy and religion in their complementary relationship. Yet it may happen that one single person engages in only one of the enterprises, (like a physicist who would work on electronics by considering electrons only as waves, or only as particles).

But this is dangerous, for it may end in either making philosophical critique an end in itself or making the religious confidence another end in itself and hence losing the balance : philosophical dogmatism in the form of a critique which finally destroys itself like in radical skepticism — would you agree, Professor VERBEKE? —, or religious dogmatism in the form of fundamentalism which also destroys the very confidence in the divine itself by substituting fanatism for prayer and adoration — would you agree, Mrs. ABOUSENNA ?

However, — to continue addressing myself to Dr. ABOUSENNA, — if a man, eventually a genuis, being disturbed by great incongruities in the circumstances under which he happens to live, thinks that the establishment of a new set, or the re-establishment of an old set, of cultural behaviours will be the remedy, he may very well advocate the establishment he envisages; that is what MARX did, that is what ELIOT also did. Whether they are right is a different matter, but their advocating this or that is permissible and not to be confused with dogmatism. The dogmatism comes in when inspite of a repeated failure in the practical promotion of authentic values by application of the establishment as advocated the advocate refuses to change his mind or to drop the ill-spent confidence.

Or, there may happen something else which may be connected with what Professor HJARPE wanted to explain, namely the turning of either religion into superstition or philosophy into ideology to such a degree that it becomes fanatism, respectively dogmatism. Take the example of the Jews; we cannot deny that they have been persecuted several times; by the way, other groups have been persecuted too, like the Parsis or the gipsies, or the Huguenots ... Cultural and social justice as an object of philosophic reflection can be examined; but when this examination turns into the crooked idea that the very existence of the group — think of the Jews — finds its justification in that they must be persecuted for ever, then it turns into fanatic ideology. Unfortunately, that ideology is very much spread today. Or when democracy is turned into

hypocritical colonialism or into those so-called popular democracies devoid of the true spirit of democracy on ideological grounds ... Would you agree, Professor BERTING ?

My argument about the complementarity of the two natures of Self might suggest that the kind of identification of philosophy with religion as encountered in Indian thought has to be discarded. But this is not so. For the identification made there is not a direct one practised on the two distinct natures, it is — would you agree, Professor ATREYA ? — an integration into the indifferentiatedness of Brahman. The distance between this way to tackle the problem and, say advocating radical fallibilism in a continuation of POPPER's recommendation is so big, that it becomes difficult to see how men can differ so much inspite of the common-ness of their physiological nature — or what do you mean, Professor NAUTA ?

There remains the question of the relationship between freedom — or perhaps rather non-freedom — and dogmatism. Nowhere was freedom talked so much about as in Professor KUÇURADI's strictly philosophical presentation, whereas Father ANAWATI's paper threw within the frame of a very precise formulation borrowed from the huge team work of a whole Concilium both a theological and a philosophical, yet more theological than philosophical light on the problem. I have nothing against putting freedom together with value in an equation, as long as it is done not in the sense of an identification but as is done analogically by posing mathematical equations which always contain at least one unknown in a relationship with known variables, with the object of solving the equation. However here, the very power of mathematics is of little use, because freedom is in any case not a notion of which we have the intuition within the finitude of objects endowed with physical properties, it is a typical metaphysical notion and if we are to conceptualize it, we have to use dialectical means, not just logico-mathematical ones.

This was, by the way, one main reason why, already years ago, I proposed a definition of freedom which clearly requires the use of dialectics to tackle any problem in which freedom is involved, for the definition itself exhibits the connection between freedom and the incommensurability of the metaphysical. This definition runs as follows : Freedom is the knowledge and the acknowledgment, even the acceptance, of the fact that we are not free. Now, if there were nothing beside nothingness but finite beings in their finite number, — be they elephants, electrons, stars, stones ... or even men, — man would simply not be free at all in his relation to otherness; this does not imply that he would be radically determined according to LAPLACE, for in contradiction to LAPLACE, Newtonian Mechanics allows by principle for the possibility for man to choose initial conditions, that is to say to take initiatives. However this itself does not make him **that** free since the consequences of the initiative (of the initial conditions) are themselves determined Whereas if man is facing Being in its oneness and infinity, he has not only the initiative, but he keeps also free towards all that is not bound to the finitude of otherness, especially with respect to the same freedom of the Other.

Now the question of **freedom** was during our debates not only posed in an equation together with value and other concepts, but also put in connection with liberation as an act, e.g. the liberation of women from a non-freedom within a masculine management of society. The proposal made by Professor PAX and accepted by Professor ORANI to seek that liberation not within the idea of sameness of man and woman is a very neat example of how an equation of dialectical form can be posed and hopefully solved. For the dogmatic aspect of non-freedom is — Dear Professor WAHBA — not produced by the Absolute dogmatically attached to the oneness and infinity of a Capital Being, much rather it is precisely due to the absolutization of the finitude of a plurality of beings, i.e. in any case not from a dogma borrowed from pseudo-scientifically grounded ideologies.

Yet if we attribute sense to equations of dialectical character as we

do so to equations of mathematical character, we need to connect with one another more than just two terms; at least a third one is involved (like for instance in NEWTON's postulate according to which **force** produces the **acceleration** of mass). In most contemporary speculations of that kind, the three prime variables involved together are : the concept of right, the concept of freedom, and the concept of human dignity (a little as if, in analogy with NEWTON's postulate, one would claim that human dignity calls for — instead of produces — the right to freedom). But even this is insufficient, for we know from theoretical physics that a fundamental equation like NEWTON's postulate taken alone can only yield abstract theorems (like that of the conservation of energy), but no explicit information about specific cases. We need so-called laws of force to get insight into the specific functioning of nature. In theoretical physics, a postulate is an 'instrument' forged by the human mind to the purpose of inquiring about the particular forms of interactions which seem to prevail in Nature. Thus, we must ask Nature, which laws of force seem to be built in her behaviour. Something like this must be done in metaphysics too, and has to be done with the help of suitable parameters which define a space of reference (like Newtonian space in classical mechanics or Riemanian space in EINSTEIN's gravitodynamics). It seems to me that this is what JOANNA KUÇURADI attempt at doing, so her work looks like good metaphysics.

In the case of the theological approach by Vatican II on the other hand, the problem is of a different altogether. I am not a theologian, but the theology presented there sounds to me to suit very well my religious feelings. ARISTOTLE was not yet able to really distinguish metaphysics from theology, while he had separated pretty well metaphysics from physics proper. THOMAS AQUINAS was the first who demanded the distinction of theology from metaphysics. But there still remained a confusion of morality (or ethics if you please) with religion (or theology if you please), until ROUSSEAU and above all KANT effectuated their separation.

There is something very satisfying in such a process of successive purification of the various spiritual activities of man. It belongs to the formation of a genuine progress, and I believe that Father ANAWATI will agree. But many seem to regret it. E.g. the Protestant tradition still sticks to a purely religious foundation of the moral law, whereas we now know that Vatican II did not stick to it like that. (In that sense, T.S. ELIOT — as exemplified by Mrs. ABOUSENNA — sounds more Protestant than Catholic). Vatican II establishes the link by carefully distinguishing, I believe, within precisely the doubleness of Self of which I talked a moment ago, the two reigns of **God** and of CAESAR.

A further thing in connection with freedom and rights is the question of duties. Professor KUÇURADI made the pint, Father ANAWATI insisted upon the inseparability of the duties from the rights. But freedom itself is neither a right, nor a duty (the confusion with a right is often made). To me, it appears as if the duties were linked to what is involved in the phrase "acknowledgment, even acceptance of non-freedom" in my definition. For, when I have accepted a duty, I am free, which means that I then can count upon rights. (This again is a kind of dialectical equation.) Therefore there are no rights without the duties constituting their counterparts.

Another interesting conception is the evangelical distinction just mentioned between the reign of God and the reign of CAESAR. It is both the understanding, at the metaphysical level, of the specific difference between the Infinite and the finite, and the generic recognition of the doubleness of a philosophical mindedness and a religious animatedness of Self. It relates the duties of man to each separately ('give' to CAESAR what is CAESAR's and to God what is God's), which by happening freely in the sense given to freedom by the above definition, institutes his (man's) rights.

But of course — Professor HJARPE — all these considerations are not devoided of paradoxes; not only the paradox of superimposing on

the mind-and-soul of children an education assumed to make them free, but the fundamental paradox is that the more tolerant you are, the more intolerant you become towards anyone else who is not tolerant. There again, one has to begin tolerant towards oneself, perhaps as an application of the Socratic 'Know thyself'; this is perhaps the first teaching to be inculcated, though it again produces a paradox, since it is taught by others and not just spontaneously experienced by the young Self. Is this what Professor VERBEKE meant when he said that teaching religion (or Professor NAUTA's teaching of non-religion too) has to be a teaching **in**, in order to be a teaching **on**, religion or non-religion ?

All this — Professor ORANI — is in agreement with your wish that an ontological basis be given to all speculation about freedom, but there I should like to approve of Professor KUÇURADI's reply that it is not so much an ontological, much rather it is an ontic basis which is needed when she said that it is the case of her anthropological approach.

Now, if You do not feel inclined — anybody — to accept my definition of freedom as the acknowledgment of non-freedom, I shall reply by invoking the example furnished by Professor SOUEIF of people in concentration camps who survived by — so he said — manipulating themselves, which is a psychological way of expressing the acknowledgment I have in mind. Only thus — Mrs. ABOUSENNA — will women be in a position to liberate themselves, especially by acknowledging the existence of irreducible differences between themselves and men.

Finally — Professor WAHBA — your wishful Weltanschauung appears to me to be a corroboration of the fact of the double nature of Self, and hence in concreto of your Self too : philosophic and religious. But you may have fallen into the dangerous habit of believing that the main task of philosophy is to criticize religion, i.e. to develop a certain type of philosophy of religion, which I condemned. Be assured that I shall never make you drink the hemlock. I love you too much for that. I am ready to hear you or anybody say that I am wrong, in so far as

a good argument is produced. The most direct such argument I can expect would consist in saying that all what I have read so far from twelve pages of my tiny hand-writing is 'philosophy of religion'. My reply would be : no, it is not philosophy of religion, it is philosophy and religion, at least to my mind and to my soul, for there is as much philosophic reason as there is religious inspiration in it.

This Weltanschauung of Professor WAHBA's — Ladies and Gentlemen — sounds to my ears like a piece of secular **mystique** put into words. I said the other day in the discussion that the language of genuine mystique is silence, even though the mystics themselves have written a lot. But their writings are always encounters of the silence of contemplation (of 'being within the temple') with poetry. Some replace the poetry by painting, by music, by dancing or what have you. For us, the encounter with poetry is more important and I suspect that Mrs. ABOU-SENNA will agree. For, poetry is by nature the art of saying the most by means of the least. A poem of one page can stand for a paper of twenty pages. Did you — Ladies and Gentlemen — notice the extraordinary shortness and concentration of all what Professor WAHBA said and included in his last Talk? A cosmic vision : **toute une mystique présenée poétiquement,** but at the same time a mystique despoiled of the due Occupier of the Temple, I mean the divinity, for WAHBA has come by reason to the conclusion that any divinification of the Absolute is at the root of dogmatism. So the temple which shall be his abode is to be identified with the Cosmos. That is pure secular mystique, — as such enchanting I am sure. By the way, it is the same cosmic element as the one advocated by our absent colleague FLORENCE HETZLER. I suspect.

But will Professor WAHBA be able to prevent the God to re-enter the temple ?

To me, the future of man and the future of God are inseparably bound, for God, who as we know (that is the only certitude we have

about Him) remains absconded; but where does He abscond ? Precisely in the future. Therefore if — according to Professor WAHBA's vision — man quits the techno-cave in order to enter the temple and to become the cosmic man of the future, he is bound to encounter — not God in flesh and bones since there is no such God — but the inspiration of God to complete human reason. This was always the fundamental and prime unity which WAHBA wishes to re-establish — yet to re-establish free of dogmatism. The cosmic cave — Professor ORANI — is therefore not in our body, it is that which is limited by our obligation to walk towards the future, you abode of the absconded God, where we shall however never positively see Him as I see my beloved friend WAHBA and You all — Dear Colleagues — seated in this room and doing me the honour to listen to this repainting of Humpty Dumpty anew.

CONFERENCE DIALOGUE

Mona Abousenna

First paper : L. Nauta (Holland)

Daher : I'd like to ask about Popper's point concerning the inability to cope with new information. Does he consider this inability as a necessary condition for dogmatism or a sufficient one too. I think that at best it can be a necessary condition but never a sufficient one. Sometimes it is a sign of ignorance.

Nauta : In fact you are making two remarks, or you are asking two questions : is it right to say that the inability to cope with new information is a necessary condition of dogmatism ? and the other question : how does it relate exactly to Popper's philosophy ? Let me start with the first question: I think you are right, and I think that at this point there is complete agreement between us that to say so about dogmatism is to state a necessary condition only. Now we have to be careful, because I don't want to say that Popper is saying that this inability is also a sufficient condition for dogmatism. What I would like to say is this : because Popper is not inquiring into the material background and circumstances of dogmatism, Fascism or Stalinism, etc..., he is not interested so to say in making these discriminations.

Berting : In your presentation you implied a certain definition of dogmatism, and in this sense it is an ideology as I understand it. But in the process of modernization, looking at the West, there is a lot of dogmatism that is not called, in everyday life and language, dogmatism. For instance, the fact that technological progress is made by people who say that technological progress is necessary. So there is, especially in the West, a group of persons who cling to a kind of technological

or economic determination, and they are defending their position in the name of progress. So, looking at Popper's criteria, we can ask : where are we ? Looking, for instance, at the discussion about the peaceful application of nuclear power. On the one hand, we have the technocrats defending their position in the name of progress vis-à-vis the people who are hesitant to apply it, and those are called dogmatists. An this is a kind of new dogmatism. The second point is about your interpretation of the stiffening actions of the Fascists. This reminds us of the gestures that are used in political life, like the use of the fist is also a type of stiffening. You are using this as an indicator of dogmatism. My question is : how do we interpret this, on a symbolic level, in comparison with other things ?

Nauta : The first point you are raising is indeed very important because you are pointing to phenomena of dogmatism which are not dealt with in my paper at all. I simply used Fascism in my paper as an example and as a phenomenon of dogmatism in the European Western culture. Let it be clear that in this respect, I fully agree with you that there are more phenomena of dogmatism. Now in fact your question is, if we have on the one hand, the technocrats who are saying that we have to build as many nuclear plants as possible because technological progress requires this, and if we have, on the other hand, the Greens of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the technocrats are calling the Greens dogmatic, and the Greens are calling the technocrats dogmatic : Can we do something as philosophers and social scientists ? I have not thought much about it, yet I am inclined to say that also it is possible that Popper himself might take sides with the technocrats. The Greens are taking sides with Popper's principles, so let's leave Popper out of the debate, and let's look at his principles. Then, in analysing the discussions about nuclear energy I think one has to say that the critics of the technocrats' point of view are much more able to take new information into account than the technocrats who are officially supposed to adhere to the scientific method. But this is only a suggestion. The second question about the stiffened actions of the Fascists, I'm now thinking for the

first time about it because you brought the point out ,I am pretty sure that the fist, let's say the revolutionary fist is also pointing to painful experiences in the past, and it has a symbolic meaning in this respect as well. And, if my hypothesis is true, then we could say that the other patterns of behaviour of these fist people are supposed to be much less rigid. Or, to put it in a positive way, as soon as revolutionary groups are expressing rigid patterns of behaviour, a danger of Fascism has come in. Whether they call themselves Fascists or not is not always important.

Orani : One of your major theses is that the heart of dogmatism is individual. If this is correct, I don't think that this is very satisfactory. So, my question is: Is the root of dogmatism individual or cultural ? I should like to add some remarks. Dogmatism exists, and it has a certain raison d'être. At certain levels we need dogmatism. So, the question should be : How far do we need dogmatism, and at what level ? My last remark is : Is it really possible to eliminate thoroughly the roots of dogmatism ?

Nauta : In my opinion, dogmatism is not primarily an individual phenomenon. The reason why I dealt with dogmatism on an individual level is due to the influence of Sartre. In his introduction **à la Critique de la Raison Dialectique** he writes about the progressive / regressive methods in the social sciences, and he says that if we have a phenomenon which in your opinion is primarily social and not individual, your social explanation has to be such that you reach the way that it expresses itself at the individual level. Otherwise, your social explanation, is too general and not specific enough. So the reason for my treatment of dogmatism on an individual level is a methodological and not an ontological one. Concerning the question how much dogmatism do we need, I should like to give a negative reaction : I am not sure we are in need, I should like to give a negative reaction.

Orani : Conservation of human life needs a certain kind of dogma-

tism. On the other hand, I think that there is a general tendency that a good future life should centre around the notion of play, or the playful life, and the essence of play is anti-dogmatism.

Wahba : I will comment first on Orani's comment. Concerning Popper, he says that the dogmatic phase is a necessity, and it precedes the critical phase. What he means by dogmatic phase is a conquest of regularities. If I find out regularities, this means that I fall into dogmatism. Then comes new information, through critical thinking, that could help me to surpass the dogmatic phase into a new dogmatic phase. So, Popper is in fact saying that we cannot get rid of dogmatism, and dogmatism goes with regularities, that goes with the certainty about what is going to happen. And this regularity takes place on the epistemological level only. In this sense, Popper, though there is a certain political implication in his theory, he does not declare it. I think because Popper is against Marxism, and he thinks that Marxism is a kind of dogmatism, so he attempts to make changes within Marxism through this adoption of criticizing dogmatic thinking, but **au fond,** Popper is for dogmatism. My next comment is about the issue of stiffening the body and the problem of fixation. I think that Nauta's interpretation is limited to the psychoanalytic level. You use the term neurotic to refer to dogmatic behaviour, saying that the dogmatic person is confined within traumas of past experiences, but this is not enough to explain dogmatism as a political phenomenon. What happens during any revolution, for instance: people are dogmatic and this is necessary to enable them to revolutionize their society, and without being dogmatic they cannot do that. But, after the revolution, if one has to push revolution forward, one has to de-dogmatize the theory. So, in this way we could have this dialectical relation between dogmatization and de-dogmatization, but because you refuse the dialectical method, perhaps you are falling into a kind of rigidity that goes, perhaps, with Fascism.

Nauta : It is, of course, difficult for me to tell how far I have fallen into Fascism. My first remark is that I do not agree with Popper that

a dogmatic phase, epistemologically, is necessary. Historically Popper is right, but if he is talking historically only, he is not original, because a lot of philosophers, from Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Comte, onwards all have told us that in history you have dogmatic phases and then critical ones. If Popper is not talking historically, he is not right because, stating regularities, for instance, in developing a scientific theory, does not mean that one is not prepared to reject a theory in the light of new evidence. You are in need of something to be rigid, but you are not in need, in order to falsify, to be a dogmatist. So, in my opinion, Popper is not clear enough and he is neglecting the difference between a scientist or a philosopher, in developing a theory, and a dogmatist who is not able to change his fundamental assumptions. About the second point, again I have to disagree with you because, I am not limiting myself to the point of view of psychoanalysis. Of course, psychoanalysis, Freud and his students, have contributed quite a lot to the understanding of dogmatism; but the difference between the psychoanalytic view and my view of Fascism is that I am linking the Fascist rigidity to its social and economic background and Freud is not. So, I'm criticizing certain social and economic theories for not taking into account psychoanalytic points of view, and I am criticizing psychoanalytic points of view as well in not taking into account social and economic aspects.

Abousenna: In your paper you state that one of the reasons for choosing Fascism as an example of dogmatism is that it is closely related to the capitalist mode of production in its imperialist stage. My comment is the following : taking into consideration the recent, widespread phenomenon of religious dogmatism as manifested by religious fundamentalism, together with the rise of a new kind of capitalist, non-productive economy that is based on consumption which has created a new parasitic class that is spreading from America to Europe to the Third World, and which, I think is the logical conclusion of the development of modern capitalism, and putting these facts together, my conclusion would be the following: religious dogmatism is the last phase of capitalism in its imperialist stage. What is your comment on that conclusion ?

Nauta : I cannot answer this question, because in order to be able to do so I should know much more about religious fundamentalism than in fact I do.

Hjarpe : My comment is part of the discussion between Wahba and Nauta. If we look at the scientific work, especially in social sciences, it consists in description of reality depending on different ways and methods of describing reality. Would it be possible to define dogmatism as the confusion between description of reality and reality itself. The work of a social scientist or a politician is to make an analysis of the social or the political reality, and if they have the attitude that their description is the reality we get rigidity which leads to dogmatism. And this rigidity of outlook is of an individual nature. What makes it a political problem is the fact that sometimes individuals or groups tend to make their descriptions the absolute truth of reality to get support from a popular movement. But this is something different, the question why a dogmatic elite gets support, this is a question of how dogmatism functions within a popular movement and not a question of the definition of dogmatism.

Nauta : Your first point is epistemological, and the second one is of a political nature in a broad sense. About the confusion of description of reality with reality itself, it is certainly an aspect of dogmatism, not being able to disentangle the conceptual structure from the world itself. I would say that this is an aspect of dogmatism, but I am not sure if this is the essence of dogmatism, or simply its main feature. Here we come back to the point of how much dogmatism do we need. I think that conceptualization of social life is necessary for social life, and here concepts and reality are very much intertwined. The second point is very interesting because it has to do with the political nature of the phenomenon of the rigidity of dogmatism.

Matar : Dogmatic attitude and Popper's attitude are not presupposing different points of departure. The dogmatists claim to past history and are against change. Popper believes that by the power of reason,

and piecemeal engineering, reparations of problems and change could take place. While dogmatists are too pessimistic, Popper is too optimistic, and, in this sense, they are equal because both are presupposing dogmatic presuppositions. Do you agree with this interpretation ?

Nauta : I cannot agree with you. On a very general level, and on a very far perspective, you are right. Popper is sticking to certain assumptions and dogmatists are sticking to certain assumptions as well. But I would not say that both are in the last resort the same. In my opinion, the defense of reason is the defense of an open mind and an open society. I'm sure there is a lot to say about this, but I'm not able to say that the man who defends the open society is closed in the same way as the people who are defending the closed society. I think there is a distinction between a man who tries to be guided by the light of reason, and a man who is just guided by his own assumptions and who is not able or not willing to get rid of them. We can perhaps point to some aspects of dogmatism in Popper's philosophy, but this doesn't make him equal to dogmatists.

Matar : But Popper, in **The Open Society and its Enemies,** is not planning for any future.

Nauta : This is true, and the reason why he doesn't is that Popper believes that he lives in the best of societies. I think Popper is very much determined by his own Marxist past, especially in his social philosophy. In the twenties, Popper was a Marxist for a few months, but the only Marxism he knows is the Marxism of the Second International, the real dogmatic Marxism, and he does not know anything about all other forms of Marxism, and I don't think he has read Marx himself, very well.

Anawati : I think there is some confusion and the reason is that we have not so far defined dogmatism. If we continue the discussions without defining what we mean by dogmatism, everyone will have his own idea of dogmatism in the pejorative sense as an attitude or a state of

mind which is close to an attitude of fanaticism, which does not accept new ideas or new events. For instance, in your paper you say quite often "in my opinion" which shows that you believe in what you say. And if I say, for example, "you are here" I am not dogmatic. Thus, we have to clarify the dogmatic attitude and then find out the connection between dogma and truth. Concerning change, a dogmatic can accept change. Then it is posible to have a kind of evolution within the dogma. Could you clarify the relation between dogmatism and fanaticism ?

Nauta : If you are saying of a certain person that he is there, then such a statement has nothing to do with dogmatism. Why not ? I'll answer in a Popperian way, and say because the statement is falsifiable. Someone else can say this man who is sitting here claims to be Nauta but he is someone else. So, statements about observational facts have nothing to do with the problem of dogmatism because such statements are falsifiable. I'll continue in the same positivist way and say that the statement 'Nauta is here' is true only if Nauta indeed is here. So if you are asking me about truth, I don't know enough because I'm not a man of religion who knows about higher forms of truth. To say that statements are in accordance with facts has nothing to do with dogmatism because statements can be corrected by the facts and that is all. This is in complete accordance with my definition of dogmatism and Popper's definition because I adhere partly to his definition, and I only think it is incomplete. I think a system of assumptions can be called dogmatist if it cannot be changed in the light of new evidence.

Anawati : You are free to adhere to this definition, but is it accepted by everyone else ? I think you can believe in facts or statements or truth and be ready to change if there is some new evidence, but you don't change in an arbitrary way, you only change if it is necessary.

Nauta : But the point of difference between us is the following in

my opinion : Is it just a matter of belief to put forward that statements are to be corrected in the light of new evidence ? Is such a falsification theory itself sufficiently characterized by saying that it is a matter of belief ? In my opinion, no.

Anawati : Do you believe in evidence or not ? Or do you think that evidence is also a matter of opinion ? And do you think that it is possible to reach some truth ?

Nauta : My answer is different because I will say : being prepared to deal with new evidence is not sufficiently characterized by saying that it is just a form of belief.

Daher : I'd like to make two remarks, one concerning Nauta's reference to Popper's belief in reason, and another concerning the definition of dogmatism. Nauta starts off from the assumption that since Popper believes in the power of reason he cannot be dogmatic in the ordinary sense of the term. But I have to remind everybody that Popper's concept of belief in reason is a mask for something else. After all Popper does not believe in reason per se, but he believes precisely in technological rationality and piecemeal engineering, and that's an ideological concept of reason So it's not a question in believing in reason, but a question of what your concept of reason is. For Popper reason has no normative function, and that's an ideological concept. In fact, if you say to Popper given the choice between revolution and reform, which would you choose, he'd say reform. And that is definitely, dogmatism. The second remark has to do with the definition of dogmatism ; Nauta says every belief evidentially grounded cannot be a dogmatic belief. Yes, but on condition that the man who believes takes it to be grounded on the facts and that he is willing to review the belief in the light of new facts And I might take the proposition that matter expands by heat as an absolutely true belief; after all, there are people who are dogmatic about what we call scientific belief. They are dogmatic in the sense that they are not willing to subject them to review in theory because,

for them, they are not subject to critical examination even in theory. So, it is a question of the attitude of the believer rather than a question of what he believes in. Take, for example, mathematical propositions: they definitely are not subject to review even in theory. If I say: the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, what I'm saying is not subject to review even in theory, but there is nothing dogmatic about it. If I say "this appears red to me", again what I say is not subject to review even in theory. According to my immediate perception I'm not saying "there is a red object", I'm saying that it appears red to me and that's not subject to review even in theory because it cannot be revised by any future facts, and there is nothing dogmatic about what I'm saying. So, it's not really a question of whether it is subject to review or not, it's a question of whether it is the kind of belief that is subject to review but the believer does not take it to be subject of review. The belief must be of the kind that is subject to review, but the believer is of the type who would not be inclined to subject it to review even in theory.

Nauta: About the first remark concerning the belief in reason, I do agree with you because you are calling certain specific aspects of Popper's theory of reason dogmatic. We don't call him dogmatic in general, but in his philosophy the normative aspects of his rationalism are not sufficiently elaborated. I can add that Popper shares with Marxism, which he rejects, the lack of expliciteness of normative problems because the Marxism of the Second International was in the same way non-normative explicitly as Popper is in many instances. About the next point concerning evidence and new facts, I agree that it depends on the attitude of the believer if he is willing to refute, and I agree also that there are a lot of great scientists who are not willing to have some of their fundamental assumptions refuted. But, for instance, if a scientist is not ready to have the hard core of his theory refuted but only parts of it, this is not simply dogmatism in the sense we were talking about. He can give good reasons. And we may call this a kind of methodological dogmatism, and that is different from fanatical dogmatism. About

your example on the difference between the statement "this is red" and "this appears red", I don't agree. In the latter case, it is true, your statement is not refutable, but only in the logical sense, because it is refutable in the sense of argumentation.

Pax: One way of understanding dogmatism is that there are different positions being presented, and, I would suggest, different rigidities to a more or less degree. I think among us there are different meanings of absolute truth, even in a religious sense. So, what I'm beginning to be bothered by is the usefulness of the notion of rigidity here. It seems to me it's not so much a problem of whether or not certain past experiences give rise to rigidity, but which give rise to rigidities rather than others. We need some broader category.

Nauta: Let me clarify what I wanted to do in my paper. I do not claim, in my paper, to be able to give a general theory of rigidity. So, if you say that we need something more to inquire into the different provinces of rigidity then I can fully agree with you. What I wanted to do, in my paper, was to show, with Fascism as an example, that a purely epistemological analysis of dogmatism and rigidity is not sufficient, and that in order to understand the phenomena of rigidity, as we find them for example in Fascism, we have to devise a theory which takes into account the history of the socio-economic practice in which people are involved. This I did not do. So, when you say we need a more differentiated concept of rigidity, I can fully agree. Yes, we need such a concept, and we need to relate it to different socio-economic practices in which people are involved. A point was made about religious fanaticism, as we see it today, I'm pretty sure we cannot understand it if we are not able to relate it to the material circumstances of the people who adhere to it.

Pax: It's not a question of whether we need different theories of rigidity. My question has to do with the relationship of rigidity to the

question of dogmatism, and it's this point that's becoming less than helpful to me.

Nauta: But then, maybe, we should inquire into the differences between the two. Where is dogmatism becoming rigid and where is it flexible ? For instance, we cannot ask where does Fascism become flexible and when does it become rigid. But if we look at the history of the Catholic church, we can make a lot of differentiations. So, in order to analyse dogmatism we should not forget about our analysis of rigidity, and we should not be determined completely by this analysis.

Hjarpe: I would like to take up the question which was posed by Anawati about the relation between dogma and truth. The only way to conceive reality or truth is within the immense complexity of human experience. Both dogma and scholarly methods are ways to structure this immense complexity of human experience. It is a part of description, and description is always used in some way. We can take, for instance a map as a simple way of description, it will always be a kind of map, a political map, or an economic map, or a physical map. If you have a map which is exactly like the truth, for instance, such a map would be useless because it would replace reality. A map is different from reality, and it is a way to structure the experience of reality. A physical map is not more true than a political map, but it may be more useful in some aspects.

Nauta: So the conclusion should be, and I can agree with you, that it is not proper to ask if a map is true. So there are a lot of things where the question of truth is not appropriate. In connection with a map such question is inappropriate because the map is a model, and in a model there is no claim of similarity with the reality. You can ask of certain parts only of the map if they are true, but you cannot ask the same question about the whole map.

Berting: I'm somewhat hesitant about my question because it may

be regarded, in the company of philosophers, as a kind of heresy, and perhaps the reaction would be some type of dogmatism. One of your statements has been that painful experiences of people are at the roots of Fascism, or more generally, at the roots of dogmatism. I think that in your point about painful experiences you make some reduction. They are not really individual experiences, but they refer to experiences which are besides being individual, of a collective nature. They are the experencies of people who feel threatened in their way of living, and who think that they cannot reach a situation in which their life could be meaningful and dignified. Now, my heresy is the following: when we know that painful experiences of a certain part are related to dogmatism, we should know that not all painful experiences lead to certain types of dogmatic thinking. But, and there is my point, in your introduction you said progress will take care of itself. Is it true that we can be so serene, sit back and say we don't need to do anything about it? Can we leave out the praxis? Does the thinking of dogmatism lead to a certain type of action?

Nauta: I agree that these painful experiences are not of an individual nature, and that's the reason why I'm calling for a theory of transformations. Only within the framework of such a theory can they be understood. Only when we understand how the material circumstances are transformed through these experiences into political events, we can really solve this problem. Now, the most important point which you call heresy, is of course, why do certain painful experiences lead to Fascism, or any other kind of rigidity, while other painful experiences do not? In my opinion, it has to do with the way a society enables its members to interpret such experiences. And I don't think it is right to talk about heresy because here, as philosophers, we are very much in need, not only of historians of religion but also of social scientists.

Mercier: It is very frequent in Europe that the students paint graffitees on the walls of the universities, and last year we found the following sentence written in German, but I will translate it into English: "Truth

is not taught, it is experienced." A colleague of mine asked me what I thought about that sentence, and I said : this is a teaching ; that is the truth he teaches.

Second paper : Hjarpe (Sweden)

Abousenna : I have two questions : the first one is : how far is your presentation of Jerusalem as a religious state compatible with the Palestinian idea of a secular state ? How far is the present situation in the Middle East, especially after the establishment of the first Islamic state in Iran, detrimental to the call for the establishment of a Palestinian secular state ? The second question is : how far are the changes taking place at present in the Arab world related to world imperialism as represented by the capitalist economic and political system, especially in the United States of America, together with world Zionism ?

Hjarpe : About the interpretative patterns in the Israeli state, I have devised for this a method, among my students. I used to show them two pictures of Jerusalem, the first one a devotional picture which I bought in Madras in South India from a Muslim painter, which is a conventional Muslim picture of Jerusalem with the Aqsa Mosque. In Sweden nobody recognized what is in the picture. They guessed that it is perhaps Teheran or Mecca, but they could not see that it is Jerusalem. And then I showed them a picture of the Second Temple of Jerusalem which I have taken from a Jewish book of Jewish liturgy, and some people could see that it is Jerusalem. I showed this picture to a Jewish congregation and he immediately recognized it. What does this mean ? If we take Jerusalem, its denotation is a place of a certain longitude and altitude, but the reaction to the word Jerusalem depends on our associations from history. We regard it as legitimate only if it fits into what is part of our own historiography. When I showed this picture of "al-bait al-moqadass" (the holy house) to my Muslim friends they immediately recognized it. This means that the word itself conveys different meanings. And this is exactly what happened with the Israeli state. It

depends on a historiography, a living history, living by repetition in rituals, which makes the world and the concept of Jerusalem something legitimate, for one's own concept of world view. Then we have to consider a Palestinian concept of Jerusalem, which is often secular, because it is part of their own history, Palestinian history, the city of their fathers and forefathers. And then go to Madras in South India, in a Muslim environment there, and it is not the Arab Jerusalem, it is not the Palestinian Jerusalem, but it is the Jerusalem as part of "dar el-Islam", or a Muslim Jerusalem. It was very interesting to read the telegram sent by Yassir Arafat to Ayatolla Khomeini thanking him for Iran's support at the Non-Aligned States conference, where he, in a very shrewd way, points at the difference in interpretation, the difference between a Palestinian Arab and Muslim city of Jerusalem. He only mentioned the Palestinian interpretation and did not go into the interpretation given by the Teheran regime that Jerusalem is a Muslim city. There will certainly be tensions between the concept of "dar el-Islam" and a Palestinian nationalist state in the futue. I'm sure of that. What I tried to do in my paper was to describe in what way these concepts can function in mass movements. It has nothing to do with the ideology or the thinking of the elite or the leaders, but in what way concepts from an ideology or a histriography provided by an ideological elite can function in a mass movement. And I think we must distinguish between the two.

Wahba: I think the defect in your analysis is due to a kind of phenomenological analysis. You get the cartoons, isolated from the economic and social factors, and you conclude by looking at the cartoons that they represent the secular versus the religious, the Western culture as secular and the Arab culture as religious. Although you say that you don't neglect the economic and social factors, you do not specify the nature of these factors. If you can get out of this limited approach to the analysis of the cartoons, you will find out that Reagan's system is backed by the Christian fundamentalists. In his recent book **The Winding Passage**, Daniel Bell says that in USA, in recent years, the

largest-growing voluntary associations have been the fundamentalist churches. How could you justify this within your analysis of the cartoons? Perhaps the Iranian regime is backed by USA with the help of fundamentalists in America, and in this way we can no longer regard the struggle as one between two different cultures, but we should see it as a struggle of economic and political regimes, the capitalist versus the socialist.

Hjarpe: I did not stress the difference between secular and religious because I think this is a false differentiation. I only consider secular and religious as alternative historiographies, or ways of interpreting history. In this way there will be no difference in function if an interpretation taken from particular histriography comes from a religious tradition or from a secular one, we can see that the effect will be the same. You take, for instance, Poland, and the developments there. How come that the Polish workers use Catholic theology and the Catholic church and clergy as a means for social protest? It is quite evident that a driving force is behind the mass movement in Poland which is of an economic and social nature, and that is the lack of bread and the lack of political influence. Then we will have to analyse why are the workers using the Catholic church and its hierarchy as a means of communication with the Party? This does not mean, as I think, that the Catholic church is the natural partner of a social movement of workers, but it can function as one.

Nauta: You say that the relation between the symbolic universe and objective, socio-economic reality, is a dialectical one, and that in this respect you are following Berger and Luckmann who talk about this relation also in a dialectical way. I think this is a perfect illustration of my thesis that I presented in the morning. When you say that a symbolic universe and socio-economic reality are related in a dialectical way, you are in fact not saying anything at all because you do not specify how they are related and how this relation can be empirically tested. Although you say that you want to take into account socio-

economic reality, methodologically you are not able to take into account socio-economic reality, notwithstanding your good intentions.

Soueif : I should like to raise two questions : the first, you talked about the liminal stage in the history of a certain people. How does it come about ? Is it by a spontaneous process of decay and breakdown, or by deliberate preplanning of a certain group or political party ? My second question is : what are the necessary and sufficient conditions that would pave the way for interpretation and legitimization ? I can imagine that you can choose hundreds of symbols from tradition and juxtapose this to that, but one or two of these patterns of juxtaposition would work and the others would not. What would make it work ?

Orani : When, you Western scholars deal with Europe you are doing sociology or history, and when you deal with our countries you are doing ethnography or anthropology. But I think it is not you who should be blamed as much as we. We have to deal with Europe in the same way, that is, to study Europe as ethnology and anthropology.

Hjarpe : Concerning Nauta's question about what I mean by dialectical and in what way the socio-economic factors are related I think that the link between them is psychology. In what way do the individuals, or groups of individuals, interpret the social and economic facts of everyday life ? In what way do they cope with it ? This is a psychological process. About Soueif's point concerning the liminal stage, it is something which comes by itself by a process of decay. That depends on what you mean by decay. Decay happens when the social and economic changes which established the old institutions are no more applicable, or are difficult to apply. Then it is possible to speak about decay of interpretative patterns, but this, in its turn, can be used by groups or by individual leaders and. I think Hitler's **Mein Kamph** gives a very good example. The decay of the old values and interpretative patterns in Nazi Germany caused a crisis in economy and this was exploited by a leader. As for Orani's point on Ethnology and Anthropology, I agree with you.

But there is nothing wrong with Anthropology or Ethnology, which we also apply on European groups, and there is a difference to study one's own private universe and that of others. But it has to be done.

3rd paper: Clyde Pax (USA)

Berting: The process of objectification, as you described it, is a long process especially in Western countries, as in the modernization process which started a long time ago. Commenting on this process, you said that we relied too much on it. This implies that you can influence it or that you could have influenced it. This means that the objectification process is the result of forces outside our control, if starts we cannot control it any longer, like the forces of the market. It is true that once, historically, there could have been possibilities to make a choice, but once you do so there are not much possibilities to escape. There is also in objectification a development of value patterns and the more we define our Western values the more we have the possibility to organize our own life according to our own values as they are the interpretations within the whole abstract universe. So, objectification is accompanied by a process of a development of abstract value system.

Pax: Concerning your point about the inability to escape from objectification, I'm suggesting that the dichotomy between theory and practice arises when I look at something without affecting it, and that dichotomy is within the objectification of objective reality. I think that any intellectual interpretation also has its effect on the others. There are various orders of understanding and various orders of praxis, and interpretation is always praxis and is always understanding, and dogmatism is the effort we make to run away from that problem into one or another of the safe places.

Wahba: Don't you think that a certain interpretation of social reality could prevent praxis towards a new phase, for instance we could have a certain kind of interpretation that preserves the status quo ? Would

you agree to differentiate between two kinds of interpretation, one that is for the status quo and another for a pro quo ?

Pax : I don't think that this differentiation is necessary. Yet, I would like to go with an interpretation that does not hang on to the status quo. But you cannot do that easily.

Mercier : There was a French peasant who once asked me questions about religion and about Jesus-Christ, and he was very astonished to learn that Jesus has never spoken Latin because in his church before Vatican II the priest talked in Latin. So for him it was a discovery to know that Jesus never spoke a word of Latin. I should also like to comment on subject number 2 in your paper about philosophy and the masses. I walked once in Montreal besides the university and two boys came up to me and asked me about the time, and then asked if I was a professor, and when I told them to guess what I taught they could not do so and when I told them I was professor of philosophy, they said there was no such thing. Two days later I was in New York and paid a visit to U-thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations at the time; I told him the story, and he said you must do something for the state of philosophy, and he meant the masses.

Wahba : At the first Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference which I organized in Cairo in 1978 under the title "Philosophy and Civilization", I invited Professor Alfred Ayer. On the first day two papers were delivered, one by a Pakistani and the other one by a Japanese. Afterwards, Ayer commented furiously saying that he was wrongly invited, for he was invited to a philosophy conference, whereas it turned out to be a conference of theology, and philosophy is not concerned with religious issues. In the same year at the World Congress of Philosophy in Dusseldorf, the issue of the Afro-Asian conference was discussed with Prof. Quine, and to my astonishment, he said that the topic "Philosophy and Civilization" has nothing to do with philosophy. So, I began to think to what extent could philosophy be isolated from the vital issues that con-

front people ? My own opinion is that politics is prevailing whether in science or in philosophy. In Düsseldorf there was a debate about the future of philosophy, whether is will die out or face the challenge against science. And now we bring in the point about philosophy and its relation to the masses. Concerning the Afro-Asian countries, philosophers should play a role: but, due to the complicated technicalities, philosophers are isolated from the masses. So, I think it's high time to discuss this issue of the relation between philosophy and the masses.

Fourth paper : A. Daher (Jordan)

Anawati : I don't share your view because I think we have great philosophers like Thomas Aquinas, who was also a great theologian, and Jacques Maritain. Both are true philosophers who have tried to define the levels of knowledge. And I don't think that you can prove that philosophy must eventually discard dogmas.

Daher : Philosophy cannot prove or disprove anything, but it has proved one thing, namely, that it cannot prove or disprove anything. If you take the history of philosophy you will find that neither one single thesis of the philosophical theses that emerged in the long historical process has been demolished completely, nor supported in a sufficient way. So, it's not a question of proving or disproving in a mathematical sense. Philosophy can no more disprove or demolish dogmas, or some of the logical theses held by Plato or held by Empiricists. And the problems remain with us simply because philosophy does not have the power to prove or disprove in the sense you intend. However, I do agree that philosophy has the tools to make a certain position appear more reasonable than another.

Anawati : This is a very negative conception of philosophy. Is not philosophy a kind of search for some truth ? What is the philosophy of being ? You have a tradition in philosophy from Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas...

Daher : But what are the philosophical results we have agreed upon? In philosophy we still have philosophical truth only in the heart of the philosopher, for instance Russell's philosophical truth is not Plato's.

Anawati : You put one philosopher's truth against another. But, what does that mean ?

Daher : You are now acting like the fundamentalists who believe only in one truth, and the only true philosophy for you is Thomism.

Anawati : I'm not fundamentalist, I believe in truth, rational truth and religious truth. I don't accept all the philosophers because some of them were teachers of philosophy who wrote some books on linguistic philosophy and said this is the philosophy. This is the corruption of mind, and of man, and I'm not speaking now of religion. I am depending on the power of mind to find some agreement among philosophers.

Daher : They have been trying to do that for centuries.

Anawati : You cannot only say Russell is against Plato, you have to criticize this kind of philosophy also. But to say that you cannot arrive at truth is very negative.

Wahba : Two points could be discussed through Daher's mind, and not through his paper : first, I think that the outcome of your paper is that religion is not a dogma, and that so far as the so-called dogma could be criticized, it is a contradiction in terms. So, the conclusion is that religion is not a dogma. The second point, what helps you reach this conclusion is that you want to say that there is no truth, so far as the dogma expresses truth and dogma could be criticized, then it's not a dogma. So, the second conclusion is that you isolate philosophy from reality in all its forms, and you put all the philosophers on the shelf, or you put them between brackets as if it's a kind of suspense, and then it would be better for us to go through life without philosophy. Would

you accept these conclusions? If you don't, then you have to change your premises.

Daher: The first point has to do with the way you use the concept of dogma ; even if you use it in the sense of established belief the question remains : is it established in the same way mathematical belief is established? If so then it is not open to criticism, and Anslem is right because mathematical belief is logically necessary and is not open to criticism. So, the fact that I argue for the conclusion that religious dogma is open to criticism doesn't mean that I argue for the conclusion that religious dogma is not dogma. That would be the case if it can be shown that Anslem was right. Concerning the second point, I'm not bracketing philosophy at all, I was just answering Father Anawati when he asked whether philosophy can disprove religion. Philosophy has proved one thing, and that is that it cannot prove or disprove in the mathematical sense. So, I'm not bracketing philosophy, I'm simply bracketing a certain way of philosophizing, the rationalistic way.

The philosophers who adopt the rationalistic attitude, or the attitude that can prove or disprove in a mathematical sense, believe that the world exists in the way a mathematician would prove the sum of the angles of a triangle equals two right angles. They use postulates, certain theories. I'm saying that philosophy has proved in its long history that you cannot do that. If philosophy can do that, why didn't it succeed like mathematics did ? But this is not to bracket philosophy, but it is simply to say that our aims should be more modest than we claim.

Wahba : To what extent modesty could go ?

Daher: To the extent of saying that at best we can use our analytical truth to know that a position is more reasonable than another.

Wahba : On what criteria ?

Daher : That's a very difficult question. I could never, in my life, be able to give an answer to what philosophical criteria are.

Nauta : I have one short question concerning technicalities ; why do you call a proposition like "a widow is a female" hypothetical, and why don't you call it analytical or tautological ? It may be a bit confusing because we call empirical propositions hypothetical as well, and the proposition "a widow is a female" is not an empirical proposition.

Daher : It is true that we call general propositions in science hypothetical, but that's something they also share with logically necessary propositions. I'm not saying that logically necessary propositions are merely hypothetical, but my point is that there is something about them that makes them lack existential import, that they they do not assert existence.

Soueif : I would say that psychology and religion are two contradictory disciplines in the same way psychology is different from sculpture.

Daher : I'm not saying that psychology contradicts religion, but I'm trying to imagine a situation where there would be a conflict between the two. For instance, the belief that God gave man a free will, I can imagine a situation where a conflict can be envisaged between religion and psychology, and I'm constructing that in my mind. Imagine that being the case : an extreme form of Freudianism whereby all my actions are controlled by unconscious, irrational desires and there is no freedom at all. Are we justified then in believing that God gave man a free will ? Of course not, unless you interpret the belief that God gave man a free will in such a fashion that makes it compatible with this fact. That's really my point.

Fifth paper : Verbeke (Belgium).

Mercier : I have a number of comments : I want to suggest that there is a more authentic belief in tolerance taken from the old city of Benares where more than five thousand creeds co-exist in complete tolerance. My next comment is about the sceptics. You suggested that scepticism is typical of antiquity. However, I don't think that scepticism

is out of the world today; we have, for instance Teilhard de Chardin who is typical a sceptic of today. Concerning what you said about the tolerance, and you mentioned Spinoza; I think that the first philosopher introduced the concept of tolerance was the Indian Emperor Ashuka in the 3rd century B.C.

Verbeke: With regard to scepticism, I agree that there are at the present time, and particularly in British philosophy, Neo-Positivism and Linguistic Analysis, a lot of representatives of scepticism. Concerning your point about tolerance, I'm quite sure that tolerance dates back to antiquity, but I don't know the example you mentioned from the 3rd century B.C.

Matar: I should like to remark on how human civilization was built. I think this was a controversial argument between Plato and the Sophists who believed in the human power to build civilization with mental and rational power of man. While according to Plato without the sense of justice and respect for other human beings, human civilization could not have been acquired. I would like to know your opinion about this controversy between Plato and his contemporaries the Sophists.

Verbeke: I quite agree with you. According to Plato, philsophers represent a very small number in society because if we look at the different classes in Plato's **Republic,** I would say that the third class represents the army and the administration, but the leading class represents wisdom, which is not only an intellectual power but is also a moral one.

Daher: I would like to add a sixth possibility to the ones you mentioned, namely, conceptual relativism which is attributed to Wittgenstein. It's the theory that criteria vary from one form of life to another, criteria of rationality, criteria of meaning, criteria of truth. Next, I would like to raise two points: the first one is about theories like relativism, universal scepticism, I would like you to comment on the critique that is usually addressed to these theories, namely that they are self-refuting.

My second point has to do with the remark about man's incapacity to know about or to fully rationalize the concept of mathematical infinity. If man is capable of mathematical infinity why is he not capable of rationalizing the problem of ontological infinity ?

Verbeke : With respect to the first part of your questions, I agree. I know to some extent those contemporary theories, and I find them largely corresponding to what I wanted to develop with respect to the sources of this problem. The Greek Sophists and relativists in general, and to some extent Neo-Positivists, have one thing in common, namely relativity of truth with respect to the thinking subject. So, I agree with you that everything is in constant development and that it is only a matter of time. With respect to scepticism, I also agree with you that universal scepticism is not self-refuting and some contemporary studies have been made by British philosophers dealing with that specific aspect namely, whether scepticism is self-refuting, and they have also come to the conclusion that it is not necessary self-refuting, because the sceptical philosopher relies on the fact that man has to live in a period of uncertainty, that he has to be satisfied with probabilities. Also sceptic philosophers will not say that it is impossible to reach truth, but they will say that we only have probable arguments for the truth. And that is not self-refuting. Finally, with respect to the finitude of the human mind, I think that we agree that our mind is finite, there is no doubt about that. You say man is able to grasp mathematical infinity. But there is a kind of infinity which the human mind may grasp to some extent. I have been busy studying the different concepts of infinity in the course of history. I discovered that there are many different concepts of infinity. What I believe is that a total rationalization of the content of religious belief in general is the goal of human beings, but it is something which will never be reached. And the reason is that the divine revelation which is the object of religious belief, according to the believer's thoughts, is not the result of human research. For him the source is something different.

Wahba : I should like to pick up three concepts out of your paper :

tolerance, dogmatism, and ambiguity of human existence. You assume that the basis of tolerance is the ambiguity of human existence, and according to this basis you are against dogmatism. Let me put these three concepts within a fourth one, that is, revolution or evolution. It is a fact that in human history sometimes we have evolution and at other times revolution. That means that there is this phenomenon of selection of certain ideas in order to promote either evolution or revolution. There should be a criterion for this selection. The criterion is the changing of reality. In order to change reality, one has to adopt and to be sure that a certain idea could be the cause of either evolution or revolution. This certainty is a kind of dogmatism. Could we say that tolerance, so far as it is neutral towards different ideas, could be advocated for the status quo and not for the pro quo ? For in order to have a pro quo you have to adopt a dogma. Then, when you are faced with new facts and new evidence, you have to change this dogma. Between the two dogmas, the previous one and the next one, you have this period of tolerance which is the transition from a past reality to a new reality. So tolerance does not help us in changing reality and that is the paradox.

Verbeke : I will attempt to translate your question, not in a different language, but by expressing it in a different way. According to you there are periods of tolerance, and those periods are characteristic of conservatism because there is no change, and there will be no evolution, and certainly no creative evolution. And then, suddenly, there are new ideas or a new dogma as you call it, and we get, not evolution, but revolution. So, if I translate, you say: thanks to the use of violence it will be possible for mankind to make progress. I use the term violence because in contemporary philosophy it is a very important one, and I'm specifically thinking of the works of Merleau Ponty in France, in which he discusses whether the use of violence in human society can be justified. That's a very important question also with respect to Marxism. So, is it a progress in the evolution of mankind depending on the enforcement of a particular dogma by violence ? My answer is no. Of course, in the past there have been revolutions which have introduced some progress. But, was

that the best way to realize that progress? I would say, first of all, tolerance is not neutral, but that doesn't mean that your brain is completely empty. You may have very firm convictions and be tolerant to the opinions of other people. I suppose that the people who have the most convictions are the most tolerant to other people. The only question is: what is the best way to obtain and realize that progress according to the changing world in which we live? I would say by mutual agreement and discussion, dialogue and human conversation. You could answer by saying that this is ideal and impossible. But I don't think it's impossible because all human beings are in search of truth. In Plato's dialogue, **Pheadrus,** which is a kind of pilgrimage, all the human beings and also the gods participate. The end of that journey, according to Plato, is the plane of truth, which means that everybody wants to get truth. But during the journey there are a lot of souls who lose their wings and fall on the earth and can not participate any more in that journey. And that's true, there are many human beings who have many difficulties, and there are many obstacles in that journey to truth. But I believe that without violence mankind could reach a kind of progress because everybody is in search of exactly the same truth and some human beings use their wings.

Hjarpe: I have two points: the first one is a summing up of this last discussion in the following way : the thesis that the truth is one creates a problem as to the principle of tolerance, as tolerance must include the human right to be wrong, and the main reason to stress tolerance as a necessity is a practical one, or a psychological one, because forced compliance leads to bad ethics, not to the incorporation in the individual personality but to the opposite and thus hinders the truth to penetrate and to be integrated in the individual. Do you accept the conclusion that tolerance is a means not a goal in itself? The second point has to do with the hegemonistic tendency in Western philosophy. We must create a sort of active cultural pluralism. Therefore, the West has a duty to study other cultural traditions. Concerning the discussion on truth and tolerance, for instance, it would have been interesting to mention some examples from Buddhist thought.

Verbeke: Your first point is a difficult one. Let me put it in this way: you say truth is one and if some people don't have that truth then they are wrong, and that means that other people develop a kind of compliance to wrong ideas. I would say truth is one, but truth is multiple at the same time, and that was the main thesis I wanted to develop. Why is truth one and multiple? This is because truth is so closely related to knowledge, and knowledge is closely related to human subjects, and that ambiguity — temporal, spatial, supra-temporal ambiguity — characterizes human individual. So, I would say truth is not simply one, it is one and multiple. It is temporal and supra-temporal, it is spatial and supra-spatial, it is linked to one civilization but at the same time it transcends the civilization. So, if you say is tolerance simply a means or is it an end? I would say it is certainly a means for a pluralistic society because it makes life and collaboration possible in a pluralistic society. But it is not merely a pragmatic means. The basis of tolerance, in my opinion, is the ambiguity of truth. You may not agree with me, but certainly, in my opinion there is a philosophical basis of tolerance. Your second question about the hegemonistic tendency in Western philosophy, and your suggestion that we should study various civilizations and cultures, there I totally agree with you. It may be Buddhism or Indian or Japanese philosophy, Eastern philosophy in general. The question I often studied was whether there has been some influence of Eastern philosophies on Greek philosophy, on Western truth. If you agree that whatever the cradle of Western thought might be, it is certainly Greek philosophy, and in this respect I never discovered full evidence that Greek philosophy has been influenced by Chinese, Indian, Persian or Japanese philosophy. What I discovered was that Greek philosophers liked to come to Egypt, but not to learn philosophy, but to learn some science, mathematics and geometry.

Abousenna: I think I will say something different from what has been said so far. I should like to bring the discussion down to earth and to try to link what was said to reality because, in the last analysis, what we think about and what we do is done within a certain society

and for a certain society. I think that there is a very serious point that has not been mentioned yet, namely the elimination of concrete reality when we talk about unity of truth. I think that since the present world is highly divided and this division is first and foremost characterized by class division, and the example you gave from Plato is a proof of that division because even Plato's Republic is class divided and oppressive, particularly in the attitude towards women. So, it's a reality which we can never evade, whether on a metaphysical level or an ontological or sociological level.. And the danger that lies behind overlooking this reality is that when we talk about tolerance or advocate it, we unknowingly head towards intolerance. This happens when we eliminate the concrete factors, political, social, economic, unwittingly we rush towards intolerance. And this is the paradox of tolerance. I will give an example from concrete reality because, I think, it's always reality that puts an end or solves all metaphysical arguments and speculations. The example is the peace initiative in the Middle East which was signed by three leaders who represented three different religious dogmas, or three different truths, Carter for Christianity, Begin for Judaism, and Sadat for Islam. And the one truth which they wanted to assert was peace, and as an attempt to immortalize that event Sadat wanted to establish a temple of religions representing the three creeds as an objectification of peace. But what was the concrete result ? More divisions, assassinations and ultimately civil war in Lebanon. How can this be surpassed in your opinion ? My next question is : how can we surpass, as you have advocated, a reality that has been evolving throughout the history of human civilization through self-respect and respect for the others ? Do you have in mind a new process of evolution, or mutation ? And how can this practically achieved ?

Verbeke : I also want to come back to reality, and in my opinion philosophy is not far from reality because it is not a very abstract but it deals with reality. But, of course, it deals with reality in its own way. But I believe that a lot of progress has been realized thanks to philosophy. You mentioned the case of the situation of women. Let me come

back to that particular aspect and go back to antiquity again. The first evaluation of women status was, as far as I know, at the beginning of the third century, at least theoretical philosophy, when the Stoics empasized the equality of all human beings, women and men, slaves and free citizens, or what I call Barbarians and Greeks. That changed immediately the whole situation of society.

What I noticed is that already in the Hellenistic period the situation within Greek society has developed, slowly I agree, but it has developed. We find already at that time woderful pictures of particular women and their role in society. So a new evaluation of human dignity and also with respect to the dignity of women is something new, and the evolution of society depends upon those ideas. But, of course, it doesn't change immediately the whole situation, but it changes them gradually. Now, you are disappointed by human efforts to change reality in a peaceful way, the situation of the world. I'm very much disappointed too. There are still clashes, wars. Does that justify us to abandon the efforts made for peaceful coexistence of human beings? I would say no. We have to continue because the aim that is pursued is justified. It is like individual human existence: is everyone and everything one does perfect? Is everything that happens in our societies perfect ? No. But that's not a reason to be discouraged. I think we have to continue to strive towards a peaceful coexistence of human beings in the same society and in the world society.

Seventh paper : Soueif **(Egypt)**

Nauta : I would like to ask two questions : the first one is : if there is a tendency towards an extremeness of response, could you please elaborate a little bit the question: response to what ? Could you specify the kind of situations which can be expected to have such reaction as their consequence ? The second question is : is there, in the empirical material, some indication about the role of what I would like to call educational capital in connection with the extremeness of response ? Is

it reasonable to exepct that the more education a person gets the better he will be able to tolerate, as you say, the ambiguity of situations, may be we could say also the better he will be able to tolerate the complexity of situations.

Berting : My question has to do with your definition of dogmatism, particularly when you say that dogmatism is related to openness or closeness of the mind. As I understand it, the dogmatic personality does not only divide the world into black and white, but he always has the need to impose his ideas on others. My question is; why is a dogmatic inclined to do so ? We also have the example of a group of people who collectively try to impose their will and ideas on others. If dogmatism, as interpreted in your paper, is a sort of weakness, or a problem in dealing with the outside world, why does this lead to something which they have to struggle for in the outside world, because it would be more convenient to live in a closed world and not bother about the outside world.

Wahba : I would like to pick up three concepts out of your paper : marginality, abnormality, and extreme responses. What is your opinion about social revolutions that are adopted by small groups of people, which could be called marginal groups, and it happens that they can change the structure of the society. But according to these three concepts, this means that those who advocate revolutions, or, according to you, extremeness of response, are abnormal, or neurotic. Could I say that one of your conclusions should be that human civilization develops and changes through neurotic people, and in this case the neurotics are normal, and those who are not neurotics are abnormal ?

Soueif : To Nauta : I will give you a very brief idea about how we came to know the difference between certain category of objects and subjects which enhances the tendency to extremeness. We made use of a very simple tool, namely trying to get the reactions of respondents to different words naming different subjects, and to get their reaction in

terms of like and dislike, or something like : could you live and could you live without ? And the subjects were instructed to give their responses in terms of a five point scale. Now we have thousands of answers, and in the machinery of statistical analysis we found that the answers were clustered into two groups related to two groups of words. Those words which triggered something like the moral sense in the subject, something like an emotionally charged subject. In this case, this word tends, in all probability, to trigger an extreme response, whereas if you ask the question : would you prefer a friend with a brown tie or a red tie, sometimes you can get some response, but it does not matter much. This is one kind of material which brought us to this kind of differentiation. Other colleagues in USA who used other tests for this tendency used different drawings. It was hypothesized that the very distorted drawing which does not respect the rule of similarity would be taken as ambiguous, and if extremeness is a measurement of intolerance of ambiguity, then in this case, an extreme reponse or an attitude towards more extremeness in response will be triggered. From these small models made to suit a laboratory atmosphere, one can extrapolate to daily life situations, and in fact, one can find a good deal of clinical observations to support this sort of argument. About your second question : whether education would prepare the person to be more tolerant. To my mind, it seems that the crucial question here is the kind of education for what. Let me put it a little bit crudely first and then elaborate later : if you educate for creative thinking, in solving problems, and imprint in the younger generation a sort of revulsion for conforming to certain solutions preferring creative terms of mind rather than compliance with the already known answer. This type of education would be very helpful for beating the intolerance to ambiguity tendency. So, the problem here is the style of education and not education as such.

To Wahba : the relationship between extremeness at the individual level and extremeness at the social level. First, I would be speculating giving my answer now, which is not based on empirical data. First, I would like to differentiate between revolutionaries and another type of

people who might lead some social movements. So, extremeness to my mind is not equated with being revolutionary. To extrapolate straight away from extremeness at the individual level, to extremeness in social movements, I don't think this would be wise nor permissible. A good deal of work has to be done here and the responsibility lies on sociologists and social psychologists who could bridge the gap between the two disciplines to illuminate us on this point.

To Berting : about the definition of dogmatism, I think that dogmatism can't be just a cognitive fact, it's more than that because the dogmatic usually defends with emotionality. The research on intolerance of ambiguity and on extremeness as a measure of intolerance of ambiguity sheds some light on this point. In the empirical literature there is a significant correlation between being dogmatic, and being intolerant to ambiguity. I would say, those people with a dogmatic tendency usually are threatened and, thereby, instigated to react violently, which in these experiments is translated into extreme responses. They react so when the situation is unstructured. At least we have in the laboratory a miniature model, and from it we can extrapolate more complex life situations.

Daher : I would like to raise a methodological or philosophical, ontological point : concerning your working definition of dogmatism. It seems to me that a definition can have undesirable consequences in a sense that if you take it seriously it would make philosophers like Spinoza, Russell, Descartes dogmatists concerning closed systems. You said that closed systems are like mathematical systems, that a closed system is one whose model is mathematical system, that closed system is in which the assumptions are complete. When we think about closed system in mathematics, we talk about systems whose axioms are complete ; to say that the axioms in a mathematical system are complete is to say that on the basis of these axioms every proof within that system can be established. That means that the axioms are complete in the sense that there is nothing beyond them. Descartes' and Russell's favouritism to closed system must be understood in this sense.

Pax : I would like simply to put the problem into broader perspective. I would like to ask whether your analysis isn't a purely formal analysis and somehow stays away from content ? This may be entirely legitimate, but it's a little bit disturbing in terms of empirical psychology.

Orani : What is the function of 'intolerance of ambiguity', what is the function of ambiguity ? Couldn't we study just intolerance ? Are there otther forms of intolerance than intolerance of ambiguity ?

Verbeke : I have a question exactly related to the formal one : I'm very grateful for Soueif's empirical approach to the question of dogmatism. But, in my opinion, he has to face a very difficult notion. Not so much intolerance but ambiguity, or the intolerance of ambiguity. Spontaneously, I suppose the definition of ambiguity is not to easy. You opposed it to black and white, that's understantable. In your definition, you also mentioned that ambiguity means that a situation is unstructured. But even that is not very clear in my mind. But, on the other hand, if you make an approach in an empirical way, I appreciate that very much, but then you have to know exactly what ambiguity means in a particular case. Let me give you a spontaneous reaction : I suppose a lot of people are intolerant, let's say towards political ambiguity. But the same people are not intolerant of other kinds of ambiguity. So, let me say, ambiguity seems to me, in this context, rather vague notion. I wonder, and that's my question : whether it is possible, in this vague context, to elaborate experiments that can result into precise conclusion?

Soueif : To Daher : I wouldn't call the philosophers you mentioned, Spinoza, Descartes, Russell as dogmatic. I would simply say that the philosopher's teachings are injected with possibilities of preaching for dogmatism. Apart from this very general statement, we come to the definite question about closed systems in mathematics. Your argument, I think, may be valid regarding arithmetic but not mathematics. For instance, what happened during the thirties of this century when new mathematicians went back to look into their axioms, something grew out of this

activity. I'm quite convinced that we cannot talk about mathematical systems as closed systems. Something new is elaborated always within each one of these systems.

To Pax's question : is my analysis purely formal ? Yes it is. I chose a formal dimension of dogmatism in the title of my presentation itself. Is it sufficient to clarify human response formally speaking ? Certainly not, because empirical psychology is a very minute part of research in this area. I should be very glad to read anything about the content aspect of the problem. But, on the other hand, we have to differentiate between two kinds of stimuli that are emotionally charged because of their past history for this particular individual, and stimuli which are not, and that those emotionally charged would enhance more extremeness of response. This brought us one step nearer to content.

To Orani : the function of the concept of ambiguity within the expression 'intolerance of amibiguity', as related to your more general question about different kinds of intolerance, I think it depends upon how one looks at these other subjects which might instigate an intolerant response. Suppose, for instance, I adhere to a certain dogma, socio-politically speaking, and it is very well structured, and I feel at ease with it; and I am confronted with another person who has a different, well-structed socio-political philosophy, this can trigger my intolerance. The problem here is : where do you stand regarding this stimulus ? This new stimulus is a foreign body relative to my socio-political framework which I consider a dogma. From this point of view it disturbes my comfort with my dogma and therefore, I become intolerant towards the other. So, ambiguity here seems to be a common denominator behind all sorts of stimuli invading my ease and comfort with my dogma. That's the way I see it now, at least. I might change my opinion later on.

To Verbeke : The ready answer I can give you now is based on empirical literature: it is, to a great extent, generalized. This answer is

based on research utilizing different measurements using different stimuli, and then trying to establish correlations between these different stimuli, then positively significant correlations were established. Yet, in the statistical jargon these correlations are not sufficient, quantitatively speaking, to account for all the situations with all their constituents.

Seventh paper : Saad-Eddin (Egypt) Representative of Third World Forum.

Abousenna : I would like to question the idea of adoption of models. This idea implies that there is one model imposed from a certain economic system on another one. I will limit myself to the Third World regarding world economic systems, especially the capitalist versus the socialist economic system in relation to Third World whose economic systems are largely neither capitalist nor socialist. I doubt that there is any good intention at all on the side of the capitalist system to transplant the modern capitalism into the Third World. The reason for that is, in my opinion, that the capitalist system with its hegemonistic foreign policy would never allow a developed capitalist system to grow and become sufficiently independent that would in the long run, through dialectical processes, lead to a socialist revolution. Therefore, what the capitalist system exports to Third World countries is not the fundamental roots of a capitalist system; they rather divorce the system as a whole from its intellectual and philosophical roots. We know that the present capitalist system is the heritage of the bourgeois culture in the wide sense that paved the way for revolution of the new bourgeois class and the material consequences were modernization and industrialization. On the other hand, the cultural heritage of Third World countries is, by its nature, would be resistant to that cultural heritage. For intance, the rejection of the critical method of thinking as introduced by European philosophy. Consequently, it would appear absurd to talk about a socialist system because it is a more advanced system than the capitalist one which has assimilated the bourgeois philosophical heritage on its way to revolution. However, I don't mean that Third World countries

have to undergo the capitalist phase in order to pass on to socialism, which you also criticize, you might be thinking of a third model or a third way. Anyhow; I think that the two stages which represent the only well-known stages of the development of human civilization, could be creatively assimilated by Third World countries for the sake of solving their economic problems.

Saad-Eddin : What I meant to present was theories and explanations of development and backwardness, and suggestions of policies in order to be able to solve the problems that we face in the Third World. A large number of economists, in their analysis of the problem of backwardness and development, start from the premise that development is equal to economic growth, and that economic growth took place in the Western countries of the world because of the existence and prevalence of a number of necessary conditions: the existence of a social class of enterpreneurs, the development of science and technology, the ability to invest and to take risks, the ability to introduce more productive abilities and retraining of the working class, the availability of markets, etc... All these conditions were considered by these economists as necessary conditions for development. Hence, when they speak about the development of the Third World they adhere to the same ideas. Second, if there is no available capital, the way out in this situation is to accept to be open for foreign capital in order to enable them to develop. They will have large markets, and in this case this means that they will have more exports, and in order to export they have to compete the advanced capitalist market, and in this situation they may be obliged to accept the multi-national companies.

Third, these economists do not take into consideration at all international relations between developed and underdeveloped countries as one of the factors that may have made for underdevelopment. Concerning the socialist model, for me, the Soviet model is not the only socialist model. A number of Soviet economists or economists in the countries of Eastern Europe, or even in some of the countries in the Third World,

consider the Soviet model as the model for change into socialism simply because the Soviet model achieved a very fast development. If we take the experience of Eastern Europe, you have the case, for example, of Hungary, Czekoslovakia, and Poland. They represent the Soviet model as it was applied in the Soviet Union and was successful in achieving certain results, but could not succeed in a different situation which is historically different from what happened in the Soviet Union.

All these economists and social scientists failed to differentiate between what is universal in that model and what is particular in this historical situation, and, to some extent, advocated this or that model, as the model that should be followed. This is the position that I'm taking. And I'm not advocating any new system, a third system between capitalism; or socialism. But I'm saying that just choosing, making a political choice, either socialism or capitalism, does not free us from the fact that we have to study the facts in the particular situations and work according to them.

Abousenna : What is your criterion of creativity in development ?

Saad-Eddin : To find an answer for this question we have to take into consideration the facts of the situation without imitating a solution that took place in some other place just because it was successful. Benefiting from it is alright but imitating is another thing.

Abousenna : Does this approach allow for adopting a critical attitude vis-à-vis your own cultural heritage and conditions, or for preserving them on the grounds that they are different and authentic ?

Saad-Eddin : When we speak about development we speak about change, so how come that we want to stay where we are when we speak about change ?

Koszinowski : If I produce an economic model for any country, and

it's up to this country to accept that model or not, I think as long as this takes place I cannot speak about dogmatism unless I impose this model on this country.

Saad-Eddin : I may accept what you say, that's why I didn't start with any definition of dogmatism, but may be when you ask me about dogmatism in this situation, I would say that when there are so many facts that at least make me doubt whether this model is the right one or not, and I'm not even advocating this doubt, then here we are speaking about some kind of dogmatism.

Soueif : There are two key concepts in this presentation : utilization of the models and generalization. I got the impression that you are against the use of models as such. Regarding generalization, again I got the impression that what you are blaming is the process of generalization. I'm not economist, and I would like to understand, if economics is claimed as a science, then by definition, you have to use models and generalizations. On the other hand, if economics is not a science, then the situation would be different.

Saad-Eddin : I start with the generalization problem. I agree that in every science we have to generalize, but I really try to criticize in my paper the inability to differentiate between what is general and what is particular in a certain situation, and considering that what happened in a certain situation can take place again without differentiating between these two facts, this is what I am condemning. I'm not condemning generalization in general. About the use of models, I'm not saying that models should not be used, but I'm saying that the model that some people advocated for a long time failed to achieve the results that they thought that could be achieved.

Abousenna : What you have dealt with mainly are practical issues of development, such as the adoption of heavy industry with purpose of adapting to the present situation, but what we should be mainly concer-

ned about is to adopt industrialization as a principle with the purpose of changing the present and to push it towards the future within the spirit of the 20th century, that is, scientific, technological and social revolutions. Otherwise the dangerous result of your argument is the absolute rejection of a basic aspect of 20th century civilization by rejecting industry on the grounds that it is not suitable for us and let's keep to agriculture because it is the most appropriate for our situation, and that is exactly what happened in Egypt in the past decade and which realized a great deal of backwardness even in Egypt's agricultural economy.

Saad-Eddin: Even to adopt industrialization as a principle and need for development, without taking into consideration the situation of the country may not be fruitful. If you take Qattar and Kuwait, you can not start with industrialization, but in the case of Egypt I can argue that we need to start by industrialization, but I don't want to say that because I'm saying that about Egypt then this should be the case in Zambia.

Nineth paper: Matar (Egypt).

Pax: My question is: while I can see that this reliance of Socrates, and of Plato too, upon the notion of Form does serve as an anti-dote against a dogmatic arbitrariness of a subjective authority, the problem which concerns me is that the same reliance on the general and the formal keeps us away from the individual agent, or better to say, it defines the individual only as an instance of a class and in that sense denies the individual as a moral and responsible agent. In this sense it seems to me there is a point of danger where dogmatism can arise.

Matar: I think that Socrates' dealing with particular instances was his first step towards the science of morality. He always begins by picking up particular instances, but he always relates these instances to presuppositions which explain them. He tries to deduce these presuppositions from the individual instances.

Verbeke : I'm quite in agreement with the general line of your contribution Indeed, the Socratic method is an anti-dote to dogmatism. But still, I have some difficulty with repect to the first issue of your paper, namely, virtue is knowledge, and that is certainly Socratic. In my opinion, it's rather difficult to understand exactly what it means. It has been translated into French by Victor Hugo : "Ouvrir une école, c'est fermer une prison," in English : "to open a school, is to close a prison". That was the French translation in a very optimistic way and I don't believe that it corresponds exactly to the opinion of Socrates. According to Socrates, each individual has to discover within himself, through a process of reminiscence, what the truly good means. It's not by a contemplation of something outside himself, but through a kind of recollection or reminiscence that each individual discovers the truly good within himself. But this opinion of Socrates has been criticized by Aristotle. When you compare the two, I tend to agree with Aristotle than with Socrates in this respect. According to Aristotle only truth, because a moral man has the experience of moral behaviour, and his whole life is moral, and that means that he is not influenced by his emotion. Therefore, in any difficult moral situation (and Aristotle mentions a lot of difficult situations) where a person asks himself what he has to do in that particular case; according to Aristotle, of course, his knowledge will, in a sense, determine his behaviour, but his knowledge, that is, his judgement, will be determined by his moral behaviour. And I don't think that Socrates emphasized this last aspect. Would you agree on that ?

Matar : I quite agree.

Tenth paper : Atreya (India)

Daher : I have two brief remarks; the first remark is about your statement : "we shall take shelter in religion when science and philosophy are not able to console us ... "That sounds like an imperative, namely that we ought to take solace in religion when science and philosophy

fail us. But someone might say: why should I take solace in religion. why can't I take solace in a secular movement of some kind? Second remark: you say towards the end of your paper all religions are partial embodiments of the truth. I'd like to know how do we determine that? What is the criterion?

Abousenna: A question of clarification: you state that Hinduism is a very tolerant religion, and then you say that religion is dogmatic, and you call for unity of religions, and you mention Ghandi's call for respect for all religions. My question is: do you consider Hinduism a religion, or not? And on what grounds do you exclude it from dogmatism? Concerning Ghandi, it is well known that, throughout his life-long political activism, he advocated peaceful resistance for long years, and then he entered into a long phase of civil disobedience, and was also successful in his struggle and was supported by the Indian people. But when he turned to preaching tolerance, and especially religious tolerance, he was immediately assassinated by a Hindu. How do you explain that?

Wahba: A point of clarification: you have mentioned two contradictory meanings of the concept "religion". Concerning Hinduism, it is a non-dogmatic religion, Christianity and Islam, they are dogmatic religions. This dichotomy, within one concept, is referred to having no god in Hinduism and having a God in Christianity and Islam. To what extent the concept of God plays a role in breeding dogmatism?

Orani: Your paper puts me in a certain perplexity. I can express this perplexity in the following way: are we with or against religion? Are you putting philosophy above or in the service of religion? In fact, I got both impressions.

Atreya: To Daher, concerning finding solace in religion; in our present age we face a number of difficulties, and one of the major difficulties is the fact that science and philosophy can no longer help us, then we shift to religion which gives use solace. Regarding partial

fulfilment, like anything else, only parial fulfilment can be found in religion.

To Abousenna, yes Ghandi was tolerant and he taught non-violence. He was killed by one man in the country, and it is not necessary that all men in the country should listen to him.

To Wahba, I think that all religions have the same trend in their thinking, including Hinduism, and the followers of every religion become either dogmatic or non-dogmatic, but I don't think that a particular religion is either dogmatic or non-dogmatic.

To Orani, I believe in a synthesis of all religions and I think this should be followed. I personally have learned a lot from Islam and Christianity and Judaism because I think that all religions are partial instances of the full truth

Eleventh paper: Weischer (West Germany)

Koszinowski: What is the aim of the Islamo-Christian dialogue ?

Abousenna: The striking thing about the theme of the last dialogue, namely the one of human rights, is that it is derived from a basically secular concept, particularly as you mention, from the 18th century which was the most secular phase of the history of human civilization. I should also like to recall the famous Christian-Marxist dialogue that was famous in the 1960s which also was organized round secular topics, such as alienation. I think that the immediate function of this dialogue is to unite religious dogmas, Christianity and Islam, for the sake of facing a common enemy which is communism. The dialogue tries to reduce a primary contradiction between the two dogmas into a secondary contradiction. However, this cannot last long, and when this primary contradiction reemerges in the future, what will happen ? Can a dialogue still solve this contradiction ?

Mercier : I have three short questions : first, two weeks ago the President of Pakistan declared that even there is a declaration of human rights, the Quran stands above, for instance in the case of the stoning of a man who has raped a girl. What have you to say to that ? Second, are you aware of the dialogue between Christian theologians and the representatives of Marxism as organized especially by Catholic priests in America ? Third, you said that perhaps the best form of dialogue would be the one taking place between mystics of each religion. But, the language of mystics is silence. How can dialogue take place ?

Weischer : To Koszinowski about the aim of the dialogue, I think that what Abousenna said has some evidence, that finally even Muslims saw that there is a great danger coming from an absolute atheistic movement and this needs some defence against it. This might be possible. But I personally think that through the conditions of modern life one is much more connected than before, through travelling and mass media. There is a completely new situation, so that there is a real need to discuss together one's own position, not always in order to be confirmed from the other side, but to see what one has in common with the others. This is a normal principle of the dialogue. One could say that such dialogue should only take place with scientists rather than with religious people.

This interest in dialogue came from the Christian side, but that is because the Muslim countries were absolutely neglected until fairly recently. Up till the emergence of the oil OPEC embargo and the economic crisis in Western economy, and the outbreak of the first Islamic revolution in Iran, the Occident became suddenly interested in the cultural background of the other cultures. This was one of the factors which instigated this dialogue.

To Mercier. Concerning Marxist-Christian dialogue, since Vatican II we have been hearing a lot about it and will be hearing a lot about it in the near future. Since that time, we observe from the official side of the church this kind of encounter for clarification of positions. About

the mystics, I think that the real mystic is never dogmatic, even though he is brought up in a certain religion. You see that in many cases in the history of Christianity mystics transcended absolutely the prescriptions of the church. The same thing with other theologians in Islam, especially the figure of Al-Halag who still poses a critical question to Islamic officials until today. He is still referred to by modern thinkers, for instance the poet Salah Abdel-Sabbour, as an authentic Muslim reformer. Yes, of course, silence is the language of mystics, but mystics themselves have a special language by which they can communicate in symbols. So, I meant to say that if there is a real Islamo-Christian dialogue, then mystics are much more able to assimilate forms of modern life and remain, at the same time, within the cultural background of their culture.

Twelfth paper : Berting. (Holland)

Nauta : I would like to ask two questions : first, you have described a process way of growing opportunity for all. Now, my first question is : how was this growing opportunity for all in Western Europe related to the external relations of Western Europe, for instance, colonialism ? Colonialism cannot be meaningfully described as the system which creates equal opportunities for all. So, I would like to know something about this relation, not only in an economic way, but also ideologically, because you stressed very much the importance and relevance of symbolic systems. My second question is : you say that this ideology of equal opportunity for all is a kind of market-model because the market is open for everyone to use the opportunity he can get. My question is : was the market ever open ? or was there an ideology of the market being open ?

Berting : About your first question, how was the relationship between the internal opportunities and the external relations of Western capitalism, connected with the symbolic universe, I think that there is a very important function. The symbolic universe could not be reconciled with the domination of a large part of the world. With the expansion of Western colonialism we see the rise of the cleavage in thinking between

one system of universalistic values of the Western countries and ideolo-ists' symbolic universe explained to those who are not in it. Concerning your second question about the market model, I would say that there was never an open market, and that it was indeed an ideology and is still used now as an ideology, and the forces that contributed to the development of a free market did not really lead in the direction of a free market in a very good way.

Nauta : If, indeed, the market never really was open, and if, indeed, the concept of the open market was also a matter of ideology, then, do you agree that we have to say that the idea of an open market was a leading principle of social consciousness, and at the same time, there were very real contradictions, contradicting the ideology ? If this is true, what then is the difference, because this is a very central point in your paper, fisrt, there was a kind of convergence ending in the welfare state and then contradictions came up. No, if the idea of the open market was not a reality, where then is the difference between the period leading to the welfare state on a basis of a convergence theory, on the one hand, and today where we are faced, as you have explained, with a lot of new contradictions ?

Perting : I must say that we should avoid thinking in terms of total oppositions. At the beginning of this century in the West in the period after the second World War from the 1950s to the 1970s, society has been characterized by expanding opportunities. There has been a lift of many people, and a growth of middle classes. But the same forces who contributed to the betterment of their life, contributed in the long run to the restrictions of the opportunities, especially for the new generations.

Wahba : I would like to relate your fascinating paper to the theme of the conference, beginning from enlightenment towards the welfare state and ending with contradictions. Is this kind of exposé a prelude to a counter cultural revolution against enlightenment, against reason, and paving the way to the fundamentalists ? This idea came to my mind,

especially when I read recently Daniel Bell's book "The winding Passage' He is of the same family as you, but he frankly, in this book, backs Christian fundamentalists, backs the return to the sacred. I hope I'm wrong in getting this idea.

Abousenna : While I was listening to your presentation, especially to the first part which is a historical exposé of the evolution of concepts of justic, rationality, modernity, industrialization, and finally technology, what struck me in your presentation is your statement that these developments could not be considered as the result of any universal law, So, from the start you put aside the possibility of subjecting these movements to universal, scientific laws. This coming from a social scientist is strange to me. Then, I thought may be this is due to the fact that you might be afraid of being accused of Euro-centrism, imperialism, racism, scientism, or dogmatism. If you would have claimed that there were scientific laws that control and govern social change, it means that these laws are universal and could be applied all over the globe, and that the evolution of Western civilization could be, in different ways, assimilated on condition that you believe in the unity and variety of human civilization. But you reject this idea, and adopt instead a dichotomist approach to civilization. Towards the end of your paper, light dawned on me and I understood the reason why you adopt this approach. You have come to the conclusion that the present identity crisis of the West is due to the fact that the concepts and principles of enlightenment have proved to be a failure, and a myth, and that the present economic crisis in Western Europe, the failure of the welfare state are all the result of the enlightenment and the evolution of the concepts that emerged at that time. Consequently, you deduce that as long as there is nothing you can do about it, because you eliminate scientific laws and are against social revolution you assume that social change is impossible as long as the key to it is unknown, and you raise the possibility to providence, luck. You then assume further, that since social change is not possible, all that could be done is to relie upon technology, and engineer social change according to technological rationality. Instead of social revolu-

tion, you advocate technological, de-ideologized, revolution. The result would be international relations on the basis of the transfer of technology. To what extent is this conclusion related to the trend of de-ideologization, or neutralization of ideology, pioneered by the Vienna Centre to which you are affiliated and to the rest of activities towards bringing about a cultural detente between the ideologies of the two superpowers, and how is this related to the Third World ? My other question is : if you are calling for an international, comparative research, what are the grounds if you eliminate scientific laws ?

Berting : Wahba tried to link my paper to the conference theme, and mentioned Daniel Bell as a member of my family. There is some lines to be drawn between what I said and Bell. In the first place, we could say that the development of rationalism pushed forward the ideas of technocracies. On the other hand, people confronted with the effect of rationalization of reorganization of models in which the autonomy of the individual is the more undermined in all fields of life, not just in the working life, may lead to a strong rejection of social life altogether. I think, that, as I mentioned in my paper the quest for community in Western democracies is the breeding ground for several types of religious movements similar to the fundamentalists, especially among people from the lower middle classes who find themselves in difficult position vis-à-vis rationalization of the West. I don't think they can bring solutions to the problems Western societies are faced with. But there is the possibility of their development into types of fascist states. Looking at what is hapenning in several Western democracies, we can say that the failure of the welfare state is used by conservatives to go back to the state of the nineteenth century. That means that when you select one type of social justice and try to institutionalize that and leave out other parts of social justice that would be a regression. On the other hand, to organize the society according to a second type of social justice as in the communist countries, leaving out the first type of social justice is also not a solution. In a country like Netherlands you see a situation, like in England, Denmark, in which there is not just the end of the welfare

state, but looking for a new model to organize society. So, as Saad-Eddin said yesterday, we know that the old model does not work and we can make new ones, and we need new criteria to organize society. Most politicians at this moment, are thinking that they can give solutions within the existing models, although we know, that these models will fail. And if they continue to fail, then possibilities arise for new types of fundamentalism and aggressiveness.

And it seems to me, in this way, Western society is at the crossroads. And so is communism. Schaff's latest book tackles this problem (Marxism at the crossroads).

To Abousenna, about my rejection of universal laws, it was not my intention to dismiss universal laws. Perhaps I overemphasized my need to elaborate all the classification processes and, of course, you could say that understanding classification could lead to a general theory. I reject the idea that it is indeed possible to find universal laws that could explain the specific situation that we experience in specific moments, because all the universal theories that we have lead to, you could say, to some kind of vulgar strategies and policies, like technological or economic determinism. My point is that philosophy, and to some extent sociology, can contribute to show we can find areas of new choices. And that is connected with international comparative research, because in my opinion, the comparison of different situations shows how many possibilities there are for human freedom to intervene and make choices. Many political elites are seeking these choices. You related one of your remarks to my position in the Vienna Centre, of course, it is true that Vienna Centre emphasizes collaboration between socialist and non-socialist countries within the field of scientific research, but this does not mean that I would like to contribute to the end of ideology, and I don't think that there is an end of ideology. The trend of end of ideology was itself an ideology as advocated by several political leaders in the West, and it proved not to be good.

Thirteenth paper : Abousenna.

Daher : I would like to ask for a clarification concerning Eliot's central point. It seems so far that Eliot's reductionism, so far as it applies to his attempt at reducing morality to theology, is central to his anti-secularism. In fact, this is usually central to any anti-secular attitude. But I would like to know if Eliot's attempt has any logical meaning. Let me explain what I mean : did Eliot believe that morality is logically deducible from theology ? In other words, was he trying to say : we cannot know what is right or wrong, in the moral sense of these terms, unless we know what God commands. If so, then, did Eliot ever confront the question, which was answered by Plato a long time ago, namely, if God commands something, does His command make it good, or does He command it because it is good ? Now, obviously, if you say : the mere fact that God commands it makes it good, then the concept of good becomes arbitrary. And if you say God commands because it is good, then we must already have prior moral knowledge before we can know that this is commanded by God. And this involves circularity. In other words, the argument here becomes question begging. Did Eliot ever confront these questions ?

Abousenna : I will reply very briefly because this question can raise a long controversial debate for which this is not the time. As I make clear at the beginning of my paper, Eliot's reductionism is based on reducing morality to theology in the sense of adopting the commandments of God as they appear in the Gospel as the logical justification of that reductionism. Hence, his call for the incarnation of the absolute, by applying God's laws, or God's will, in the social sphere, or the establishment of the Unified Church that would undertake the task of creating the unitary community by Christianizing the whole society, the secular aspects of society : education, legislations, art and literature, etc... So, he relies, in his reductionism, on an arbitrary concept of good that derives from his belief in the supernatural power of God as dominating the universe, and as the remedy to decadence. He believes that decadence is the result of

being aloof from God's commandments, hence, evil arises. In other words, he opposes man-made society and the evils attached to it, to God-made society which is by definition the only good society. This philosophical question was dealt with at length in his book "Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley", where the pivotal concept is the "Absolute" which he elaborates by discussing Bradley's theory of 'appearance' and 'reality' or the 'real' and the 'ideal'.

Anawati : A point of clarification : the ideas mentioned in your paper are only Eliot's, or have you added your own interpretation ? Is it absolutely objective ?

Abousenna : My interpretation is first expressed in the title of the paper, and in relating Eliot's ideas on culture and literary criticism to his **Weltanschauung** based on the method of relating interdisciplinary method that aims at establishing an organic unity between philosophy and literature. The philosophical concept, which Eliot manipulated by reducing it to theology, is the pivotal concept in his **Weltanschauung** around which his dramatic and poetic themes revolve, and which are the practical applications of his own critical theories about the function and nature of poetry.

Berting : At the end of the paper there are some sentences which I don't know if they are your own conclusions or those of Eliot. The relation between the church and modern capitalism, when you say : "the paradox of modern capitalism now is that, at its apex, it has to resurrect the church, the very force on whose ruins capitalism rose."

Abousenna : These are my own words.

Berting : Then my question is : it it true that capitalism rose on the fetters of religion ? As I look back at the interpretation of Max Weber, I see that the rise of Protestantism was one of the conditions for the rise of capitalism, at least it reinforced its development. The second point

is : concerning the same statement : how can capitalism be seen as saved by religion ? I don't see the connection between capitalism and the link with religion. The third point is : when I look at the development of the church within modern capitalist societies, I see no trend towards fundamentalism. Capitalism can do without religion because now the rationalization of the system is so strongly ingrained in a whole organization of production that I would say religion, for the continuation of capitalism, is not that much necessary any more.

Abousenna : Historically, the movement of religious reformation led by Luther and resulted in Protestantism, achieved a radical transformation within the field of religious belief. This was done through theological hermeneutics or the free and critical examination of the holy scripture, which in fact meant reducing the sacred text to its secular i.e. cultural origin, and this was exemplified by Luther's translation of the bible from Latin into German. The political and economic results were the weakening of the authority of the church by separating it from the state, or the political life, and the rise of the new mercantile, bourgeoisie to political power. So, Protestantism was a break away from traditional Christianity both in faith and social domains, and capitalism could not rise to power without the weakening of the role of the church in these domains. Now, at the end of the twentieth century where modern capitalism has reached an advanced stage in which it is faced with all sorts of crises, economic, political and social, it has to seek the help of religion in its two forms the institutionalized form in the church as a religious organization, and in the form of belief system. The strict alliance between the political power and the religious power is seen in the heart of modern capitalism : the United States of America. The revivalist or fundamentalist trend, headed by Reagan, which aims at de-secularization of society, directly employs religious institutions. This was done in the campaign for presidential elections in 1980, and is still carried out, for instance Reagan's plan to reintroduce religion in schools as an obligatory subject is an instance of de-secularizing society. In the field of foreign policy, the Unied States employs religion to reinforce its domination, e.g.

Reagan's relationship with Sadat on grounds of religious faith, America's involvement in Pakistan and Afghanistan. So, it is quite evident now that the present ruling power can only survive, nationally and internationally, through a strict alliance with the religious forces.

Nauta : How do you explain the discrepancy between the poetry of a genius and the ideological nonsense Eliot wrote as an essayist ?

Abousenna : I think we have first to clarify the meaning of genius in order to explain the relation between Eliot's poetry and the rest of his intellectual output. The traditional definition of genius is some-one of unusual mental abilities who uses his intellectual potentials to create something new that brings about some change in the existing reality. So, essential meaning of genius here is creativity in the sense of changing reality. This cannot only take place within the field of literary or artistic creativity only, but has to encompass all spheres of the genius's life. The act of creativity in this case is governed by a Weltanschauung, or a cosmic outlook, which derives from a certain philosophical concept whereby he attempts to unify his fragmentary knowledge into a system, which also represents man's inherent tendency in the human mind toward wholeness. In Eliot's case, his search for this wholeness concentrated in the concept of the absolute which he formulated first philosophically, and then widened it to include theology which then became the guiding principle of his thought and action, with the purpose of changing reality. In this way, it is impossible to separate Eliot's poetry from his prose writings. Taking this into consideration, there will be no discrepancy. Discrepancy appears when you make an arbitrary seperation within the author's world view or system of thought which is expressed in two different forms : poetry and prose. When you fragment the whole Eliot, the discrepancy, which is just an optical illusion, arises, and this is what literary critics did, whether deliberately or not, with Eliot's literature. Eliot's active involvement in the missionary movement led by the Anglican church in India, Britain's main colony then, his abundant religious writings which include church sermons verify Eliot's own proposition

that literary criticism should be completed by criticism from a definite ethical and theological standpoint, because those who enjoy literature solely because of their literary merit are essentially parasites Eliot was attacking his own critics when he accused them of being parasites. And Eliot was definitely not a parasite but a great genius as you say. So, according to Eliot himself, separating his poetry from his essays, would be to reduce his art to a parasitic art and Eliot to a parasite. His poetry and his dramas are literary formulations of his world view, which consists in the Christianization of the world through the establishment of the Unified church in order to save the world from decadence which lies in secularization. Thus, Eliot's output, prose and poetry, is dogmatic and fundamentalist in the strict sense of de-secularizing the European society as an essential step towards unifying the world into one world Christian society. So, my paper attempts to unmask the hidden part of Eliot's thought in order to give him his right due as a great, fundamentalist, dogmatic thinker-poet.

Fourteenth paper : Orani (Egypt)

Pax : I agree that we need a profound kind of social anthropology which will enable us to question some ways of thinking which are unclear and undogmatic, and which could enable us to think about the liberation of women and men away from the notion of sameness. I don't use the word equality because it is obscure. We have to think of community in terms of differences, in the differentiation of the sexes and not in their sameness.

Abousenna : In your oral presentation of your paper you have adopted a critical attitude toward Qasim Amin, whereas this attitude is not very clear in the written text of your paper. Could you explain Amin's schizophrenic attitude toward the issue of women's liberation ? Why did he change in radical way his ideas in his first book "Les Egyptiens" and later writings in the "New Woman and The Liberation of Women" ?

Wahba: A point of clarification: a book was recently published and entitled **God Beyond Sex** says that at the beginning God was a female, a Goddess related to fertility in the agricultural civilization, then was turned into a male God, and now he is trying to go beyond sex. Shifting to Qasim Amin, you tell us that the problem of women is not central to his thought and that the main issue for him is the liberation of the nation which includes the liberation of women. Could we say, in analogy with God beyond sex, that Amin could have written a book by the title "Society beyond Sex", and in this way we could go out of this dogma concerning feminism, or as you have said that feminism as a dogma is that we treat woman as a sui generis, as an entity within itself and we try to liberate her. Now, you are trying to go beyond this. To what extent could we be non-dogmatic with Kassem if we could reach a society that goes beyond sex ?

Verbeke: I would like to ask: in society, people have been talking for thirty two centuries about the liberation of women. I must note that after all this, liberation has not been really performed or implemented. And therefore, in this context, talking about the roots of dogmatism I should like to know something about the root of that inferiority situation of women in many socieies.

Orani: In fact, I'm presenting my own opinion, but my presentation is rather a reinterpretation of Qasim Amin's position. The problem of women for Amin is a national, and more specifically, a political problem. Yet, he is not very clear about this issue: Is it the reformation of society that could be a reformation to the status of women, or is it the status of women that could be used as a means for the reformation of society? He exposes the two positions, but his thesis is that; if we have to change society, we have to change the status of women. So, women status is, at the same time, a symptom and origin of the illness of society.

Concerning Pax's remark about samenes, equality, difference, and whether we could go beyond such notions: of course, there will always be a difference, but is such difference a path for any sort of privilege ?

This is the point. Thus, I refuse the term "schizophrenia", and refuse at the same time, the term "double personality", for Amin could not be accused of double personality. What we have in his case two stages of his thinking. For, he says, at the opening of his book "Liberation of Women" that he continued to reflect and contemplate about the problem.

To Wahba concerning the possibility of having a society beyond sex, this is impossible. The sexual differentiation is a matter of fact.

Wahba: What I meant was that society could neither be ruled by male nor by female, and that you are not in need of saying that such is a male-dominated society or female-dominated. Is this possible according to Kassem Amin ?

Orani: Yes, sure, this is possible. I have to mention here that Amin did not advocate a complete removal of the veil; he asked just for the legal, Islamic veil, and he did not advocate that women should take any sort of jobs in society.

Orani: To Verbeke, I don't think that the movement of the liberation of women began thirty two centuries ago. We have to distinguish between two things: an idea, and a social movement. Ideas are as old as mankind, but social movements are not. In fact, the big liberator of women is reality, in the sense of the changing economic conditions.

Fifteenth paper: Anawati. (Egypt)

Hjarpe: I would like to raise three points: the first is the fact that the declaration of religious freedom does not affirm that a man has the right to believe what is false or to do what is wrong. But, I can't see that this right leads to intolerance. The principle of tolerance implicates that man has the human right to be wrong.

Anawati: You have the possibility to do what is wrong but you have not the right, I have not the right to kill my neighbour, for instance. Rights go only for good things.

Hjarpe: The second point is: the tension between the concept of individual freedom and the freedom of groups. I think it is impossible to argue simultaneously for the rights of groups and those of the individual. For instance, the right of the children to choose for themselves in full freedom, and the right of the group to choose for their children means coersion for the individual and not a free choice. In sweden, there has been a great debate about this, because the school system is unified and, therefore, there is no religious (confessional) education but only education on religion. And this is regarded as a duty of the government to give via the schools orientation about all religions.

Anawati: This is your opinion, but the Catholic church's opinion is that it is up to the parents to choose for their children what they think is the best for them. It is not reasonable to deprive the child from what is, in the opinion of the parents, the most precious thing, to have faith and moral values and to practice them, but without coersion.

Hjarpe: What I'm pointing at is that here is a tension between the freedom of the individual and the freedom of the group.

Anawati: Then you have to coordinate them.

Hjarpe: My third point is: as for freedom of religious matters, it is rather difficult to make a definition of what is a religious matter and what is not. The totalitarian concept of religion is denied in many parts of the world.

Anawati: Religion is totalitarian in a way that it is inspiring to the individual, and not to imposing one's belief on others.

Hjarpe: In this way, we can say that religion can be a political factor as an inspiration for the individual. But in order to consider religion as a political order, we must have the possibility to define what is religious and what is not.

Anawati : I am Aristotelian, and I know what is the object of politics : it is the command of justice in society according to natural law that can be accepted by all people in society whatever their religion is. And then, within this domain, what is to be affirmed and practised is decided according to reason. I think we have to distinguish between the natural domain and the religious domain, but they are not separate because the natural domain has not to be against the spiritual domain. This is why the church, from time to time, has to say it is my obligation to say that this law is against human right.

Nauta : The first point tackled by Hjarpe, in my opinion, was not sufficiently answered by Anawati because I think if we want to be objective we have first to discuss how to determine what is wrong and what is right. If the principles of Vatican II will be implemented in the right way, then the necessary consequence, in my opinion, is that Vatican II should say that what is wrong and what is false depends on the frame of reference which one adopts. And this can be said without renouncing one's own religious principles, because this is valid at a socio-political level. At a socio-political level, it has to be stated that there is nobody who has the right to say what is right and what is wrong. My second point is that I will criticize your answer to Hjarpe's question about the right of children to choose for themselves and I would like to hear your response. What does Vatican II want the parents to do ? Are the parents supposed to implement certain religious principles, or are they supposed to educate their children in such a way that they can later on choose for themselves ? If it is the latter, then I agree. But, if Vatican II only talks about parent's right to educate children in their own religion, then my thesis is that the very basis for the application of Vatican II is detroyed, because it is the family that reproduces coersion and repression in society. If we want to have real tolerance, according to Vatican II, then we have to organize family life in quite a different way. What does Vatican II say about that ?

Anawati : Concerning your first remark about the rights Vatican II

says that it believes in objective truth, which is the commandment of God. I am free to think about killing you but I have not the right. Objectively, it is not Voltaire's famous saying about tolerance : I may not partake in your conviction, but I am ready to defend your right to say it. About your second remark : you have to understand that there is an objective good, and an objective truth in which the Catholic church believes, and that is that parents should not feed children with coersive ideas. They have to make them accept religion with liberty.

Sixteenth paper : Wahba.

Weischer : Would you agree that your new universalistic philosophy has several components : a voluntaristic one, a cosmological one (not in the old sense), and a mystical one, being united with the cosmos.

Wahba : But my only objection to mysticism is that mystical experience is a purely subjective and mythical one, and not scientific. The mystic experience belongs wholly to the mystic and not to humanity.

Weischer : But the feeling of being united with the cosmos is also subjective to some extent.

Wahba : But I'm predicting that this cosmic consciousness will not emerge on mythical thinking, but on scientific basis, and I'm using the scientific and technological revolution as a means to realize that end, to help man create a new species, which could be called "space man" or "cosmic man", and it could be created within millions of years, after which man could leave the whole earth and float around in space. There are now signs pointing to this future, beginning with landing on the moon and the building of the first space station.

Abousenna : A point of clarification : will man's relation to nature, in the cosmic era, be a relation of conflict or one of unity ?

Wahba : I think that from the beginning of civilization, there was an organic unity between man and nature. And then through the creation of civilization, especially through the agricultural civilization, and through the creation of taboos, particularly incest taboos, man became separated from nature, and nature appeared to be his enemy. What I'm trying to predict, is that in the future, we are going back to this organic unity between man and nature, that means a kind of friendship without enmity, but this will occur on scientific and technological basis. This means I'm a **fundamentalist** of a new type.

Nauta : We are finite beings, and the means of life which are provided to us by nature are also finite. There are certain limits and restrictions imposed on the way nature is used by our technological means. Now, I would say before becoming spacemen it may be better to inquire into these constraints in order to be able to have a good relation to nature because our relation to nature is disturbed.

Wahba : I think your argument is based on the dichotomy principle, that is, the differentiation between finite and infinite. But, if you discard this dichotomy principle, through the concept of cosmic consciousness man could be infinite. Take, for example, the problem of life and death. Man, through his development, tries ta make life overcome death. If his attempts continue man might grasp infinity. The second point; cosmic consciousness is a postulate, and through this postulate I am analysing the problem of the relation of man to nature.